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Foreword
This book presents a selection of peer-reviewed papers which were presented
on a conference organized in Ghent, Belgium, from 27 till 29 August, 2009. The
conference was given the title Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in
Early modern Science and Mathematics (PASR). For this book we selected
papers which deal with the consequences for mathematics in particular, hence
the omission of ‘science’ in the title of this book. Another selection, dealing
with the understanding of nature and a broader range of topics, will appear
in the journal Foundations of Science.
The conference was sponsored by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO)
and Ghent University, which indirectly made this book possible. We also
have to thank the other members of the programme committee Marco Panza,
Chikara Sasaki, and Erik Weber and our keynote speakers Jens Høyrup, Doug
Jesseph, Eberhard Knobloch, Marco Panza, Mathias Schemmel and Michel
Serfati. Five of their papers are included in this volume. Most of the papers
beneﬁted from valuable and sometimes substantive comments by our refer-
ees which must remain anonymous. Special thanks to Michael Barany who
assisted in the editorial process.
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Preface
The novel use of symbolism in early modern science and mathematics poses
both philosophical and historical questions. The historical questions evi-
dently are when and how symbolism was introduced into mathematics. Often
Franc¸ois Vie`te is considered to be the father of symbolic algebra. But how
we should then understand the centuries of algebraic practice before Vie`te?
The abbaco tradition applied algebra to the solution of merchant problems on
exchange, bartering, partnership, allegation of metals, etc., since the begin-
ning of the fourteenth century. Some sort of symbolism was emerged within
that tradition and was fully in place during the sixteenth century. Is there a
fundamental diﬀerence in mathematical practice before and after Vie`te?
The philosophical questions relate to the nature of such symbolism and
its impact on mathematical reasoning and early-modern understanding of
knowledge. Is the use of short-hand notations and abbreviations the same as
symbolism? Or we should understand symbolism as involving a more intri-
cate model of reasoning, diﬀerent from geometrical or arithmetical reasoning?
So, what precisely do symbolic representations contribute to mathematical
reasoning?
Against this background, it is striking that at the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, the idea took ground that there might be a universal symbolic
language which facilitates the representation of all reasoning in a clear and
distinct way. In what way does the idea of a mathesis universalis or a char-
acteristica universalis depend on the symbolization of mathematics? To what
extent was the project of devising such new language ever achieved?
Of course, not all our questions could be answered over the course of a
three days conference, let alone on the limited number of pages of the current
volume. However, a representative state of the art is here provided on three
main themes:
• The development of algebraic symbolism. Our ﬁrst three contribu-
tions cover a consecutive period of historical events from the beginning
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of the introduction of Arabic algebra into Europe (thirteenth century),
through the abbaco period (1300-1500), the sixteenth century, all the way
up to Leibniz. Taking up a diplomatic stance towards the precise meaning
of “symbolism”, Jens Høyrup meticulously traces the development of no-
tations for diﬀerent mathematical objects, from formal fractions over the
powers of the unknown to the confrontation sign, or what later would be-
come the equation. He attributes a distinctive role to Maghreb practices
on early European notations (e.g. the fraction bar). Despite a continuous
process in abbaco manuscripts towards more intricate symbolism, Høyrup
concludes that this whole development was one which was neither under-
stood, nor intended by the participants in the process.
Albrecht Heeﬀer picks up where Høyrup concluded his analysis – with the
German cossic tradition – and continues with the innovations by Cardano
and the French humanists. He shows how one particular representational
diﬃculty – an unambiguous symbolism for multiple unknowns – shaped
the very concept of an equation. The symbolic representation of condi-
tions involving multiple unknowns facilitated the process of substitution
and operations on equations. According to Heeﬀer, it is precisely because
operations on equations and between equations became possible that the
equation became a mathematical object and hence the corresponding con-
cept developed. Challenging the generally accepted view of Vie`te as the
father of symbolic algebra, he argues that the development of algebraic
symbolism was a gradual process involving many minor achievements by
several actors.
Starting by formulating six functional criteria for symbolic representations,
Michel Serfati discusses the contribution by Vie`te and Descartes against the
background of earlier achievements by Cardano and Stifel. He elaborates on
two of these patterns: the dialectic of indeterminacy and the representation
of compound concepts. The ﬁrst contributed to the concept of an indeter-
minate, the second to one of the most essential operations in symbolic
mathematics: substitution. Where the development of symbolism in the
abbaco period was an unconscious process for the participants according
to Høyrup and in the sixteenth century a technical struggle of representa-
tion for Heeﬀer, for Serfati it became no less than a symbolic revolution
in the seventeenth century: “one of the major components of the scientiﬁc
revolution”.
• The interplay between diagrams and symbolism. Diagrams and early
symbolism both added non-discursive elements to mathematical texts. Both
functioned as additional sources of epistemic justiﬁcation to the argumen-
tative and rhetorical structure of the text. Four contributions deal with
the interactions between these two. Michael Barany’s paper deals with
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English translations of Euclid during the sixteenth century. But ‘translat-
ing’ here has a double meaning. Not only was Euclid made accessible to a
broad public where it previously was ‘locked up in straunge tongues‘”, these
translators also provided a new context which was dramatically diﬀerent
from the original Euclid. Barany focuses on the variety of diagrammatic
approaches by ﬁve authors who published between 1551 and 1571: Robert
Recorde, Henry Billingsley, John Dee and Leonard and Thomas Digges. He
shows how diﬀerent representational strategies and pedagogical views led
to equally diﬀerent notions of what constitutes a diagram. The notion of a
point in a diagram is one such example.
Maria Rosa Massa Esteve takes up the work Cursus mathematicus by the
enigmatic author Pierre He´rigone, demonstrating how Euclid’s Elements
became rendered into a purely symbolic language. He´rigone’s ambitions
clearly show how symbolism had changed mathematics in the seventeenth
century: “I have devised a new method, brief and clear, of making demon-
strations, without the use of any language”. He devised his own set of no-
tations, including a terse format for referring to propositions, lemmas and
corollaries, with the intention of not only representing objects of mathe-
matics but the very process of axiomatic-deductive reasoning. Although
he did not ﬁnd any followers in his idiosyncratic system, his whole enter-
prize is exemplary for the further development of mathematics during the
seventeenth century.
While most contributors to this book take the explicit (Heeﬀer and Serfati)
or less explicit position that the development of symbolism was responsi-
ble for the transformation of mathematics during the seventeenth century,
Marco Panza challenges this view. Starting from a classical construction
problem, proposition VI.30 of the Elements, he argues that a conceptual
transformation occurred, independent from developments in symbolic rep-
resentations. This transformation took place already in the Arabic works
of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ and Tha¯bit ibn Qurra who conceived the same problem
as a conﬁguration of pure quantities. According to Panza it was this shift
in conception that functioned as a necessary condition for the application
of the literal formalism of early modern algebra in a purely syntactic way.
Where Euclid’s solution to the proposition is entirely diagrammatic, lit-
eral formalism exploits the purely quantitative aspect of such construction
problems.
A fourth contribution to the relation of algebra and geometry, or the in-
terplay between diagrams and symbolism, is the discussion of Bombelli’s
algebra linearia by Roy Wagner. Where previous chapters deal mostly
with the symbolic interpretations of geometrical problems, Wagner ana-
lyzes Bombelli’s geometrical representation of algebra, which became a
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crucial issue for the justiﬁcation of algebraic procedures. One central prob-
lem in this practice is homogeneity: to keep the constructed geometrical
objects invariant with respect to the unit of measurement. Wagner shows
how Bombelli’s strategy of regimenting representations enabled him to go
well beyond the limits of Cardano’s approach. Bombelli’s algebra linearia
explored the troublesome relations between algebra and geometry during
the sixteenth century. It was a decisive step towards rigorous practices to
impose well-regimented relations between the two, on which post-Cartesian
analytic geometry would depend.
• Mathesis universalis and charateristica universalis. The ﬁnal part
of the book deals with developments and refections on symbolism in the
later half of the seventeenth century. After the initial achievement of sym-
bolic algebra – for which Descartes’ Geometry stands as a milestone –
methodological discussions arose on the all-encompassing role of a symbolic
language for all ‘scientiﬁc’ reasoning, the notion known as Mathesis uni-
versalis. Doug Jesseph distinguishes two camps, which he calls algebraic
and geometric foundationalists. The ﬁrst group, consisting of Descartes,
Wallis and others, considered algebra as the foundation of all mathemat-
ics. They were met with skepticism by the geometric foundationalists, such
as Hobbes, who scorned them for representing only a “scab of symbols”,
ignoring the real contents of mathematics, such as quantity, measure and
proportion. Such a discussion is now absent in the philosophy of mathe-
matics. For Jesseph this is a nice illustration of how foundational issues
get relocated to other contexts. The opposition was replaced by one on the
diﬀerent views on the new calculus at the end of the seventeenth century.
A charateristica universalis in which all problems are represented in a sym-
bolic language and resolved by calculation, is Leibniz’s version of algebraic
foundationalism. Eberhard Knobloch describes the toolbox that Leibniz
created to fulﬁll that aim: the ars characteristica or the art of invent-
ing suitable characters and signs, the ars combinatoria or the art of com-
bination, and the ars inveniendi for inventing new theorems and meth-
ods. He shows that it is not without reason that Cajori called him “the
master-builder of mathematical notations”. With well chosen examples,
Knobloch demonstrates how Leibniz builds layers of symbolic representa-
tions to tackle advanced problems in diﬀerential equations, power sums and
elimination theory.
Ghent, Belgium Albrecht Heeﬀer
15 September, 2010 Maarten Van Dyck
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Part I
The development of algebraic
symbolism

Chapter 1
Hesitating progress – the slow
development toward algebraic
symbolization in abbacus-and related
manuscripts, c. 1300 to c. 1550
Jens Høyrup
Ian Mueller in memoriam
Abstract From the early fourteenth century onward, some Italian Abbacus
manuscripts begin to use particular abbreviations for algebraic operations
and objects and, to be distinguished from that, examples of symbolic opera-
tion. The algebraic abbreviations and symbolic operations we ﬁnd in German
Rechenmeister writings can further be seen to have antecedents in Italian
manuscripts. This might suggest a continuous trend or perhaps even an in-
herent logic in the process. Without negating the possibility of such a trend
or logic, the paper will show that it becomes invisible in a close-up picture,
and that it was thus not understood – nor intended – by the participants in
the process.
Key words: Abbacus school, Algebra, Symbolism
1.1 Before Italy
Ultimately, Italian abbacus algebra1 descended from Arabic algebra – this is
obvious from its terminology and techniques. I shall return very brieﬂy to
some of the details of this genealogy – not so much in order to tell what
1 The “abbacus school” was a school training merchant youth and a number of other boys,
11-12 years of age, in practical mathematics. It ﬂourished in Italy, between Genoa-Mi-
lan-Venice to the north and Umbria to the south, from c. 1260 to c. 1550. It taught cal-
culation with Hindu numerals, the rule of three, partnership, barter, alligation, simple and
composite interest, and simple false position. Outside this curriculum, many of the abbacus
books (teachers’ handbooks and notes, etc.) deal with the double false position, and from
the fourteenth century onward also with algebra.
3
4 Jens Høyrup
happened as to point out how things did not happen; this is indeed the best
we can do for the moment.
First, however, let us have a look at Arabic algebra itself under the per-
spective of “symbolism”.2
The earliest surviving Arabic treatise on the topic was written by al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯ somewhere around the year 820.3 It is clear from the introduction
that al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ did not invent the technique: the caliph al-Ma↪u¯n, so he
tells, had asked him to write a compendious introduction to it, so it must
have existed and been so conspicuous that the caliph knew about it; but it
may have existed as a technique, not in treatise form. If we are to believe al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯’s claim that he choose to write about what was subtle and what
was noble in the art (and why not believe him?), al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s treatise is
likely not to contain everything belonging to it but to leave out elementary
matters.
It is not certain that al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s treatise was the ﬁrst of its kind, but of
the rival to this title (written by the otherwise little known ibn Turk) only a
fragment survives (ed. Sayılı, 1962). In any case it is clear that one of the two
roughly contemporary treatises has inﬂuenced the other, and for our purpose
we may take al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s work to represent the beginning of written Arabic
algebra well.
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra (proper) is basically a rhetorical algebra. As al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯ starts by saying (ed. Hughes, 1986, p. 233), the numbers that are
necessary in al-jabr wa’l-muqa¯balah are roots, census and simple numbers.
Census (eventually censo in Italian) translates Arabic ma¯l, a “possession”
or “amount of money”, the root (radix/jidhr, eventually radice) is its square
root. As al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ explains, the root is something which is to be multi-
plied by itself, and the census that which results when the root is multiplied
by itself; while the fundamental second-degree problems (on which presently)
are likely to have originated as riddles concerned with a real amount of money
and its square root (similar to what one ﬁnds, for instance, in Indian prob-
lem collections),4 we see that the root is on its way to take over the role as
basic unknown quantity (but only on its way), whereas “dirham” serves in
2 I shall leave open the question of what constitutes an algebraic “symbolism”, and adopt a
fairly tolerant stance. Instead of delimiting by deﬁnition I shall describe the actual character
and use of notations.
3 The treatise is known from several Arabic manuscripts, which have now appeared in a
critical edition (Rashed, 2007), and from several Latin translations, of which the one due to
Gherardo of Cremona (ed. Hughes, 1986) is not only superior to the other translations as a
witness of the original but also a better witness of the original Arabic text than the extant
Arabic manuscripts as far as it goes (it omits the geometry and the chapter on legacies, as
well as the introduction) – both regarding the grammatical format (Høyrup, 1998) and as
far as the contents is concerned (Rashed, 2007, p. 89).
4 Correspondingly, the “number term” is originally an amount of dirham (in Latin drag-
mata), no pure number.
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al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s exposition simply as the denomination for the number term,
similarly to Diophantos’s mona´s. In the ﬁrst steps of a problem solution, the
basic unknown may be posited as a res or sˇay↩, “a thing” (cosa in Italian);
but in second-degree problems it eventually becomes a root, as we shall see.
As an example of this we may look at the following problem (ed. Hughes,
1986, p. 250):5
I have divided ten into two parts. Next I multiplied one of them by the other, and
twenty-one resulted. Then you now know that one of the two sections of ten is a
thing.6 Therefore multiply that with ten with a thing removed, and you say: Ten
with a thing removed times a thing are ten things, with a census removed, which
are made equal to twenty-one. Therefore restore ten things by a census, and add a
census to twenty-one; and say: ten things are made equal to twenty-one and a census.
Therefore halve the roots, and they will be ﬁve, which you multiply with itself, and
twenty-ﬁve results. From this you then take away twenty-one, and four remains. Whose
root you take, which is two, and you subtract it from the half of the things. There thus
remains three, which is one of the parts.
This falls into two sections. The ﬁrst is a rhetorical-algebraic reduction which
more or less explains itself.7 There is not a single symbol here, not even a
Hindu-Arabic numeral. The second section, marked in sanserif, is an unex-
plained algorithm, and indeed a reference to one of six such algorithms for
the solution of reduced and normalized ﬁrst- and second-degree equations
which have been presented earlier on.
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ is perfectly able to multiply two binomials just in the way he
multiplies a monomial and a binomial here; slightly later (ed. Hughes, 1986,
p. 249) he states that “ten with a thing removed” multiplied by itself yields
“hundred and a census with twenty things removed”. He would thus have no
diﬃculty in ﬁnding that a “root diminished by ﬁve” multiplied by itself gives
a “census and twenty-ﬁve, diminished by ten roots”. But he cannot go the
other way, the rhetorical style and the way the powers of the unknown are
labeled makes the dissolution of a trinomial into a product of two binomials
too opaque either for al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ himself or for his “model reader”. In con-
sequence, when after presenting the algorithms al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ wants to give
proofs for these, his proofs are geometric, not algebraic – geometric proofs
not of his own making (as are his geometric illustrations of how to deal with
binomials), but that is of no importance here.
It is not uncommon that rhetorical algebra like that of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ is
translated into letter symbols, the thing becoming x and the census becoming
5 My translation, as everywhere in the following when no translator into English is identiﬁed.
6 This position was already made in the previous problem about a “divided ten”.
7 However, those who are already somewhat familiar with the technique may take note of a
detail: we are to restore ten things with a census, and then add a census to 21. “Restoring”
(al-jabr) is thus not the addition to both sides of the equation (as normally assumed, in
agreement with later usage) but a reparation of the deﬁciency on that side where something
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x2. The above problem and its solution thereby becomes{
10 = x+ (10− x)
x(10− x) = 21
10x− x2 = 21
10x = 21 + x2
x =
10
2
−
√(
10
2
)2
− 21
To the extent that this allows us to follow the steps in a medium to which
we are as accustomed as the medieval algebraic calculators were to the use
of words, it may be regarded as adequate. But only to this extent: the letter
symbolism makes it so much easier to understand the dissolution of trinomials
into products that the need for geometric proofs becomes incomprehensible –
which has to do with the theme of our meeting.
Geometric proofs recur in many later Arabic expositions of algebra – not
only in Abu¯ Ka¯mil but also in al-Karaj¯ı’s Fakhr¯ı (Woepcke, 1853, pp. 65–71),
even though al-Karaj¯ı’s insight in the arithmetic of polynomials8 would cer-
tainly have allowed him to oﬀer purely algebraic proofs (his Al-Bad¯ı↪ explicitly
shows how to ﬁnd the square root of a polynomial (ed. Hebeisen, 2008, p. 117–
137)). What is more: he brings not only the type of proof that goes back to
al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ but also the type based directly on Elements II (as introduced
by T
¯
h
¯
a¯bit ibn Qurrah, ed. (Luckey, 1941)).
Some Arabic writers on algebra give no geometric proofs – for instance, ibn
Badr and ibn al-Banna¯↩. That, however, is because they give no proofs at all;
algebraic proofs for the solution of the basic equations are absent from the
entire Arabic tradition.9
This complete absence is interesting by showing that we should expect no
direct connection between the existence of an algebraic symbolism and the cre-
ation of the kind of reasoning it seems with hindsight to make possible. It has
indeed been known to historians of mathematics since Franz Woepcke’s work
is lacking; this is followed by a corresponding addition to the other side.
8 Carried by a purely rhetorical exposition, only supplemented by use of the particle illa¯
(“less”) – still a word, but used contrary to the rules of grammar in the phrase wa illa¯,
“and less” – to mark a subtractive contribution. As pointed out by Abdeljaouad (2002, p.
38), this implies that illa¯ has become an attribute (namely subtractivity) of the number.
9 An interesting variant is found in ibn al-Ha¯↩im’s sˇarh. al-Urju¯zah al-Yasmı¯nya, “Commen-
tary to al-Ya¯samin’s Urjuza” (ed., trans. Abdeljaouad, 2004, pp. 18f). Ibn al-Ha¯↩im explains
that the specialists have a tradition for giving geometric proofs, by lines (viz, as T
¯
h
¯
a¯bit) or
by areas (viz, as al-Khwa¯rizmı¯), which however presuppose familiarity with Euclid. He there-
fore gives an arithmetical argument, fashioned after Elements II.4. For use of this theorem
he is likely to have had precursors, since Fibonacci also seems to model his ﬁrst geometric
proof after this proposition (ed. Boncompagni, 1857, p. 408) (his second proof is “by lines”).
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Fig. 1.1: Al-Qalas.a¯di’s explanation of how to multiply “8 things less 4” by
“6 census less 3 things” in Souissi’s edition (1988, p. Ar. 96) – symbolic
notations in frames (added here).
in (1854) that elements of algebraic symbolism were present in the Maghreb,
at least in the mid-ﬁfteenth century (they are found in al-Qalas.a¯di’s Kasˇf,10
but also referred to by ibn Khaldu¯n). Woepcke points to symbols for pow-
ers of the unknown and to signs for subtraction, square root and equality;
symbols for the powers11 are written above their coeﬃcient, and the root
10 The use of the symbols can thus be seen in Mohamed Souissi’s edition of he Arabic text
(1988). His translation renders the same expressions in post-Cartesian symbols; edition as
well as translation change the format of the text (unless this change of format has already
taken place in the manuscript he uses, which is not to be excluded). Woepcke’s translation
(1859) renders the formulae more faithfully (using K for the cube, Q for the square and C
for the unknown itself), and also renders the original format better (putting the symbolic
notations outside the text). Figures 1.1 and 1.2 confront Woepcke’s translation with Souissi’s
Arabic text.
11 There are individual signs for the thing, the census and the cube. Higher powers are rep-
resented by products of these (the ﬁfth power thus with the signs for census and cube, one
written above or in continuation of the other, corresponding to the verbal name ma¯l ka↪b.
However, the arithmetization of the sequence of “powers” (i.e., exponents) was present. Ibn
al-Banna¯↩ must have known it, since he says (he was a purist) that it is not “allowed” to
speak of the power of the ma¯l (as 2), viz because it is an entity of its own; ibn Qunfudh
(1339–1407), in the commentary from which we know this prohibition, states that other
writers on algebra did not agree, and speaks himself of the power of the number as “noth-
ing”, that is, 0 (Djebbar, 2005, pp. 95f ). The individual names for the powers should thus
8 Jens Høyrup
Fig. 1.2: The same in Woepckes translation (1859, p. 427)
sign above the radicand. He shows that these symbols (derived from the ini-
tial letters of the corresponding words, prolonged so as to be able to cover
composite expressions, that is, to delimit algebraic parentheses12) are used
not have been a serious impediment to the development of algebraic proofs, had the inten-
tion been there to develop them.
12 Three points should perhaps be made here. One concerns terminology. “Parenthesis”
does not designate the bracket but the expression that is marked oﬀ, for example by a pair
of brackets; but pauses may also mark oﬀ a parenthesis in the ﬂow of spoken words, and a
couple of dashes may do so in written prose. What characterizes an algebraic parenthesis
is that it marks oﬀ a single entity which can be submitted to operations as a whole, and
therefore has to be calculated ﬁrst in the case of calculations. When division is indicated
by a fraction line, this line delimits the numerator as well as the denominator as parenthe-
ses if they happen to be composite expressions (for instance, polynomials). Similarly, the
modern root sign marks oﬀ the radicand as a parenthesis.
The remaining points are substantial, one of them general. The possibility of “embed-
ding” parentheses is fundamental for the unrestricted development of mathematical thought,
as I discuss in (Høyrup, 2000). An algebraic language without full ability to form parenthe-
ses and manipulate them is bound to remain “close to earth”.
The last point, also substantial, is speciﬁc and concerns the Maghreb notation. It did
not use the parenthesis function to the full. The fraction line and the root sign might mark
oﬀ polynomials as parentheses; the signs for powers of the unknown, on the other hand,
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to write polynomials and equations, and even to operate on the equations.
Making the observation (p. 355) that
la condition indispensable pour donner a` des signes conventionnels quelconques le
caracte`re d’une notation, c’est qu’ils soient toujours employee´s quand il y a lieu, et
toujours de la meˆme manie`re
he shows that one manuscript at his disposal fulﬁls this condition (another
one not, probably because of “la negligence d’un copiste ou d’une succession
de copistes”).
Fig. 1.3: Ibn al-Ya¯samin’s scheme for multiplying 12 ma¯l less
1
2 sˇai↩ by
1
2 sˇai↩
Ibn Khaldu¯n’s description made Woepcke suspect that the notation goes back
to the twelfth century, as has now been conﬁrmed by two isolated passages
in ibn al-Ya¯samin’s Talq¯ıh. al-afka¯r reproduced by Mahdi Abdeljaouad (2002,
p. 11) after Touhami Zemmouli’s master thesis and corresponding exactly to
what al-Qalas.a¯di was going to do – one of them is shown in Figure 1.3.
Though manuscripts diﬀer in this respect (as observed by Woepcke), the
symbolic calculations appears to have been often made separate from the run-
ning text (as shown in Woepcke’s translation of al-Qalas.a¯di), usually preceded
by the expression “its image is”. They illustrate and duplicate the expres-
sions used by words. They may also stand as marginal commentaries, as in
the “Jerba manuscript” (written in Istanbul in 1747) of ibn al-Ha¯↩im’s sˇarh.
al-Urju¯zah al-Yasmı¯nya, “Commentary to al-Ya¯samin’s Urjuza” (originally
written in 1387 – manuscripts preceding the one from Jerba are without these
marginalia) (ed. Abdeljaouad, 2004), of which Figure 1.4 shows a page. Ac-
cording to ibn Mun↪im (†1228) and al-Qalas.a¯d¯ı, these marginal calculations
may correspond to what was to be written in a takht (a dustboard, in particu-
lar used for calculation with Hindu numerals) or a lawha (a clayboard used for
might at most mark oﬀ a composite numerical expression – see (Abdeljaouad, 2002, pp.
25–34) for a much more detailed exposition. This should not surprise us: even Descartes
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Fig. 1.4: A page from the “Jerba manuscript” of ibn al-Ha¯↩im’s Sˇarh. al-
Urju¯zah al-Yasmin¯ıya (ed. Abdeljaouad, 2004, p. Ar. 45)
eschewed general use of the parenthesis – for instance, expressions like (y− 3)2, as pointed
out by Michel Serfati (1998, p. 259).
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temporary writing) – see (Lamrabet, 1994, p. 203) and (Abdeljaouad, 2002,
pp. 14, 19f ). The use of such a device would explain that the examples of sym-
bolic notation we ﬁnd in manuscripts normally do not contain intermediate
calculations, nor erasures (Abdeljaouad, 2002, p. 20).
We are accustomed to consider the notation for fractions as something
quite separate from algebraic symbolism. In twelfth-century Maghreb, the
two probably belonged together,13 and from al-H. as.s.a¯r’s Kita¯b al-baya¯n wa’l-
tadhka¯r onward Maghreb mathematicians used the various fraction notations
with which we are familiar from Fibonacci’s Liber abbaci (and other works
of his): simple fractions written with the fraction line, ascending continued
fractions ( e c af d b meaning
a
b +
c
bd +
e
bdf ), and additively and multiplicatively
compounded fractions – see (Lamrabet, 1994, pp. 180f ) and (Djebbar, 1992,
pp. 231–234).
1.2 Latin algebra: Liber mahamaleth, Liber abbaci,
translations of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ – and Jordanus
The earliest documents in our possession from “Christian Europe” which
speak of algebra are the Liber mahamaleth and, with a proviso, Robert of
Chester’s translations of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s Algebra (c. 1145); slightly later is
Gherardo da Cremona’s translation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s treatise. All of these
are from the twelfth century. From 1228 we have the algebra chapter in Fi-
bonacci’s Liber abbaci (the ﬁrst edition from 1202 was probably rather similar,
but we do not know how similar). In his De numeris datis, Jordanus de Nemore
presented an alternative to algebra, showing how its familiar results could be
based in (rather) strictly deductive manner on his Elements of Arithmetic,
but he avoided to speak about algebra (hinting only for connoisseurs at the
algebraic sub-text by using many of the familiar numerical examples) – see
the analysis in (Høyrup, 1988, pp. 332–336). Finally, around 1300 a revised
version of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s Algebra of interest for our topic was produced (ed.
(Kaunzner, 1986), cf. (Kaunzner, 1985)).
The Liber mahamaleth and the Liber abbaci share certain characteristics,
and may therefore be dealt with ﬁrst.
All extant manuscripts of the Liber mahamaleth14 have lost an introductory
systematic presentation of algebra, which however is regularly referred to.15
13 Cf. the hypothesis of Mahdi Abdeljaouad (2002, pp. 16–18), that “l’alge`bre symbolique
est un chapitre de l’arithme´tique indienne maghre´bine”.
14 I have consulted (Sesiano, 1988) and a photocopy of the manuscript Paris, Bibliothe`que
Nazionale, ms. latin 7377A.
15 Thus fol. 154v , “sicut docuimus in algebra”; fol. 161r, “sicut ostensum est in algebra”.
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There are also references to Abu¯ Ka¯mil,16 and a number of problem solutions
make use of algebra. Fractions are written in the Maghreb way, with Hindu
numerals and fraction line;17 there are also copious marginal calculations in
rectangular frames probably rendering computation on a lawha. However, one
ﬁnds no more traces of algebraic symbolism than in al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s and Abu¯
Ka¯mil’s algebraic writings.
Fibonacci uses Maghreb fraction notations to the full in the Liber abbaci
(ed. Boncompagni, 1857), writing composite fractions from right to left and
mixed numbers with the fraction to the left – all in agreement with Arabic
custom. Further, he often illustrates non-algebraic calculations in rectangular
marginal frames suggesting a lawha. That systematic presentation of the al-
gebraic technique which has been lost from the Liber mahamaleth is present
in the Liber abbaci ; there is no explicit reference to Abu¯ Ka¯mil, but there are
unmistakeable borrowings (which could of course be indirect, mediated by one
or more of the many lost treatises). When the “thing” technique is used in the
solution of commercial or recreational ﬁrst-degree problems,18 it is referred to
as regula recta, not as algebra. But in one respect their algebras are similar:
they are totally devoid of any hint of algebraic symbolism.19 Inasfar as the
Liber mahamaleth is concerned, this could hardly be otherwise – it antedates
the probable creation of the Maghreb algebraic notation.
Equally devoid of any trace of symbolism is Gherardo’s translation of al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯, which is indeed very faithful to the original – to the extent indeed
that no Hindu numerals nor fraction lines occur, everything is completely
verbal.
Robert does use Hindu numerals heavily in his translation (as we know
it), but apart from that his translation is also fully verbal. It has often been
believed, on the faith of Karpinski’s edition (1915, p. 126) that his translation
describes an algebraic formalism. It is true that the manuscripts contain a ﬁnal
list of Regule 6 capitulis algabre correspondentes making use of symbols for
census, thing and dragma (the “unit” for the number term, we remember);
16 Thus fol. 203r, “modum agendi secundum algebra, non tamen secundum Auoqamel”;
cf. (Sesiano, 1988, pp. 73f, 95f). We may observe that the spelling “Auoqamel” reﬂects an
Iberian pronunciation.
17 However, ascending continued fractions are written in a mixed system and not in Maghreb
notation – e.g., “ 4
5
et 2
5
unius sue e
5
” (fol. 167rl.− 9) for 4
5
+ 2
5
· 1
5
( e
5
means “quinte”).
18 The Liber mahamaleth contains several pseudo-commercial problems involving the square
root of an amount of money, leading to second-degree problems – see (Sesiano, 1988, pp. 80,
83). The Liber abbaci contains nothing of the kind, and no second-degree problems outside
the ﬁnal chapter 15.
19 Florian Cajori (1928, I, p. 90) has observed a single appearance of  in the Pratica
geometrie (ed. Boncompagni, 1862, p. 209). Given how systematically Fibonacci uses his
notations for composite fractions we may be sure that this isolated abbreviation is a copyist’s
slip of the pen (the manuscript is from the fourteenth century, where this abbreviation began
to spread). Marginal reader’s notes in a manuscript of the Flos are no better evidence of
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they are classiﬁed as an appendix by Barnabas Hughes (1989, p. 67), but
even he appears (p. 26) to accept them as genuine. However, the symbols are
those known from the southern Germanic area of the later ﬁfteenth century,20
and all three manuscripts were indeed written in this area during that very
period (Hughes, 1989, p. 11–13). The appendix has clearly crept in some three
centuries after Robert made his translation.
Fig. 1.5: From Oxford, Bodleian Library, Lyell 52, fol. 45r (Kaunzner, 1986,
pp. 64f)
Far more interesting from the point of view of symbolism is the anonymous ak-
Khwa¯rizmı¯ redaction from around 1300. It contains a short section Qualiter
ﬁgurentur census, radices et dragma, “How census, roots and dragmas are
represented” (ed. Kaunzner, 1986, pp. 63f ).21 Here, census is written as c,
roots as r, and dragmata (the unit for number) as d or not written at all.
If a term is subtractive, a dot is put under it. These symbols are written
below the coeﬃcient, not above, as in the Maghreb notation. In Figure 1.5 we
see (redrawn from photo and following Wolfgang Kaunzner’s transcription)
“2 census less 3 roots”, “2 census less 4 dragmata”, “5 roots less 2 census,
and “5 roots less 4 dragmata”. Outside this section, the notation is not used,
which speaks against its being an invention of the author of the redaction; it
rather looks as if he reports something he knows from elsewhere, and which,
as he says, facilitates the teaching of algebraic computation. He refers not only
what Fibonacci did himself.
20 One of them is an abbreviation of the spelling zenso/zensus, the spelling of many
manuscripts from northern Italy (below, note 86). The spelling zensus as well as the ab-
breviation were taken over in Germany (as the north-Italian spelling cossa was taken over
as coss); the spelling was unknown in twelfth-century Spain, and the corresponding abbre-
viation could therefore never have been invented in Spain in 1145.
21 This redaction is often supposed to be identical with a translation made by Guglielmo de
Lunis. However, all references to this translation (except a false ascription of a manuscript of
the Gherardo translation) borrow from it a list of Arabic terms with vernacular explanation
which is absent from the present Latin treatise. It is a safe conclusion that Guglielmo
translated into Italian; that his translation is lost ; and that the present redaction is to be
considered anonymous.
14 Jens Høyrup
to additive-subtractive operations but also to multiplication, stating however
only the product of thing by thing and of thing by number. He can indeed do
nothing more, he has not yet explained the multiplication of binomials. The
notation is certainly not identical with what we ﬁnd in the Maghreb texts;
the similarity to what we ﬁnd in ibn al-Ya¯samin and al-Qalas.a¯d¯ı is suﬃciently
great, however, to suggest some kind of inspiration – very possibly indirect.
However that may be: apart from an Italian translation from c. 1400 (Vatican,
Urb. lat. 291), where c is replaced by s (for senso) and r by c (for cose), no
inﬂuence in later writings can be traced. A brief description of a notation
which is not used for anything was obviously not understood to be of great
importance (whether the redactor believed it to be can also be doubted, given
that he does not insist by using it in the rest of the treatise).
Jordanus de Nemore’s De numeris datis precedes this redaction of al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯ by a small century or so.22 It is commonly cited as an early
instance of symbolic algebra, and as a matter of fact it employs letters as
general representatives of numbers. At the same time it is claimed to be very
clumsy – which might suggest that the interpretation as symbolic algebra
could be mistaken. We may look at an example:23
If a given number is divided into two and if the product of one with the other is
given, each of them will also be given by necessity.
Let the given number abc be divided into ab and c, and let the product of ab
with c be given as d, and let similarly the product of abc with itself be e. Then the
quadruple of d is taken, which is f. When this is withdrawn from e, g remains, and
this will be the square on the diﬀerence between ab and c. Therefore the root of g
is extracted, and it will be b, the diﬀerence between ab and c. And since b will be
given, c and ab will also be given.
As we see, Jordanus does not operate on his symbols, every calculation leads
to the introduction of a new letter. What Jordanus has invented here is a
symbolic representation of an algorithm, not clumsy symbolic algebra.
The same letter symbolism is used in Jordanus’s De elementis arithmetice
artis, which is presupposed by the De numeris datis and hence earlier. In the
22 As well known, the only certain date ante quem for Jordanus is that all his known works
appear in Richard de Fournival’s Biblionomina (ed. de Vleeschauwer, 1965), which was
certainly written some time before Richard’s death in 1260 (Rouse, 1973, p. 257). However,
one manuscript of Jordanus’s Demonstratio de algorismo (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Savile
21) seems to be written by Robert Grosseteste in 1215–16, and in any case at that moment
(Hunt, 1955, p. 134). This is the revised version of Jordanus’s treatise on algorism. In
consequence, Jordanus must have been beyond his ﬁrst juvenile period by then. It seems
likely (but of course is not certain) that the arithmetical works (the Elements and the Data
of arithmetic) are closer in time to the beginning of his career that works on statics and on
the geometry of the astrolabe, and that they should therefore antedate 1230.
23 Translated from (Hughes, 1981, p. 58) (Hughes’ own English translation is free and
therefore unﬁt for the present purpose). Juxtaposition of letters is meant as aggregation,
that is, addition (in agreement with the Euclidean understanding of number and addition).
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algorithm treatises, letters are used to represent unspeciﬁed digits (Enestro¨m,
1907, p. 146); in the two demonstrations that are quoted by Enestro¨m (pp.
140f ), the revised version can be seen also to use the mature notation, while
it is absent from the early version. The assumption is close at hand that
Jordanus developed the notation from the representation of digits by letters
in his earliest work; it is hard to imagine that it can have been inspired in any
way by the Maghreb notations. This representation of digits might have given
rise to an algebraic symbolism – but as we see, that was not what Jordanus
aimed at. Actually – as mentioned above – he did not characterize his De
numeris datis as algebra even though he shows that he knows it to be at least
a (theoretically better founded) alternative to algebra.
There are few echoes of this alternative in the following centuries. When
taking up algebra in the mid-fourteenth century in his Quadripartitum nu-
merorum ((ed. l’Huillier, 1990), cf. (l’Huillier, 1980)), Jean de Murs borrows
from the Liber abbaci, not from Jordanus. Somewhere around 1450, Peurbach
refers in a poem to “what algebra calculates, what Jordanus demonstrates”
(ed. Gro¨ßing, 1983, p. 210), and in his Padua lecture from 1464 (ed. Schmeid-
ler, 1972, p. 46) Regiomontanus refers in parallel to Jordanus’s “three most
beautiful books about given numbers” and to “the thirteen most subtle books
of Diophantos, in which the ﬂower of the whole of arithmetic is hidden, namely
the art of the thing and the census, which today is called algebra by an Ara-
bic name”. Regiomontanus thus seems to have been aware of the connection
to algebra, and he also planned to print Jordanus’s work (but suddenly died
before any of his printing plans were realized).24
Two German algebraists from the sixteenth century knew, and used, Jor-
danus’s quasi-algebra: Adam Ries and Johann Scheubel. The codex known
as Adam Ries’ Coß (ed. Kaunzner and Wußing, 1992) includes a fragment
of an originally complete redaction of the De numeris datis, containing the
statements of the propositions in Latin and in German translation, and for
each statement an alternative solution of a numerical example by cossic tech-
nique; Jordanus’s general proofs as well as his letter symbols have disappeared
(Kaunzner and Wußing, 1992, II, pp. 92–100). From Scheubel’s hand, a com-
plete manuscript has survived. It has the same character – as Barnabas Hughes
says in his description (1972, pp. 222f ), “Scheubel’s revision and elucidation
[...] has all the characteristics of an original work save one: he used the state-
ments of the propositions enunciated by Jordanus”. Both thus did to Jordanus
exactly what Jordanus had done to Arabic algebra: they took over his prob-
lems and showed how their own technique (basically that of Arabic algebra)
allowed them to deal with them in what they saw as a more satisfactory man-
24 As we shall see, these prestigious representatives of Ancient and university culture had
no impact on Regiomontanus’s own algebraic practice.
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ner. Jordanus’s treatise must thus have had a certain prestige, even though
his technique appealed to nobody.25
I only know of two works where Jordanus’s letter formalism turns up after
his own times, both from France. One is Lefe`vre d’e´taples’ edition of Jor-
danus’s De elementis arithmetice artis (Lefe`vre d’e´taples, 1514) (ﬁrst edition
1494). The other is Claude Gaspar Bachet’s Problemes plaisans et delecta-
bles, que se font par les nombres (1624) (ﬁrst edition 1612), where (for the
ﬁrst and only time?) Jordanus’s technique is used actively and creatively by
a later mathematician.26
1.3 Abbacus writings before algebra
The earliest extant abbacus treatises are roughly contemporary with the al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯-redaction (at least the originals – what we have are later copies).
They contain no algebra, but their use of the notations for fractions is of some
interest.
Traditionally, a Livero dell’abbecho (ed. Arrighi, 1989) conserved in the
codex Florence, Ricc. 2404, has been supposed to be the earliest extant ab-
bacus book, “internal evidence” suggesting a date in the years 1288–90. Since
closer analysis reveals this internal evidence to be copied from elsewhere, all
we can say on this foundation is that the treatise postdates 1290 (Høyrup,
2005, p. 47 n. 57) – but not by many decades, see imminently.
The treatise claims in its incipit to be “according to the opinion” of Fi-
bonacci. Actually, it consists of two strata – see the analysis in (Høyrup, 2005).
One corresponds to the basic abbacus school curriculum, and has nothing to
do with Fibonacci; the other contains advanced matters, translated from the
Liber abbaci but demonstrably often with scarce understanding.
The Fibonacci-stratum copies his numbers, not only his mixed numbers
with the fraction written to the left (2710 where we would write 10
2
7 ) but
also his ascending continued fractions (written, we remember, in Maghreb
notation, and indeed from right to left, as done by al-H. as.s.a¯r, cf. above).
However, the compiler does not understand the notation, at one place (ed.
25 Vague evidence for prestige can also be read from the catalogue the books belonging to
a third Vienna astronomer (Andreas Stiborius, c. 1500). Three neighbouring items in the
list are dedomenorum euclidis. Iordanus de datis. Demonstrationes cosse (Clagett, 1978,
p. 347). Whether it was Stiborius (in the ordering of his books) or Georg Tannstetter (who
made the list) who understood De numeris datis as belonging midway between Euclid’s
Data and algebra remains a guess.
26 In order to discover that one has to go to the seventeenth-century editions. Labosne’s
“edition” (1959) is a paraphrase in modern algebraic symbolism. Ries and Stifel were not
the last of their kind.
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Arrighi, 1989, p. 112), for instance, he changes
33 6 42 46
53 53 53 53
standing in the Liber abbaci (ed. Boncompagni, 1857, p. 273) for
46 +
42 +
6 +
33
53
53
53
53
into 336424653535353 . It is obvious, moreover, that he has not got the faintest idea
about algebra: he mostly omits Fibonacci’s alternative solutions by means of
regula recta; on one occasion where he does not (fol. 83r, ed. Arrighi 1989:
89) he skips the initial position and afterwards translates res as an ordinary,
not an algebraic cosa.27
The basic stratum contains ordinary fractions written with a fraction line
but none of the composite fractions. Very strange is its way to speak of con-
crete mixed numbers. On the ﬁrst few pages they look quite regular – e.g.
“d. 6 2728 de denaio”, meaning “denari 6,
27
28 of a denaro”. Then, suddenly
(with some slips that show the compiler to copy from material written in
the normal way) the system changes, and we ﬁnd expressions like “d. 274 de
denaio”, “denari 274 of a denaro” – obviously a misshaped compromise be-
tween Fibonacci’s way to write mixed numbers with the way of the source
material, which hence can not have been produced by Fibonacci (all his ex-
tant works write simple and composite fractions as well as mixed numbers in
the same way as the Liber abbaci). All in all, the Livero dell’abbecho is thus
evidence, ﬁrstly, that the Maghreb notations adopted by Fibonacci had not
gained foothold in the early Italian abbacus environment (which it would by
necessity have, had Fibonacci’s works been the inspiration) ; secondly, that
the aspiration of the compiler to dress himself in the robes of the famous
culture hero was not accompanied by understanding of these notations (nor
of other advanced matters presented by Fibonacci).
The other early abbacus book is the Columbia Algorism (New York,
Columbia University, MS X511 AL3, ed. (Vogel, 1977)). The manuscript was
written in the fourteenth century, but a new reading of a coin list which it
contains dates this list to the years 1278–1284 (Travaini, 2003, pp. 88–92).
Since the shapes of numerals are mostly those of the thirteenth century (with
occasional slips, where the scribe uses those of his own epoch) (Vogel, 1977,
p. 12), a dating close to the coin list seems plausible – for which reason we
27 This total ignorance of everything algebraic allows us to conclude that the treatise cannot
be written many decades after 1290.
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must suppose the Columbia Algorism to be (a fairly scrupulous copy of) the
oldest extant abbacus book.
There is no trace of familiarity with algebra, neither a systematic exposition
nor an occasional algebraic cosa. A fortiori, there is no algebraic symbolism
whatsoever, not even rudiments. Another one of the Maghreb innovations is
present, however (Vogel, 1977, p. 13). Ascending continued fractions turn up
several times, sometimes in Maghreb notation, but once reversed and thus to
be read from left to right (1 14 2 standing for
3
8 ). Nothing else suggests any link
to Fibonacci. Moreover, the notation is used in a way never found in the Liber
abbaci, the ﬁrst “denominator” being sometimes the metrological denomina-
tion – thus 1 1gran 2 being used for 1
1
2 gran (or rather, as it would be written
elsewhere in the manuscript, for 1 gran 12 ). Next, the Columbia Algorism dif-
fers from all other Italian treatises (including those written in Provence by
Italians) in its formulation of the rule of three – but in a way which approaches
it to Ibero-Provenc¸al writings of abbacus type – see (Høyrup, 2008, pp. 5f ).
Finally, at least one problem in the Columbia Algorism is strikingly similar
to a problem found in a Castilian manuscript written in 1393 (copied from an
earlier original) while not appearing elsewhere in sources I have inspected –
see (Høyrup, 2005, p. 42 n. 32). In conclusion it seems reasonable to assume
that the Columbia Algorism has learned the Maghreb notation for ascending
continued fractions not from Fibonacci but from the Iberian area.
1.4 The beginning of abbacus algebra
The earliest abbacus algebra we know of was written in Montpellier in 1307
by one Jacopo da Firenze (or Jacobus de Florentia; otherwise unknown as a
person). It is contained in one of three manuscripts claiming to represent his
Tractatus algorismi (Vatican, Vat. lat. 4826; the others are Florence, Riccar-
diana 2236, and Milan, Trivulziana 90).28 As it follows from in-depth anal-
ysis of the texts (Høyrup, 2007a, pp. 5–25 and passim), the Florence and
Milan manuscripts represent a revised and abridged version of the original,
while the Vatican manuscript is a meticulous copy of a meticulous copy of
the shared archetype for all three manuscripts (extra intermediate steps not
being excluded, but they must have been equally meticulous if they exist);
28 The Vatican manuscript can be dated by watermarks to c. 1450, the Milan manuscript
in the same way to c. 1410. The Florence manuscript is undated but slightly more removed
from the precursor it shares with the Milan manuscript (which of course does not automat-
ically make it younger but disqualiﬁes it as a better source for the original).
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this shared archetype could be Jacopo’s original, but also a copy written well
before 1328.29
Jacopo may have been aware of presenting something new. Whereas the
rest of the treatise (and the rest of the vocabulary in the algebra chapter)
employs the standard abbreviations of the epoch and genre, the algebraic
technical vocabulary is never abbreviated.30 Even meno, abbreviated in the
coin list, is written in full in the algebra section. Everything here is rhetorical,
there is not the slightest hint of any symbolism. We may probably take this as
evidence that Jacopo was aware of writing about a topic the reader would not
know about in advance (the book is stated also to be intended for independent
study), and thus perhaps that his algebra is not only the earliest extant Italian
algebra but also the ﬁrst that was written. As we shall see, however, several
manuscripts certainly written later also avoid the abbreviation of algebraic
core terms – even around 1400, authors of general abbacus treatises may have
suspected their readers to possess no preliminary knowledge of algebra.
Not only symbolism but also the Maghreb notations for composite fractions
are absent from the treatise, even though they turned up in the Columbia Al-
gorism. None the less, Jacopo’s algebra must be presumed to have its direct
roots in the Ibero-Provenc¸al area, with further ancestry in al-Andalus and
the Maghreb; there is absolutely no trace of inspiration from Fibonacci nor
of direct inﬂuence of Arabic classics like al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ or Abu¯ Ka¯mil (nor
any Arabisms suggesting direct impact of other Arabic writings or settings).
Jacopo oﬀers no geometric proofs but only rules, and the very mixture of
commercial and algebraic mathematics is characteristic of the Maghreb–al-
Andalus tradition (as also reﬂected in the Liber mahamaleth). A particular
multiplicative writing for Roman numerals (for example mcccc , used as expla-
nation of the Hindu-Arabic number 400000) could also be inspired by the
Maghreb algebraic notation (it may also have been an independent invention,
Middle Kingdom Egyptian scribes and Diophantos sometimes put the “de-
29 Comparing only lists of the equation types dealt with in various abbacus algebras and
believing in a steady progress of their number within each family, Warren Van Egmond
claims (2008, p. 313) that the algebra of the Vatican manuscript “falls entirely within
the much later and securely dated Benedetto tradition and was undoubtedly added to
a manuscript containing some sections from Jacopo’s earlier work” (actually, it contains
fewer types than the manuscript from c. 1390 which Van Egmond takes as the starting
point for this tradition). If he had looked at the words used in the manuscripts he refers
to he would have discovered that the Vatican algebra agrees verbatim with a section of an
algebra manuscript from c. 1365, which however ﬁlls out a calculational lacuna left open in
the Vatican manuscript and therefore represents a more developed form of the text (and
combines it with other material – details in (Høyrup, 2007a, pp. 163f )). Van Egmond’s
dating can be safely dismissed.
30 There is one instance of  (fol. 44r, ed. (Høyrup, 2007a, p. 326); as the single appearance
of  in Fibonacci’s Pratica geometrie (see note 19), this is likely to be a copyist’s lapsus
calami.
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nomination” above the “coeﬃcient” in a similar way, and there is no reason
to believe that these notations were connected to the Maghreb invention).
In 1328, also in Montpellier, a certain Paolo Gherardi (as Jacopo, unknown
apart from the name) wrote a Libro di ragioni, known from a later copy (Flo-
rence, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Magl. XI, 87, ed. (Arrighi, 1987, p. 13–107)). Its ﬁnal
section is another presentation of algebra.31 Part of this presentation is so close
to Jacopo’s algebra that it must descend either from that text (by reduction)
or from a close source; but whereas Jacopo only deals (correctly) with 20 (of
the possible 22) quadratic, cubic and quartic basic equations (“cases”) that
can be solved by reduction to quadratic equations or by simple root extrac-
tion,32 Gherardi (omitting all quartics) introduces false rules for the solution
of several cubics that cannot be solved in these ways (with examples that are
“solved” by means of the false rules). Comparison with later sources show
that they are unlikely to be of his own invention. A couple of the cases he
shares with Jacopo also diﬀer from the latter in their choice of examples, one
of them agreeing at the same time with what can be found in a slightly later
Provenc¸al treatise (see imminently).
Gherardi’s algebra is almost as rhetorical as Jacopo’s, but not fully. Firstly,
the abbreviation  is used copiously though not systematically. This may be
due to the copyist – the eﬀort of Jacopo’s and Fibonacci’s copyists to conserve
the features of the original was no general rule; but it could also correspond
to Gherardi’s own text. More important is the reference to a diagram in one
example (100 is ﬁrst divided by some number, next by ﬁve more, and the sum
of the two quotients is given); this diagram is actually missing in the copy,
but so clearly described in the text that it can be seen to correspond to the
diagram found in a parallel text:33
100
100
/∖ 1 cosa
1 cosa piu 5
The operations performed on the diagram (“cross-multiplication” and the
other operations needed to add fractions) are described in a way that implies
underlying operations with the “formal fractions” 1001 cosa and
100
1 cosa piu 5 . No
abbreviations being used, we may speak of what goes on as a beginning of
symbolic syntax without symbolic vocabulary.
Such formal fractions, we may observe, constitute an element of “symbolic
algebra” that does not presuppose that “cosa” itself be replaced by a sym-
31 Beyond Arrighi’s complete edition of the treatise (1987, pp. 97–107), there is an edition
of the algebra text with translation and mathematical commentary in (Van Egmond, 1978).
32 The lacking equations are the two mixed biquadratics that correspond to al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s
(and Jacopo’s) ﬁfth and sixth case. Only the six simple cases (linear and quadratic) are
provided with examples – ten in total, half of which are dressed as commercial problems.
For the others, only rules are oﬀered.
33 Florence, Ricc. 2252, see (Van Egmond, 1978, p. 169).
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bol – but certainly an isolated element only. It must be acknowledged, on
the other hand, that this isolated element already made possible calculations
that were impossible within a purely rhetorical framework. Jacopo, as already
al-Khwa¯rizmı¯, could get rid of one division by a binomial via multiplication.
However, problems of the type where Gherardi and later abbacus algebra use
two formal fractions were either solved geometrically by al-Khwa¯rizmı¯, Abu¯
Ka¯mil and Fibonacci, as I discuss in a forthcoming paper,34 or they were re-
placed before being expressed algebraically without explanation by a diﬀerent
problem, namely the one resulting from multiplication by the denominators
(al-Khwa¯rizmı¯, ed. (Hughes, 1986, p. 51)).
A third abbacus book written in Provence (this one in Avignon) is the
Trattato di tutta l’arte dell’abbacho. As shown by Jean Cassinet (2001), it
must be dated to 1334. Cassinet also shows that the traditional ascription to
Paolo dell’Abbaco is unfounded.35 Exactly how much should be counted to
the treatise is not clear. The codex Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centr., fond. princ.
II.IX.57 (the author’s own draft according to (Van Egmond, 1980, p. 140))
contains a part that is not found in the other copies36 but which is informative
about algebra and algebraic notation; however, since this extra part is in the
same hand as the main treatise (Van Egmond, 1980, p. 140), it is unimportant
whether it went into what the author eventually decided to put into the ﬁnal
version.
There is no systematic presentation of algebra nor listing of rules in this
part,37 only a number of problems solved by a rhetorical censo-cosa tech-
nique.38 The author uses no abbreviations for cosa, censo and radice – but
at one point (fol. 159r) an astonishing notation turns up: 10cose , meaning “10
cose”. The idea is the same as we encountered in the Columbia Algorism when
it writes 1 1gran 2 meaning “1 gran
1
2”: that what is written below the line is
a denomination; indeed, many manuscripts write “il 13” in the sense of “the
34 “‘Proportions’ in the Liber abbaci”, to appear in the proceedings of the meeting “Pro-
portions: Arts – Architecture – Musique – Mathe´matiques – Sciences”, Centre d’e´tudes
Supe´rieures de la Renaissance, Tours, 30 juin au 4 juillet 2008.
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ (ed. Hughes, 1986, p. 255) does not make the geometric argument ex-
plicit, but a division by 1 betrays his use of the same diagram as Abu¯ Ka¯mil (ed. Sesiano,
1993, p. 370).
35 Arguments speaking against the ascription are given in (Høyrup, 2008, p. 11 n. 29).
36 I have compared with Rome, Acc. Naz. dei Lincei, Cors. 1875, from c. 1340. For other
manuscripts, see (Cassinet, 2001) and (Van Egmond, 1980, passim).
37 The codex contains a list of four rules (fol. 171v), three of which are followed by examples,
written on paper from the same years (according to the watermark) but in a diﬀerent hand
than the recto of the sheet and thus apparently added by a user of the manuscript. It
contains one of the examples which Gherardi does not share with Jacopo, conﬁrming that
his extra examples came from what circulated in the Provenc¸al area. It contains no algebraic
abbreviations nor anything else suggesting symbolism.
38 Jean Cassinet (2001, pp. 124–127) gives an almost complete list.
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third” (as ordinal number as well as fraction) – that is, the notation for the
fraction was understood as an image of the spoken form, not of the division
procedure (cf. also the writing of quinte as e5 in the Liber mahamaleth, see
note 17).
The compiler of the Trattato di tutta l’arte was certainly not the ﬁrst to
use this algebraic notation – who introduces a new notation does not restrict
himself to using it a single time in a passage well hidden in an odd corner
of a text. He just happens to be our earliest witness of a notation which for
long was in the way of the development of one that could serve symbolic
calculation.
This compiler was, indeed, not only not the ﬁrst but also not the last to use
this writing of monomials as quasi-fractions. It is used profusely in Dardi of
Pisa’s Aliabraa Argibra from 1344,39 better known for being the ﬁrst Italian-
vernacular treatise dedicated exclusively to algebra and for its presentation of
rules for solving no less than 194+4 algebraic cases, 194 of which are solved
according to generally valid rules (with two slips, explained by Van Egmond
(1983, p. 417)), while the rules for the last four cases are pointed out by Dardi
to hold only under particular (unspeciﬁed) circumstances.40
Dardi uses algebraic abbreviations systematically. Radice is always  , meno
(“less”) is tieaccentlowercasem, cosa is c, censo is c¸, numero/numeri are nu˜o/nu˜i. Cubo is
unabridged, censo de censo (the fourth power) appears not as c¸c¸ but in the
expanded linguistic form c¸ de c¸, which we may take as an indication that Dardi
merely thinks in terms of abbreviation and nothing more. Roots of composite
entities are written by a partially rhetorical expression, for instance (fol. 9v)
“ de zonto 14 co¯  de 12” (meaning
√
1
4 +
√
12; zonto corresponds to Tuscan
gionto, “joined”).
As just mentioned, Dardi also employs the quasi-fraction notation for
monomials, and does so quite systematically in the rules and the examples
(but only here).41 When coeﬃcients are mixed numbers Dardi also uses the
39 See (Van Egmond, 1983). The three principal manuscripts are Vatican, Chigi M.VIII.170
written in Venetian in c. 1395; Siena, Biblioteca Comunale I.VII.17 from c. 1470 (ed. Franci,
2001); and a manuscript from Mantua written in 1429 and actually held by Arizona State
University Temple, which I am grateful to know from Van Egmond’s personal transcription.
In some of the details, the Arizona manuscript appears to be superior to the others, but at
the level of overall structure the Chigi manuscript is demonstrably better – see (Høyrup,
2007a, pp. 169f ). Considerations of consistency suggests it to be better also in its use of
abbreviations and other quasi-symbolism, for which reason I shall build my presentation on
this manuscript (cross-checking with the transcription of the Arizona-manuscript – diﬀer-
ences on this account are minimal); for references I shall use the original foliation.
A fourth manuscript from c. 1495 (Florence, Bibl. Med.-Laur., Ash. 1199, partial ed.
(Libri, 1838, III, pp. 349–356)) appears to be very close to the Siena manuscript.
A critical edition of the treatise should be forthcoming from Van Egmond’s hand.
40 Dardi reaches this impressive number of resolvable cases by making ample use of radicals.
41 This notation appears only to be present in the Chigi and Arizona manuscripts; Franci
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formalism systematically in a way which suggests ascending continued frac-
tions, writing for instance 212c not quite as
2 1
c 2 but as
2
c
1
2 (which however
could also mean simply “2 censi and 12”. Often, a number term is written as
a quasi-fraction, for example as 325n . How far this notation is from any oper-
ative symbolism is revealed by the way multiples of the censo de censo are
sometimes written – namely for example as 81c¸ de c¸ (fol. 46
v).
None the less, symbolic operations are not absent from Dardi’s treatise.
They turn up when he teaches the multiplication of binomials (either algebraic
or containing numbers and square roots) – for instance, for (3−√5) ·(3−√5),
3 R de 5
14 m R de 180
m
m3 R de 5
Noteworthy is also Dardi’s use of a similar scheme
10
10
2
2
64
m
m
as support for his proof of the sign rule “less times less makes plus” on fol.
5v:
Now I want to demonstrate by number how less times less makes plus, so that every
times you have in a construction to multiply less times less you see with certainty
that it makes plus, of which I shall give you an obvious example. 8 times 8 makes 64,
and this 8 is 2 less than 10, and to multiply by the other 8, which is still 2 less than
10, it should similarly make 64. This is the proof. Multiply 10 by 10, it makes 100,
and 10 times 2 less makes 20 less, and the other 10 times 2 less makes 40 less, which
40 less detract from 100, and there remains 60. Now it is left for the completion of
the multiplication to multiply 2 less times 2 less, it amounts to 4 plus, which 4 plus
join above 60, it amounts to 64. And if 2 less times two less had been 4 less, this
4 less should have been detracted from 60, and 56 would remain, and thus it would
appear that 10 less 2 times 10 less two had been 56, which is not true. And so also if
2 less times 2 less had been nothing, then the multiplication of 10 less 2 times 10 less
2 would come to be 60, which is still false. Hence less times less by necessity comes
to be plus.
does not mention it in her edition of the much later Siena manuscript, and composite
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Such schemes were no more Dardi’s invention than the quasi-fraction notation
(even though he may well have been more systematic in the use of both than
his precursors). The clearest evidence for this is oﬀered by an anonymous
Trattato dell’alcibra amuchabile from c. 1365 (ed. Simi, 1994), contained in
the codex Florence, Ricc. 2263. This is the treatise referred to in note 29, part
of which agrees verbatim with Jacopo’s algebra. It also has Gherardi’s false
rules. However, here the agreement is not verbatim, showing Gherardi not to
be the immediate source (a compiler who follows one source verbatim will not
use another one freely) – cf. (Høyrup, 2007a, p. 163).
The treatise consists of several parts. The ﬁrst presents the arithmetic
of monomials and binomials, the second contains rules and examples for 24
algebraic cases (mostly shared with Jacopo or Gherardi), the third a collection
of 40 algebraic problems. All are purely rhetorical in formulation, except for
using  in the schemes of the ﬁrst part (see imminently). However, the ﬁrst
and third part contain the same kinds of non-verbal operations as we have
encountered in Gherardi and Dardi, and throws more light on the former.
In part 3, there are indeed a number of additions of formal fractions, for
example (in problem #13) 1001 cosa +
100
1 cosa+5 . This is shown as
100 100
per una cosa per una cosa e 5
and explained with reference to the parallel 244 +
24
6 (cross-multiplication of
denominators with numerators followed by addition, multiplication of the de-
nominators, etc.). Gherardi’s small scheme (see just after note 33) must build
on the same insights (whether shared by Gherardi or not).
Part 1 explains the multiplication of binomials with schemes similar to
those used by Dardi – for example
5 e piu  di 20
via
5 e meno  di 20
As we see, the scheme is very similar to those of Dardi but more rudimentary.
It also diﬀers from Dardi in its use of the ungrammatical expressions e piu`
and e meno, where Dardi uses the grammatical e for addition and the ab-
breviation tieaccentlowercasem for subtraction.42 There is thus no reason to suppose it should
expressions where their presence might be revealed show no trace of them. They are also
absent from Guglielmo Libri’s extract of the Florence manuscript.
42 The expression e meno n, as we remember, corresponds to what was done by al-Karaj¯ı,
see note 8. The appearance of the parallel expression e piu` n shows that the attribute
“subtractivity” was seen to ask for the existence of a corresponding attribute “addivity” –
another instance of “symbolic syntax” without “symbolic vocabulary” (or, in a diﬀerent
terminology but with the same meaning, the incipient shaping of the language of algebra
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be borrowed from Dardi’s earlier treatise – inﬂuence from which is on the
whole totally absent. Schemes of this kind must hence have been around in
the environment or in the source area for early abbacus algebra before 1340,
just as the calculation with formal fractions must have been around before
1328, and the quasi-fractions for monomials before 1334.43 On the whole, this
tells us how far the development of algebraic symbolic operations had gone in
abbacus algebra in the early fourteenth century – and that all that was taken
over from the Maghreb symbolism was the calculation with formal fractions; a
very dubious use of the ascending continued fractions; and possibly the idea of
presenting radice, cosa and censo by single-letter abbreviations (implemented
consistently by Dardi but not broadly, and not necessarily a borrowing).
1.5 The decades around 1400
The Venetian manuscript Vatican, Vat. lat. 10488 (Alchune ragione), written
in 1424, connects the early phase of abbacus algebra with its own times. The
manuscript is written by several hands, but clearly as a single project (hands
may change in the middle of a page; we should perhaps think of an abbacus
master and his assistants). From fol. 29v to fol. 32r it contains a short intro-
duction to algebra, taken from a text written in 1339 by Giovanni di Davizzo,
a member of a well-known Florentine abbacist family, see (Ulivi, 2002, pp. 39,
197, 200). At ﬁrst come sign rules and rules for the multiplication of algebraic
powers, next a strange section with rules for the division of algebraic powers
where “roots” take the place of negative powers;44 then a short section about
the arithmetic of roots (including binomials containing roots)45 somehow but
indirectly pointing back to al-Karaj¯ı; and ﬁnally 20 rules for algebraic cases
without examples, of which one is false and the rest parallel to those of Jacopo
(not borrowed from him but sharing the same source tradition). Everywhere,
radice is  , but “less”, cosa and censo all appear unabbreviated (censo mostly
as zenso, which cannot have been the Florentine Giovanni’s spelling).
as an artiﬁcial language).
In the proof that “less times less makes plus” (see above), Dardi speaks of subtractive
numbere, e.g., as “2 meno”/“2 less”, etc., whereas additive numbers are not characterized
explicitly as such.
43 This latter presence leads naturally to the question whether the notation in the
al-Khwa¯rizmı¯–redaction from c. 1300 should belong to the same family. This cannot be
completely excluded, but the absence of a fraction line from the notation of the redaction
speaks against it. It remains more plausible that the latter notation is inspired from the
Maghreb, or an independent invention.
44 An edition, English translation and analysis of this initial part of the introduction can
be found in (Høyrup, 2007b, pp. 479–484).
45 Translation in (Høyrup, 2009, pp. 56f).
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Fig. 1.6: The “equations” from VAT 10488 fol. 37v (top) and fol. 39v (bottom)
This introduction comes in the middle of a long section containing number
problems mostly solved by means of algebra (many of them about numbers
in continued proportion).46 Here, abbreviations abound. Radice is always ,
meno is often , tieaccentlowercasem, or
︷ ︷
me (diﬀerent shapes may occur in the same line). More
interesting, however, is the frequent use of co, , (occasionally ce) and no
written above the coeﬃcient, precisely as in the Maghreb notation (and quite
likely inspired by it). However, these notations are not used systematically,
and only used once for formal calculation, namely in a marginal “equation”
without equation sign47 on fol. 39v – see Figure 1.6, bottom.48 In another place
(fol. 37r, Figure 1.6 top) the running text formulates a genuine equation, but
this is merely an abbreviation for 100 e` 1 censo meno 20 cose. It serves within
the rhetorical argument without being operated upon.
Later in the text comes another extensive collection of problems solved by
means of algebra (some of them number problems, others dressed as business
problems), and inside it another collection of rules for algebraic cases (17 in
total, only 2 overlapping the ﬁrst collection). In its use of abbreviations, this
second cluster of problems and rules is quite similar to the ﬁrst cluster, the
only exception being a problem (fols. 95r–96v) where the use of coeﬃcients
46 Even these are borrowed en bloc, as revealed by a commentary within the running text
on fol. 36r, where the compiler tells how a certain problem should be made al parere mio,
“in my opinion”. The several hands of the manuscripts are thus not professional scribes
copying without following the argument.
47 Two formal fractions are indicated to be equal; the hand seems to be the same as that
of the main text and of marginal notes adding words that were omitted during copying.
48 The treatment of the problem is quite interesting. The problem asks for a number
which, when divided into 10 yields 5 times the same number and 1 more. Instead of writing
“ 10co
1
= co5 e 1 piu” it expresses the right-hand side as a fraction
co
5 e 1 piu
1
, thus opening
the way to the usual cross-multiplication.
As in several cases below, I have had to redraw the extract from the manuscript in order
to get clear contours, my scanned microﬁlm being too much grey in grey.
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with superscript power is so dense (without being fully systematic) that it
may possibly have facilitated understanding of the argument by making most
of the multiples of cosa and censo stand out visually.
In the whole manuscript, addition is normally indicated by a simple e,
“and”. I have located three occurrences of piu`,49 none of them abbreviated.
The expressions e piu` and e meno appear to be wholly absent.
It is fairly obvious that this casual use of what could be a symbolism was
not invented by the compilers of the manuscript, and certainly not something
they were experimenting with. They used for convenience something which
was familiar, without probing its possibilities. If anybody else in the abbacus
environment had used the notation as a symbolism and not merely as a set
of abbreviations (and the single case of an equation between formal fractions
suggests that this may well have been the case), then the compilers of the
present manuscript have not really discovered – or they reveal, which would
be more signiﬁcant, that the contents of abbacus algebra did not call for and
justify the eﬀort needed to implement a symbolism to which its practitioners
were not accustomed.50 They might almost as well have used Dardi’s quasi-
fractions – only in the equation between formal fractions would the left-hand
side have collided with it by meaning simply “10 cose”.
Though not using the notation as a symbolism, the compilers of Vat. lat.
10488 at least show that they knew it. However, this should not make us
believe that every abbacus writer on algebra from the same period was familiar
with the notation, or at least not that everybody adopted it. As an example
we may look at two closely related manuscripts coming from Bologna, one
(Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale 2 Qq E 13, Libro merchatantesche) written
in 1398, the other (Vatican, Vat. lat. 4825, Tomaso de Jachomo Lione, Libro
da razioni) in 1429.51 They both contain a list of 27 algebraic cases with
examples followed by a brief section about the arithmetic of roots (deﬁnition,
multiplication, division, addition and subtraction). The former has a very
fanciful abbreviation for meno, namely , which corresponds, however, to
the way che and various other non-algebraic words are abbreviated, and is
thus merely a personal style of the scribe; the other writes meno in full,
and none of the two manuscripts have any other abbreviation whatsoever of
algebraic terms – not even  for radice which they are unlikely not to have
known, which suggests but does not prove that the other abbreviations were
also avoided consciously.
49 In a marginal scheme and the running text of a problem about combined works (fol.
90r), and once in an algebra problem (fol. 94r). There may be more instances, but they
will be rare.
50 The latter proviso is needed. For us, accustomed as we are to symbolic algebra, it is often
much easier to follow a complex abbacus texts if we make symbolic notes on a sheet of paper.
51 More precisely, 7 March 1429 – which with year change at Easter means 1430 according
to our calendar, the date given in (Van Egmond, 1980, p. 223).
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Fig. 1.7: Schemes for the multiplication of polynomials, from (Franci and
Pancanti, 1988, pp. 812), and from the manuscript, fol. 146v
Maybe we should not be surprised not to ﬁnd any daring development in
these two manuscripts. In general, they oﬀer no evidence of deep mathemat-
ical insight. In this perspective, the manuscript Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centr.,
fondo princ. II.V.152 (Tratato sopra l’arte della arismetricha) is more illumi-
nating. Its algebraic section was edited by Franci and Pancanti (1988).52 It
52 I have controlled on a scan of a microﬁlm, but since it is almost illegible my principal
basis for discussing the treatise is this edition.
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was written in Florence in c. 1390, and oﬀers both a clear discussion of the
sequence of algebraic powers as a geometric progression and sophisticated use
of polynomial algebra in the transformation of equation types – see (Høyrup,
2008, pp. 30–34).
In the running text, there are no abbreviations nor anything else which
foreshadows symbolism. However, inserted to the left we ﬁnd a number of
schemes explained by the text and showing multiplication of polynomials with
two or three terms (numbers, roots and/or algebraic powers), of which Figure
1.7 shows some examples – four as rendered by Franci and Pancanti, the last
of these also as appearing in the manuscript (redrawn for clarity).
Those involving only binomials are easily seen to be related to what we ﬁnd
in the Trattato dell’alcibra amuchabile and in Dardi’s Aliabraa Argibra – but
also to schemes used in non-algebraic sections of other treatises, for instance
the Palermo-treatise discussed above, see Figure 1.8, which should warn us
against seeing any direct connection.
Fig. 1.8: Non-algebraic scheme from Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale 2 Qq E
13, fol. 38v
The schemes for the multiplication of three-term polynomials are diﬀerent.
They emulate the scheme for multiplying multi-digit numbers, and the text
itself justly refers to multiplication a chasella (ed. Franci and Pancanti, 1988,
p. 9). The a casella version of the algorithm uses vertical columns, while
the scheme for multiplying polynomials used in the Jerba manuscript (ed.
Abdeljaouad, 2002, p. 47) follows the older algorithm a scacchiera with slanted
columns; none the less inspiration from the Maghreb is plausible, in particular
because another odd feature of the manuscript suggests a pipeline to the
Arabic world. In a wage problem, an unknown amount of money is posited
to be a censo, whereas Biagio il vecchio (ed. Pieraccini, 1983, p. 89f ) posits
it to be a cosa in the same problem in a treatise written at least 50 years
earlier. But the present author does not understand that a censo can be an
amount of money, and therefore feels obliged to ﬁnd its square root – only
to square it again to ﬁnd the amount of money asked for. He thus uses the
terminology without understanding it, and therefore cannot have shaped the
solution himself; nor can the source be anything of what we have discussed so
far.
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Schemes of this kind (and other schemes for calculating with polynomials)
turn up not only in later abbacus writings (for instance, in Raﬀaello Canacci,
see below) but also in Stifel’s Arithmetica integra (1544, fols. 238r − 239r), in
Jacques Peletier’s L’Alge`bre (1554, pp. 15–22) and in Petrus Ramus’s Algebra
(1560, fol. Aiiir).
Returning to the schemes of the present treatise we observe that the cosa is
represented (within the calculations, not in the statement lines) by a symbol
looking like ρ, and the censo by c. Radice is  in statement as well as calcu-
lation. The writing of meno is not quite systematic – whether it is written in
full, abbreviated me or as (rendered “m.” by Franci and Pancanti) seems
mostly to depend on the space available in the line. Addition may be e or
piu` (piu` being mostly but not always nor exclusively used before ); when
space is insuﬃcient, and only then, piu` may be abbreviated p.53 All in all, the
writer can be seen to have taken advantage of this incipient symbolism but
not to have felt any need to use it systematically – it stays on the watershed,
between facultative abbreviation and symbolic notation.
1.6 The mid-15th-century abbacus encyclopediæ
Around 1460, three extensive “abbacus encyclopediae” were written in Flo-
rence. Most famous among these is, and was, Benedetto da Firenze’s Trattato
de praticha d’arismetrica – it is the only one of them which is known from
several manuscripts.54
Earliest of these is Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, L.IV.21,
which I have used together with the editions of some of its books.55 According
to the colophon (fol. 1r) it was “conpilato da B. a uno suo charo amicho
negl’anni di Christo MCCCCLXIII”. It consists of 495 folios, 106 of which
deal with algebra.
The algebra part consists of the following books:
• XIII: Benedetto’s own introduction to the ﬁeld, starting with a 23-lines’ ex-
cerpt from Guglielmo de Lunis’s lost translation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ (cf. note
21). Then follows a presentation of the six fundamental cases with geomet-
53 The phrases e piu` and e meno occur each around half a dozen times, but apparently in
a processual meaning, “and (then) added” respectively “and (then) subtracted”. Nothing
suggest a use of piu` and meno as attributes of numbers, even though the author does operate
with negative (not merely subtractive) numbers in his transformation of cubic equations –
see (Høyrup, 2008, p. 33).
54 On Benedetto and his historical setting, see the exhaustive study in (Ulivi, 2002).
55 (Salomone, 1982); (Pieraccini, 1983); (Pancanti, 1982); (Arrighi, 1967). All of these
editions were made from the same Siena manuscript, which is also described in detail with
extensive extracts in (Arrighi, 2004/1965).
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ric proofs, built on al-Khwa¯rizmı¯; a second chapter on the multiplication
and division of algebraic powers (nomi, “names”) and the multiplication of
binomials; and a third chapter containing rules and examples for 36 cases
(none of them false);
• XIV: a problem collection going back to Biagio il vecchio († c. 1340 accord-
ing to Benedetto);
• XV: containing a translation of the algebra chapter from the Liber abbaci,
provided with “some clariﬁcations, speciﬁcation of the rules in relation
to the cases presented in book XIII, and the completion of calculations,
which the ancient master had often neglected, indicating only the result”
(Franci and Toti Rigatelli, 1983, p. 309); a problem collection going back
to Giovanni di Bartolo (ﬂ. 1390–1430, a disciple of Antonio de’ Mazzinghi);
and Antonio de’ Mazzinghi’s Fioretti from 1373 or earlier (Ulivi, 1998, p.
122).
The basic problem in using this manuscript is to which extent we can rely on
Benedetto as a faithful witness of the notations and possible symbolism of the
earlier authors he cites. A secondary problem is whether we should ascribe
to Benedetto himself or to a later user a number of marginal quasi-symbolic
calculations.
Fig. 1.9: A marginal calculation accompanying the same problem from Anto-
nio’s Fioretti in Siena L.IV.21, fol. 456r and Ottobon. lat. 3307, fol. 338v
Regarding the ﬁrst problem we may observe that there are no abbreviations
or any other hints of incipient symbolism in the chapters borrowed from Fi-
bonacci and al-Khwa¯rizmı¯. This suggests that Benedetto is a fairly faithful
witness, at least as far as the presence or absence of such things is concerned.
On the other hand it is striking that the symbols he uses are the same through-
out;56 this could mean that he employed his own notation when rendering the
56 One partial exception to this rule is pointed out below, note 59.
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notations of others, but could also be explained by the fact that all the ab-
bacists he cites from Biagio onward belong to his own school tradition – as
observed by Raﬀaella Franci and Laura Toti Rigatelli (1983, p. 307), the Trat-
tato is not without “a certain parochialism”.
Fig. 1.10: The structure of Siena, L.IV.21, fol. 263v. To the right, the orderly
lines of the text proper. Left a variety of numerical calculations, separated by
Benedetto by curved lines drawn ad hoc.
Marginal calculations along borrowed problems can obviously not be sup-
posed a priori to be borrowed, and not even to have been written by the
compiler. However, the marginal calculations in the algebraic chapters appear
to be made in the same hand as marginal calculations and diagrams for which
partial space is made in indentions in book XIII, chapter 2 as well as in earlier
books of the treatise. Often, the irregular shape of the insertions shows these
earlier calculations and diagrams to have been written before the main text,
cf. fol. 263v as shown in Figure 1.10.57 This order of writing shows that the
manuscript is Benedetto’s original, and that he worked out the calculations
57 This page presents a particularly striking case, and contains calculations for a very
complicated problem dealing with two unknowns, a borsa, “[the unknown contents of] a
purse”, and a quantita`, the share received by the ﬁrst of those who divide its contents.
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while making it – in particular because the marginal calculations are never
indented in the algebra chapters copied from earlier authors.
Comparison of the marginal calculations accompanying a problem in the
excerpt from Antonio’s Fioretti and the same problem as contained in the
manuscript Vatican, Ottobon. lat. 3307 from c. 1465 (on which below) show
astonishing agreement, proving that these calculations were neither made
by a later user nor invented by Benedetto and the compiler of the Vati-
can manuscript – see Figure 1.9. In principle, the calculations in the two
manuscripts could have been added in a manuscript drawn from the Fioretti
that had been written after Antonio’s time and on which both encyclopedias
build; given that the encyclopedias do not contain the same selection it seems
reasonable, however, to assume that they reﬂect Antonio’s own style – not
least, as we shall see, because we are not far from what can be found in the
equally Florentine Tratato sopra l’arte della arismetricha c. 1390, discussed
around note 52.
What Benedetto does when he approaches symbolism can be summed up
as follows: He uses ρ (often a shape more or less like ϕ) and (much less often)
c and co for cosa respectively censo (and their plurals), but almost exclusively
within formal fractions.58 Even in formal fractions, censo may also be written
in full. Meno is mostly abbreviated
︷ ︷
me in formal fractions.59 Radice may
be abbreviated  in the running text, but often, and without system, it is
left unabridged; within formal fractions, where there is little space for the
usual abbreviation, it may become r or ra. Both when written in full and
when appearing as  , it may be encircled if it is to be taken of a composite
expression. In later times (e.g., in Pacioli’s Summa, see below) this root was
to be called radice legata or radice universale; the use of the circle to indicate
it goes back at least to Gilio of Siena’s Questioni d’algebra from 1384 (Franci,
1983, p. xxiii), and presumably to Antonio, since Gilio’s is likely to have been
taught by him or at least to have known his works well (ibid. pp. ivf ). The
concept itself, we remember, was expressed by Dardi as “ de zonto ... con
...”, close in meaning to radice legata.
All of this suggests that the “symbolism” is only a set of facultative ab-
breviations, and not really an incipient symbolism. However, in a number of
58 Outside such fractions, I have noticed ρ three times in the main text of the Fioretti,
viz on fols. 453r, 469r and 469v (of which the ﬁrst occurrence seems to be explained by an
initial omission of the word chosa leaving hardly space for the abbreviation), and co once,
on fol. 458r. Arrighi (1967, p. 22) claims another co on fol. 453r, but the manuscript writes
chosa in the corresponding place.
59 Additively composite symbolic expressions are mostly constructed by juxtaposition (in
running text as well as marginal computations); in rhetorical exposition, e or (when a root
and a number are added) an unabbreviated piu` is used. A few marginal diagrams in the
section copied from Bartolo mark additive contributions to a sum by p, and all subtractive
contributions by m.
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marginal calculations it does serve as carrier of the reasoning. One example
was shown in Figure 1.9, another one (fol. 455r, see Figure 1.11) performs a
multiplication which, in slightly mixed notation, looks as follows:
(1ρ
︷ ︷
me[13
1
2
︷ ︷
me 1 c])× (1ρ p[iu`] [131
2
︷ ︷
me 1 c])
Fig. 1.11: The multiplication of 1ρ−
√
13 12 − 1c by 1ρ+
√
13 12 − 1c
Formal fractions without abbreviation are used in the presentation of the
arithmetic of algebraic powers in Book XIII (fols. 372r–373r). At ﬁrst in this
piece of text we ﬁnd
Partendo chose per censi ne viene rotto nominato da chose chome partendo 48 chose
per 8 censi ne viene 6
1 chosa
.
in translation
Dividing things by censi results in a fraction denominated by things, as dividing 48
things by 8 censi results in 6
1 chosa
.
Afterwards we ﬁnd denominators “1 censo”, “1 cubo”, “1 cubo di censo”, etc.
When addition of such expressions and the division by a binomial are taught,
we also ﬁnd denominators like “3 cubi and 2 cose”.60
Long before we come to the algebra, namely on fols. 259v–260v, there is an
interesting appearance of formal fractions in problems of combined works,
involving not a cosa or a censo but a quantita` – such as 81 quantita and
60 This whole section looks as if it was inspired by al-Karaj¯ı or the tradition he inaugurated;
but more or less independent invention is not to be excluded: once the notation for fractions
is combined with interest in the arithmetic of algebraic monomials and binomials things
should go by themselves.
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1 quantita meno 8
1 chosa .
61 These fractions are written without any abbreviation.62
Together with the explanation of the division of algebraic powers they demon-
strate (as we already saw it in the Trattato dell’alcibra amuchabile) that the
use of and the argumentation based on formal fractions do not depend on
the presence of standard abbreviations for the unknown (even though cal-
culations involving products of unknown quantities become heavy without
standard abbreviations).
The manuscript Vatican, Ottobon. lat. 3307, was already mentioned above.63
Like Benedetto’s Trattato, it was written in Florence; it dates from c. 1465, and
is also encyclopedic in character but somewhat less extensive than Benedetto’s
treatise, of which it is probably independent in substance.64 It presents itself
(fol. 1r) as Libro di praticha d’arismetrica, cioe` ﬁoretti tracti di piu` libri facti
da Lionardo pisano – which is to be taken cum grano salis, Fibonacci is cer-
tainly not the main source.
Judged as a mathematician (and as a Humanist digging in his historical
tradition), the present compiler does not reach Benedetto’s shoulders. How-
ever, from our present point of view he is very similar, and the manuscript
even presents us with a couple of innovations (which are certainly not of the
compiler’s own invention).
Even in this text, margin calculations are often indented into the text in a
way that shows them to have been written ﬁrst, indicating that it is the com-
piler’s autograph.65 Already in an intricate problem about combined works
(not the same as Benedetto’s, but closely related) use is made of formal frac-
tions involving an unknown (unabbreviated) quantita`. Now, even the square
of the quantita` turns up, as quantita` di quantita`.
61 Benedetto would probably see these solutions not as applications of algebra but of the
regula recta – which he speaks of as modo retto/repto/recto in the Tractato d’abbaco, ed.
(Arrighi, 1974, pp. 153, 168, 181), everywhere using quantita` for the unknown.
62 However, in the slightly later problem about a borsa and a quantita` mentioned in note
57, these are abbreviated in the marginal computations – perhaps not only in order to save
space (already a valid consideration given how full the page is) but also because it makes
it easier to schematize the calculations.
63 Description with extracts in (Arrighi, 2004/1968).
64 The idea of producing an encyclopedic presentation of abbacus mathematics may of
course have been inspired by Benedetto’s Trattato from 1463 – unless the inspiration goes
the other way, the dating “c. 1465” is based on watermarks (Van Egmond, 1980, p. 213)
and is therefore only approximate. If the present compiler had emulated Benedetto, one
might perhaps expect that he would have indicated it in a heading, as does Benedetto when
bringing a whole sequence of problems borrowed from Antonio. In consequence, I tend to
suspect that the Ottoboniano manuscript precedes Benedetto’s Trattato.
65 This happens seven times from fol. 48v to fol. 54v . On fols. 176v and 211v there are
empty indentions, but these are quite diﬀerent in character, wedge-shaped and made in the
beginning of problems, and thus expressions of visual artistry and not evidence that the
earlier indentions were made as empty space while the text was written and then ﬁlled out
afterwards by the compiler or a user.
36 Jens Høyrup
When presenting the quotients between powers, the compiler writes the
names of powers in full within the formal fractions, just as done by Benedetto.
The details of the exposition show beyond doubt, however, that the compiler
does not copy Benedetto but that both draw on a common background; it
seems likely that the present author makes an attempt to be creative, with
little success. In the present treatise, the ﬁrst fractional power is introduced
like this (fol. 304v):
Partendo dramme per chose ne viene un rocto denominato da chose, chome partendo
48 dramme per 6 chose ne viene questo rotto cioe` 48 dramme
1 chosa
.
The second example makes the same numerical error. From the third example
onward, it has disappeared. The fourth one looks as follows (fol. 305r):
Partendo chose per chubi ne viene rotto nominato da chubi, come partendo 48 chose
per 6 chubi, ne viene questo rotto, cioe` 8 chose
1 chubo
.
Only afterwards is the reduction of the ratio between powers (schifare) intro-
duced, for instance, that 8 chose1 chubo is
8 dramme
1 censo .
Abbreviations for the powers are absent not only from this discussion but
also from the presentation of the rules. When we come to the examples, how-
ever, marginal calculations with binomials expressed by means of abbrevia-
tions abound. That for cosa changes between ρ and ϕ, that for censo between
c (written ) and σ (actually ); in both cases the diﬀerence is simply the
length of the initial stroke; since all intermediate shapes are present, a single
grapheme is certainly meant for cosa as well as censo. co appears to be absent.
In the marginal computations, piu` may appear as p, whereas meno may be
may be m or meˆ.66 However, addition may also indicated by mere juxtapo-
sition. The marginal calculations mostly have the same character as those of
Benedetto, cf. Figure 1.9; in the running text abbreviations are reserved for
formal fractions and otherwise as absent as from Benedetto’s Trattato.
Fig. 1.12: The marginal note from Ottobon. lat. 3307 fol. 309r
On two points the present manuscript goes slightly beyond Benedetto. Along-
side a passage in the main text which introduces cases involving cubi and
censi di censi (fol. 309r), the margin contains the note shown in Figure 1.12.
66 m and meˆ appear in the same calculation on fol. 31v – by the way together with p.
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no being numero and the superscript square being known (for instance from
Vat. lat. 10488, cf. above) to be a possible representative for censo, it is a
reasonable assumption (which we shall ﬁnd fully conﬁrmed below) that the
triangle stands for the cube and the double square for censo di censi, the whole
diagram thus being a pointer to the equation types “cubi and censi di censi
equal number” and “censi and cubi equal number”. We observe that equality
is indicated by a double line.67 As we shall see imminently, the compiler and
several other ﬁfteenth-century writers indicate equality by a single line. This,
as well as the deviating symbols for the powers, suggests that this particular
note was made by a later user of the manuscript.
The other innovation can be safely ascribed to the hand of the compiler if
not (as an innovation) to his mind. It is a marginal calculation found on fol.
331v, alongside a problem 1001 ρ +
100
1 ρ+7 = 40 (these formal fractions, without
+ and =, stand in the text). The solution follows from a transformation
100ρ+ 100 · (ρ+ 7)
(1ρ) · (1ρ+ 7) =
100ρ+ (100ρ+ 700)
1σ + 7ρ
= 40
whence 200ρ + 700 = 40σ + 280ρ. In the margin, the same solution is given
schematically:
100ρ
100ρ 700
200ρ 700
1σ 7ρ
40
200ρ 700 ——— 40σ 〈280ρ〉
(the omitted 〈280ρ〉 in the last line is present within the main text). The
strokes before 40 and 40σ appear to be meant as equation signs. It might be
better, however, to understand them as all-purpose “confrontation signs” –
in the margin of fol. 338r, ——— means that one commercial partner has
3000
1ρ 5000 , the other
4000
1ρ 6000 (see Figure 1.13).
68
67 The double line is also used for equality in a Bologna manuscript from the mid-sixteenth
century reproduced in (Cajori, 1928, I, p. 129); whether Recorde’s introduction of the same
symbol in 1557 was independent of this little known Italian tradition is diﬃcult to decide.
In any case, the combination with the geometric symbols indicates that the present example
(and thus the Italian tradition) predates Recorde by at least half a century or so.
68 As we shall see, Raﬀaello Canacci also uses the line both for equality and for confronta-
tion. Even Widmann (1489) uses the long stroke for confrontation: fols. 12r, 21r–v, 23r,
27r, 38v when confronting the numbers 9 and 7 with the schemes for casting out nines and
sevens, fol. 193v (and elsewhere) when stakes and proﬁts in a partnership are confronted.
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This is one of Antonio’s problems. In Benedetto’s manuscript, we ﬁnd the
same problem and the same diagram on fol. 456r – with the only diﬀerence
that the line is replaced by an X indicating the cross-multiplication that is to
be performed – see Figure 1.9. The “confrontation line” is thus not part of
the inheritance from Antonio (nor, in general, of the inheritance shared with
Benedetto). Though hardly due to the present compiler, it is an innovation.
The reason to doubt the innovative role of our compiler is one of Regiomon-
tanus’s notes for the Bianchini correspondence from c. 1460 (ed. Curtze, 1902,
p. 278). For the problem 1001ρ +
100
1ρ+8 , he uses exactly the same scheme, includ-
ing the “confrontation line”:
100
1ρ
100
1ρ+8
100ρ et 800
100ρ
200ρ et 800
1ρ et 8 σ ——– 40
40 σ et 320ρ ——– 200ρ et 800
40 σ et 120ρ ——– 800
1 σ et 3ρ ——– 20
Fig. 1.13: The confrontation sign of Ottobon. lat. 3307 fol. 338r
(Regiomontanus extends the initial stroke of ρ even more than our compiler,
to ; his variant of σ, census, is , possibly a diﬀerent extension of c)69.
A third Florentine encyclopedic abbacus treatise is Florence, Bibl. Naz.
Centr., Palat. 573.70 Van Egmond (1980, p. 124) dates it to c. 1460 on the
69 Curtze does not show these shapes in his edition, but see (Cajori, 1928, I, p. 95).
70 Described with sometimes extensive extracts from the beginnings of all chapters in
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basis of dates contained in problems, but since the compiler refers (fol. 1r) to
Benedetto’s Trattato (from 1463) as having been made “already some time
ago” (gia` e` piu` tenpo), a date around 1470 seems more plausible. This is con-
ﬁrmed by the watermarks referred to by Van Egmond – even this manuscript
can be seen from marginal calculations made before the writing of the main
text to be the compiler’s original, whose date must therefore ﬁt the water-
marks.
As regards algebraic notations and incipient symbolism, this treatise teaches
us nothing new. It does not copy Benedetto (in the passages I checked) but
does not go beyond him in any respect; it uses the same abbreviations for
algebraic powers, in marginal calculations and (sparingly) in formal fractions
within the main text – including the encircled radice and  . In the chapter
copying Fibonacci’s algebra it has no marginal calculations (only indications
of forgotten words), which conﬁrms that the compilers of the three encyclo-
pedic treatises copied the marginal calculations and did not add on their own
when copying – at least not when copying venerated predecessors mentioned
by name.
1.7 Late ﬁfteenth-century Italy
The three encyclopediae conﬁrm that no systematic eﬀort to develop nota-
tions or to extend the range of symbolic calculation characterizes the mid-
century Italian abbacus environment – not even among those masters who,
like Benedetto and the compiler of Palat. 573, reveal scholarly and Humanist
ambitions by including such matters as the Boethian names for ratios in their
treatises and by basing their introduction of algebra on its oldest author (al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯).71 The experiments and innovations of the fourteenth century –
mostly, so it seems, vague reﬂections of Maghreb practices – had not been
developed further.72 In that respect, their attitude is not too far from that of
mid-ﬁfteenth–century mainstream Humanism.
(Arrighi, 2004/1967).
71 Benedetto (ed. Salomone, 1982, p. 20) gives this argument explicitly; the compiler of
Palat. 573 speaks of his wish that “the work of Maumetto the Arab which has been almost
lost be renovated” (Arrighi, 2004/1967, p. 191).
72 It is true that we have not seen the quotients between powers expressed as formal frac-
tions in earlier manuscripts; however, the way they turn up independently in all three en-
cyclopædiæ shows that they were already part of the heritage – perhaps from Antonio. The
interest in such quotients is already documented in Giovanni di Davizzo in 1339, who how-
ever makes the unlucky choice to identify negative powers with roots – see (Høyrup, 2007c,
pp. 478–484) (and cf. above, before note 44).
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Fig. 1.14: The two presentations of the algebraic powers in Bibl. Estense, ital.
578
Towards the end of the century we have evidence of more conscious ex-
ploration of the potentialities of symbolic notations. A ﬁrst manuscript to be
mentioned here is Modena, Bibl. Estense, ital. 578 from c. 1485 (according to
the orthography written in northern Italy – e.g., zonzi and mazore where Tus-
can normal orthography would have giongi and magiore).73 It contains (fols.
5r–20r) an algebra, starting with a presentation of symbols for the powers
with a double explanation, ﬁrst with symbols and corresponding “degrees”,
gradi (fol. 5r), next by symbols and signiﬁcation (fol. 5v) – see Figure 1.14.
As we see, the symbol for the cosa is the habitual c. For the censo, z is
used, in agreement with the usual northern orthography zenso – however, in
a writing which is quite diﬀerent from the z used in full writing of zenso (
respectively , see also Figure 1.15); the cubo is Q, the fourth power is z di
z. The ﬁfth power is c di zz, obviously meant as a multiplicative composition
(as the traditional cubo di censo), the sixth instead z di Q, that is, composed
by embedding. The seventh degree is c di z di Q, mixing the two principles,
the eight again made with embedding as z di zz. So is the ninth, QQ.
Fig. 1.15: Three graphemes from Bibl. Estense, ital. 578. Left, z abbreviating
zenso in the initial overview; centre, z as written as part of the running text;
right, the digit 3
Then follow the signiﬁcations. c is “that which you ﬁnd”, z “the root of that”,
Q “the cube root of that”, and z di z “the root of the root of that”. Already
now we may wonder – why “roots”? I have no answer, but discuss possible
73 (Van Egmond, 1986) is an edition of the manuscript. It has some discussion of its sym-
bolism but does not go into details with the written shapes, for which reason I base my
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hints in (Høyrup, 2008, p. 31), in connection with the Tratato sopra l’arte
della arismetricha (see just before note 52), from where these “root-names”
are known for the ﬁrst time.74 It is reasonable to assume a connection –
this Tratato has the same mixture of multiplicative and embedding-based
formation of the names for powers, though calling the ﬁfth degree cubo di
censo, and the sixth (like here) censo di cubo.75
The root names go on with “root of this” for the ﬁfth power – which is
probably meant as “5th root of this”, since the seventh power is “the 7th
root of this”. The names for the sixth, eighth and ninth degree are made by
embedding.
After explaining algebraic operations and the arithmetic of monomials and
binomials the manuscript oﬀers a list of algebraic cases followed by examples
illustrating them. Here the same symbols are used within the text (there are no
marginal calculations) – with one exception, instead of z a sign is used which
is a transformed version of Dardi’s c¸ – , with variations that sometimes make
it look like a z provided with an initial and a ﬁnal curlicue.76
The problems are grouped in capitoli asking for the same procedure in spite
of involving diﬀerent powers – chapter 14, for instance, combines “zz and z di
zz equal to no” and “c di zz and QQ equal to c”. The orderly presentation
of the powers in a scheme and the concept of numerical gradi, “degrees”,
(our exponents) has facilitated this further ordering. This is clear from the
presentation – in chapter 14, “When you ﬁnd three names of which one is 4
degrees more than the other ...”. Beyond this, the abbreviations seem to serve
as nothing but abbreviations, though used consistently.
discussion on the manuscript.
74 Van Egmond (1986, 20) “explains” them Z = R, x2 = n → x√n etc., which however,
while being an impeccable piece of mathematics, is completely at odds with the words of
the text.
75 This diﬀerence may tell us something about the spontaneous psychology of embedding:
it seems to be easier to embed within a single than within a repeated multiplication – that
is, to grasp censo of P as (P )2 than to understand cubo of R as (R)3.
76 There are a few slips. In the initial list, a full zenso is once written c¸enso (written with
), and itself appears once; within the list of cases and the examples a few instances of
zenso abbreviated z (written , not ) occur. Van Egmond (1986, p. 23) reads these as
“3”, and takes this as evidence that the manuscript was made by a copyist who did not
really understand but had a tendency to replace a z used in the original by c¸. However, even
though the writings of z and 3 are similar, magniﬁcation shows them quite clearly to be
diﬀerent, and makes it clear that the copyist did not write 3 where he should have written z
(see Figure 1.15). Other errors pointed out by Van Egmond demonstrate beyond doubt that
the beautifully written manuscript is a copy. However, the almost systematic distinction
between the abbreviations and , as well as the general idea of applying stylized shapes
of letters when used as symbols, is likely to reﬂect the ways of the original – an unskilled
copyist would hardly introduce them.
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Fig. 1.16: Canaccis scheme with the naming of powers, after (Procissi, 1954,
p. 432)
Raﬀaello Canacci’s use of schemes for the calculation with polynomials (in-
cluding multiplication a casella) in the Ragionamenti d’algebra77 from c. 1495
(ed. Procissi 1954, pp. 316–323) was mentioned above. In a couple of these
he employs geometric signs for the powers, but mostly he writes s for cosa
and censo in full. Addition may be indicated by juxtaposition, by e, by piu` or
by p, subtraction by tieaccentlowercasem or me.78 Later he presents an ordered list, with three
diﬀerent systems alongside each other – see Figure 1.16. To the right we ﬁnd
an extension of a diﬀerent “geometric” system – namely the one which was
found in a (secondary) marginal note in the Ottoboniano encyclopædia. Next
toward the left we ﬁnd powers of 2 corresponding to the algebraic powers
(an explanatory stratagem also used by Pacioli in the Summa); then letter
abbreviations; and then ﬁnally, just to the right of the column with Canacci’s
full names, his own “geometric” system (not necessarily invented by him, cf.
imminently, but the one he uses in the schemes) – better planned for the
economy of drawing than as a support for operations or algebraic thought.
According to Cajori (1928, I, pp. 112f ) the system turns up again in Ghali-
gai’s Pratica d’arithmetica from 1552 (and probably in the ﬁrst edition from
1521, entitled Summa de arithmetica), where their use is ascribed to Ghali-
gai’s teacher Giovanni del Sodo.
77 Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centr., Palat. 567. I have not seen the manuscript but only Angiolo
Procissi’s diplomatic transcriptions.
78 However, p n and p no stand for “per numero”. In schemes showing the stepwise calcu-
lation of products (pp. 313f), m stands for multiplication. In one scheme p. 318), a ﬁrst p
stands for piu`, a second in this way for per.
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Canacci uses these last geometric signs immediately afterwards in a brief
exposition of the rules for multiplying powers – and then no more. In a couple
of marginal notes to the long collection of problems (ed. Procissi, 1983, pp.
58, 62–64) he uses the letter abbreviations (only s and co) – but also the line
as an indication, once of equality, twice of confrontation or correspondence
not involving equality. The running text, including formal fractions, writes
the powers unabridged (except numero, which once is no); even piu` and meno
are mostly written in full, but meno sometimes (pp. 21–23) with a brief stroke
“–” – the earliest occurrence of the minus sign in Italy I know of.79
Three works by Luca Pacioli are of interest: the Perugia manuscript from
1478, the Summa de arithmetica from 1494, and his translation of Piero della
Francesca’s Libellus de quinque corporibus regularibus as printed in (Pacioli,
1509).
Since there is only one brief observation to make on the latter work, I
shall start by that. According to the manuscript Vatican, Urb. lat. 632 as
edited by G. Mancini (1916, pp. 499–501), Piero uses the familiar superscript
square for censo when performing algebraic calculations, or he writes words;
for res he uses a horizontal stroke over the coeﬃcient, but mostly also keeps
the word.80 Pacioli (1509, fols. 3v–26r, passim) instead uses a sign  for the
cosa and  for the censo (or, in the old unsystematic way, words). Censo di
censi is  on fol. 4r and  de  on fols. 4r and 11v. These geometric signs
are absent from Pacioli’s other works, and they must rather be considered
a typographic experiment – given that their use is not systematic, they can
hardly be understood as an instance of mathematical exploration beyond what
Pacioli had done before. It is diﬃcult to agree with Paola Manni (2001, p. 146)
that they should represent “progress of mathematical symbolism” with respect
to the more systematic use of letter abbreviations in the Perugia manuscript
and the Summa (see imminently; and cf. the quotation from Woepcke after
note 12). Indeed, the Libellus is an appendix to Pacioli’s Divina proportione,
in which Pacioli (1509, fol. 3v) explains that various professions, among whom
le mathematici per algebra, use speciﬁc caratheri e abreviature “in order to
avoid prolixity in writing and also of reading”.81
The 1478 Perugia manuscript Suis carissimis disciplis ... (Vatican, Vat.
lat. 3129) has lost the systematic algebra chapters listed in the initial table
79 As well known, “–” is already used in the Deutsche algebra from 1481 (ed. Vogel, 1981,
p. 20). Whether this is part of the very mixed Italian heritage of this manuscript (see below,
note 88 and surrounding text) or a German innovation eventually borrowed by Ghaligai is
undecidable unless supplementary evidence should turn up.
80 The same (lack of) system is found in his abbacus treatise, see (Arrighi, 1970, p. 12).
81 That Pacioli really thinks in terms of abbreviations is conﬁrmed by a list of examples
given in the manuscript of the treatise (Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Ms. 170 Sup.,
written in 1498), see (Maia Bertato, 2008, 13): it mixes the abbreviations for radice, piu`,
meno, quadrato (cosa and censo are absent) with others for, inter alia, linea, geometria
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of contents,82 but it does contain a large amount of algebraic calculation.
Everywhere here – in the main text as well as in the margin, and in the
neat original prepared in 1478 as well as in fols. 350r–360v, added at a later
moment and obviously very private notes – we ﬁnd the signs from Canacci’s
right-hand column (Figure 1.16) written superscript and to the right – on fol.
360v extended until  , censi di censi di censi. Meno is and piu` (both
signifying addition and as a normal word) a corresponding encircled p. This
is thus the system which Pacioli used when calculating for himself, at least
at that moment.83 He uses the equality line in the margin (but also the same
line indicating confrontation/correspondence, e.g., fol. 130r).
Most important (in the sense that it was immensely inﬂuential and the
other two works not) is of course the Summa (Pacioli, 1494). Typographic
constraints are likely to have caused Pacioli to give up his usual notation.
In ordinary algebraic explanation and computation, he now uses .co. and .ce.
written on the line, and piu` and meno have become p˜ and m˜ (meno sometimes
me¯) – both as operators and as indicators of positivity and negativity (not
only additivity and subtractivity).84 However, he also has more systematic
presentations. The ﬁrst, in the margin of fol. 67v, shows how the sequence
.co.-.ce. is to be continued, namely (third power) cubo, (4th) censo de censo,
(5th) primo relato, (6th) censo de cubo/cubo de senso, (7th) secundo relato,
(8th) censo de censo de censo, (9th) cubo de cubo, (10th) censo de primo
relato, (11th) terzo relato, etc. until the 29th power. As we see, the embed-
ding principle has taken over completely, creating problems for the naming of
prime-number powers. For each power the “root name” is indicated, number
being “ prima”, cosa “ 2a”, censo “ 3a”, etc.85 As we see, the “root
number” is not the exponent, but the exponent augmented by 1. This dimin-
ishes the heuristic value of the concept: it still permits to see directly that
“6th roots and 4th roots equal 2nd roots” must be equivalent to “5th roots
and 3rd roots equal 1st roots”, but it requires as much thinking as in Jacopo’s
days almost 200 years earlier to see that this is a biquadratic problem that
must be solved in the same way as “3rd roots and 2nd roots equals 1st roots”.
and arithmetica).
82 See the meticulous description in (Derenzini, 1998), here p. 173. Since all abbreviations
except the superscript symbols are expanded in the edition (Calzoni and Gavalzoni, 1996),
I have used a scan of the manuscript.
83 This restriction is probably unnecessary. At least the encircled p and m and the square
are in the list oﬀered by the 1498 manuscript, cf. note 81.
84 E.g., on see fol. 114r, “a partir .m˜.16.p
¯
.m˜.2. ne vene .p˜.8”, and the proof that “meno via
meno fa piu`” on fol. 113r, which is characterized as “absurda” and referred to the concept
of a debt – if only subtractive numbers were involved, as in Dardi’s corresponding proof,
nothing would be absurd.
85 Pacioli believes (or at least asserts) that these names go back to “the practice of algebra
according to the Arabs, ﬁrst inventors of this art”. Could he have been led to this belief by
the equivalence of “root” and thing/cosa in al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra?
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After this list comes a list of symbols for “normal” roots:  meaning radici ;
 meaning radici de radici ; u. meaning radici universale or radici legata,
that is, root of a composite expression following the root sign (encircled in
Benedetto’s Trattato and spoken of as “ de zonzo” by Dardi, we remember);
and  cu., cube root.
Fig. 1.17: Paciolis scheme (1494, fol. 143r) showing the powers with root
names
On fol. 143r follows a scheme that deals with the ﬁrst 30 powers (dignita`),
and with how they are brought forth as products (li nascimenti pratici o li
30 gradi de li caratteri algebratici). It runs in four tangled columns and 30
rows. The ﬁrst column has the numbered “root name” of the power, the sec-
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ond formulates in Pacioli’s normal language or in abbreviations that number
times this power gives the same power. The third, written inside the second,
indicates the corresponding power of 2. The fourth, ﬁnally, repeats the second
column, now translated into root names – see Figure 1.17.
On the next page follow further schemes, expressed in roots names, for the
products of the nth root with all roots from the nth to the (31–n)th (meaning
that all products remain within the range deﬁned by the 30th root), 2≤n≤15.
All in all, we may say that Pacioli explored existing symbolic notations to a
greater extent (and used them more consistently) than for example Benedetto,
thus oﬀering those of his readers who wanted it matters to chew; but he
hardly gave them many solutions they could build on (and as we have seen,
he thought of his notations as mere abbreviations serving to avoid prolixity).
Even in this respect, subsequent authors could easily have found reasons to
criticize him while standing on his shoulders (as they did regularly), if only
their own understanding of the real progress they oﬀered had been suﬃcient
for that. Tartaglia, for instance, gives the list of dignitates until the 29th in La
sesta parte del general trattato (Tartaglia, 1560, fol. 2r), with names agreeing
with Pacioli’s .co.-.ce.-list and indication of the corresponding exponents (now
segni), alongside a text that explains how multiplication of dignitates corre-
sponds to addition of segni ; that, however, was well after Stifel’s Arithmetica
integra, which Tartaglia knew well.
1.8 Summary observations about the German and
French adoption
Regiomontanus shows familiarity with algebraic practice, not only in the notes
for the Bianchini-correspondence (cf. above) but also elsewhere – several arti-
cles in (Folkerts, 2006) elucidate the topic in detail. Not only the calculation
before note 69 but also some of his abbreviations (and the variability of these)
are evident borrowings from Italian models (Høyrup, 2007c, p. 134). It might
seem a not impossible assumption that Regiomontanus was the main channel
for the adoption of Italian abbacus algebra into German areas, in spite of
his purely ideological ascription of the algebraic domain to Diophantos and
Jordanus (above, text before note 24).
An inﬂuence cannot be excluded, even though those of Regiomontanus’
algebraic notes we know about may not have circulated widely. However,
those of his symbolic notations or abbreviations which are not to be iden-
tiﬁed as Italian are already present in a section of a manuscript possessed
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by Regiomontanus but not written by him (Folkerts, 2006, V, pp. 201f ), cf.
(Høyrup, 2007c, pp. 136f ).86.
That Regiomontanus was at most one of several channels can also be seen
from the so-called Deutsche Algebra from 1481 (ed. Vogel, 1981). Its symbols87
for number (denarius, replaces earlier dragma), thing and census coincide with
those of the Robert-Appendix,88 that for the cube with the one Regiomontanus
employs for census – hardly evidence for inspiration from the latter. A token of
Italian inspiration certainly not passing through Regiomontanus is occasional
use of the quasi-fraction notation for powers and of 1c for cosa (Vogel, 1981,
p. 10) – all in all, as Kurt Vogel observes, evidence that a number of sources
ﬂow together in this manuscript.
I shall not consider in detail German algebraic writings from the sixteenth
century (Rudolﬀ, Ries, Stifel, Scheubel), only sum up that with time German
algebra tends to be more systematic and coherent in its use of symbolism
(for notation as well as calculation) than any single Italian treatise.89 But
what the German authors do is to combine and put into system ideas that
are all present in some Italian work. They never really go beyond the Italian
inspiration seen as a whole, and never attain the coherence which appears to
have been reached by the Maghreb algebraists of the twelfth century.90
I shall also be brief on what happened in French area. Scrutiny of Nicolas
Chuquet’s daring exploration of the possibilities of symbolism in the Triparty
from 1484 (ed. Marre, 1880) would be a task of its own; his parenthesis (an
underlining91) and his complete arithmetization of the notation for powers
86 The thing symbol in the appendix to Robert of Chester’s translation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ is
the same as Regiomontanus’s transformation of ρ ; the census symbol is a z provided with a
ﬁnal curlicue and which could be derived from the which we ﬁnd in the Modena-manuscript
but is much more likely to correspond to its initial use of z in this function.
87 Listed in (Vogel, 1981, p. 11).
88 With ∂ as an alternative for thing, standing probably for dingk.
89 The use of schemes for polynomial arithmetical calculation by Stifel (1544) and Scheubel
(1551) was mentioned above. They also appear in Rudolﬀ’s Coss (1525).
90 Quite new, as far as I know, and awkwardly related to the drive toward more systematic
use of notations (but maybe more closely to the teaching of Aristotelian logic), is the idea to
represent persons appearing in commercial problems by letters A, B, C, .... I have noticed it
in Magister Wolack’s Erfurt lecture from 1467, apparently the earliest public presentation of
abbacus mathematics in German land (ed. Wappler, 1900, pp. 53f), and again in Christoﬀ
Rudolﬀ’s Behend und hu¨bsch Rechnung durch die kunstreichen Regeln Algebra #128 (1525,
fol. Nvr−v).
91 The only parentheses Italian symbolic notation had made use of were those marked oﬀ
by the fraction line and the  de zonzo/legata/universale. The latter, furthermore, was
ambiguous – how far does the expression go that it is meant to include? (Actually, I have
not seen it go beyond two terms, which may indeed have been part of the concept.) A
parenthesis as good and universal as that of Chuquet had to await Bombelli (1572), even
though Pacioli (1494) uses brackets containing textual parentheses (e.g., on fol. 3r). As we
remember from note 12, even Descartes eschews general use of the parenthesis.
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as well as roots certainly goes beyond what can be found in anything Italian
until Bombelli, and (as far as the symbols for powers and roots are concerned)
even beyond the Maghreb notation. However, his innovations were historical
dead ends; Etienne de la Roche, while transmitting other aspects of Chu-
quet’s mathematics in his Larismetique from 1520, returned to more familiar
notations (Moss, 1988, pp. 120f ). What later authors learned (or, like Bu-
teo, refused to learn, ibid., p. 123) from de la Roche could as well have been
Italian.92
As a representative of the French mid-sixteenth century I shall choose
Jacques Peletier’s L’algebre from (1554) – interesting not least because his
orthographic reform proposal (1555; 1554, ﬁnal unpaged note) shows him to
have reﬂected on notation. Peletier knows Stifel’s Arithmetica integra, cites it
often and learns from it. But he must be acquainted with the Italian abbacus
tradition, and not only through Pacioli and Cardano, both of whom he cites
on p. 2: he speaks of the powers as nombres radicaus (p. 5), and uses  for the
ﬁrst power (this, as well as the nombres radicaus, could at a pinch be inspired
by Pacioli) and the stylized c¸ ( ) which we know from the Modena-manuscript
for the second power (following Stifel for higher powers). That certainly does
not help him go beyond the combination of the most developed elements of
Italian symbolism we know from the German authors – and like Stifel he does
not get beyond.
1.9 Why should they?
As we have seen, Italian abbacus algebra makes use of a variety of elements
that might have been (and in the main probably were) borrowed from the
Maghreb, most of them already present in one or the other manuscript from
the fourteenth century. But the abbacus masters do not seem to have been
eager to use them consistently, to learn from each other or to surpass each
other in this domain (to which extent they wanted to avoid to teach symbolism
is diﬃcult to know – it will not have had the same value in the competition for
jobs and pupils as the ability to solve intricate questions); Benedetto and the
compilers of the Ottoboniano and Palatino encyclopædiae were quite satisﬁed
with repeating a heritage that may reach back to Antonio, and did not care
about the schemes for polynomial arithmetic that had been in circulation at
least since Dardi’s times. Only with the Modena manuscript, with Canacci
92 The question to which extent the Provenc¸al tradition which Chuquet draws upon was
independent of the Italian tradition (to some extent it certainly was) is immaterial for the
present discussion; no surviving earlier or near-contemporary Provenc¸al writings oﬀer as
much incipient symbolism as the Italian abbacus writers.
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and with Pacioli’s Summa do we ﬁnd some eﬀort to be encyclopedic (if not
systematic) also in the presentation of notations.
Our meeting is about the “philosophical aspects of symbolic reasoning”,
and about “early modern science and mathematics”. The philosophical ques-
tion to raise to the material presented above is whether the abbacus masters
of the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth century, and even the algebraic writers of the
early and mid-sixteenth century, had any reason to develop a coherent sym-
bolic approach. The answer seems to be that they had none (cf. also note 50
and preceding text). The kind of mathematics they were engaged in (even
when they applied their art to Elements X, as do for instance Fibonacci and
Stifel) did not ask for that. They might sometimes extrapolate their technique
further than their mathematical practice asked for – 29 algebraic powers is
an example of that, as is of course the creation of never-used symbols for
these powers. But without a genuine practice there was nothing which could
force these extrapolations to merge into a consistent conceptual and opera-
tional framework. Even those abbacus authors that had scholarly ambitions –
as Benedetto and his contemporary encyclopedists, Pacioli and Tartaglia –
did not encounter anything within the practice of university or Humanist
mathematics which asked for much more than they did. To the contrary, the
aspiration to connect their mathematics to the Euclidean ideal made them
re-attach geometric proofs to a tradition from which these had mostly been
absent, barring thereby the insight that purely arithmetical reasoning could
be made as rigorous as geometric proofs – barring it indeed to such an extent
that Ries and Scheubel rejected Jordanus’ arithmetical rigor and borrowed
only his problems, as we have seen.
That changed in the outgoing sixteenth century. By then (if I may be
allowed some concluding sweeping statements), Apollonios, Archimedes and
Pappos were no longer mere names (or at most authors of diﬃcult texts to
be assimilated) but providers of problems to be worked on, and trigonometry
had become an advanced topic. This was probably what created the pull on
the development of symbolic reasoning and of those notations that symbolic
reasoning presupposed if it was to go beyond simple formal fractions;93 the
reaction to this pull (which at ﬁrst created a complex of new mathematical
developments) was what ultimately transformed symbolic mathematics into
93 It may perhaps be allowed to give a frivolous illustration of a sweeping statement: the
problems which the 16–17 years old Huygens investigated by means of Cartesian algebra
under the guidance of Frans van Schooten. Quite a few of them deal with matters from
Archimedes or Apollonios (Huygens, 1908, 27–60). The problems he dealt with 4–5 years
later (pp. 217–275 in the same volume) are derived from Pappos, and even they make
extensive use of Descartes’ technique. This is thus what a young but brilliant mathematical
mind was training itself at a decade after the appearance of Descartes’ Geometrie.
It is diﬃcult to imagine that these problems could have been well served by cossic
algebra, with or without the abbreviations that had been standardized in the mid-sixteenth
century.
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a factor that could (eventually) push the development of (some constituents
of) early modern science.
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Chapter 2
From the second unknown to the
symbolic equation
Albrecht Heeﬀer
Abstract The symbolic equation slowly emerged during the course of the
sixteenth century as a new mathematical concept as well as a mathematical
object on which new operations were made possible. Where historians have of-
ten pointed at Franc¸ois Vie`te as the father of symbolic algebra, we would like
to emphasize the foundations on which Vie`te could base his logistica speciosa.
The period between Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae of 1539 and Gosselin’s
De arte magna of 1577 has been crucial in providing the necessary build-
ing blocks for the transformation of algebra from rules for problem solving
to the study of equations. In this paper we argue that the so-called “second
unknown” or the Regula quantitates steered the development of an adequate
symbolism to deal with multiple unknowns and aggregates of equations. Dur-
ing this process the very concept of a symbolic equation emerged separate
from previous notions of what we call “co-equal polynomials”.
Key words: Symbolic equation, linear algebra, Cardano, Stifel, regula quan-
titates.
L’histoire de la re´solution des e´quations a` plusieurs inconnues n’a pas encore donne´
lieu a` un travail d’ensemble satisfaisant, qui donnerait d’ailleurs lieu a` d’assez longues
recherches. Il est intimement lie´ aux progre`s des notations alge´briques. J’ai appele´
l’attention sur le proble`me de la resolution des equations simultane´es, chaque fois que
je l’ai rencontre´, chez les auteurs de la ﬁn du XVIe et du commencement du XVIIe
sie`cle. (Bosmans, 1926, 150, footnote 16).
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2.1 Introduction
This footnote, together with many similar remarks by the Belgian historian
Father Henri Bosmans (S.J.), initiated our interest in the role of the second
unknown or regula quantitates on the development of symbolism during the
sixteenth century.1 Indeed, the importance of the use of multiple unknowns in
the process leading to the concept of an equation cannot be overestimated. We
have traced the use and the development of the second unknown in algebraic
problem solving from early Arabic algebra and its introduction in Europe
until its last appearance in Jesuit works on algebra during the late seventeenth
century. The ﬁrst important step in abbaco algebra can be attributed to the
Florentine abbaco master Antonio de’ Mazzinghi, who wrote an algebraic
treatise around 1380 (Arrighi 1967). Luca Pacioli almost literally copied the
solution method in his Summa of 1494, and Cardano used the second unknown
both in his Arithmetica and the Ars Magna. A second thread of inﬂuence is
to be distinguished through the Triparty by Chuquet and the printed works
of de la Roche and Christoﬀ Rudolﬀ. The Rule of Quantity ﬁnally culminates
in the full recognition of a system of linear equation by Buteo and Gosselin.
The importance of the use of letters to represent several unknowns goes much
further than the introduction of a useful system of notation. It contributed to
the development of the modern concept of unknown and that of a symbolic
equation. These developments formed the basis on which Vie`te could build
his theory of equations.
It is impossible to treat this whole development within the scope of a single
chapter. The use of the second unknown by Chuquet (1489) and de la Roche
(1520) and its spread in early sixteenth-century Europe is already treated in
Heeﬀer (2010a). Its reception and development on the Iberian peninsula has
recently be studied by Romero (2010). In this paper we will concentrate on
one speciﬁc aspect of the second unknown – the way it shaped the emergence
of the symbolic equation.
2.2 Methodological considerations
As argued in Heeﬀer (2008), the correct characterization of the Arabic concept
of an equation is the act of keeping related polynomials equal. Two of the
three translators of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra, Guglielmo de Lunis and Robert
of Chester use the speciﬁc term coaequare. In the geometrical demonstration
1 References to the second unknown are found in Bosmans (1925-6) on Stifel, Bosmans
(1906) on Gosselin, Bosmans (1907) on Peletier, Bosmans (1908a) on Nunez and Bosmans
(1926) on Girard.
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of the ﬁfth case, de Lunis proves the validity of the solution for the “equation”
x2 + 21 = 10x. The binomial x2 + 21 is coequal with the monomial 10x, as
both are represented by the surface of a rectangle (Kaunzner, 1989, 60):
Ponam censum tetragonum abgd, cuius radicem ab multiplicabo in 10 dragmas, quae
sunt latus be, unde proveniat superﬁcies ae; ex quo igitur 10 radices censui, una cum
dragmis 21, coequantur.
Once two polynomials are connected because it is found that their arithmeti-
cal value is equal, or, in the case of the geometrical demonstration, because
they have the same area, the continuation of the derivation requires them to
be kept equal. Every operation that is performed on one of them should be
followed by a corresponding operation to keep the coequal polynomial arith-
metical equivalent. Instead of operating on equations, Arabic algebra and the
abbaco tradition operate on the coequal polynomials, always keeping in mind
their relation and arithmetical equivalence. Such a notion is intimately re-
lated with the al-jabr operation in early Arabic algebra. As is now generally
acknowledged (Oaks and Alkhateeb, 2007; Heeﬀer 2008; Hoyrup 2010, note 7),
the restoration operation should not be interpreted as adding a term to both
sides of an equation, but as the repair of a deﬁciency in a polynomial. Once
this polynomial is restored – and as a second step – the coequal polynomial
should have the same term added.
At some point in the history of algebra, coequal polynomials will transform
into symbolic equations. This transformation was facilitated by many small
innovations and gradual changes in permissable operations. An analysis of
this process therefore poses certain methodological diﬃculties. A concept as
elusive as the symbolic equation, which before the sixteenth century did not
exist in its current sense, and which gradually transformed into its present
meaning, evades a full understanding if we only use our current symbolic
language. To tackle the problem we present the original sources in a rather
uncommon format, by tables. The purpose is to split up the historical text
in segments which we consider as signiﬁcant reasoning steps from our current
perspective. Each of these steps is numbered. Next, a symbolic representation
is given which conveys how the reasoning step would look like in symbolic
algebra, not necessarily being a faithful translation of the original source.
Finally, a meta-description is added to explain the reasoning and to verify its
validity. So, we have two levels of description: the original text in the original
language and notations, and a meta-level description which explains how the
reasoning would be in symbolic algebra. Only by drawing the distinction, we
will be able to discern and understand important conceptual transformations.
Our central argument is that once the original text is directly translatable into
the meta-description we are dealing with the modern concept of a symbolic
equation.
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2.3 The second unknown
Before discussing the examples, it is appropriate to emphasize the diﬀerence
between the rhetorical unknown and unknowns used in modern translitera-
tions. Firstly, the method of using a second unknown is an exception in al-
gebraic practice before 1560. In general, algebraic problem solving before the
seventeenth century uses a single unknown. This unknown is easily identiﬁed
in Latin text by its name res (or sometimes radix ), cosa in Italian and coss or
ding in German. The unknown should be interpreted as a single hypothetical
value used within the analytic method. Modern interpretations such as an
indeterminate value or a variable, referring to eighteenth century notions of
function and continuity, do not ﬁt the historical context. In solving problems
by means of algebra, abbacus masters often use the term ‘quantity’ or ‘share’
or ‘value’ apart from the cosa. The rhetoric of abacus algebra requires that the
quantities given in the problem text are formulated in terms of the hypotheti-
cal unknown. The problem solving process typically starts with “suppose that
the ﬁrst value sought is one cosa”. These values or unknown quantities can-
not be considered algebraic unknowns by themselves. The solution depends
on the expression of all unknown quantities in terms of the cosa. Once a value
has been determined for the cosa, the unknown quantities can then easily be
determined.
However, several authors, even in recent publications, confuse the unknown
quantities of a problem, with algebraic unknowns. As a result, they consider
the rhetorical unknown as an auxiliary one. For example, in his commentary on
Leonardo of Pisa’s Flos, Ettore Picutti (1983) consistently uses the unknowns
x, y, z for the sought quantities and regards the cosa in the linear problems
solved by Leonardo to be an auxiliary unknown. The “method of auxiliary
variable” as a characterization by Barnabas Hughes (2001) for a problem-
solving method by ben-Ezra also follows that interpretation. We believe this
to be a misrepresentation of the original text and problem-solving method.
The more sophisticated problems sometimes require a division into sub-
problems or subsequent reasoning steps. These derived problems are also for-
mulated using an unknown but one which is diﬀerent from the unknown in the
main problem. For example, in the anonymous manuscript 2263 of the Bib-
lioteca Riccardiana in Florence (c. 1365; Simi, 1994), the author solves the
classic problem of ﬁnding three numbers in geometric proportion given their
sum and the sum of their squares. He ﬁrst uses the middle term as unknown,
arriving at the value of 3. Then the problem of ﬁnding the two extremes is
treated as a new problem, for which he selects the lower extreme as unknown.
We will not consider such cases as the use of two unknowns, but the use of
a single one at two subsequent occasions. We have given some examples of
what should not be comprehended as a second unknown, but let us turn to a
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positive deﬁnition. The best characterization of the use of several unknowns
is operational. We will consider a problem solved by several unknowns if all
of the following conditions apply in algebraic problem solving:
1. The reasoning process should involve more than one rhetorical unknown
which is named or symbolized consistently throughout the text. One of the
unknowns is usually the traditional cosa. The other can be named quantita`,
but can also be a name of an abstract entity representing a share or value
of the problem.
2. The named entities should be used as unknowns in the sense that they are
operated upon algebraically by arithmetical operators, by squaring or root
extraction. If no operation is performed on the entity, it has no operational
function as unknown in solving the problem
3. The determination of the value of the unknowns should lead to the solution
or partial solution of the problem. In some cases the value of the second
unknown is not determined but its elimination contributes to the solution
of the problem. This will also be considered as an instance of multiple
unknowns.
4. The entities should be used together at some point of the reasoning process
and connected by operators or by a substitution step. If the unknowns are
not connected in this way the problem is considered to be solved by a single
unknown.
In all the examples discussed below, these four conditions apply.
2.4 Constructing the equation: Cardano and Stifel
2.4.1 Cardano introducing operation on equations
As far as we know from extant abbaco manuscripts Antonio de’ Mazzinghi
was the ﬁrst to use the second unknown (Arrighi, 1967). Surprisingly, this was
not for the solution of a linear problem but for a series of problems on three
numbers in continuous proportion (or geometric progression, further GP). The
same problems and the method of the second unknown are discussed by Pacioli
in his Summa, without acknowledging de’ Mazzinghi (Heeﬀer, 2010b). Before
turning to Cardano’s use of the second unknown, it is instructive to review
his commentary on the way Pacioli treats these – and hence, Mazzinghi’s –
problems. In the Questionibus Arithmeticis, the problem is listed as number
28 (Cardano, 1539, f. DDiiiv). Not convinced of the usefullness of the second
unknown, he shows little consideration for this novel solution as it uses too
many unnecessary steps (“Frater autem Lucas posuit ean et soluit cum maga
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diﬃcultate et pluribus operationibus superﬂuis”). He presents the problem
(2.1) with a = 25 instead of 36, as used by Pacioli.
x
y =
y
z
x+ y + z = a
a
x +
a
y +
a
z = x+ y + z = xyz
(2.1)
The solution is rather typical for Cardano’s approach to problem solving.
The path of the least eﬀort is the reduction of the problem to a form in which
theoretical principles apply. Using his previously formulated rule,2
a
x
+
a
y
+
a
z
= x+ y + z, y =
√
a
he immediately ﬁnds 5 for the mean term. As the product of the three, xyz =
y3 = 125, is also equal to the sum of the three, the sum of the two extremes
is 120. Applying his rule for dividing a number a into two parts in continuous
progression3 with b as mean proportional
a
2
±
√(a
2
)2
− b2,
he immediately arrives at(
60 +
√
3575, 5, 60−
√
3575
)
ita soluta est.
This approach is interesting from a rhetorical point of view. Abbaco trea-
tises are primarily intended to show oﬀ the skills of the master, often involving
the excessive use of irrationals while an example with integral values would
have illustrated the demonstration with the same persuasion. These trea-
tises are, with the exception of some preliminaries, limited to problem solving
only. With Pacioli, some recurring themes are extracted from his sources and
treated in separate sections. Cardano extends this evolution to a full body of
theory, titled De proprietatibus numerorum mirisicis, including 136 articles
(Cardano 1539, Chapter 42). The problem is easily solved because it is an
application of two principles expounded in this chapter.
2 Cardano 1539, Chapter 42, art. 91, f. Iiiv : “Omnium trium quantitatum continuae pro-
portionalium ex quarum divisione alicuius numeri proventus congregati ipsarum aggregato
aequari debeat, media illius numeri radix erit nam est eaedem necessarioeveniunt quantum
aggregatum est idem ex supposito”.
3 Cardano 1539, Chapter 42, art. 116, f. Ivir: “Si sint duo numeri utpote 24 et 10 et velis
dividere 24 in duas partes in quarum medio cadat 10 in continua proportionalitate, quadra
dimidium maioris quod est 12 sit 144. Detrahe quadratum minoris quod est 100 remanet
44, cuius R addita ad 12 et diminuta faciet duos numeros inet quos 10 cadit in medio in
contuna proportionalitate, et erunt 12 p R 44 et 10 et 12 m R 44.”
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Using such solution method, he completely ignores Pacioli’s use of two
unknowns for this problem. However Cardano adopts two unknowns for the
solution of linear problems in the Arithmetica Practicae of 1539. Six years
later he even dedicates two chapters of the Ars Magna (Cardano, 1545) to
the use of the second unknown. The last problem he solved with two unknowns
is again a division problem with numbers in continuous proportion.
Cardano used the second unknown ﬁrst in chapter 51 in a linear prob-
lem (Opera Omnia, IV, 73-4). He does not use the name regula quantitates
but operandi per quantitatem surda, showing the terminology of Pacioli. He
uses cosa and quantita for the unknowns but will later shift to positio and
quantitates in the Ars Magna.4
Let us look at problem 91 from the Questionibus, as this fragment embodies
a conceptual breakthrough towards a symbolic algebra. The problem is a com-
plex version of the classic problem of doubling other’s money to make equal
shares (Tropfke 1980, 647-8; Singmaster 2004, 7.H.4). In Cardano’s problem,
three men have diﬀerent sums of money. The ﬁrst has to give 10 plus one
third of the rest to the second. The second has to give 7 plus one fourth of
the rest to the third. The third had 5 to start with. The result should be so
that the total is divided into the proportion 3 : 2 : 1 (Cardano 1539, Chap.
66, article 91, ﬀ. GGviiiv – HHiv):
Tres ludebant irati rapverunt peccunias suas & alienas cum autem pro amicum
quievissent primus dedit secundo 10 p 1/3 residui. Secundus dedit tertio 7 p residui
& tertio iam remanserant 5 nummi & primus habuit 1/2 secundus 1/3 tertius 1/6
quaeritur summa omnium, & quantum habuit qui libet.
The meta-description in symbolic form is as follows:
a− 10− 13 (a− 10) = 12 (a+ b+ c)
b+ 10 + 13 (a− 10)− 7− 14
(
b+ 10 + 13 (a− 10)− 7
)
= 13 (a+ b+ c)
c+ 14
(
b+ 10 + 13 (a− 10)− 7
)
= 16 (a+ b+ c)
c = 5
Cardano uses the ﬁrst unknown for a and the second for b (“Pone quod primus
habuerit 1 co. secundus 1 quan.”). He solves the problem, in the standard way,
by constructing the polynomial expressions, corresponding with the procedure
of exchanging the shares. Doing so he arrives at two expressions. The ﬁrst one
is
x = 21
4
7
+ 3
6
7
y
(“igitur detrae 1/8 co. ex 5/12 co remanent 7/24 co. et hoc aequivalet 6 7/24
p. 1 1/8 quan. quare 7 co. aequivalent 151 p. 27 quan. quare 1 co. aequalet
4 The same problem is solved slightly diﬀerent in the Ars Magna and is discussed below.
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21 4/7 p. 3 6/7 quan.”). This expression for x would allow us to arrive at a
value for the second unknown. Instead, Cardano derives a second expression
in x
x = 101
4
5
+ 1
4
5
y
(“et quia 5/12 co. aequivalent etiam 42 5/12 p. quan. igitur 5 co. aequivale-
bunt 509 p. 9 quan. quare 1 co. aequivalent 101 4/5 p. 1 4/5 quan.”). As these
two expression are equal he constructs an equation in the second unknown:
21
4
7
+ 3
6
7
y = 101
4
5
+ 1
4
5
y
(“igitur cum etiam aequivaleat 21 4/7 p. 3 6/7 quan. erunt 21 4/7 p. 3 6/7
quan. aequalia 101 4/5 p. 1 4/5 quan. “). The text continues with: “Therefore,
subtracting the second unknowns from each other and the numbers from each
other this leads to a value of 39 for the second unknown. And this is the share
of the second one.” (“igitur tandem detrahendo quan. ex quan. et numerum
ex numero ﬁet valor quantitatis 39 et tantum habuit secundus“). However,
the added illustration shows us something very interesting (see Figure 2.1).
Fig. 2.1: Cardano’s construction of equations from (Cardano, 1539, f. 91r)
The illustration is remarkable in several ways. Firstly, it shows equations
where other illustrations or marginal notes by Cardano and previous authors
only show polynomial expressions. As far as I know, this is the ﬁrst unam-
biguous occurrence of an equation in print. This important fact seems to have
gone completely unnoticed. Secondly, and supporting the previous claim, the
illustration shows for the ﬁrst time in history an operation on an equation.
Cardano here multiplies the equation
80
8
35
= 2
2
35
y
by 35 to arrive at
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2808 = 72y
The last line gives 39 = y and not ‘y equals 39’ which designates the implicit
division of the previous equation by 72. The illustration appears both in the
1539 edition and the Opera Omnia (with the same misprint for 2808). As
we discussed before, the term ‘equation’ should be used with caution in the
context of early sixteenth-century practices. This case however, constitutes the
construction of an equation in the historical as well as the conceptual sense.
We have previously used an operational deﬁnition for the second unknown.
Similarly, operations on an equation, as witnessed in this problem, support
an operational deﬁnition of an equation. We can consider an equation, in this
historical context, as a mathematical entity because it is directly operated
upon by multiplication and division operators.
2.4.2 Michael Stifel introducing multiple unknowns
As a university professor in mathematics, Stifel marks a change in the typical
proﬁle of abbaco masters writing on algebra. In that respect, Cardano was a
transitional ﬁgure. Cardano was taught mathematics by his father Fazio “who
was well acquainted with the works of Euclid” (Cardano, 2002, 8). Although
he was teaching mathematics in Milan, his professorship from 1543 was in
medicine. His choice of subjects and problems ﬁt very well within the abacus
tradition. However, he did change from the vernacular of the abbaco masters
to the Latin used for university textbooks. Stifel is more part of the university
tradition studying Boethius and Euclid, but believed that the new art of
algebra should be an integral part of arithmetic. That is why his Complete
Arithmetic includes a large part on algebra (Stifel, 1544). Most of his problems
and discussions on the cossic numbers, as he calls algebra, refer to Cardano. He
concludes his systematic introduction with the chapter De secundis radicibus,
devoted to the second unknown (ﬀ. 251v − 255v).
Several authors seem to have overlooked Cardano’s use of the second un-
known in the Practica Arithmeticae. Bosmans (1906, 66) refers to the ninth
chapter of the Ars Magna as the source of Stifel’s reference, but this must be
wrong as the foreword of the Arithmetica Integra is dated 1543 and the Ars
Magna was published in 1545. In fact, the inﬂuence might be in the reverse
direction. Cifoletti (1993, 108) writes that “reading Stifel one wonders why the
German author is so certain of having found most of his matter on the second
unknown precisely in Cardano, i.e. in the Practica Arithmeticae. For, the Ars
Magna would be more explicit on this topic”. She gives the example of the
regula de medio treated in chapter 51 of the Practica Arithmeticae (Opera,
87) and more extensively in the Ars Magna (Witmer, 92). She writes: “In
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fact, the rule Cardano gives for this case is not quite a rule for using several
unknowns, but rather a special case, arising as a way to solve problems by
‘iteration’ of the process of assigning the unknown”. However, Stifel’s appli-
cation of the secundis radicibus to linear problems unveils that he drew his
inspiration from the problems in Cardano’s Questionibus of Chapter 66, as
the one discussed above. He makes no eﬀort to conceal that:5
Christoﬀ Rudolﬀ and Cardano treat the second unknown using the term quantitatis,
and therefore they designate it as 1q. This is at greater length discussed by Car-
dano. While Christoﬀ Rudolﬀ does not mention the relation of the second [unknown]
with the ﬁrst. On the other hand, Cardano made us acquainted with it by beautiful
examples, so that I could learn them with ease.
Graciously acknowledging his sources, he adds an important innovation for
the notation of the second an other unknowns. Keeping the cossic symbol
for the ﬁrst unknown, the second is represented as 1A, the third by 1B, and so
on, which he explains, is a shorthand notation for 1A and 1B , the square
of 1A being 1A . The use of the letters A, B and C in linear problems is
common in German cossist manuscripts since the ﬁfteenth century.6 Although
these letters are not used as unknowns, the phrasing comes very close to the
full notation given by Stifel. For example, Widman writes as follows: “Do as
follows, pose that C has 1x, therefore having A 2 , because he has double
of C, and B 3 , because he has triple”.7 Using Stifel’s symbolism this would
read as 1x, 2Ax and 3Bx. Although conceptually very diﬀerent, the notation
is practically the same. The familiarity with such use of letters made it an
obvious choice for Stifel. Later, in his commentary on the Coss from Rudolﬀ,
he writes on Rudolﬀ’s use of 1 and 1q., “However, I prefer to use 1A for 1q.
5 Stifel (1544) f. 252r: “Christophorus et Hieronymus Cardanus tractant radices secundas
sub vocabulo Quantitatis ideo eas sic signant 1 q. Latius vero eas tractavit Cardanus.
Christophorus enim nihil habet de commissionibus radicum sedundarum cum primis. Eas
autem Cardanus pulchris exemplis notiﬁcavit, ita ut ipsas facile didicerim”, (translation
AH). In the edition of Rudolﬀ’s Coss, he adds: “Bye dem 188 exempl lehret Christoﬀ die
Regul Quantitatis aber auss vil oben gehandelten exemplen tanstu yetzt schon wissen wie
das es teyn sonderliche regel sey... Das aber Christoﬀ und auch Cardanus in sollichen fal
setzen 1 q. Das ist 1 quantitet. Daher sie diser sach den nahmen haben gegeben und nennens
Regulam Quantitatis” (Stifel 1553, 307).
6 For example, the marginal notes of the C80 manuscript written by Johannes Widman
in 1481, give the following problem (C80 f. 359r, Wappler 1899, 549): “Item sunt tres
socij, scilicet A, B, C, quorum quilibet certam pecuniarum habet summam. Dicit C: A
quidem duplo plus habet quam ego, B vero triplum est ad me, et cum quilibet eorum
partem abiecerit, puta A 2 et B 3, et residuum vnius si ductum fuerit in residuum alterius,
proveniunt 24. Queritur ergo, quod quilibet eorum habuit, scilicet A et B, et quot ego”.
Høyrup (2010) describes an even earlier example by Magister Wolack of 1467, note 90.
7 Ibid.: “Fac sic et pone, quod C habet 1 x, habebit ergo A 2x, quia duplum ad C, et B 3x,
quia triplum”.
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because sometimes we have examples with three (or more) numbers. I then
use 1 , 1A, 1B, etc.”.8
Distinguishing between a second and third unknown is a major step for-
ward from Chuquet and de la Roche who used one and the same symbol for
both.9 Before Stifel, there has always been an ambiguity in the meaning of the
‘second’ unknown. From now on, the second and the third unknown can be
used together as in yz, which becomes 1AB. However, Stifel’s notation system
is not free from ambiguities. For the square of A, he uses 1A , while B
should be read as the product of x2 and B. The product of 2x3 and 4y2, an
example given by Stifel, becomes 8 A . A potential problem of ambiguity
arises when we multiply 3x2 and 4z, also given as an example. This leads to
12 B and thus it becomes very confusing that 12z2x being the product of
12z2 and x is written as 12 B while 12z2 would be 12B . Given the com-
mutativity of multiplying cossic terms, both expressions should designate the
same. The problem becomes especially manifest when multiplying more than
two terms together using the extended notation. Stifel seems not be aware of
the problem at the time of writing the Arithmetica integra.
Fig. 2.2: The rules for multiplying terms from Stifel (1545, f. 252r)
The chapter on the secundis radicibus concludes with some examples of prob-
lems. Other problems, solved by several unknowns are given in de exemplis of
the following chapters. Here we ﬁnd solutions to many problems taken from
Christoﬀ Rudolﬀ, Adam Ries and Cardano, usually including the correct ref-
8 Stifel, 1553, f. 186r: “Ich pﬂeg aber fu¨r 1q zusetzen 1A auss der ursach das zu zeyten ein
exemplum wol drey (oder mehr) zalen fu¨rgibt zu ﬁnden. Da setze ich sye also 1x, 1A, 1B etc”.
9 For an extensive discussion of the second unknown in Chuquet, de la Roche and Rudolﬀ
and their interdependence see Heeﬀer (2010a).
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erence. In the original sources, these problems are not necessarily treated
algebraically, or by a second unknown. Let us look at one problem which he
attributes to Adam Ries:10
Three are in company, of which the ﬁrst tells the second: if you give me half of your
share, I have 100 ﬂ. The second tells the third: if you give me one third of your share,
then I have 100 ﬂ. And the third tells the ﬁrst: if you give me your sum divided by
four, I have 100 ﬂ. The question is how much each has.
The problem is slightly diﬀerent from the example discussed above, in that
the shares refer to the next one in the cycle and not to the sum of the others.
The direct source of Stifel appears to be the unpublished manuscript Die
Coss by Adam Riese, dated 1524 (Berlet 1860, 19-20). The problem is treated
twice by Riese (problem 31, and repeated as problem 120). Although he uses
the letters a, b and c, the problem is solved with a single unknown. Riese
in turn might have learned about the problem from Fredericus Amann, who
treated the problem in a manuscript of 1461, with the same values (Cod. Lat.
Monacensis 14908, 155r − 155v; transcription by Curtze, 1895, 70-1).
Stifel’s version in modern notation is as follows:
a+ b2 = 100
b+ c3 = 100
c+ a4 = 100
The solution is shown in Table 2.1. As a pedagogue, Stifel takes more steps
than Cardano or the abacus masters before him. Line 8 is a misprint. Probably,
the intention was to bring the polynomial to the same denominator as is done
in step 13. This ostensibly redundant step shows the arithmetical foundation
of the performed operations. Our meta-description gives the multiplication of
equation (12) by 4 which makes line (13) superﬂuous. Stifel however, treats
the polynomials as cossic numbers which he brings to the same denominator.
Ten years later he will omit such operations as he acts directly on equations.
The solution method is structurally not diﬀerent from the one used by previous
authors for similar linear problems. Note that Stifel does not use the second
and third unknown in the same expression. The problem could as well be
solved by two unknowns in which the second unknown is reused as by de
la Roche. However, the fact that more than two unknowns are used opens
up new possibilities and solution methods. How simply it may seem to the
modern eye, the extension of the second unknown to multiple unknowns by
Stifel was an important conceptual innovation.
10 Stifel 1553, f. 296r: “Exemplum quartum capitis huius, et est Adami. Tres sunt socij,
quorum primus dicit ad secundum, Si mihi dares dimidium summae tua, tunc haberem 100
ﬂ. Et secundus dicit ad tertium: Si mihi dares summae tuae partem tertiam, tunc haberem
100 ﬂo. Et tertius ad primum dicit: Si tu mihi dares summae tuae partem quartam, tunc
haberem 100 ﬂ. Quaestio est, quantum quisque eorum habeat”.
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Symbolic Meta description Original text
1 a + b
2
= 100 premise Quod autem primus petit aˆ secundo dimid-
ium summae, quam ipse secundus habet, ut
ipse primus habeat 100 ﬂ.,
2 x + y
2
= 100 choice of ﬁrst and
second unknown
fatis mihi indicat, aequationemen esse in-
ter 1x + 1/2A et 100 ﬂorenos. Sic auˆt soleo
ponere fracta huiusmodi (1x + 1A)/2 ae-
quatae 100 ﬂ.
3 2x + y = 200 multiply (2) by 2 Ergo 2x + 1A aequantur 200 ﬂ.
4 y = 200− 2x subtract 2x from
(3)
Et 1A aequantur 200 ﬂ – 2x. Facit ergo 1A,
200ﬂ. – 2x id quod mihi reservo loco unius
A. Habuit igitur primus 1x ﬂorenorum. Et
secundus 200 ﬂ. – 2x.
5 z = c choice of third un-
known
Et tertius 1B ﬂor.
6 y + z
3
= 100 premise Petit autem secundus tertiam partem sum-
mae terti socij, ut sicispe secundus habeat
100 ﬂ.
7 200− 2x + z
3
= 100 substitute (4) in (6) Itaque iam 200 ﬂ. – 2x ﬂ + 1/3 B, aequan-
tur 100 ﬂorenis.
8 600− 6
3
x + z = 100 illegal Sic ego soleo ponere huiusmodi fractiones,
ut denominator respiciat totum numera-
torem. Ut 600 – 6/3 x + B aequata 100.
9 600− 6x + z = 300 multiply (7) by 3 Aequantur itaque 600 – 6x + B cum 300.
10 z = 6x− 300 add 6x+ 600 to (9) Atque hac aequatione vides fatis, ut 1B re-
solvatur in 6x – 300. Et sic primus habuit
1x ﬂorenorum. Secundus 200 ﬂ – 2x. Tertius
6x – 300.
11 z + x
4
= 100 premise Petit autem tertius partem quartam sum-
mae, quam habet primus, ut sic ipse tertius
etiam habeat centum ﬂorenos.
12 6 1
4
x− 300 = 100 substitute (10) in
(11)
Itaque 6 x – 300 aequantur 100.
13 25x−1200
4
= 100 from (12) Item (25x – 1200)/4 aequantur 100 ﬂ.
14 25x− 1200 = 400 multiply (12) by 4 Et sic 25x – 1200 aequantur 400.
15 25x = 1600 add 1200 to (12) Item 25x aequantur 1600 ﬂ.
16 x = 64 divide (13) by 25 Facit 1x 64 ﬂ.
17 y = 200− 128 substitute (16) in
(4)
Habuit igitur primus 1x, id est, 64 ﬂ. Se-
cundus habuit 200 – 2x.
18 y = 72 from (15) i. 72 ﬂ.
19 z = 384− 300 substitute (18) in
(10)
Et tertius habuit 6x – 300,
20 z = 84 from (19) hoc est 84 ﬂ.
Table 2.1: Stifel’s exposition of the second unknown.
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2.5 Cardano revisted: The ﬁrst operation on two
equations.
Cardano envisaged an Opus perfectum covering the whole of mathematics in
fourteen volumes, published in stages (Cardano 1554). Soon after the pub-
lication of the Practica arithmeticae, he started working on the Ars Magna,
which was to become the tenth volume in the series.11 It was published by
Johann Petreius in Nu¨rnberg in 1545, who printed Stifel’s Arithmetica Integra
the year before as well as several other books by Cardano. We know that Car-
dano has seen this work and it would be interesting to determine the inﬂuence
of Stifel.12 The Ars Magna shows an evolution from the Practica Arithmeti-
cae in several aspects. Three points are relevant for our story of the second
unknown. Having learned that Tartaglia arrived at a solution to the cubic by
geometrical reasoning, Cardano puts much more eﬀort than before in deliver-
ing geometrical proofs, and this not only for the cubic equation. He also tries
to be more systematical in his approach by listing all possible primitive and
derivative cases of rules (which we call equations), and then by treating them
separately. One of these primitive cases deals with two unknowns which he
discusses in two chapters. Chapter IX is on De secunda incognita quantitate
non multiplicata or the use of the second unknown for linear problems. Rules
for solving quadratic cases are treated in Chapter X. Let us look at the ﬁrst
linear problem:13
Three men had some money. The ﬁrst man with half the other’ would have had 32
aurei ; the second with one-third the other’, 28 aurei ; and the third with one-fourth
the others’, 31 aurei. How much has each?
In modern notation the problem would be:
a+ 12 (b+ c) = 32
b+ 13 (a+ c) = 28
c+ 14 (a+ b) = 31
(2.2)
In solving the problem Cardano introduces the two unknowns for the share
of the ﬁrst and the second person (“Statuemus primo rem ignotam primam,
11 The dating can be deduced from the closing sentence of the Ars Magna: “Written in ﬁve
years, may it last as many thousands” from Witmer (1968, 261).
12 Cardano mentions in his biography that he is cited by Stifel in what must be the ﬁrst
citation index (2002, 220).
13 Translation from Witmer (1968, 71). Witmer conscientiously uses p and q for positio
and quatitates which preserves the contextual meaning. Unfortunately he leaves out most
of the tables added by Cardano for clarifying the text, and replaces some of the sentences
by formulas. As the illustrations and precise wording are essential for our discussion, I will
use the Latin text from the Opera Omnia when necessary, correcting several misprints in
the numerical values.
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Symbolic Meta de-
scription
Original text
1 a = x choice of ﬁrst
unknown
Statuemus primo rem ignotam pri-
mam,
2 b = y choice of second
unknown
secundo secundam rem ignotam
3 c = 31− 1
4
(x + y) substituting
(1) and (2) in
(2.2)c
tertio igitur 31 aurei, minus quarta
parte rei, ac quarta parte quanti-
tatis relicti sunt
4 a + 1
2
(b + c) = 32 premise iam igitur vide, quantum habet
primus, equidem si illi dimididium
secundi et terti addicias, habiturus
est aureos 32.
5 a = 32− 1
2
y − 15 1
2
+ 1
8
x + 1
8
y substitute (2)
and (3) in (4)
habet igitur per se aureos 32 m. 1/2
quan. m. 15 1/2 p. 1/8 positionis p.
1/8 quant.
6 a = 16 1
2
− 3
8
y + 1
8
x from (5) quare habebit 16 m. 3/8 quanti-
tatis p. 1/8 pos.
7 x = 16 1
2
− 3
8
y + 1
8
x substitute (1)
in (6)
hoc autem sit aequale uni positioni
8 7
8
x + 3
8
y = 16 1
2
from (7) erit 7/8 pos. et 3/8 quant. aequale
16 1/2
9 7x + 3y = 132 multiply (8)
with 8
quare deducendo ad integra 7 pos.
et 3 quant. aequabuntur 132.
10 b + 1
3
(a + c) = 28 premise Rursus videamus, quantum habeat
secundus, habet hic 28 si ei tertia
pars primi ac tertij addatur
11 1
3
(a + c) = 1
3
x + 10 1
3
− 1
12
x− 1
12
y from (3) and
(6)
ea est 1/3 pos. p. 10 2/3 m. 1/12
pos. m. 1/12 quant.
12 1
3
(a + c) = 1
4
x + 10 1
3
− 1
12
y from (11) hoc est igitur pos. p. 10 1/3 m.
1/12 quant.
13 b = 17 2
3
+ 1
12
y − 1
4
x substitute (12)
in (11)
abbice ex 28 relinquitur 17 2/3 p.
1/12 quant. m. pos. et tantum ha-
bet secundus.
14 y = 17 2
3
+ 1
12
y − 1
4
x substitute (2)
in (14)
suppositum est autem habere il-
lum quantitatem, quantitas igitur
secunda, aequivalet 1/12 suimet, et
17 2/3 p. m. pos.
secundo secundam rem ignotam”) (Opera III, 241). In the rest of the book
the two unknowns are called positio and quantitates, abreviated as pos. and
quan. They appear regularly throughout the later chapters, and in some cases
Cardano uses pos. for problems solved with a single unknown.
Note how strictly Cardano switches between the role of two unknowns and
the share of the ﬁrst and second person by making the substitution steps of
lines (7) and (14) explicit.
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15 11
12
y + 1
4
x = 17 2
3
subtract 1
12
y from
(14) and add 1
4
x
abiectis communiter 1/12 quantitatis,
et restituto m. alteri parti, sient 11/12
quan. p. pos aequalia 17 2/3,
16 11y + 3x = 212 multiply (15) by 12 quare 11 quant. p. 3 pos. aequalia erunt
212 multiplicatis partibus omnibus per
12 denominatorem.
The next part in the solution is the most signiﬁcant with respect to the emerg-
ing concept of a symbolic equation. Historians have given a lot of attention
to the Ars magna for the ﬁrst published solution to the cubic equation, while
this mostly is a technical achievement. We believe Cardano’s work is equally
important for its conceptual innovations such as the one discussed here.
The ﬁrst occurrence of the second unknown for a linear problem is by an
anonymous ﬁfteenth-century abbaco master, author of Fond. prin. V.152.14
The problem about four men buying an ox is by means of the second unknown
reduced to two “linear equations”, 7y = 13x+4 and 4y = 2x+167. Expressed
in symbolic algebra it is obvious to us that by multiplying the two equations
with the coeﬃcients of y, we can eliminate the second unknown which leads
to a direct solution. However, the author was not ready to do that, because
he did not conceive the structures as equations. They are subsequently solved
by the standard tool at that time, the rule of double false position. Cardano
here marks a turning point in this respect. Having arrived at two equations
in two unknowns Cardano gives a general method: 15
Now raise whichever of these you like to equality with the other with respect to the
number of either x or y “(in positionum aut quantitatum numero”). Thus you may
decide that you wish, by some method, that in 3x + 11y = 212, there should be 7x.
Then, by using the rule of three, there will be
7x + 25
2
3
y = 494
2
3
.
You will therefore have, as you see,
7x + 3y = 132 and 7x + 25
2
3
y = 494
2
3
Hence, since 7x is the same in both, in both the diﬀerence between the quantities of
y, namely 22 2/3, will equal the diﬀerence between the numbers, which is 362 2/3.
14 Franci and Pancanti, 1988, 144, ms. f. 177r: “che tra tutti e tre gli uomeni avevano 3 oche
meno 2 chose e sopra a questo agiugnero` l’ocha la quale si vole chonperare, chos aremo che
tra tutti e tre gli uomeni e l’ocha saranno 4 oche meno 2 chose, dove detto fu nella quistione
che tra danari ch’anno tutti e tre gli uomeni e ’l chosto del’ocha erano 176. Adunque,
posiamo dire che lle 4 oche meno 2 chose si vagliano 176, chos`ı a`i due aguagliamenti”. In
Heeﬀer (2010b) it is argued that this text is by Antonio de’ Mazzinghi or based on a text
by his hand.
15 Cardano 1663, Opera IV, 241. I have adapted Witmer’s translation to avoid the use of
the terms coeﬃcient and equation, not used by Cardano (Witmer 1968, 72).
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Divide therefore, as in the simple unknown, according to the third chapter, 362 2/3
by 22 2/3; 16 results as the value of y and this is the second.
Using modern terms, this comes down to the following: given two linear equa-
tions in two unknowns, you can eliminate any of the unknowns by making
their coeﬃcients equal and adapting the other values in the equation. The
diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient of the remaining unknown will be equal to
the diﬀerence of the numbers. Although the result is the same, the text does
not phrase the procedure as a subtraction of equations. However, the table
added by Cardano, which is omitted in Witmer’s translation, tells a diﬀerent
story:
7x + 3y = 132
7x + 25 2
3
y = 494 2
3
22 2
3
y = 362 2
3
The table shows a horizontal line which designates a derivation: “from the ﬁrst
and the second, you may conclude the third”. This table goes well beyond the
description of the text and thus reads: “the ﬁrst expression subtracted from
the second results in the third”. He previously used the same representation
for the subtraction of two polynomials, also subtracting the upper line from
the lower one (Cardano 1663, IV, 20). Cardano never describes the explicit
subtraction of two equations in the text. Even if he did not intend to represent
it that way, his peers studying the Ars magna will most aptly have read
it as an operation on equations. As such, this is the ﬁrst occurrence of an
operation involving two equations, a very important step into the development
of simultaneous equations and the very concept of an equation.
A second point of interest for the story of the second unknown is an addition
in a later edition of the Ars Magna (Cardano, 1570; 1663; Witmer p. 75
note 13). Cardano added the problem of ﬁnding three so that the following
conditions hold (in modern notation):16
a+ b = 1 12 (a+ c)
a+ c = 1 12 (b+ c)
He oﬀers two algebraic solutions for this indeterminate problem. The second
one is the most modern one, since he only manipulates equations and not
polynomials. But the ﬁrst solution has an interesting aspect, because we could
16 Cardano, Opera IV, 242: “Exemplum tertium fatis accommodatum. Invenias tres quan-
titates quarum prima cum secunda sit sequialtera primae cum tertia et prima cum tertia
sit sequialtera 2 cum tertia”.
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call it a derivation with two and a half unknowns. Cardano uses positio for
the third number and quantitates for the second, for which we will use x and
y. The sum of the ﬁrst and third thus is
1
1
2
(x+ y).
Subtracting the third gives the value of the ﬁrst as
1
2
x+ 1
1
2
y.
Multiplying the sum of the ﬁrst and third with 112 gives the sum of ﬁrst and
second as
2
1
4
x+ 2
1
4
y.
Subtracting the second gives a second expression for the ﬁrst as
2
1
4
x+ 1
1
4
y.
As these two are equal
1
3
4
x =
1
4
y or y is equal to 7x
Only then, Cardano removes the indeterminism by posing that x = 1 lead-
ing to the solution (11, 7, 1). The interesting aspect of this fragment is that
Cardano tacitly uses a third unknown which gets eliminated. As a demonstra-
tion, the reasoning can be reformulated in modern notation, with z as third
unknown as follows:
z + y = 1
1
2
(z + x) (2.3)
z + x = 1
1
2
(x+ y) (2.4)
If we subtract x from (2.4) it follows that
z =
1
2
x+ 1
1
2
y
Substituting (2.4) in (2.3) gives
z + y = 2
1
4
x+ 2
1
4
y
Subtracting y from this equation gives
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z = 2
1
4
x+ 1
1
4
y
Therefore
1
2
x+ 1
1
2
y = 2
1
4
x+ 1
1
4
y
or
y = 7x
There is only a small diﬀerence between Cardano’s solution and our refor-
mulation. If only he had a symbol or alternative name for the ﬁrst unknown
quantity, it would have constituted an operational unknown. He seems to be
aware from the implicit use of three unknowns as he concludes: “And this is a
nice method because we are working with three quantities” (“Et est pulchrior
modus quia operamur per tres quantitates”) (Opera, IV, 242). It is not clear
why this problem was not included in the 1545 edition. It could have been
added by Cardano as a revision to the Basel edition of 1570.
A third aspect from the Ars magna, which reveals some evolution in Car-
dano’s use of multiple unknowns is one of the later chapters, describing several
rules, previously discussed in the Practica aritmeticae. Chapter 31 deals with
the Regula magna, probably one of the most obscure chapters in the book.
The rule is not described, only some examples are given. Nor does it con-
tain any explanation why it is called The Great Rule. Most of these problems
concern proportions which are represented by letters. Remarkably, Cardano
performs operations on these letters and constructs equations using the letters
such as “igitur 49 b, aequalia sunt quadrato quadrati a” (see Table 2.2). Only
in the ﬁnal step, as a demonstration that this solves the problem, does he
switch back to regular unknown called res. Let us look in detail at problem
10 (Witmer 190, Opera IV, 276). A modern formulation of the problem is:
a+ b = 8
a3
7b
=
7b
ab
The text is probably the best illustration that the straightforward interpre-
tation of the letters as unknowns is an oversimpliﬁcation. If the letters would
be unknowns then substituting b = 8 − a in a4b = 49b2 would immediately
lead to the equation. Instead, Cardano takes a detour by introducing c, d and
e and then applying the magical step 5. No explanation is given, though the
inference
a
7
=
d
c
is correct, because
d
c
=
7b
a3
=
a
7
, or
7b
a3
=
ab
7b
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Symbolic Meta description Original text
1 c = a3 choice of unknown Sit a minor, eius cubus c, b autem maior,
2 ab = e choice of unknown et productum b in a sit e,
3 7b = d choice of unknown et septuplum b sit d,
4 a
7
= e
d
divide (2) by (3) quia igitur ex b in a, sit e et ex b in 7 sit d,
erit a ad 7,
5 a
7
= d
c
ut e ad d quare a ad 7 ut d ad c
6 ac = 7d multiply (5) by 7c Igitur ex a in c, sit septuplum d
7 a4 = 49b subtitute (1) & (3) in (6) sed est septuplum b, igitur 49 b aequalia
sunt quadrato quadrati a
8 b = 1
49
a4 divide (7) by 49 igitur b est aequale 1/49 quad. quadrati a
9 a + b = 8 premise quia igitur a cum b est 8
10 a + 1
49
a4 = 8 substitute (8) in (9) et b est 1/49 quad. quadrati a, igitur a cum
1/49 quad. quadrati sui, aequatur 8.
11 x + 1
49
x4 = 8 substitute a by x in (10) quare res et 1/49 [quad. quadratum ae-
quatur 8]
12 x4 + 49x = 392 multiply (11) by 49 [Igitur] quad. quadratum p. 49 rebus, ae-
quatur 392
Table 2.2: Cardano’s Regula magna for solving linear problems
which is the reciprocal of what was given. Apparently, the fact that e is to d
as d is to c, is evident to Cardano, shows how his reasoning here is inspired
by proportion theory, rather than being symbolic algebra.
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2.6 The improved symbolism by Stifel
From the last part of Stifel’s Coss (1553, f. 480r) we know that he has read
the Ars magna. He cites Cardano on the discovery of Scipio del Ferro (f. 482r)
and adds a chapter on the cubic equation. The inﬂuence between Cardano and
Stifel is therefore bidirectional. At several instances he discusses the second
unknown from a methodological standpoint, as Cardano did in the Ars magna.
Although Rudolﬀ does use the second unknown in the original 1525 edition
for several problems, in other examples Stifel recommends the regula quanti-
tatis as a superior method to the ones given by Rudolﬀ (“Christoﬀ setzet vier
operation oder practicirung auﬀ diss exemplum. Ich will eine setzen ist besser
und richtiger zu lernen und zu behalten denn seyne vier practicirung”, 223v).
He notes that there is nothing magical about the second unknown. For him,
it is basically not diﬀerent from the traditional coss: “Den im grund ist regula
Quantitatis nichts anders denn Regula von 1 .”(Stifel 1553, ﬀ. 223v−−224r).
While we can only wonder why it has not been done before, for Stifel it seems
natural to use multiple unknowns for the typical shares or values expressed in
linear problems: “Man kan auch die Regulam (welche sye nennen) Quantitatis
nicht besser verstehn den durch sollische exempla [i.e. linear problems] Weyl
sye doch nichts anders ist denn da man 1 setzt under einem andern zey-
chen” (Stifel 1553, f. 277v). He considers arithmetical operations on shares not
fundamentally diﬀerent from algebraic operations on unknowns: “Der Cossis-
chen zeychen halb darﬀest du dich auch nicht hart bekumern. Denn wie 3 ﬂ.
un 4 ﬂ. machen 7 ﬂ., also auch 3 und 4 machen 7 ” (1553, f. 489r).
After treating over 400 problems from Rudolﬀ, Stifel adds a chapter with
some examples of his own. Half of the 24 problems added are solved by two
unknowns. Interestingly, he silently switches to another notation system for
quadratic problems involving multiple unknowns, thus avoiding the ambigu-
ities of his original system. The improved symbolism is well illustrated with
the following example:17
Find two numbers, so that the sum of both multiplied by the sum of their squares
equals 539200. However, when the diﬀerence of the same two numbers is multiplied
by the diﬀerence of their squares this results in 78400. What are these numbers?
This is a paraphrase of Stifel’s solution: Using 1 and 1A for the two numbers,
their sum is 1 + 1A. Their diﬀerence is 1 – 1A. Their squares 1 and
1AA. The sum of the squares 1 + 1AA. The diﬀerence between the squares
1 – 1AA. So multiplying 1 + 1A with 1 + 1AA gives + 1 A +
1 AA + 1AAA which equals 539200. Then I multiply also 1 – 1A. with
1 – 1AA. This gives – 1 A – AA + 1AAA and that product equals
539200.
17 Stifel 1553, ﬀ. 469r − 470v , translation mine.
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So Stifel now uses AA for the square and AAA for the third power of A. He
thus eliminates the ambiguities discussed before. Now that A becomes AA,
the product of the square of A with 1 can be expressed as AA and the
product of the square of 1 with A as A or A – thus also removing the
ambiguity of multiplying cossic terms together. As such, algebraic symbolism
is functionally complete with respect to to the representation of multiple un-
knowns and powers of unknowns. What is still missing, as keenly observed by
Serfati (2010), is that this does not allow to represent the square of a polyno-
mial. In order to represent the square of 1 + 1 + 2, for example, Stifel has
to perform the calculation. Also, the lack of symbols for the coeﬃcients does
not yet allow that every expression of seventeenth-century Cartesian algebra
can be written unambiguously in Stifel’s symbolism. This was later introduced
by Vie`te. However, the important improvement by Stifel in his Coss, was an
important step necessary for the development of algebraic symbolism, and has
been overlooked by many historians.18 Having shown that Stifel resolved the
ambiguities in the interpretation of multiplied cossic terms, we will further
replace the cossic signs for coss, census and cube by x, x2 and x3.
Fig. 2.3: The improved symbolism by Stifel (1553, f. 469r)
Next, Stifel eliminates terms from the equation by systematically adding,
subtracting, multiplying and dividing the equations, not seen before in his
Arithmetica Integra of 1544 (Stifel 1553, 469v):
18 The symbolism introduced by Stifel in the Arithmetica integra is discussed by Bosmans
(1905-6), Russo (1959), Tropfke (1980, 285, 377), Gericke (1992, 249-50), Cifoletti (1993)
chapter 3, appendix 1 and 2. With the exception of Cajori (1928-9, I, 144-146) who mentions
Stifel’s innovation as “another notation”, none of these authors discuss the signiﬁcance of the
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Multiply the two equations in a cross as you can see below:
x3 + 1x2A + 1xAA + 1AAA = 539200
x3 − 1x2A− 1xAA + 1AAA = 78400
But dividing these numbers by their GCD (“yhre kleynste zalen”) gives 337 and 49
and so we arrive at the two sums:
49x3 + 49x2A + 49xAA + 49AAA
337x3 − 337x2A− 337xAA + 337AAA
and these two sums are equal to each other. If we now add 337x2A+337xAA to each
side so, this result in
337x3 + 337AAA = 49x3 + 386x2A + 386xAA + 49AAA
Now subtract 49x3 + 49AAA from each side, this will give
386x2A + 386xAA = 288x3 + 288AAA
Divide each side by 2x + 2A, this results in
193xA = 144x2 − 144xA + 144AA (2.5)
Next (as you can extract the square root from each side) subtract from each side
144xA
49xA = 144x2 − 288xA + 144AA
Extract from each side the square root, which becomes
√
49xA = 12x − 12A . This
we keep for a moment.
Here, operations on equations are remarkably extended to root extraction.
Although not fully correct, this can be considered a ‘natural’ step from previ-
ous extensions. Because the alternative solutions are imaginary they are not
recognized as such. Only in the seventeenth century we will see the full ap-
preciation of double solutions to quadratic equations. Now Stifel returns to
the equation (2.5) (“Ich widerhole yetzt die obgesetzte vergleychung”).
Add to each side [of this equation] as much as is needed to extract the root of each
side. This is 3 times 144xA, namely 432xA. So becomes
144x2 + 288xA + 144A2 = 625xA
Extract again from each side the square root, so will be
√
625xA = 12x + 12A
And before I have found that
√
49xA = 12x− 12A. From these two equations I will
make one through addition. Hence
improvements of 1553. Enestro¨m (1906-7, 55) spends one page on the improved symbolism
discussing Cantor’s Vorlesungen (1892, 441, 445).
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24x =
√
1024xA
Next I will square each side, which results in 576x2 = 1024xA and then I divide each
side with 576x. Thus
1x = 1
7
9
A or 1A =
9
16
x
Having formulated both unknowns in terms of the other, one of them can
be eliminated, or in Stifel’s wording resolved. He reformulates the original
problem in x and 9/16 x, which leads to a cubic expression with solution 64.
We have previously shown that Cardano’s operations on equations are im-
plicit in the illustrations but are not rhetorically phrased as such. In this
text by Stifel we have a very explicit reference to the construction from one
equation by the addition of two others: “From these two equations I make
one equation by addition” (“Aufs desen zweyen vergleychungen mach ich ein
einige vergleychung mit addiren”). This is certainly an important step forward
from the Arithmetica Integra, and from then on, operations on equations will
be more common during the sixteenth century.
We have here an unique opportunity to compare two works, separated
by a decade of development in Stifel’s conceptions of algebra. It gives us
a privileged insight into subtle changes of the basic concepts of algebra, in
particular that of a symbolic equation. As an illustration, let us look at one
problem with three numbers in geometric progression. The same problem is
presented in Latin in the Arithmetica Integra and in German in the Stifel
edition of Rudolﬀ’s Coss, though with diﬀerent values. The problem is solved
using two unknowns in essentially the same way, but there are some delicate
diﬀerences which are very important from a conceptual point of view. As Stifel
presents the problem in a section with “additional problems by his own”, we
can assume that he constructed the problem himself. In any case, it does
not appear in previous writings. In modern formulation the problem has the
following structure:
a : b = b : c
(a+ c)(a+ c− b) = d
(a+ c− b)(a+ b+ c) = e
with respectively (4335, 6069) and (90720, 117936) for d and e. The start of
the solution is identical in the Latin and German text, except that the choice
of the ﬁrst and second unknowns are reversed (see Table 2.3).
In both cases Stifel arrives at two equations in two unknowns. These com-
pares very well with those from Fond. prin. V.152 and the example of Car-
dano’s Ars Magna, except that we now have a quadratic expression. If we
swap back the two unknowns in the German text, the equations compare as
follows:
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Stifel 1544, f. 313r Problem 24, Stifel 1553, f. 474r
Quaeritur tres numeri continue propor-
tionales, ita ut multiplicatio duorum
extremorum, per diﬀerentiam, quam
habent extremi simul, ultra numerum
medium, faciant 4335. Et multiplicatio
eiusdem diﬀerentiae, in summam, om-
nium trium faciat 6069.
Es sind drey zalen continue propor-
tionales so ich das aggregat der ersten,
und dritten, multiplicir mit der diﬀer-
entz dess selbigen aggregatis uber die
mittel zal, so kommen 90720. Und so
ich die selbige diﬀerentz multiplicir in
die summa aller dreyer zalen, so kom-
men 117936. Welche zalen sinds?
1A + 1x est summa extremorum 1A
– 1x est summa medij 2A est summa
omnium trium 2x est diﬀerentia quam
habent extremi ultra medium.
Die drey zalen seyen in einer summa 2x.
Die zurlege ich also in zwo summ
1x + 1A, 1x – 1A
Nu last ich 1x – 1A die mittel zal seyn
so muss 1x + 1A die summa seyn der
ersten und dritten zalen. Und also sind
2A die diﬀerentz dess selbigen aggre-
gats uber die mittel zal.
Itaque 2x multiplicatae in summam ex-
tremorum, id est, in 1A + 1x faciunt
2xA + 2x2 aequata 4335.
Drumb multiplicir ich 2A in 1x + 1A
facit 2xA + 2AA gleych 90720.
Deinde 2x multiplicatae in 2A seu in
summam omnium, faciunt 4xA aequata
6096.
So ich aber 2A multiplicir in die summ
aller dreyer zalen, nemlich in 2x, so
kommen 4xA die sind gleych 117936.
Table 2.3: Two ways how Stifel solves structurally the same problem.
2xy + 2x2 = 4335
4xy = 6096
2xy + 2x2 = 90720
4xy = 117936
The next step is to eliminate one unknown from the two equations. We have
seen that Cardano was the ﬁrst to do this by multiplying one equation to
equal the coeﬃcients of one term in both equations and then to subtract the
equations, albeit implicitly. In this respect, the later text deviates from the
former (see Table 2.4).
The method in the Latin text articulates the value of xy from the two
expressions and compares the resulting values. The text only states that their
values are equal. Although Stifel writes “Confer iam duas aequationes illas”,
this should be understood as “now match those two equal terms”, aequationes
being the acts of comparing. So from the ﬁrst expression we can infer that the
value of xy is (4335 – 2x2)/2. From the second we can know that the value
is 6069/4. Thus, (4335 – 2x2)/2 must be equal to 6069/4, from which we can
deduce the value of x. The reasoning here is typical for the abacus and early
cossist tradition were the solution is based on the manipulation and equation
of polynomials expressions. In the German text, a decade later, Stifel distinctly
moves to the manipulation of equations. He literally says: “Now double the
equation above” and “from this [equation] I will now subtract the numbers
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Stifel 1544, f. 313r Problem 24, Stifel 1553, f. 474v
Confer iam duas aequationes illas. Nam
ex priore sequitur quod 1xA faciat
(4335− 2x2)/2.
So duplir ich nu die obern vergleychung,
fa. 4xA + 4AA gleych 181440.
Ex posteriore autem sequitur quod
1xA faciat 6069/4. Sequitur ergo quod
(4335 − 2x2)/2 et 6069/4 inter se ae-
quentur. Quia quae uni et eidem sunt
aequalia, etiam sibi invicem sunt ae-
qualia. Ergo (per reductionem) 17340−
8x2 aequantur 12138 facit 1x2 · 650 1
4
.
Da von subtrahir ich yetzt die zalen
diser yetzt gefundnen vergelychung.
Nemlich 4xA gleych 117936 so bleyben
4AA gleych 63504.
Et 1x facit 25 1
2
. Also extrahir ich auﬀ yeder seyten die
quadrat wurzel, so werden 2A gleych
252 und ist die diﬀerentz dess aggregats
uber die mittel zal. So in nu 1A gleych
126.
Table 2.4: Two ways how Stifel solves structurally the same problem.
of the newly found equation”, thus eliminating the second unknown. The last
step also shows a clear evolution. In the Latin text he reduces the expression
to the square of the unknown 1x2 and then extracts the root. In the later text
he “extracts the square root of each side [of the equation]”. The rest of the
problem is to reformulate the original problem using the value of the second
unknown. This is done in similar ways.
The example shows how the road to the concept of a symbolic equation
is completed in a crucial decade of algebraic practice of the mid-sixteenth
century. We have witnessed this evolution within a single author. The French
algebraists from the second half of the sixteenth century will extend this
evolution to a system of simultaneous linear equations.
2.7 Towards an aggregate of equations by Peletier
Stifel’s edition of the Coss was published in Ko¨ningsberg in 1553, his foreword
is dated 1552. Peletier’s postscript ends the Alge`bre with the date July 28,
1554. The printer’s permit allows him to print and sell the book for three years
from June 15, 1554. So, while Peletier might have seen Stifel’s edition of the
Coss, it does not show in his book. He certainly has studied the Arithmetica
Integra well.
Jacques Peletier spends one quarter of the ﬁrst book on the second unknown
which he calls les racines secondes (pp. 95-117), a direct translation of Stifel’s
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de secundis radicibus (Stifel 1544, f. 251v). He introduces Stifel’s notation by
way of the problem of ﬁnding two numbers, such that, in modern formulation
(Peletier 1554, 96):
x2 + y2 = 340
xy = 67x
2
If we would use the same name for the unknown for both numbers, this would
lead to confusion, he argues. He therefore adopts Stifel’s notation of 1A, 1B
for the second and third unknown in addition to his own sign for the ﬁrst
unknown. He then discusses the operations with multiple unknowns: addition,
subtraction, multiplication and division, as was done with polynomials in
his introductory chapters. He retains Stifel’s ambiguity from the Arithmetica
Integra that xy cannot be diﬀerentiated from yx.
Peletier has selected this example, instead of the one used by Stifel, because
that problem can easily be solved in one unknown (“Car il est facile par une
seule posicion sans l’eide des secondes racines”, Peletier 1554, 102).
Fig. 2.4: The rules for multiplying terms with multiple unknowns from Peletier
(1554, 98). Compare these with Stifel (1545, f. 252r)
Using x for the larger number and y for the smaller one he squares the second
equation to
x2y2 =
36
49
x4 which leads to 49y2 = 36x2
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Because y2 = 340− x2 this can be rewritten as y2 = 340− 4936y2.
Then the second unknown can be expressed as
2
13
36
y2 = 340 or y2 = 144,
leading to the solution 12 and 14.
Peletier gives four other problems solved with multiple unknowns. The ﬁrst
two are taken from Cardano’s De Quaestionibus Arithmeticis in the Practica
arithmeticae, problem 97 and 98 (Cardano, Opera III, 168-9), the third is the
problem from Cardano’s Ars magna discussed above (2.2). The fourth is one
from Stifel (1544, f. 310v), reproducing the geometric proof. This shows that
Peletier was well acquainted with the most important algebraic treatises of
his time. In fact, Peletier’s example III (1554, 105-7) and its solution, is a
literal translation from Cardano’s, only using the symbolism from Stifel. The
problem is structurally similar to problem 41 from Pacioli discussed earlier
and follows the method by Pacioli. Compare the following text fragments:
Cardano, 1539, ﬀ. HH.vir - HH.viv Peletier, 1554, p. 106
Igitur per praecedentem iunge summam
eorum sit 3 quan. m. 31/30 co. divide per
1 m. numero hominum quod est 2 exit 1
quan. m. 31/60 co. et haec est summa quae
debet aequari valori equi sed aequus valet
1. quan. igitur 1 quan. m. 31/60 co. ae-
quantur 1 quan. quare detrahe 1 quan. ex
1 quan. remanebit quan. equivalens 31/60
co. igitur 1 quan. aequivalet duplo quod est
31/30 co. igitur dabis ex hoc fracto valorem
denominatoris qui est 30 [sic] ad co. et nu-
meratorem ad quan. igitur valor co. est 30
et valor quantitatis est 31 et in bursa fuere
30.
Par la precedente, assemblez les
troes sommes: ce sont 3A m. 31/30
R. Divisez par un nombre moindre
de 1 que les hommes, savoer est
par 2: ce sont 1 A m. 31/60 R.
E c’est la valuer du cheval. Donq,
1A est egale a 1 A m. 31/60 R.
E par souttraction, A est egale a
31/60 R. Donc 1A, vaut la double,
qui est 31/30 R. Meintenant, prenez
pour 1A, le numerateur, que est 31,
e pour 1R prenez le denominateur
30. Partant, le cheval valoet 31 e
l’argant commun etoest 30.
Table 2.5: The dependence of Peletier on Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae.
Peletier thus literally translated Cardano’s text only changing 1 quan. in 1A
and reformulating the common sum as the value of a horse. We included
this fragment to show how strongly Peletier bases his algebra on Cardano
while Cifoletti attributes to him an important role in the development to-
wards a symbolic algebra. Nonetheless, Peletier introduces some interesting
new aspects in the next linear problem taken from Ars Magna. He ﬁrst gives
a literal translation of Cardano’s solution calling the problem text proposi-
tion and the solution disposition. Interestingly he leaves out the substitution
steps from Cardano, lines (7) and (14). Cardano considered these important
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for a demonstration, but apparently Peletier does not. Then he introduces a
solution of his own (“trop plus facile que l’autre”). Starting from the same
formulation (2.2), Peletier adapts Cardano’s solution method by means of
Stifel’s symbolism for multiple unknowns.
Symbolic Meta description Original text
1 a = x choice of ﬁrst unknown Le premier a` 1R
2 b = y choice of second unknown Le second 1A
3 c = z choice of third unknown Le tiers 1B.
4 a + 1
2
(b + c) = 32 premise E par ce que le premier avec
1
2
des deus autres, an a` 32:
5 x + 1
2
(y + z) = 32 substitute (1), (2) and (3)
in (4)
1R p. (1A p. 1B)/2 seront
egales a 32.
6 2x + y + z = 64 multiply (5) by 2 E par reduccion, e due trans-
posicion: 2R p. 1A p. 1B sont
egales a 64, qui sera la pre-
miere equacion.
7 b + 1
3
(a + c) = 28 premise Secondemant, par ce que le
second, avec 1/3 partie des
deus autres an a` 28:
8 y + 1
3
(x + z) = 28 substitute (1), (2) and (3)
in (6)
ce sont 1A p. (1R p. 1B)/3
egales a 28:
9 x + z + 3y = 84 multiply (8) by 3 E par reduccion, 1A p. 1B p.
3A seront egales a 84, qui sera
la seconde equacion.
10 c + 1
4
(a + b) = 31 premise Pour le tiers (lequel avec 1
4
partie des deus autres an a`
31),
11 z + 1
4
(x + y) = 31 substitute (1), (2) and (3)
in (10)
nous aurons 1B p. (1R p.
1A)/4, egales a 31.
12 x + y + 4z = 124 multiply (11) by 4 e par samblable reduccion,
1R p. 1A p 4B seront egales
a 124. Voela, noz troes equa-
cions principales.
Table 2.6: Peletier solving a problem by multiple unknowns.
Having arrived at three equations in three unknowns there seems to be little
innovation up to this point. All operations and the use of three unknowns have
been done before by Stifel. However, we can discern two subtle diﬀerences.
Firstly, the last line (12) suggests that Peletier considers the three equations
as an aggregate. In the rest of the problem solving process he explicitly acts
on this aggregate of equations (“disposons donq nos troes equacions an cete
sorte”). Secondly, he identiﬁes the equations by a number. In fact, he is the
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ﬁrst one in history to do so, a practice which is still in use today.19 The
identiﬁcation of equations, as structures which you can manipulate, facilitates
the rhetorical structure of the disposition. This becomes evident in the ﬁnal
part (see Table 2.7).
Symbolic Meta description Original text
13 2x + 4y + 5z = 208 add (9) and (12) Ajoutons la seconde e la tierce, ce
seront, pour quatrieme equacion 2R
p. 4A p. 5B egales a 208
14 3y + 4z = 144 subtract (6) from (13) Donq an la conferant a la premier
equacion, par ce que 2R sont tant
d’une part que d’autre, la diﬀerance
de 64 a 208 (qui est 144) sera egale
avec la diﬀerance de 1A p. 1B a 4A
p. 5B: Donq, an otant 1A p. 1B de
4A p. 5B, nous aurons pour la cin-
quieme equacion 3A p. 4B egales a
144
15 3x + 4y + 2z = 148 add (6) and (9) ajoutons la premiere e la seconde:
nous aurons pour la sizieme equa-
cion 3R p. 4A p. 2B egales a 148.
16 3x + 2y + 5z = 188 add (6) and (12) ajoutons la premiere e la tierce:
nous aurons pour la sesttieme equa-
cion 3R p. 2A p. 5B egale a 188.
17 6x + 6y + 7z = 336 add (15) and (16) ajoutons ces deus dernieres: nous
aurons, pour la huitieme equacion
6R p. 6A p. 7B egales a 336.
18 6x + 6y + 24z = 744 multiply (12) by 6 Finablemant, multiplions la tierce
par 6 (pour sere les racines egales,
de ces deus dernieres equacions)
e nous aurons, pour la neuvieme
equacion 6R p. 6A p. 24B egales a
744.
Table 2.7: Peletier eliminating unknowns by adding and subtracting equations.
Peletier succeeded in manipulating the equations in such a way that he arrives
at two equations in which two of the unknowns have the same coeﬃcients, or
in his terms, “equal roots”. Subtracting the two gives 17z = 408 arriving at
the value 24 for z. The other values can then easily be determined as 12 and
16. Comparing his method with Cardano’s, it is not shorter or more concise.
Cardano takes 16 steps to arrive at two equations in which one unknown can
be eliminated, Peletier takes 18 steps to the elimination of two unknowns. But
19 The classic work by Cajori (1928-9) on the history of mathematical notations, does not
include the topic of equation numbering or referencing. I have seen no use of equation
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Peletier does not use the argument of length, instead he considers his method
easier and clearer, thus emphasizing the argumentative structure. Indeed, as
can be seen from the table, the actual text ﬁts our meta-description very well.
Peletier systematically uses operations on equations and applies addition and
subtraction of equations to eliminate unknowns. Moreover, he explicitly for-
mulates the operations as such: “add the second [equation] to the third, this
leads us to a fourth equation”. Although we have seen such operations per-
formed implicitly in Cardano’s illustration, the use of the terminology in the
argumentation is an important contribution. The use of multiple unknowns,
the symbolism and the argumentation, referring to operations on structures,
called equations, makes this an important entrance into symbolic algebra.
2.8 Valentin Mennher (1556)
Valentin Mennher, a reckoning master from Antwerp, introduces the rule in
between problems 254 and 255 as regle de la quantite´, ou seconde radice in his
Arithme´tique seconde (Mennher, 1556, f. Qiv; 1565, f. FFir) as a “rule which
exceeds all other rules and without which many examples would otherwise be
unsolvable”. He refers to Stifel for the origin of the rule and adopts Stifel’s
notation.20 From problem 267, it becomes clear that he has used Stifel’s edi-
tion of Rudolﬀ (1553) as he also uses the improved notation AA for the square
of the second unknown (1556, ﬀ. Qvir − Qviv; 1565, ﬀ. Ffviiir − Ffviiiv).
We will give one example from Mennher, though the method does not diﬀer
from Stifel’s solution to problem 193 of Rudolﬀ’s Coss. The problem is about
four persons having a debt, with the four sums of three given. The problem
is known from early Indian sources. Stifel uses four unknowns while Rudolﬀ
originally reuses the second unknown. Mennher adopts Stifels method with
diﬀerent values and slightly changing the unknowns. Mennher uses the values:
a+ b+ c = 18
b+ c+ d = 25
a+ c+ d = 23
a+ b+ d = 21
With the unknowns x, A, B and C for d, a, b and c respectively, he expresses
the sum of all four as 18 + x, 25 + A, 23 + B and 21 + C.
numbers prior to Peletier’s.
20 Mennher, clearly learned the use of letters from Stifel, as he writes: “tout ainsi comme M.
Stiﬀelius l’enseigne, en posant apres le x pour la seconde position A, et pour la troisiesme
B, et pout la quatriesme C.” (Mennher, 1556, Qiv ; 1565 Ffir − Ffiv).
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Fig. 2.5: The use of the second unknown by Mennher (1556, f. Ffir).
As these four expressions have the same value, the debts of the ﬁrst three
can be restated in terms of x, namely x – 7, x – 5, and x – 3 respectively.
Adding the three together with x leads to the sum of all four 4x – 15, which
is equal to 18 + x. From this it follows that x is 11, and the other debts are 4,
6 and 8. Most of the last twenty problems in the book are solved using several
unknowns.
2.9 Kaspar Peucer (1556)
The humanist Caspar Peucer wrote, among other works on medicine and
philosophy, a Latin algebra with the name Logistice Regulae Arithmeticae. The
book contributed little to the works published by Stifel and had little inﬂuence.
Except for a recent paper by Meiβner and Deschauer (2005), Peucer seems to
be forgotten. He discusses the regula quantitatis by the term radicibus secundis
and provides four examples (Peucer 1556, ﬀ. Tvir-Viir). He refers to Rudolﬀ,
Stifel and Cardano for the origin of the method. His ﬁrst example is the
ass and mule problems from the Greek epigrams, creating the indeterminate
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equation 1x+1 = 1A−1. The other problems are linear ones involving multiple
unknowns. The symbolism is taken from Stifel (1544).
2.10 Towards a system of simultaneous equations
2.10.1 Buteo (1559)
Jean Borel, better known under his Latinized name Buteo, is an underesti-
mated as an author of mathematical works during the sixteenth century. He
started publishing only after he became sixty. His Logistica of 1559 is a natu-
ral extension of the ideas of Peletier. Though Peletier was the ﬁrst to consider
an aggregate of equations, Buteo improved on Peletier and raised the method
to what we now call solving a system of simultaneous linear equations. The
naming of his book by the Greek term of logistics is an implicit denial of the
Arab contributions to Renaissance algebra. This position is shared by several
humanist writers of the sixteenth century.
Buteo introduces the second unknown in the third book on algebra in a
section De regula quantitatis (Buteo 1559, f. 189r). For the origin of the rule
he cites Pacioli and de la Roche (by the name Stephano). While the name of
the rule is indeed derived from de la Roche, Buteo remains quiet about his
main source, his rival Peletier.21
After an explanation of the method by means of four examples he solves
many linear problems by multiple unknowns in the ﬁfth book. He introduces
some new symbols but he had too little inﬂuence on his peers to be followed
in this. Where Peletier and Mennher still used the radix or cossic sign for the
ﬁrst unknown, Buteo assigns the letter A to the ﬁrst unknown and continues
with B, C, .. for the other unknowns. Ommitting the cossic signs all together,
Buteo takes a major step into the “representation of compound concepts”, a
necessary step towards algebraic symbolism according to Serfati (2010). The
next step would be the use of exponents as introduced by Descartes in the
Regulæ. Buteo further uses a comma for addition, the letter M for subtraction
and a left square bracket for an equation. Thus the linear equation
6x+ 3y + 2c = 84
is written as
6A, 3B, 2C[84
21 Apart from a theoretical dispute on the angles of contact, in which Buteo’s Apologia of
1562 pursues a refutation of Peletier, there existed a real hostility between them.
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Once an equation is resolved in one unknown, he uses two brackets as in
5C[60] for 5z = 60
A fragment of the fourth example is shown in Figure 2.6.
Fig. 2.6: Systematic elimination of unknowns by Buteo (1559, 194)
Buteo refers to equations, not by numbers as Peletier but at least by their
order. As an example let us look at question 30 (Buteo 1559, 357-8). His
commentary is very terse (see Table 2.8).
With this and other examples, Buteo systematically manipulates equations
to eliminate unknowns. His explanation refers explicitly to the multiplication
of equations and the operations of adding or subtracting two equations. The
idea of substitution is implicitly present, but is not performed as such, as can
be seen from the missing commentaries for steps (13) and (16).
2.10.2 Pedro Nunes criticizing the second unknown
Although from Portugese origin, Nunes wrote his treatise on algebra in Span-
ish and published it in Antwerp.22 Because his Algebra was published in 1567,
it could appear that Nunes did not take advantage of the signiﬁcant advances
22 His name is therefore often written in the Spanish form Pedro Nun˜ez.
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Symbolic Meta description Original text
1 x + y
2
+ z
3
= 14 premise Huius solution secundum quanti-
tatis regulam investigabitur, hoc
modo. Pone Biremes esse 1A,
Triremes 1B, Liburnicas 1C. Erit
igitur 1A, B, 1/3 C [ 14. Item 1B,
1/3 A, C [13. Et 1C, 1/6 A, 1/8 B
[ 14.
2 x
3
+ y + z
4
= 13 premise
3 x
6
+ y
8
+ z = 14 premise
4 6x + 3y + 2z = 84 multiply (1) by 6
5 4x + 12y + 3z = 156 multiply (2) by 12
6 4x + 3y + 24z = 336 multiply (3) by 24
7 24x + 12y + 8z = 336 multiply (4) by 4 multiplica aequationem (4) in 4
8 20x + 5z = 180 subtract (5) from (7) auser (5) restat
9 10x + 15y + 5z = 240 add (4) and (5) adde (4) (5)
10 10x + 60 = 15y subtract (9) from (8) Inter duas equationem postremas
que sunt (8) et (9) diﬀerentia est
(10)
11 5z = 60 subtract (10) from (8) qua sublata ex (10) restat (11)
12 z = 12 divide (11) by 5 Partire in 5 provenit (12)
13 20x + 60 = 180 substitute in (12) in (8)
14 20x = 180− 60 resolves (13) habeas Biremes ex aequatione ubi
est 180 auser 60
15 x = 6 divide (14) by 20 partire (14) in 20
16 2 + y + 3 = 13 substitute (15), (12) in (2)
17 y = 8 resolves (16) et Trimeres erunt 8
Quod erat quaesitum.
Table 2.8: Buteo’s handling of a system of linear equations.
in symbolic algebra established during the decades before him. However, in
the introduction, Nunes explains that he wrote most of the book over thirty
years ago.23 He chose to base much of the problems treated in his book on
the Summa by Pacioli (1494). He questions some innovations that he learned
from Pacioli, such as the use of the second unknown. Nunes discusses the
problem of three men comparing their money as treated by Pacioli in distinc-
tion 9, treatise 9, paragraph 26 (1494, f. 191v − 192r). However, the values
of the problem are not those of Pacioli but are identical to the problem of
Cardano, which we discussed above (2.2). Nunes does not reduce the problem
23 John Martyn discovered a manuscript in 1990, the Cod. cxiii/1-10 at Municipal Library
of E´vora, Portugal. This Portugese text, written in 1533, contains an algebra which he at-
tributed to Pedro Nunes. The date corresponds well with this thirty years of time diﬀerence.
Martyn (1996) published an English translation and put much eﬀort in the demonstration
of the similarities with the Spanish text of 1567. The attribution of this text to Nunez has
recently been refuted by Leita˜o (2002).
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to two linear equations in two unknowns to be resolved by manipulating the
equations as did Cardano (1545). Instead he follows the solution method in
two unknowns from Pacioli.24 He then provides a solution of his own, using a
single unknown and concludes with the following observation:25
But having treated the same example, that is case 51, we solved this with much ease,
and more concise by the single unknown, without the use of the absolute quantity.
And all the cases that Father Lucas solved with the [rule of] quantity, we solved by
the rules of the unknown, without the aid of this last quantity.
Nunes is not very impressed by the regula quantitatis in which others saw “a
more beautiful” way for solving problems or even “a perfection of algebra”.
He believes that most (linear) problems can be solved easier and shorter by a
single unknown.
Similar criticism was formulated by other authors. Bosmans discovered a
copy of the Arithmetica Integra by Stifel (1544) with marginal annotations
from Gemma Frisius. The book, kept at the Louvain university library, has
unfortunately been destroyed during World War I. Bosmans (1905-6, 168)
reports three occasions in which Frisius critizes Stifel for using the second un-
known: “Haec quaestio non requirit secundas radices” (f. 252v), “hic quoque
secundis radicibus non est opus” (f. 253r), “et haec quastio secundis radi-
cibus non est opus” (f. 253v) and “et haec quaestio secundis radicibus absolve
potest” (f. 255r). This demonstrates that the use of the second unknown was
still controversial during the mid-sixteenth century.
One could blame Frisius and Nunes for a reactionary view point. Bosmans
(1908a, 159) quotes Nunes with some examples in which he rejects negative
solutions and zero as a solution to an equation. However, Nunes had a very
modern approach to algebra. As pointed out by Bosmans (1908a, 163), he can
be credited as being the ﬁrst who investigates the relationship of the following
product with the structure of the equations (Nunes 1567, f. 125v):
(x+ 1)(x+ 1), (x+ 1)(x+ 2), (x+ 1)(x+ 3) . . .
(2x+ 1)(x+ 1), (2x+ 1)(x+ 2), (2x+ 1)(x+ 3) . . .
As we now known from further developments, such investigations were impor-
tant to raise sixteenth century algebra from arithmetical problem solving to
the study of more abstract algebraic structures and relations. This leads us
to the last author before Vie`te writing on the Regula quantitatis.
24 We omit the solution here because a complete transcription of the problem with a
symbolic translation is provided by Bosmans (1908b, 21-2).
25 Nunes 1567, f. 225v: “Pero nos avemos tratado esto mismo exemplo, que es el caso 51, y
lo practicamos muy facilmente, y brevemente por la cosa, sin usar de la quantidad absoluta.
Y todos los casos que Fray Lucas practica por la quantidad, practicamos nos por las reglas
de la cosa, sin ayuda deste termino quantidad”.
2 From the second unknown to the symbolic equation 93
2.10.3 Gosselin (1577)
Guillaume Gosselin’s De Arte Magna is our last link connecting the achieve-
ments of Cardano, Stifel, and Buteo using the second unknown with Vie`te’s
study of the structure of equations in his Isagoge. Cifoletti (1993) has rightly
pointed out the importance of this French tradition to the further development
of symbolic algebra.
Gosselin is rather idiosyncratic in his notation system and seems to ignore
most of what was used before him. For the arithmetical operators, addition
and subtraction he uses the letters P and M, rather than + and – as was
commonly used in Germany and the Low Countries at that time and also
adopted by Ramus in France. However, ﬁve years later in de Ratione (Gosselin,
1583) he did use the + and – sign. The letter ‘L’ (from latus) is used for the
unknown; the square becomes ‘Q’ and the cube ‘C’. In some cases he refers
to the second unknown by ‘q’, as did Cardano. For a linear problems with
several unknowns he switches to the letters A, B, C, as Buteo, but evidently
leading to ambiguities with the sign for x3. Even more confusing is the use of
‘L’ for the root of a number, such as
L9 for
√
9 and LC8 for 3
√
8
Accepting isolated negative terms, the letter ‘M’ is also used as M8L for –8x.
Gosselin follows Buteo with equations to zero as in ‘3QM24L aequalia nihilo’,
for 3x2−24x = 0 (Gosselin 1577, f. 73v). The symbolism adopted by Gosselin
can be illustrated with an example of the multiplication of two polynomials
(ibid. f. 45v):
4 L M 6 Q P 7
3 Q P 4 L M 5
12 C M 18 QQ P 21 Q
Producta 16 Q M 24 C P 28 L
M 20 L P 30 Q M 35
Summa 67 Q P 8 L M 12 C M 18 QQ M 35
The major part of book IV deals with the second unknown, though his ter-
minology is rather puzzling. Chapter II is titled De quantitate absoluta (f.
80r) and chapter III (misnumbered as II) as De quantitate surda (f. 84r).
In both these chapters Gosselin solves linear problems with several unknown
quantities. So what is the diﬀerence? Gosselin gives no clue as he leaves out
any deﬁnitions of the terms. However, we have previously seen that ‘abso-
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lute quantity’ is used by Nunes and quantita sorda by Pacioli and Cardano.26
From a comparison of the ﬁve problems solved by ‘absolute quantities’ with
the four solved by the quantita surda it becomes apparent that Gosselin places
the distinction between multiple unknowns and the second unknown. Thus the
‘absolute quantities’ correspond with the symbolic unknowns A, B, C, .. as
used by Buteo. Gosselin leaves out the primary unknown of Stifel or Peletier,
as was previously done by Buteo. The quantita surda corresponds with the
quan. of Cardano (1545), for which Gosselin uses the symbol q. The positio of
Cardano becomes the latus for Gosselin.
1
2
y + 2 + x = 9
2
y − 18
x + 20 = 4y
y = 1
4
x + 5
1
3
x + 3 + 1
4
x + 5 = 2x− 9
17
12
x = 17
x = 12, y = 8
Table 2.9: Gosselin’s use of the quantita surda (Gosselin, 1577, f. 84v)
Cifoletti (1993, 138-9) concludes on Gosselin that
it is true that this innovation originates with Borrel [Buteo], but Gosselin uses it with
a new skill that permits him to more easily solve the same problems proposed by
Borel. It seems reasonable to think that Vie`te took his symbol as point of departure to
arrive at his A, E. Gosselin could also be a source for the notation used by Descartes,
who in the Regulae proposes to designate the known term with lower-case letters and
the unknown with capitals.
26 Cifoletti (1993, 136) is wrong in claiming that “Cardano does not use the word surda
in this sense”. Furthermore, she translates the quantita surda as the surd quantity and
speculates on irrational quantities. However, the Italian term sorda, as used by Pacioli,
means ‘mute’ in Italian. Thus quantitate sorda may simply refer to the voiceless consonant
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Symbolic Meta description Original text
1 x + y
2
+ z
2
+ u
2
= 17 premise 1ABCD aequalia 17
2 x
3
+ y + z
3
+ u
3
= 12 premise 1B1/3A1/3C1/3D aequalia 12
3 x
4
+ y
4
+ z + u
4
= 13 premise 1CABD aequalia 13
4 x
6
+ y
6
+ z
6
+ u = 13 premise 1D1/6A1/6B1/6C aequalia 13
5 2x + y + z + u = 34 multiply (1) by 2 revocentur ad integros numeros, exis-
tent 2A1B1C1D aequalia 34
6 x + 3y + z + u = 36 multiply (2) by 3 1A3B1C1D aequalia 36
7 x + y + 4z + u = 52 multiply (3) by 4 1A1B4C1D aequalia 52
8 x + y + z + 6u = 78 multiply (4) by 6 1A1B1C6D aequalia 78
9 2x + 2y + 5z + 7u = 130 add (7) and (8) addamus duas ultimas aequationes,
tertiam scilicet et quartam, existent
2A2B5C7D aequalia 130
10 y + 4z + 6u = 96 subtract (5) from
(9)
tollamus hinc primam, restabunt
1B4C6D aequalia 96
11 2x + 4y + 2z + 7u = 114 add (6) and (8) addamus quartam et secundam, ﬁent
2A4B2C7D aequalia 114
12 3y + z + 6u = 80 subtract (5) from
(11)
tollamus hinc primam, supererunt
3B1C6D aequalia 80
13 2x + 4y + 5z + 2u = 88 add (6) and (7) addamus secundam et tertiam aequa-
tionem, ﬁent 2A4B5C2D aequalia 88
14 3y + 4z + u = 54 subtract (5) from
(13)
tollamus primam, restabunt
3B4C1D aequalia 54
15 3y + 12z + 18u = 288 multiply (10) by 3 iam vero triplicemus 1B4C6D quae
fuerunt aequalia 96 ﬁent 3B12C18D ae-
qualia 288
16 11z + 12u = 208 subtract (12) from
(15)
tollamus hinc 3B1C6D aequalia 80,
restabunt 11C12D aequalia 20
17 8z + 17u = 234 subtract (14) from
(15)
subducamus iterum ex eadem tripli-
cata aequatione 3B4C1D eaqualia 54,
restabunt 8C17D aequalia 234
18 88z + 187u = 2574 multiply (17) by 11 multiplicemus hanc aequationem in 11,
ﬁent 88C187D aequalia 2574
19 88z + 96u = 1664 multiply (16) by 8 ducamus etiam 11C12D aequalia 208,
in 8, existent 88C96D aequalia 1664
20 91u = 910 subtract (19) from
(18)
tollamus 88C96D aequalia 1664 ex
88C187D aequalibus 2574, restabunt
91D aequalia 910 sicque stat aequatio
21 u = 10 divide (20) by 91 partiemur 910 in 91, quotus erit 10
valor D, est ergo 10 ultimus numerus
ex quaesitis
22 11z + 120 = 208 substitute (21) in
(16)
et quoniam 11C12D erant aequalia 208,
Table 2.10: Gosselin’s solution to a problem from Buteo.
q representing ‘quantity’. In English a voiceless consonant is also called a surd.
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We believe that the inﬂuence on Vie`te and Descartes attributed to Gosselin
by Cifoletti is too much of an honour for Gosselin. The many ambiguities in
Gosselin’s system of symbols are clearly a departure from the achievements
by Stifel (1553). As to the superior way of solving problems with multiple
unknowns let us look at the ﬁfth problem which Gosselin solves by ‘absolute
quantities’. The problem text and its meta-description is as follows (Gosselin
1577, f. 82v):
Quatuor numeros invenire, quorum primus cum semisse reliquorum faciat 17. Secun-
dus cum aliorum triente 12. Tertius cum aliorum quadrante 13. Quartus cum aliorum
sextante faciat 13.
x+ y2 +
z
3 +
u
2 = 17
x
3 + y +
z
3 +
u
3 = 12
x
4 +
y
4 + z +
u
4 = 13
x
6 +
y
6 +
z
6 + u = 13
This is the very same problem of Buteo (1559, 193-6) shown in Figure 2.6.
Bosmans (1906, 64) writes that here “Gosselin triumphs over Buteo who gets
confused in solving the problem”. Let us ﬁrst look at Gosselin’s solution in
Table 2.10.
23 11z = 88 subtract 120 from
(22)
tollamus 12D hoc est 120, restabunt 88
aequalia 11C
24 z = 8 divide (23) by 11 dividemus 88 in 11, quotus erit 8, valor
C et tertius numerus
25 3y + 10 + 32 = 54 substitute (21) and
(24) in (14)
sed etiam 3B4C1D aequalia sunt 54,
26 3y = 12 subtract 42 from
(25)
tollamus hinc 4C1D, hoc est 10 et 32,
nempe 42, restabunt 12 aequalia 3B
27 y = 4 divide (26) by 3 estque B et secundus numerus 4
28 2x + 4 + 8 + 10 = 34 substitute (21),
(24) and (27) in (5)
iam vero 2A1B1C1D aequantur 34,
29 2x = 12 subtract 22 from
(28)
tollamus 1B, nempe 4, 1C 8, 1D 10, hoc
est 22, restabunt
12 aequalia 2A
30 x = 6 divide (28) by 2 quare 1A et primus numerus est 6
Table 2.11: Final part of Gosselin’s solution to a problem from Buteo.
Buteo provides three diﬀerent but correct solutions to the problem. In the
ﬁrst he reduces the number of equations by multiplication and subtraction to
eliminate an unknown in every subtraction step. Gosselin’s method may be
somewhat more resourceful but there is little conceptual diﬀerence between
both with regards to equations and the possible operations on equations.
Remark that the solution text is close to identical with our meta-description.
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This signiﬁes the completion of an important phase towards the emergence of
symbolic algebra.
2.11 Simon Stevin (1585)
In his L’arithmetique, Simon Stevin (1585) employs the second unknown for
several problems. From questions 25 to 27 it becomes obvious that he used
Cardano’s Ars Magna for his use of the second unknown. Although not orig-
inal in its method, Stevin’s use of symbolism is quite novel (see Figure 2.7).
Let us look at question 27 asking for three numbers in GP with the sum given
and the condition that the square of the middle term is equal to twice the
product of the two smaller numbers plus six times the smaller number (Stevin
1585, 402-404). In modern symbolism the structure of the problems is:
Fig. 2.7: Simon Stevin’s symbolism for the second unknown (from Stevin 1585,
401)
a : b = b : c
a+ b+ c = d
eab+ fa = b2
Cardano discusses the problems with (20; 2, 4) for the values of (d; e, f).
Stevin writes that he has the problem from Cardano and changes the values
to (26; 2, 6). Stevin calls his solution a construction (of an equation) and
starts by using the ﬁrst unknown for the middle term and the second for the
lower extreme, for which we will use x and y. An unknown is represented by
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Stevin as a number within a circle. The number inside denotes the power of
the unknown. Thus
 stands for x and  for x2
To diﬀerentiate the second unknown from the ﬁrst the power of the unknown
is preceded by sec., for example
5y2 becomes 5sec. 
For multiplication, Stevin used the letter M , thus
5xy2 would be 5 Msec. 
Remark that if this system would be extended to pri. and ter., the circled
numbers correspond to our exponents and the Stevin’s symbolism becomes
very similar with the one adopted by Descartes in 1637.
Stevin proceeds by formulating the condition in terms of the two unknowns
as x2 = 2xy + 6y, or using his notation, as
1 e´gale a` 2 Msec. + 6sec.
As x is the mean proportional between y and the third number c, x2 = yc
and the larger extreme must be equal to 2x+ 6. Thus, y, x and 2x+ 6 are in
continuous proportion and their sum is 26. This allows Stevin to express the
value of the second unknown as:
−3+ 20
Substituting (−3x+ 20) as the value of y in x2 + 2xy + 6y leads to
x2 = −6x2 + 22x+ 120
for which Stevin gives the root of 6 leading to the solution (2, 6, 18).
2.12 Conclusion
We have treated the development of symbolism with regards to the second
unknown from 1539 to 1585, the period preceding Vie`te’s Isagoge (1591). We
have argued that the search – or we might even say, the struggle – towards
a satisfactory system for representing multiple unknowns has lead to the cre-
ation of a new mathematical object: the symbolic equation. The solution to
linear problems by means of the second unknown initiated, for the ﬁrst time,
operations on equations (in Cardano’s Practica Arithmeticae) and operations
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between equations (in Cardano’s Ars Magna). Once operations on equations
became possible, the symbolic equation became a mathematical object of its
own and hence required a new concept. Algebraic practice before Cardano
consisted mostly of problem solving by means of the manipulation of poly-
nomials – on the condition that they were kept equal – in order to arrive at
a format for which a standard rule could be applied. We therefore use the
term ‘co-equal polynomials’ for these structures rather than “equations” in
the modern sense. Half a century of algebra textbooks marked the transition
from algebra as a practice of problem solving (the abbaco and cossic tradition)
to algebra as the study of equations. These authors, and especially Cardano
and Stifel paved the Royal road for Vie`te, Harriot, and Descartes, to use al-
gebra as an analytic tool within the wider context of mathematics. In order
to study the structure of equations, the concept of a symbolic equation had
to be established.
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Chapter 3
Symbolic revolution, scientiﬁc
revolution: mathematical and
philosophical aspects
Michel Serfati
Abstract This paper is devoted to showing how the introduction of symbolic
writing in the seventeenth century was a true revolution in thought patterns
that instituted a powerful tool for the creation of mathematical objects, with-
out equivalent in natural language. I ﬁrst comment on the constitution of
symbolic representation, the main protagonists being Vieta and Descartes.
The ﬁnal institution of symbolic representation involved six patterns, which
turn out to be constitutive. I give a short account of these six patterns and
discuss two of them in more details, ﬁrst the dialectic of indeterminancy, then
the representation of compound concepts. All these innovations are found
gathered together in the Ge´ome´trie of 1637. I conclude with two important
points. First, the introduction of substitution in a symbolic text: with Leibniz
substitutability actually became an essential, everyday element. One can dis-
cover here one of the creative aspects of symbolism. Second, the description
of an important aspect of symbolism: the emergence of a speciﬁc scheme in
three phases for creating mathematical objects from it.
Key words: Descartes, exponential, Leibniz, representation, symbolic.
3.1 Symbolic revolution, scientiﬁc revolution
A fundamental chapter in the history of humanity, the scientiﬁc revolution
in seventeenth century Europe was a time of rupture with old Greek and
scholastic visions of the world, and that of the establishment of a new scien-
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tiﬁc world — the dawn of modern science. Already abundantly commented
upon, this period of upheavals is the subject of numerous speciﬁc historical
studies, as well by discipline (physics, cosmology, philosophy, mathematics),
as by protagonist (Galileo, Descartes, Kepler or Newton for example). Among
the components of these upheavals, there is one, the new mathematical sym-
bolism, which has remained almost entirely without comment, however. An
essential chapter in the philosophy of language, the constitution of mathemat-
ical writing indeed has suﬀered an almost completely neglect in theoretical
studies. In ﬁne I shall return to the platonic origins of this disinterest.
This paper is devoted to showing how the introduction of symbolic writing
in the seventeenth century was a true revolution in thought patterns, and that
it instituted a powerful tool for the creation of mathematical objects, without
equivalent in natural language.
I will ﬁrst comment on the constitution of symbolic representation, the
main protagonists being Vieta and Descartes. One might be surprised that
I have the culmination of this formative period coincide with Descartes’s
Ge´ome´trie (1637) and not, for example, with Frege’s Begriﬀsschrift (1879).
My position is pragmatic: most of the constitutive and decisive elements were
in place by 1637, although a theory about them had not yet been elaborated.
So for two and a half centuries, mathematicians went on inventing, without
being able to refer to a theory of symbolism. I am mostly interested in this
aspect of creation, which is too often neglected by the philosophy of mathe-
matics.
3.2 From Cardano to Descartes
One can introduce the question in a natural way by comparing two celebrated
texts. On the one hand, a page of Cardano’s Ars Magna (1545) (Figure 3.1)
that appears unreadable today, an archaic text; but a major representative
work of sixteenth century mathematics. On the other hand, a quasi-modern
excerpt (Adam and Tannery, VI, 473) of Descartes’s Ge´ome´trie (1637) using
the usual symbols of algebra (letters and the sign of the square root) as we
do today (Figure 3.2).
Both texts deal with basically the same subject: equations of the third
degree. The ﬁrst contains no symbols other than numbers and abbreviations,
and we are able to read it only after a prior study and with great eﬀort.
Below, I shall comment more accurately on the reason why it is unreadable.
The second is perfectly intelligible, because it uses the appropriate symbols,
which have at that time acquired their ﬁnal form.
More precisely, we ﬁx the time of the split between 1591 (Vieta’s Isagoge)
and 1637 (La Ge´ome´trie). After 1637, mathematical writing would certainly
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Fig. 3.1: Cardano’s Ars Magna of 1545, Chapter XV, fol. 34v
Fig. 3.2: Descartes’s Ge´ometrie of 1637, Adam and Tannery, VI, p. 473
be amended and improved, but it had already acquired the main features
of its present form, features that would make all the future developments of
symbolism possible. Hence this leitmotif : the Ge´ome´trie is the ﬁrst text in
history directly readable by present-day mathematicians.1
How and why was such a reversal possible? We ﬁnd ourselves here at a mo-
ment in historical time (in the seventeenth century in Europe), at the birth
of a new written language, the mathematical language, with many texts and
authors. How did it happen? That is, what was it about the speciﬁc material
aspects of the text at this time, which we can now regard as the major diﬀer-
ences between Cardano and Descartes? I will propose epistemological answers
to that question, because the study of the constitution of symbolic represen-
tation must go beyond a merely historical approach that would limit itself to
describing and listing various occurrences of signs. This was a task remarkably
1 On the structure of the Ge´ome´trie, see (Serfati 2005b).
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carried out by Florian Cajori, without this work oﬀering any opening towards
epistemological interpretations, however.
Rather, this constitution directly concerns philosophy. First of all because
analyzing the progressive constitution of a new written language is doubtless
a genuinely philosophical task, not to be carried out in reference to a scheme
of eternal “mathematical idealities”, supposed to exist abstractedly and in
themselves, but always with an eye to the concrete interests and motivations
of the mathematicians of the time and, equally important, the constraints
that reality opposed to them.2 This part of the analysis brings to light a
form, empirical and real, of the “necessity” of the system. Above all, the
advent of symbolism appears not as a mere “change of notation” against a
(supposedly) unchanged mathematical background, but on the contrary, as
a decisive conceptual revolution, in particular with regard to the creation of
objects. (This aspect of the history of ideas is even more philosophical.) In
order to prove this point, there is only one available method: to ask always
and everywhere: “Is there anything we can do with mathematical symbolism
that we could not do before?” To this key question, positive answers have
been so numerous and various since the 17th century that it would be hard
even to list them all. We (I mean, present-day mathematicians) are so used to
symbolism — actually an internalized epistemological frame, and the neces-
sary and preliminary means to any scientiﬁc knowledge — that we can hardly
imagine how certain methods could have been lacking or could have taken so
long to emerge.
3.3 The patterns of the symbolic representation
The ﬁnal institution of symbolic representation involves six patterns, which
turn out to be constitutive. In (Serfati, 2005a), I extensively developed these
various points. Here, I shall give a short account of these patterns and discuss
two of them in more detail.
1. The representation of the “unknown” or “required”. Simple as
it may appear, this involves surprising features, in Diophantus’s work for
instance.
2. The dialectic of indeterminancy (the representation of the “given”).
It is for example the use of a in y = ax. This aspect is discussed below in
a certain detail.
2 These constraints, particularly of a symbolic nature, are imposed by the need for the
mathematician to produce objects that are both consistent and that can be operated on.
For example the representation of the lineage of powers mentioned below in Section 3.5.
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3. Structuration by assemblers (the representation of elementary oper-
ative instructions: addition, division, extraction of roots, etc.), with the
signs +, ÷, ·, –. Thus the (very simple) writing of: 2 · x+ 1.
4. The ambiguity of order (the representation of the succession and en-
tanglement of instructions). This pattern is coextensive to both dividing
and gathering signs in the symbolic text, via brackets or vinculum for in-
stance, that is via punctuation signs, also denoted aggregation signs. Thus
the concatenation of signs 2 ·x+1 above is naturally ambiguous in reading,
and its signiﬁcance must be speciﬁed according to (2 · x) + 1 or 2 · (x+ 1).
This part of the study concludes ﬁrst with stressing the conceptual impor-
tance of a tree-structure underlying any symbolic text (it structures the
mathematical thought). Thus, with the two possible readings of the pre-
ceding example, one can associate two tree-structures as shown in Figure
3.3.
2
x 1
+
.
2 x
1
+
.
Fig. 3.3: Parsing trees for two interpretations of the ambiguous 2 · x+ 1
One can then distinguish two ways of traversing the tree (from the root or
from the leaves), which I eventually identiﬁed as two (theoretical) episte-
mological positions of the mathematical subject, namely the author’s and
the reader’s.
This example is very simple, however, undoubtedly too simple. It is interest-
ing to carry out the same analysis on the solution (developed by Descartes
in the Ge´ome´trie in solving Pappus’ problem) of a certain quadratic equa-
tion of the second degree, which leads him to the formula:
m− n
ξ
+
√
m ·m+ o · x− p
m
x · x
This formula leads to the tree as in Figure 3.4:
We can conclude that the employment in the symbolic text of signs of ag-
gregation, like the brackets, progressively opened up the possibility of the
successive execution of a signiﬁcant number of various instructions, a com-
plex operation which could not be considered rhetorically before. Of course,
the 17th century geometers did not draw the tree of a symbolic expression
any more than do contemporary mathematicians wishing to write or deci-
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1B (∙)
5 (+)
4√
1C (∙)
2B (+)
3B (–)
2B (∙)
1E (÷)1D (∙)
3A (–)
2A (∙)
1A (÷)x
m
Fig. 3.4: Parsing tree for a quadratic equation of the second degree
pher a symbolic text! It remains that this tree-like organization structures
mathematical thought.
Cardano’s text above is deﬁnitely not punctuated, and that’s why it is
unreadable. A line of calculation from the end of the 17th century could,
on the contrary, usually display twenty-ﬁve partial results, with neverthe-
less an easy deciphering, by the use of a full set of implicit hierarchical
conventions.
This fourth of the six “patterns of the representation” constitutive of the
new writing, therefore represented a major methodological step. Appar-
ently resulting from a mere quantitative modiﬁcation aiming at the number
of instructions to describe, it in fact found an extension such as to become
a diﬀerence of kind.
Note incidentally that this part of the study (4th pattern) also stresses a
clearly possible distinction in the text between two spontaneous interpre-
tations of symbolism: as a procedure or as an object.
5. Representation of relationship (for example by means of the signs
= (Recorde), > (Harriot), and ∼= (Leibniz)). In the case of equality,
this was established by Recorde’s work (Recorde 1557), then Descartes’s
(Ge´ome´trie, 1637). It was a late-coming representation, which nevertheless
made it impossible to maintain the syntax of natural language in the text.
In eﬀect, a new symbolism expressing ideal interchangeability succeeded
the predicate structure of rhetorical expression.
6. Representation of compound concepts, based on the example of
the representation of the sequence of powers (squares, cubes, sursolids or
quadratics, etc.). This point is also discussed below.
3.4 The dialectic of indeterminancy (second pattern)
The symbolic representation of the “given” was a major innovation in the
late sixteenth century, due to Franc¸ois Vieta, who introduced a new system
of signs, entirely made up of letters, and whose true function consisted, in
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the last analysis — I anticipate my conclusions here — to combine within the
symbolic system two concepts hitherto considered as opposites, the arbitrary
and the ﬁxed, or the one and the multiple or even, maybe more signiﬁcantly,
the unspeciﬁed and the singular.
In Vieta’s time, and since Antiquity, geometrical ﬁgures had been consid-
ered “arbitrary”, i.e., generic or emblematic of some given geometrical sit-
uation — the ﬁgure was some particular example of its type, but its par-
ticularity was not signiﬁcant.3 There was no comparable representation of
arbitrary numbers. To represent an unknown, a non-numeric symbol (some-
times a letter) was needed, precisely because it was unknown. In his Isagoge,
Vieta (1591) introduced the use of letters to represent the given as well. The
letters used were of diﬀerent types, according to the concept: vowels for the
unknowns (which were less numerous), and consonants for the given.
In his preliminary considerations, Vieta is very careful to ﬁnd an “obvious
and durable symbol” to distinguish “the given and required magnitudes”. But
this deﬁnition, insofar as his contemporaries understood it according to the
rules of the time, might contain a contradiction due to this simple fact: in any
calculation considered valid at that time, the “given” was just what could be
explicitly represented by numbers. Saying, as Vieta did, that the consonant
B represented a given magnitude, meant that the author of the text knew
its value. But, as thus represented, the reader had no knowledge of it! How
could Vieta call B the sign of a given? Objections to such a conception of
knowledge and representation cannot be overlooked, and bear a resemblance
to those later exchanged (circa 1905) by proponents and opponents of the
Axiom of Choice in their celebrated correspondence. How is the author cer-
tain to always “think” of the same element? As Lebesgue wrote to Zermelo,
it was not a question of contradiction, but of self-consistence: how could Zer-
melo be sure that Zermelo would always “think” of the same element, since
he did not characterize it in any other way per se ? (Cf. our discussion on this
point in (Serfati, 1995).) These objections to Vieta’s symbolism were actually
considerable epistemological obstacles, so that many centuries were needed
to understand and (in some way) go beyond them. One can thus clearly un-
derstand why, although it is widespread knowledge that the representation of
givens by letters was a conclusive element in the development of mathematics,
this major discovery was not made until thirteen centuries after Diophantus.
In those conditions, however, the withdrawal of numbers as explicit sym-
bolizations of given data led directly to a new power and a new obligation:
3 All the commentary on the ancient Greek mathematics recognizes this Platonic concep-
tion. Heath e.g. notes that the ﬁgure actually represented a class of ﬁgures “The conclusion
can, of course, be stated in as general terms as the enunciation, since it does not depend
on the particular ﬁgure drawn; that ﬁgure is only an illustration, a type of the class of ﬁg-
ure and it is legitimate therefore, in stating the conclusion, to pass from the particular to
the general” (Heath, 1921, I, 370).
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to consider the given as arbitrary. If in fact the only information provided by
the letter was to indicate a convention relating to the category of some rep-
resented entity (namely the “given”) and not to make its value explicit, then
this one, although ﬁxed, was free to be arbitrarily selected. In other words,
Vieta’s letter B was doubtless the sign of a given quantity, but of an arbi-
trary one. But how was it possible for a quantity to be altogether arbitrary
and yet ﬁxed, ﬁxed and moving, speciﬁc and general? Such statements appear
as contradictions in natural language, so that what Vieta actually asked his
reader to do was to accept a convention: on the one hand, “arbitrary and
ﬁxed” entities exist; on the other hand, the warrant of this kind of existence
is symbolic language (not natural) — thus there is a “dialectic” here.
Immediately accepted by the mathematical community, in particular by
Descartes, Vieta’s system of letters spread in Europe. No matter what was its
legitimacy, it authorized the use of literal formulas for the resolution of the
problems. Since then, the formulas came to replace the rhetorical counting
rhymes or pieces of poetry which, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance,
had described the resolution of problems in natural language. A little later, the
concept (pseudo-concept?) of “indetermined” was equipped with a convenient
but ambiguous term, which appeared at the end of the seventeenth century
with Leibniz, the “variable”. Opposed to “constant”, the term once knew
(and still has) a considerable success, due to the fact that it is accompanied
by a strong naive cinematic connotation, that of a quantity that could, by
the assumption of some imaginary displacement, “take all its values” inside a
certain ﬁeld.
This issue of the status of the letter, so central, remained (at least: almost)
unchanged until the early twentieth century when it rebounded in very im-
portant discussions between mathematicians, logicians and philosophers such
as Frege, Russell, Hilbert and Go¨del. Thus Russell and Frege were vigorously
opposed on the character of the fundamental contradiction, whether it was
reducible in the natural language or not (Serfati, 2005a, 189-193). Meanwhile
Hilbert and Go¨del believed being able to evacuate the question, i.e. to elim-
inate it as a question, by simply stating the vanity of any interpretation —
each one in his way, however, formalist for the ﬁrst, logicist for the second. It
is well known that this refusal of a certain constructivism led to a well located
metamathematical split between interpretations and formalism. In everyday
practice, the question is still not settled among mathematicians at work, for
example Bourbaki.
To repeat: we must interpret Vieta’s approach as an implicit request to
accept a radical change in the level of convention, legitimizing the “arbitrary
but ﬁxed”, whose existence is secured only by the symbolic. We must then
consider that since Vieta (and perhaps, in a sense, up to Hilbert and Go¨del)
only those are recognized as mathematicians who have agreed to enroll in this
agreement — an assent which has always been counted as a sign of a strong
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implicit adherence to the mathematical community, testifying once again that
the symbolic is not the transcript, nor the reﬂection in signs, of writings in
natural language.
3.5 The representation of compound concepts (sixth
pattern)
Faced with an unknown quantity, such as the “Thing” of the cossic system
or Diophantius’ Arithmos, calculators saw very quickly that it was useful to
conceive the “Square”, and also the “Cube”. Beyond these, there were higher
species called the “Square-Square” (or “Biquadratic”, according to the au-
thors), then the “Sursolid”, and ﬁnally a whole lineage of powers. As yet
the simplest of calculations interspersed “Thing”, “Square” and “Cube”, it
became necessary to represent symbolically the whole lineage. The solutions
proposed were remarkably diﬀerent, despite the apparent simplicity of the
question, not only in terms of choosing the type of signs (number, letter, or
“ﬁgure”), but mostly in the procedure of representation itself. In (Serfati,
2005a, chap. VIII) we have given some epistemologically signiﬁcant examples
(e.g. Vieta’s and Bombelli’s) of the proposed systems, from Diophantus to
Descartes. There were other good attempts from others writers, recorded and
reviewed by Cajori.4 Descartes’s exponent put an end to centuries of scattered
notations, not yet operationally completed before him. One will better under-
stand the central conceptual importance of the representation of powers by
ultimately pointing out that being a basic condition in terms of mathematical
technique, it was simultaneously the ﬁrst, historically speaking, which led to
the representation in symbolic writing of a compound concept.5
For brevity, we limit ourselves here to two symbolic systems prior to
Descartes, ﬁrst Diophantus’s (the ﬁrst symbolic algebra) and secondly, the
cossic system, which immediately preceded Descartes. Clavius, who imposed
the reform of mathematics in Jesuit schools, was one of its last practitioners
and the young Descartes, who was one of his followers at La Fle`che, still used it
in its early texts (e.g. the Cogitationes Privatæ of 1619-1621 (Adam and Tan-
nery, X, 213-256)). Countless other systems were employed, both in Europe
(like in Lucas Pacioli’s the Summa di Aritmetica,6 or Cardano’s Italian system
in the sixteenth century) as well as in Arabic algebra.7 On these important
4 “Signs of Powers” in (Cajori, 1928, I, 335–360).
5 I developed some of these conclusions in (Serfati, 1998).
6 See for instance Høyrup (2010) who gives a reproduction of Pacioli’s scheme, showing the
signs for powers with root names.
7 See for instance (Cajori, 1928, I), Symbols in Arithmetic and Algebra (Elementary Part),
71–400. Also (Woepcke, 1954, 352–353).
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historical points, we refer the reader to two papers quoted in the references,
to Høyrup (2009) for Europe, for the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and
to Heeﬀer (2008) for Arabic algebra.
First, we brieﬂy investigate Diophantus’s system, noting that a speciﬁcity
of his symbolism lies in the coexistence of a sign for ς for arithmos (i.e the
unknown) together with another, radically diﬀerent, for the Square, Δυ, and
also for the Cube Kυ. As one can observe, it cannot be deduced from the
symbolism that Δυ and Kυ denoted the square and the cube of an unknown
denoted by ς . A battery of diﬀerent signs then completed the representation of
the “Square-Square” ΔυΔ, the “Square-Cube” ΔKυ, and the “Cube-Cube”
KυK. Diophantus also exhibited a new sign ς ′, for what we today call the
inverse of the unknown, and ﬁnally another Δυ
′
for the square of the latter.
A quite similar inventory was in use in the cossic system, with signs diﬀer-
ent from the previous ones, however: the “Thing” (the unknown) had for
symbol, the “Square” (or Census) was usually represented (in Stifel or Rudolﬀ
for instance) by , and the “Cube” by . Similarly, the “Biquadratic” had
for denotation. Rudolﬀ’s book exposes one of the ﬁrst inventories of such
signs, with ten levels (Cajori, 1928, I, 134):
Fig. 3.5: Diﬀerent powers of the unknown (from Rudolﬀ fol. Diiij)
At ﬁrst glance, this might seem a satisfactory system, then as now! We
will however describe its signiﬁcant structural deﬁciencies in an example (an
equation in Stifel). In the Arithmetica Integra, Stifel proposes to solve
1 + 2 + 6 + 5 + 6 æqu. 5550
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Weaving together “Thing”, “Square”, “Cube” and “Biquadratic”, the prob-
lem is what is anachronistically called (since Descartes!) a numerical equation
of the fourth degree.8 To resolve, Stifel introduced the new expression:
1 + 1 + 2
and found that if he added it to its own square, he got the ﬁrst member of
the original equation.9 This requires comment: one ﬁrst has to calculate the
square of 1 +1 + 2. Now this square cannot be written symbolically in
the cossic system, since representation by the sign allows writing the square
of the initial term only. To evoke the square of the new expression, Stifel was
forced to abandon the symbolic representation of direct powers and multiply
the expression by itself. Under these conditions, however, and to continue
the calculation, he would then necessarily have to known how to deal with
expressions such as 1 · 1 for example. He has therefore been obliged to
involve four basic rules governing the multiplication of the cossic signs. Here
are the ﬁrst two. First:
1 · 1 equal to 1
or
(“Thing” multiplied by “Thing” makes “Square”)
which, written in Latin, was the maxim, famous in its time, Res in Rem ﬁt
Census. Also:
1 · 1 equal to 1
or
(“Thing” multiplied by “Square” makes “Cube”)
This situation was very similar to what we described above in Diophantus’s
algebra. And since Diophantus, and up to Vieta, a list of these rules had to
be memorized and was, in various forms (especially as counting-out-rhymes),
part of the baggage of any mathematician (Serfati, 2005a, 208). Note that the
protagonists of the time did not perceive them as we would naturally regard
them today, namely as instances of a simple multiplication table.
Note also incidentally that such equation would seem diﬃcult to solve at
a time when Ferrari’s method for equations of the fourth degree was not
yet available. A careful examination of Stifel’s statement of the question (a
gambling problem coming from Cardano’s Arithmetica (1539), chapter 51)
8 From Stifel’s Arithmetica Integra f. 307v . The example is reproduced in (Cajori, 1928, I,
139-140).
9 (x2 + x + 2)2 + (x2 + x + 2) = x4 + 2x3 + 6x2 + 5x + 6.
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makes us understand how its mode of elaboration is genetic, meaning that this
equation is entirely ad hoc: to the unknown (say x), the author adds ﬁrst its
square, then the number 2. To the sum thus obtained, he adds its own square
and wants the latter sum to be equal to 5550. He is then seeking the value of
x. In modern terms (completely anachronistic) the proposed equation of the
fourth degree thus decomposes into the successive resolution of two equations
of degree 2:
A2 +A = 5550 (3.1)
followed by
x2 + x+ 2 = A (3.2)
This is obviously not a general method for the resolution of an equation of
the fourth degree! Actually Stifel made the analysis of what he himself has
synthesized.10 One must therefore not anachronistically consider the system
(3.1) and (3.2) as an indetermined change of variables (see below).
Let us repeat: Stifel could write as the square of the “Thing”. However, he
could not write the square of 1 +1 +2 in a structurally analogous manner,
as we do today in the Cartesian system, very simply by replacing A with A2.
In other words, the cossic expressions and 1 +1 +2 could not be freely
substituted for one another in the symbolic expression of a square. Naturally,
this was also impossible for an expression such 3 +5. In fact, the Cossic
could never allow the symbolic text to represent the square of an arbitrary
expression. This point is crucial. Therefore Stifel could evoke the square of
1 +1 +2 in the text — which was essential — only by developing it, i.e. by
computation.
Developing, however, is not representing; developing requires the calcula-
tor to use various memorizing methods, and thus to appeal to elements of
meaning foreign to the symbolic system. Actually, such “square”, since it is
unrepresentable in the cossic system is not capable of being individuated, that
is, it cannot be objectiﬁed. In other words, it is inconceivable as an object in
the system. Admittedly, some calculation may give a speciﬁc value to a spe-
ciﬁc symbolic expression, but such expression is deﬁnitely the product of two
other symbolic expressions, and not a “square” per se.
10 A careful analysis of the complete resolution shows to what even greater extent the
solution is ad hoc. Actually, the two quadratic equations of the system have the same speciﬁc
form, namely a product of two consecutive numbers, Z(Z +1) = C. First A(A+1) = 5550
is satisﬁed by A = +74, the other root, (obviously −75) must be rejected as “false”. Then
Stifel had to solve x(x + 1) + 2 = 74, that is x(x + 1) = 72, satisﬁed similarly by x = 8
(the other root being −9). 8 is therefore the single solution of the problem. I think it highly
probable that Stifel actually began synthetically, that is to say in the opposite direction, by
considering ﬁrst the number 8, then forming 8 · 9, then the equation x(x+1)+ 2 = 74, etc.
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This example also illustrates the inability of the mathematician of the time
to make an arbitrary change of unknowns within the system. One could argue
that in Cardano’s Ars Magna (Chapter XXXIX for example) there are changes
of unknowns (e.g.: y = x+ b3 ) which remove the “square” term from the cubic
equation x3 + bx2 + cx + d = 0 so as to get a standard reduced form (Vieta
used a similar device). This interpretation, however, appears anachronistic. In
fact, a careful analysis of Cardano’s text shows that it is but a straightforward
veriﬁcation: just like in the equation of the second degree x2 + ax+ b = 0 the
ﬁrst two terms x2 + ax had long been regarded as the beginning of a square
(in order to reach the standard canonical form), so the block x3 + bx2 was
considered by Cardano as the beginning of a cube, so that the whole calcula-
tion was equivalent to a simple check. Epistemologically speaking, Cardano’s
technique (just like Vieta’s) was adventitious: it was not an arbitrary (inde-
termined) change of unknown and could therefore hardly be transposed to an
example of an even slightly diﬀerent nature. The ﬁrst actual examples of ar-
bitrary changes of unknowns appear later with Tschirnaus’s transformations
under the rules of the new (post Cartesian) symbolic writing.11
Thus our initial conclusions can be summarized as a list of deﬁciencies
and drawbacks inherent to the cossic system, similar to those of Diophantus:
inability of an arbitrary change of unknowns, necessity of the use of rhymes
to make any calculation.
The analysis of these disadvantages stresses (retrospectively) the major
importance of two predicates: substance and relation (e.g., in the 2a3 of
Descartes’s Regulae12 where a and 3 are respectively signs for substance and
relation). Should a symbolic system have ‘decided” to represent them both,
the univocity rule would necessitate two signs, not just one, and the repre-
sented concept would therefore have been considered compound. And this is
what Descartes was the ﬁrst to do in Rule XVI of Regulae, where a is the sign
of the substance and 3 that of the relation. For various reasons the Cossic
“decided” to use only one sign, thereby implying that the concept was simple.
Thus the Cossic for all intents and purposes represented neither of the two
predicates. This was not, however, a logical fault. Following a (supposedly)
11 An indeterminate change of unknowns to solve an algebraic equation F (x) = 0 is a
mapping g of the form x = g(t, a) where t is the new unknown, and a an indetermi-
nate parameter, such as the new equation, known as the transformed equation, namely
Ga(t)(= F (g(t, a)) = 0 becomes simpler by a suitable choice of the parameter a. This is the
simplest case. It may happen that the process involves several parameters with the same
function. A paradigmatic example is Tschirnaus’ method for equations of the third degree
which considers the equation F (x) = x3 + bx2 + cx+ d = 0 and sets y = ax2 + bx+ c (thus
there are 3 parameters) so as to reduce it to the “binomial” form y3 = K. Lagrange studied
the method and its inherent limitations. Many attempts to extend Tschirnaus’ method to
higher degrees were developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See for instance
(Adamchik and Jeﬀrey, 2003).
12 The ﬁrst exponential in history appears in Rule XVI of Descartes’s Regulae‘.
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natural approach, the Cossic worked in eﬀect as a listing operator: each new
concept was given a distinct representation. But as far as mathematics is con-
cerned, such a procedure has no future. Descartes’s exponent put an end to
the Cossic.
The introduction of the Cartesian exponent marked thus the disappearance
of the “diophanto-cossic” symbolism which for centuries had ruled mathemat-
ical thinking on the issue of powers. With it disappeared its main limitations.
We can make ours Cajori’s conclusion: “There is perhaps no symbolism in or-
dinary algebra which has been as well chosen and is as elastic as the Cartesian
exponents” (Cajori, 1928, I, 360).
It was indispensable to the advancement of mathematics to represent the
original lineage of powers by two signs, and not just one: so we can summarize
the lesson of this ﬁrst part of the story of powers. Thus the representation of
powers was historically the ﬁrst which led to today’s mode of representation
of a compound concept in universal symbolic writing (assembler and open
places). At the end of the century, one of the epistemological lessons drawn
by posterity from the outcome of the question of “powers”, was undoubtedly
the analogous creation of Leibniz’s “New Calculus” (Serfati, 2005a, 274).
3.6 Descartes’s Ge´ome´trie or the “Rosetta Stone”
Out of the eﬀective representation of the six above-mentioned concepts
emerged the essence of the new symbolic system. Thus, from Vieta to
Descartes, mathematical symbolic writing was constituted, taking on the prin-
cipal aspects of its current structure. The role of Leibniz, on which I will ex-
pand a bit in what follows, was quite as capital, but diﬀerent. (On the various
contributions of the three protagonists, cf. Serfati (2005a, 386)).
All these innovations are found gathered together in the Ge´ome´trie of 1637.
This text took center-stage because of the richness of its mathematical content
as well as Descartes’s authority as a philosopher; and despite the fact that
Descartes gave no explicit instructions on symbolism, it served during the
17th century as the model for deciphering new symbolic texts (according to
the so-called “principle of the Rosetta Stone”).
3.7 The introduction of substitution
From the above discussion of the sixth pattern (compound concepts) it is clear
that the substitution of
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A = x2 + 1 in Z = 2A3 − 5A
so simple to write and perform today, remained an inconceivable operation
for the medieval rhetorical writing of mathematics. But with Leibniz, substi-
tutability became an essential, everyday element. One can discover one of the
creative aspects of symbolism here. The successive creation of ﬁrst fractional
exponents, then irrational and real exponents, is a good elementary example.
Fractional exponents was the object of a famous letter from Newton to
Leibniz in June 1676, the Epistola Prior (Leibniz, 1899, 179). Nothing in
Leibniz’ preliminary experience at that time, nor in the Cartesian deﬁnition
of exponential (the only one he knew) allowed him to understand what mean-
ing Newton could bring to symbolic forms as 3
1
2 , (x + 3)
1
2 , 5
2
3 , or (
√
2)−
6
7 .
Any attempt of rhetoric translation “a` la Descartes’s led to nonsense: if the
procedure of the form “35” can be described by
“Multiply the number of sign 3 ﬁve times by itself”,
which signiﬁcance could be reasonably allotted, with respect to 3
1
2
“Multiply the number of sign 3 half-time by itself”?
There was thus for Leibniz, faced with symbolic forms without signiﬁcance,
an epistemologically crucial time of incomprehension (a momentary, “logical”
time), which was dissipated by following the letter. In the Epistola Poste-
rior (Leibniz, 1899, 225) that followed Newton persevered, now introducing
irrational exponents, as in:
x
√
2 + x
√
7
√
3
2
3
That the ﬁrst version of the Newtonian exponential, the so-called broken
one (i.e. with fractional exponents) in the Epistola Prior, was precisely de-
ﬁned, while the second, surd (quadratic irrational) in the Epistola Posterior
was not at all, hardly worried Leibniz. On the contrary, capturing the essence
of the Newtonian process, Leibniz worked at that time to build – by imita-
tion – a new exponential, with sign ax or yx, whose importance, as Leibniz
does naively repeat, would exceed both Descartes’s and Newton’s. The ques-
tion was of course: what could at that time and for him be the meaning of a
symbolic form where at the place of the exponent was a sign of an arbitrary
(indeterminate) number? An exponential, which was for him one of the three
aspects of what he then named the transcendent in the mathematical sense.13
As it is known, this method is more explored today, for example by sub-
stituting a complex number, or an endomorphism, or else a square matrix,
13 Leibniz was the ﬁrst to import in mathematics the concept of transcendence, with diverse
meanings of the word. See for instance (Breger, 1986) and (Serfati, 1992).
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deﬁning the exponential AB of two arbitrary objects A and B of an (almost)
arbitrary category C.14
Far from appearing strange or arbitrary, these creations of objects by sub-
stitution were each time recognized as legitimate and fertile by the mathemat-
ical community. The authentic reasons for such a universal approval constitute
a capital epistemological fact and will be analyzed in another place. Here, I
will consider an instance in the last section, however.
Other examples in Leibniz reinforced the importance of substitutability
without any equivalent in natural language. Thus, in his demonstration of
Arithmetic Squaring of the Circle, he used, with modiﬁcations, the demon-
stration that Mercator had given in his Logarithmotechnia (Mercator, 1668)
for squaring the hyperbola. Mercator developed 11+x as a power series, and
then integrated term by term. In order to “square the circle”, Leibniz substi-
tuted x2 for x, then integrated the development of 11+x2 term by term (cf. for
instance (Leibniz, 2004, 208)), a substitution that goes without saying for us,
but that was amazing at the time. Today one can hardly imagine the diﬃcul-
ties faced by scholars of the time, whose minds were ﬁlled with geometrical
truths, in grasping such a substitution that involves only symbolism. It is
hardly necessary to specify to which extent the procedure requires the use of
the symbolic writing to be conceived!
3.8 Symbolic notation and the creation of mathematical
objects
I will conclude with an important aspect of symbolism, describing the emer-
gence of a process of creating objects from it. I will analyze it in statu nascendi
in the correspondence of 1676 between Leibniz and Newton mentioned above,
by returning to this question: how to provide meaning to the symbolic form
a
1
2 which for Descartes certainly had no signiﬁcance? The reconstruction of
the method is the following: ﬁrst, the geometer chooses a formula for the ex-
ponential (Cartesian), in the stock of all those that it was known to validate.
This will be for example the so-called “multiplicative formula”
(ar)s = ar·s
valid if r and s are the signs of any natural numbers, and a the sign of any
positive (real) number.
This formula will be known as elective in what follows (it is the mathemati-
cian who chooses it). If however r is interpreted as an unspeciﬁed rational,
14 The category C must be “cartesian closed”. This deﬁnition (due to F. W. Lawvere)
legitimately points out the reference to Descartes.
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say r = pq , then a
p
q is without signiﬁcance: a and pq being separately both
equipped with signiﬁcance, it is the assembler, that is the exponential cop-
ula which is deprived from it, and the nonsense comes from an inadequacy
of categories. The method then consists in the deﬁnition, if possible, of the
values of ar and as as numbers such that the same formula remains true for
any value of the couple of the rational numbers, of signs r and s. With this
intention, one will start by aﬃrming the validity in the particular case of it
where r is the inverse of a natural number, that is to say r = 1q . One then
shows simply by stages that the only possible value for a
p
q is ( q
√
a)p, i.e. the
one proposed by Newton in his letter — for instance a
1
2 =
√
a, a value which
satisﬁes the elective formula:(
a
1
2
)2
= a
1
2 ·2 = a1 = a
In this modest example, the calculator can undoubtedly believe to have
won on all counts: he provided signiﬁcance to a symbolic form which did not
have any. Thus he uncovers a rational, scientiﬁc management of nonsense —
ruptures of meaning here being consubstantial with (mathematical) creation.
At the same time, he extended extra muros (i.e. to the rationals) the ﬁeld of
validity of the multiplicative formula, which can thus appear as depositary of
a higher form of truth, intrinsic and enlarged, an hypostasis of some (alleged)
general concept of “Exponential”. The mechanism thus consolidates the (Pla-
tonic!) feeling of the protagonists to be in the presence of a “natural” concept,
with the simple acceptation of “which one ﬁnds in nature”. I will close here
this short parenthesis of philosophy of psychology to note that this form of
illusion is the result of the occultation of the fact that the seemingly natural
signiﬁcance is the exact counterpart of the method of the elective formula.
I am well aware of the modesty of this example. It is however decisive for
the abstraction of a method. One can indeed show that this same pattern in
three phases, meaningless forms, elective formulas and analogical extensions,
was at work in creation of many objects, both in the eighteenth century with
Euler (e.g. complex exponential) and more recent (Moore-Penrose’s pseudo
-inverses of matrices, derivation in the sense of distributions, the elective for-
mula being here integration by parts, etc.). Let us quote another example, of
major importance in mathematical Analysis, highlighted by J.P. Kahane,15
the couple of Fourier’s relations
cn =
∫
f(. . .) and f(. . .) =
∑
n∈Z
cn . . .
that institute, in his terminology, a “program”, composed of two elective for-
mulas, registered in a structural canonical duality between series and integrals.
15 Intervention at the 6 May 2008 Meeting of the Acade´mie des Sciences: “La vertu cre´atrice
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This term of “program” means that the concerned formulas (Fourier’s rela-
tions) are conceived, not as completed data, but as objectives to be reached,
and this in various situations, by deﬁning each time ad hoc objects to satisfy
them. In other words, the above formulas “require” new objects for their own
satisfaction.
Epistemologically speaking, the scheme is a pattern for the creation of
objects by analogical extension and permanence of symbolic forms in a mode
that is entirely speciﬁc to mathematics and consubstantial with the notation.
It thus shows one of the aspects under which the advent of the symbolic
system contributed, from the seventeenth century onwards, to invention in
mathematics, thus helping to clarify the intimate nature of this “power to
create” by mathematicians — actually the fundamental subject here — evoked
by Dedekind and stressed by Cavaille`s (Cavaille`s, 1981, 57).
In ﬁne, one can philosophically comment on the psychological aspects of
the scheme, which, notwithstanding its essentially ad hoc nature, has an am-
biguous eﬀect: it indeed helps to “spontaneously” reinforce the Platonic (or
realistic) vision of mathematics. Admittedly, the scheme is purely construc-
tive, and the product of human activities. Admittedly, it is based on the desire
of permanence of some symbolic forms — a central point in the philosophy
of psychology, of which one will certainly have to discuss both the origin and
the relevance, but not the historical reality which is undeniable. Nevertheless,
once in the presence of the scheme, the mathematician can believe that he
does nothing but put his steps in the way of a discovery traced by others
that uncovers idealities, i.e. objects and formulas eternal as well as transcen-
dent to the human subject of knowledge. Note also that a primitive form
of the scheme has been uncovered by George Peacock in the 1830’s, under
the name of “permanence of equivalent symbolic forms” (Peacock, 1830), but
with simple examples only and without that he perceived the universality and
systematicity of the schema, as well as its deep rationality.16
Thus, after the introduction of the symbolic writing system, nothing in
mathematics was anymore like before. The outcome was, strictly speaking,
a (symbolic) revolution, one of the major components of the scientiﬁc revo-
lution. An epistemologist therefore cannot fail to wonder about the reasons
for the already noted, persistent absence of any study of the subject. Our
analysis delivers some astonishing conclusions here. One indeed uncovers un-
derground epistemological obstacles attached to unquestioned beliefs. Overall,
the pregnant Platonic conception that since mathematical objects are suppos-
du symbolisme mathe´matique”.
16 Heeﬀer (2010, 521) rightly emphasizes the creative role of Peacock’s principle in the early
history of numbers. He thus writes: “We should like to demonstrate that Peacock’s principle
of the permanence of equivalent forms is a fruitful framework for studying changes in the
history of numbers”. He gives examples of expansions of the number concept in Maestro
Dardi and Cardano.
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edly ideal, contingent representations would not matter; with as corollary the
naive belief, as widespread as false, that the symbolic system would only be
shorthand, the reﬂection in signs of natural writing.17 A conception which, as
I showed here, cannot face the reality of mathematical developments since the
seventeenth century, in the very ﬁrst place because of the question of substi-
tutability — a major point of division between natural language and scientiﬁc
(mathematical) language.
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Part II
The interplay between diagrams and
symbolism

Chapter 4
Translating Euclid’s diagrams into
English, 1551–1571
Michael J. Barany
Abstract The years 1551–1571 saw the ﬁrst published translations of Eu-
clid’s Elements in the English language. Euclid’s ﬁrst English translators had
to translate not just his words, but his entire system of geometry for a vernac-
ular public unversed in a method and study hitherto ‘locked up in straunge
tongues.’ Throughout its written and printed history, diagrams have been
crucial features of Euclid’s text. This paper considers the variety of diagram-
matic approaches used in these ﬁrst English translations, arguing that the
strategic inclusion and exclusion of points, lines, letters, and labels, along
with depictions of surveying instruments and landscapes, played crucial roles
in establishing the authors’ voices, vocabularies, methodologies, and mathe-
matical philosophies. Using simple but polysemic objects such as points and
lines, and appealing to familiar practices such as drawing, using a compass,
and surveying a ﬁeld, Euclid’s translators projected and enforced an image of
a geometry which could be seen to be already present and meaningful. Their
diagrams, rather than being mere illustrations, played indispensable roles in
establishing the new English geometry.
Key words: Euclid’s Elements; Robert Recorde, John Dee, Henry Billings-
ley, Leonard Digges, Thomas Digges, Geometry, Translation, Diagrams, Rep-
resentation
4.1 Translating Diagrams
In 1551, Robert Recorde published England’s ﬁrst surviving vernacular text-
book on the principles of Euclidean geometry, Pathway to Knowledg.1 Recorde’s
Princeton University Program in History of Science, mbarany@princeton.edu
1 Taylor (1954, 14–15, 312) discusses earlier surveying texts and a possible prior translation
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text presents the deﬁnitions, axioms, postulates, and propositions of the ﬁrst
four books of Euclid’s Elements in such a way that “the simple reader might
not justly complain of hardnes or obscuritee.”2 Making Euclid’s ancient geom-
etry newly accessible to his vernacular readers, Recorde’s translation involved
more than mere linguistic substitution and coinage. For Recorde was not
merely translating between languages, but across concepts, idioms, places,
times, social positions, and professions. Euclid’s new tongue grew out of a
translation in the fullest sense of the word.
Henry Billingsley completed his own edition of the Elements in 1570. The
volume has been identiﬁed by Heath (1956) as “the ﬁrst and most important
translation” of Euclid’s Elements into English (109). Billingsley’s text incor-
porated “Scholies, Annotations, and Inventions, of the best Mathematiciens,
both of time past, and in this our age” and a “very fruitfull Præface” by
his collaborator John Dee.3 The text was produced for, as Dee writes, “un-
latined people, and not Universitie Scholers,” and included all ﬁfteen books
then attributed to Euclid of Megara.4 The following year, Thomas Digges
posthumously published his father Leonard’s tripartite geometrical practice,
Pantometria, appending a preface and his own discourse on geometrical solids.
Pantometria emphasizes surveying and the military arts, while Thomas’s con-
tribution concerns “matters only new, rare and diﬃcile.”5
This paper focuses on one aspect of these ﬁve authors’ translations: their
diagrams. Geometric diagrams and ﬁgures had been present even in the ﬁrst
print editions of the Elements, dating to the printer Erhard Ratdolt’s 1482
volume, and the inclusion of illustrative diagrams was a standard feature
for geometric texts.6 Indeed, Euclid’s Elements can scarcely be understood
without the aid of geometric illustrations, and the visual vocabulary of the
Elements had long been established as a central feature of geometric learning.
Even so, the sheer variety of diagrammatic approaches used in the ﬁrst English
vernacular translations of the Elements indicates that the choice of how to
illustrate one’s text was no trivial matter.
I use the word ‘diagrams’ here in an unusual and anachronistic sense, but
one which seems to me the most justiﬁable for the discussion that will fol-
of Euclid.
2 Sig.a1r. Page citations are according to Gaskell (1972). I use Johnson and Larkey’s (1935)
convention of preserving spellings while sometimes modernizing typography by, for exam-
ple, expanding contractions and converting ‘u’s to ‘v’s where appropriate. Emphasis in quo-
tations is the quoted author’s.
3 Sig.[ﬁst]1r.
4 Sig.A3v . The Elements are now typically attributed to Euclid of Alexandria, instead of
Megara, and only the ﬁrst thirteen of the books included in Billingsley’s translation are
considered to be of Euclid’s authorship (Heath 1956, 3–5).
5 Sig.S4v .
6 On manuscript geometric diagrams, see Keller (2005) and De Young (2005, 2009).
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low. The diagrams considered here comprise all manner of visual para-text –
including illustrations of deﬁnitions, constructions, proof ﬁgures, and draw-
ings of instruments – designed to facilitate geometric understanding in these
translations of the Elements. Such an expansive view is necessary for two prin-
cipal reasons. The ﬁrst is that by construing diagrams broadly one is better
able to account for the diversity of illustrative approaches used by the dif-
ferent authors. Drawing from the same representational traditions found in
past editions of the Elements, each translator took a diﬀerent approach to
rendering the visual and geometric meaning in those texts for his vernacular
readers.
More importantly, a detailed reading of the visual vocabularies in these
starkly varied texts cannot help but undermine any narrow circumscription
of what counts as a diagram. One ﬁnds in our texts a variety of meanings
for terms such as ‘ﬁgure’ and ‘example’ as well as a variety of uses for illus-
trations of diﬀerent sorts. As all of these works were produced in print, the
safest delineation seems to be that between conventional alphabetical text and
other printed illustrations, including their captions. There, the extra work of
producing ﬁgures and arranging the rest of the text around them suggests
a special place for such images in our consideration of these translations. In
these ﬁgures, we shall see the junctures where our authors found, for a diver-
sity of reasons, that words did not suﬃce.7
Diagrams, for our authors, were integral means of establishing a new En-
glish geometry which was simultaneously comprehensible, even familiar, to its
vernacular readers and a part of an ancient mathematical tradition. The next
section provides some further necessary context for the authors and texts un-
der consideration, exploring what it means to translate the Elements. I then
consider Recorde and Billingsley’s uses of diagrams, ﬁrst in turn and then in
comparison, and contrast these uses to those of Dee and Leonard and Thomas
Digges. Finally, I synthesize these observations by comparing how each author
establishes the deﬁnitions for parallel lines and the simple geometric point.
In these texts, I argue, the strategic inclusion and exclusion of points, lines,
letters, and labels, along with the depiction of instruments and landscapes,
ﬁgured crucially in the establishment of the authors’ voices, vocabularies,
methodologies, and mathematical philosophies.
4.2 Translating Euclid
Between the ﬁrst geometrical writings of Recorde, Billingsley, Dee, and
Leonard and Thomas Digges, one ﬁnds the foundations of English vernac-
7 This is not to discount the crucial role of printers and engravers in preparing diagrams.
The texts engage suﬃciently with their illustrations that it is safe to presume substantial
involvement on the part of the authors, but there are also signs (particularly in errors or
omissions) that suggest the limits of such involvement. For the remainder of this paper, I
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ular geometry. Billingsley was a wealthy merchant and translator of several
genres. His collaboration with Dee connected him to a closely interlinked Tu-
dor tetrumvirate of English mathematics. Leonard and Thomas Digges both
use elements of Recorde’s terminology in their work, and Dee had worked
directly with Recorde’s arithmetical text The Ground of Artes.8 Dee and the
elder Digges knew each other personally, and the younger Digges was a pupil
of Dee, who became Thomas’s “second mathematical father” after Leonard’s
death.9
While Billingsley’s is the only work of these ﬁve authors typically counted
among translations of Euclid’s Elements, and is certainly the most complete
and literal of the group, the texts of each played pivotal roles in shaping Eu-
clid’s reception in England. Pathway oﬀered many new geometric terms for
geometry’s new language, and, following Proclus, was the ﬁrst modern text to
classify Euclid’s propositions as either constructions or theorems.10 Dee’s pref-
ace presented a taxonomy of the mathematical sciences and was among the
most inﬂuential mathematical texts of the late sixteenth century.11 Pantome-
tria oﬀered a deﬁnitive bridge between practical and theoretical geometry
from an author already widely read by practical users of the art.12 Begin-
ning with “Elementes of Geometrie, or Diﬃnitions,” its Euclidean allusions
and aspirations permeate the text.13 Thomas Digges’s treatise on geomet-
ric solids was the ﬁrst of many works securing his place as one of England’s
most eminent mathematicians.14 All ﬁve authors incorporate Euclid’s style
and content, implicitly or explicitly, into their own.
In this respect, all ﬁve should be counted among the ﬁrst English transla-
tors of Euclid’s Elements.15 One must remember that before the work of these
translators there was no geometry, as such, outside the universities in Eng-
land.16 Our authors realized the novelty and signiﬁcance of what they were
creating.17 “For nother is there anie matter more straunge in the englishe
tungue,” Recorde explains, “then this where of never booke was written be-
will attribute the constellation of authorships underlying the diagrams to the works’ oﬃcial
authors.
8 Johnson (1944, 132), Roberts (2004), Johnston (2004a, 2004b), Easton (1967, 515),
Heninger (1969, 109).
9 Digges (1573, Sig.A2r), Johnston (2004b), Johnson (1936, 398–399), Taylor (1954, 166).
10 Johnson and Larkey (1935, 68), Johnson (1944). Johnson identiﬁes ‘straight line’ as the
only one of Recorde’s coinages to have survived to the present day.
11 Roberts (2004, 200), Taylor (1954, 170–171, 320). 12 McRae (1993, 345). 13 Sig.B1r.
14 Johnston (2004b).
15 Euclid’s work was ﬁrst printed in Latin in 1482 and its ﬁrst full vernacular rendering
was in Italian some sixty years later. Heath (1956, 97, 106). On English translations of the
Elements, see Barrow-Green (2006, esp. 3–7).
16 Feingold (1984, 178), for instance, credits these very authors with introducing higher
mathematics to “London’s practitioners as well as its scholars.”
17 Bennett (1986, 10–11); Hill (1998, 253).
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fore now, in that tungue.”18 In his 1556 Tectonicon, an elementary technical
treatise, Leonard Digges explains his intention to write his forthcoming Pan-
tometria for “all maner men of this realme” and for making accessible “those
rules hidde, and as it were locked up in straunge tongues.”19 Billingsley de-
sired that “our Englishe tounge shall no lesse be enriched with good Authors,
then are other straunge tounges.”20
But these authors did not aim merely to reproduce the same obscure knowl-
edge in a diﬀerent language. Rather, as Thomas Digges writes of his father’s
intentions, works were “compiled in the Englishe tong, desiring rather with
plaine and proﬁtable conclusions to store his native language and beneﬁte
his Countrey men, than by publishing in the Latin rare and curiouse demon-
strations, to purchase fame among straungers.”21 In the second edition of
Pantometria, Digges further declares his resolve to publish “onely in my Na-
tive Language: Aswell to make the beneﬁte thereof the more private to my
Countreymen, as also to make thereby other Nations to aﬀect as much our
Language as my selfe have desired to learne the Highe Dutche.”22 Recorde and
Thomas Digges both saw mathematics and a mathematically literate public
as important elements of statecraft.23 Dee adds the aims that this “Englishe
Geometrie” would occupy those with sharp wits but lacking philosophical
inclinations and simultaneously serve to increase the prestige of university
mathematics among the general public.24
The geometry our authors made was a local geometry, valid in particular
ways for its particular users. It was also, however, a global geometry which,
though newly minted, could be traced in the authors’ prefaces as far back as
Archimedes’s defense of Syracuse.25 Our authors rendered geometric truth for
English vernacular audiences by appealing in multiple ways to their audiences’
situated and local experiences of the art. Their task was to render as geometry
the multifarious knowledges and practices brought to bear by their vernacular
readers.
It need hardly be mentioned that the translations did not emerge in a vac-
uum. Indeed, the annotated text from which Billingsley prepared the bulk of
his translation survives to this day – a 1548 edition of Zamberti’s Latin trans-
lation of Theon’s version of the Elements.26 One can infer from the others’
writings that they were well read in the mathematics of their contemporaries,
18 Sig.a2r. 19 Sig.π2r. 20 Sig.[ﬁst]3r. 21 Sig.A4v .
22 Digges (1591, 176). Recorde, too, published only in English. Johnson and Larkey (1935,
85).
23 Easton (1966, 354–355; 1967, 523), Hill (1998, 256), Feingold (1984, 186, 206–207).
24 Sig.A4r. 25 Recorde Sig.†2v–†3v , Digges Sig.A3v , Dee Sig.C4v .
26 Archibald (1950) reviews the history and historiography of Billingsley’s sources. See also
Feingold (1984, 158).
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both in England and on the Continent. Recorde, for instance, refers in his text
to claims made by German near-contemporary Albrecht Du¨rer.27 Moreover,
the personal and scholarly ties joining the translators makes it reasonable
to assume that they had access to a similar corpus of mathematical works.
Beyond that, however, it is diﬃcult to untangle the variety of sources upon
which they drew for their geometric works – certainly, such a task is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
Even in the case of their diagrams, which could presumably be transfered
more recognizably from their various sources, one can assert little beyond the
observation that, broadly speaking, there is little that is particularly inno-
vative about the representational strategies employed in the English trans-
lations. Features identiﬁed in the discussion below can, with few exceptions,
be found in prior works in other languages, both from the overtly Euclidean
volumes28 and from other geometric texts.29 Each of the English translations
combines images and motifs identiﬁable in multiple prior works. In light of the
common visual vocabulary upon which our ﬁve translators could draw, along
with the convergence in pedagogical intent among all but Thomas Digges, it
is all the more remarkable how diﬀerent their works appear.
My analysis takes these authors’ aims and dispositions, drawn largely from
the writings of the authors themselves, as its starting point. My goal is not to
evaluate the success or failure of these authors, nor to assess their inﬂuence
and inﬂuences, nor even to address the surely complicated matters of author-
ship and responsibility for the various words and ﬁgures of their respective
texts. Taking the works’ attributed authors at their word, the ensuing analysis
explores what can be learned by contrasting the diﬀerent representations as
they stand before us.
Each author set out to fashion a new English geometry on the back of
Euclid’s Elements. I shall interrogate their texts in order to shed light on
what they deemed necessary in order to accomplish such a monumental task.
The result will not account for the images, nor will it be simply an accounting
of them. Rather, it will comprise a ﬁrst inquiry into how the images account
for geometry. My question shall be how Euclid’s diagrams, in our broad sense
of the word, were translated for an English vernacular readership. How, in
other words, was the visual vocabulary of the Elements made meaningful for
this (at least purportedly) new audience? The diﬀerent strategies employed
by the texts under consideration oﬀer a view of the choices each author made
and the range of strategies each author set aside in his attempt to render a
vernacular geometry.
27 Sig.A4v . 28 For example, Ratdolt (1482), Pacioli (1523), Grynaeus (1533), Hirschvogel
(1543), Benedetti (1553), or Xylander (1562).
29 For example, Nemorarius (1533), Fine (1544), Cardano (1554), or Frisius (1557).
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4.3 Recorde’s English Geometry
Robert Recorde’s Pathway to Knowledg presented a geometry steeped in the
familiar trades and practices of men in all walks of life, whether or not they
were potential readers of his book. To help establish that geometry truly
was everywhere, his preface lists no fewer than sixteen ‘unlearned’ professions
which, he claimed, already relied on the subject.30 Users of geometry include
the commoner, the deity, the contemporary, the ancient, and (implicitly) ev-
eryone in between. “Ceres and Pallas,” for instance, join a congregation of
Ancient ﬁgures who “were called goddes” for teaching little more than geom-
etry’s applications, and Galen “coulde never cure well a rounde ulcere, till
reason geometricall didde teache it him.”31
Yet Recorde’s geometry consisted of a mass of terms, methods, and ways
of organizing knowledge which had never before appeared in the English lan-
guage. To bridge this gap between theoretical knowledge and purported prac-
tice, Recorde enlisted both words and images. Diagrams and illustrations in
the early pages of Recorde’s exposition are laden with extra contextualizing
details. Thus, ‘A twiste line’ is shown wrapped about a column and a right an-
gle in a construction is shown against a drafting square. Even abstract shapes
are drawn with hatching in order to give a sense of depth and form (ﬁgures
4.1(a)–(c)).
Deﬁnitions are illustrated with ﬁgures that can also stand alone without
the expository text surrounding them. Typographically diﬀerentiated terms
from Recorde’s exposition match copious labels attached to the ﬁgured objects
being deﬁned.32 Such typographical cues create an explicit link between text
and ﬁgure, and in so doing they establish parallel functions for the textual
deﬁnition and its associated diagram. Thus, the components of the ﬁgure
are not just semantically but also structurally mapped onto the components
of the deﬁnition. The structural authority thus acquired by the deﬁnitional
diagram makes it a credible stand-in for its textual counterpart. Particularly in
a setting where geometry’s rhetorical formulae had not entered the vernacular,
such an elevated role for diagrams oﬀered a crucial conceptual bridge for
Recorde’s readers.
Nor did Recorde’s diagrams stop at merely illustrating individual terms. In
many cases, deﬁnitional ﬁgures show the multiplicity and variety encompassed
by the term or terms in question – something the written text would be hard-
pressed to do without distractingly wordy descriptions. Individual concepts
are instantiated, in Recorde’s illustrations, by a sometimes-vast variety of
30 Sig.[ez]4v–†1v . 31 Sig.†1v–2r.
32 See ﬁgures 4.1(a)(b)(d) and 4.27 (below). In 4.1(d), the label for ‘A corde’ was included
without the cord even being drawn into the ﬁgure.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4.1: Deﬁnition and construction ﬁgures with contextualizing details and
internal captions from Recorde (1551): (a) twist and spiral lines, Sig.A4v; (b)
two three-dimensional shapes, Sig.C1r; (c) a construction using a drafting
square, Sig.D1v; (d) a tangent (‘touche’) line, Sig.B1r
cases. In some places, images are reused to illustrate multiple phenomena,
as when Recorde’s exemplary ‘spirail line’ joins a dizzying array of ‘croked’
ones (ﬁgure 4.2). Here, expediency for the printer reinforces the mathematical
principle that the same object can belong to many geometric classes.
According to Recorde, the diagrams establish abstract geometric concepts
on the basis of “such undowbtfull and sensible principles.”33 It is important
that this approach is emphasized at an early stage in the text. On the ﬁrst
page of his deﬁnitions, for example, Recorde explains that a line is composed
of points34 by saying that “if you with your pen will set in more other prickes
betweene everye two of these [in the dotted line above], then wil it be a
line.”35 His demonstration purports to explain the composition of both the
particular dotted and solid lines on the page and the general concept of a
geometric line. He thus transforms the familiar action of drawing points and
33 Sig.c1r.
34 See Alexander (1995, 580–581) for contemporary disputes over the composition of the
continuum.
35 Sig.A1r.
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Fig. 4.2: Deﬁnition ﬁgure for crooked lines from Recorde (1551, Sig.A1v)
lines from the mere production of marks on the page into the production of
geometry. The reader can see that all lines are composed of points through
a practice so intuitive that it need not actually be performed. That such
practices need only be performed hypothetically becomes important later on,
where assertions which cannot be veriﬁed with a few dots of a pen nonetheless
inherit the same degree of clarity and obviousness as those which can.
This same reliance on what was readily sensible led Recorde to exercise cau-
tion where the diagrams might introduce ambiguities. He explains the dangers
of deceptive ﬁgures in his discussion of right angles (ﬁgure 4.3). Though “an-
gles (as you see) are made partly of streght lines, partly of croked lines, and
partly of both together,” his illustrations of right angles show only straight
lines, “because it would muche trouble a lerner to judge them: for their true
judgment doth appertaine. . . rather to reason then to sense.”36 Indeed, geom-
etry was, for Recorde, a foundation for reason, not something reason could
teach. As the more fundamental subject, geometry was to be grounded in the
already-meaningful and already-obvious – that is, it was to be grounded in
the purely sensible.
Recorde’s use of an excess of exemplars in order to deﬁne geometric entities
was and remains a widely employed practice. But Recorde does not stop his
parade of multiplicity as he embarks on constructions, which in other contexts
are illustrated and discussed in just one putatively generic case. Emphasiz-
ing the development of an intuitive comprehension of geometric truths over
their rigorous proof-based establishment, Recorde frequently oﬀers multiple
constructions for a single proposition or problem. His diagrams show how the
construction should be applied in diﬀerent situations and imply that the ge-
36 Sig.A1v–A2v .
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Fig. 4.3: Deﬁnition ﬁgures for right and sharp angles from Recorde (1551,
Sig.A2r)
ometric conclusion is no mere byproduct of an overly facile case study while
suggesting how other geometric case studies might be applied beyond the
cases in which Recorde considers them explicitly.
Pathway also extends the familiarity-granting depiction of the everyday
objects of practical geometry to the constructions later in the text. Thus,
Recorde depicts a window arch with a hanging plumbline to accompany three
constructions for bisecting a semicircle using diﬀerent surveying tools, includ-
ing compasses and drafting squares. He illustrates Euclid’s petition to con-
struct a circle from a point and a radius with a picture of a compass, rather
than the series of embedded circles, sometimes accompanied by radii, used
in nearly all of the other Euclidean texts of his period (ﬁgures 4.1(c), 4.4;
cf. ﬁgure 4.10).
Fig. 4.4: Constructions using, respectively, a plumb line and a compass from
Recorde (1551, Sig.D1v, b1r)
Diagrams can, moreover, indicate information that is omitted in the text,
as where Recorde’s diagrams show that he intends his theorems about tri-
angles to apply only to ones formed of straight lines, even though his deﬁni-
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tions stress that triangles can also be formed using curved, or crooked, lines.
Recorde’s diagrams rarely include numbers, and while some numbers appear
to correspond with their associated measures in the diagram,37 others corre-
spond hardly at all to the proportions of the drawn ﬁgure itself (e.g. ﬁgure
4.5). With his proofs, Recorde is explicit about having
drawen in the Linearic examples many times more lines, than be spoken of in the
explication of them, whiche is doone to this intent, that if any manne list to learne
the demonstrations by harte,. . . those same men should ﬁnde the Linearic exaumples
to serve for this purpose, and to want no thing needefull to the juste proofe. . . .38
This practice is evident in his ﬁgure for the Pythagorean theorem, discussed
below (page 141), but we shall also see more examples where pluralistic con-
siderations lead to the inclusion of many more diagram elements than would
be used in more conventional Euclidean proofs such as Billingsley’s (see ﬁgures
4.7 and 4.11).
Fig. 4.5: Triangles with speciﬁed measures from Recorde (1551, Sig.c1v)
Pedagogical through and through, Recorde’s text works by guiding the
reader through concepts using explicitly exemplary situations. For Euclid’s
common notions relating to equalities of magnitude, Recorde uses the ar-
eas of rectangles and triangles as his case studies (ﬁgure 4.6). For the sixth
common notion, that two doubles of the same thing are equal to each other,
Recorde’s diagram includes two copies of the doubled rectangle. These are
37 e.g. Sig. b2v and b3v , both of which show tick-marks, and e4r, for the Pythagorean
theorem, discussed below.
38 Sig a3r–a3v .
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arranged alongside two larger rectangles formed by joining the smaller ones
along diﬀerent edges, showing both that geometric objects can be doubled
in multiple ways and underscoring that either doubling produces the same
new area. As with the deﬁnitions discussed above, the diagrams for Recorde’s
common notions aim to establish not just the legitimacy of the claim but
also its scope and purpose. Recorde’s readers had to be convinced that it was
meaningful to compare diﬀerent ways of doubling an object before examining
those comparisons, just as it was necessary to exhibit a multitude of angles
and shapes before embarking on their systematic classiﬁcation.
Fig. 4.6: Figures for two common notions from Recorde (1551, Sig.b2v, b3v)
Elsewhere, Recorde puts his images to multiple use by illustrating a method
of partitioning polygons using parallel lines in a construction involving trian-
gulation (ﬁgure 4.7). One diagram indicates how to triangulate simple poly-
gons of increasingly many edges while the other shows a large selection of
more complicated polygons which suggests the general applicability of the
construction and a practical means of applying it. Finally, Recorde takes care
to show why some possible exceptions to his geometric principles are not so.
This involves showing variations on a theorem which fail to hold (see ﬁgure
4.11 below) and demonstrating how two straight lines cannot enclose a region
by showing a regions and non-regions made of diﬀerent combinations of two
curved or straight lines (ﬁgure 4.8).
The diagrams in Recorde’s Pathway to Knowledg are thus made to perform
a variety of functions as a crucial supplement to the text. His images estab-
lish the legitimacy, meaningfulness, and familiarity of everything from simple
geometric objects to relatively complex assertions, constructions, and theo-
rems. Recorde exhibits a geometry addressed to a dazzling array of shapes
and objects from both the geometric world and the everyday one. His ﬁg-
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Fig. 4.7: Constructions involving triangulation from Recorde (1551, Sig.E1v–
E2r)
Fig. 4.8: Pairs of lines from Recorde (1551, Sig.b2r)
ures justify geometry through its contexts while simultaneously showing how
such contexts are to be translated and manipulated according to geometric
conventions. Many of these aspects appear in diﬀerent ways in the ﬁgures of
subsequent texts, and Recorde’s work oﬀers a rich template against which to
set later English geometries.
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4.4 Euclid According to Billingsley
At ﬁrst glance, the illustrations in Billingsley’s compendious edition of the
Elements are unremarkable. He holds close to what by that time were highly
standardized diagrammatic conventions in the manuscript and even print tra-
ditions which preceded his contribution. For the purposes of this essay, and
without aiming to describe Billingsley’s many inﬂuences, it should suﬃce to
note that the ‘look and feel’ of Billingsley’s (albeit exceedingly thorough and
well-appointed) text does not depart dramatically from other authoritative
versions of the Elements in circulation at his time.
The text does not arouse our interest for its representational innovations
so much as for the means by which it deploys its very unoriginal illustrations
to serve an utterly original audience. The work’s diagrams and ﬁgures must
have been the object of much careful consideration. The author attests to
the “charge & great travaile” incurred in translating the Elements, stating in
the text’s frontmatter that “I have added easie and plaine declarations and
examples by ﬁgures, of the deﬁnitions.”39 The book is copiously illustrated,
and no cost was spared in annexing images to proofs, deﬁnitions, scholia,
examples, and other textual features. Where proofs span a page-turn, their
corresponding diagrams are typically copied over so that they are always vis-
ible when following the proof.40 To help the reader grasp three-dimensional
shapes, Billingsley adds to his two-dimensional diagrams a parallel set which
use fold-out ﬂaps so that the shapes literally pop out of the page. This latter
was perhaps the most distinctive of Billingsley’s arsenal of illustrative tools.
Billingsley’s representational strategies are best seen in contrast to Recorde’s.
Although they claim in their prefaces to be writing for similar audiences and
to similar ends, it is not hard to see where their purposes diverge. The diﬀer-
ence goes all the way down to what sort of geometry they would have their
readers learn. As a case in point, contrast Recorde’s approach to multiple
representations of a triangulation procedure (ﬁgure 4.7 above) to Billingsley’s
treatment of the proof for Euclid’s second proposition, which concerns the
reproduction of a line segment at a new location.41 Recorde shows a suitably
representative variety of case studies for his procedure, addressing it to in-
creasingly complex polygons in order to inspire conﬁdence in the method’s
general applicability and point to how it might be so applied. Billingsley, by
contrast, exhausts all of the logical possibilities for the proof’s diagram, show-
ing how the respective diagram for each of four cases is related to the proof’s
text (ﬁgure 4.9). Recorde prizes instructiveness, Billingsley completeness.
At the same time, Billingsley’s completeness is necessarily a qualiﬁed one.
Previous editions of the Elements in other languages break proofs down by
39 Sig.[ﬁst]2v . 40 This feature can also be found, albeit less frequently, as far back as the
1482 Ratdolt text. 41 Fol.10r–11r.
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Fig. 4.9: Billingsley’s (1570) four cases for Proposition 2. Fol.10v–11r
their possible diagrams in similar ways, but Billingsley appears particularly
zealous in treating proposition I.2 in this manner. Just as Recorde uses demon-
strations by simple manual practices such as drawing early in his text where
such demonstrations are still simple and plausible, Billingsley can only aﬀord
to be exhaustive with such proofs at a relatively early stage. Thus, Billingsley’s
detailed demonstration of proposition I.2 manages to stand in for the great
range of demonstrations where such a consideration would be prohibitively
impractical. He shows how one diagram and argument can stand for many in
this simple case so as to avoid having to do so for later ones.
Recorde and Billingsley’s diﬀerent approaches to instructiveness and com-
pleteness play out dramatically in the diﬀerent illustrations they attach to
Euclid’s common notions. Where Recorde instantiates the principle with a
speciﬁc example which illustrates and justiﬁes the claim (as in ﬁgure 4.6
above), Billingsley aspires to the most abstract possible representation by
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joining the claim to images of appropriately related line segments (ﬁgure
4.10). Here, Billingsley appropriates a convention found in many prior Eu-
clidean texts from later books of the Elements where quantities are depicted
as linear magnitudes, often arranged in series next to each other for ease of
comparison. The segments become, for Billingsley, standard representatives
for any type of quantity, and could just as well be of any length or dimension.
In Billingsley’s metonymy of magnitude, “a line, which is the ﬁrst kynde of
quantitie,”42 stands in for all geometric quantities. The letters labeling their
lengths reinforce this point, as well as the convention in geometric diagrams
of using such labels to produce general geometric arguments. Recorde’s rect-
angles, on the other hand, work only as rectangles and have speciﬁc numerical
sizes associated to them.
Fig. 4.10: Illustrations of postulates and common notions from Billingsley
(1570) Fol.6r–7r
Similarly, Recorde depicts a compass to show how circles of arbitrary center
and radius may be made (ﬁgure 4.4 above), whereas Billingsley asserts their
multiplicity by drawing a nested collection of three circles with a common
center described along a single radial line (ﬁgure 4.10). Where Recorde shows
how the postulated circles can be produced, it is enough for Billingsley to
assert that they can be. Like Recorde (ﬁgure 4.8 above), Billingsley shows
two straight lines failing to make a surface (ﬁgure 4.10), but does not show
the feat being accomplished when lines are allowed to bend. As before, it is
a simple fact in Billingsley’s presentation that straight lines cannot enclose
a surface; he does not strive like Recorde to graphically detail the scope and
import of the claim as he makes it.
The same disanalogy applies to the theorems of the two works. Billings-
ley’s and Recorde’s illustrations for Euclid’s theorem that a pair of circles can
cross at most twice43 both depict a circle crossed four times by an eye shape,
42 Fol.1v . 43 Theorem lv (Sig.i2r) in Recorde, book 3 proposition 10 (Fol.89r) in Billingsley.
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the standard ﬁgure (with very few exceptions) for this proof in the Euclidean
canon. This non-example provides a starting point for a proof by contradiction
which is spelled out in Billingsley’s translation but only hinted at by Recorde.
Recorde, however, also includes another circle of the same size to show how
circles do indeed cross,44 as well as an ovular ‘tunne forme’ to show, along
with the eye form, that only ‘irregulare formes’ may violate the theorem. He
thus adds a surplus of pedagogic detail to facilitate understanding of the range
of the theorem’s implications. Billingsley’s ﬁgure is an accessory to the proof
of the theorem, never seeking to show more than the relationships between
diﬀerent objects cited in the proof and providing a means of visualizing the
series of letters and shapes to which the textual demonstration refers. A sim-
ilar contrast in approaches is present throughout Recorde’s and Billingsley’s
works, reaching all the way back to the deﬁnitions.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4.11: Proofs about intersecting circles: (a) Recorde (1551, Sig.i.2r), (b)
Billingsley (1570, Fol.89r–89v)
This is not to say that Billingsley wholly disregards pedagogic consider-
ations or indications of how geometry might look in practice. Both Recorde
and Billingsley include ﬁgures demonstrating how compass marks might eco-
nomically be produced in service of a construction (ﬁgure 4.12). In Recorde’s
case, the construction is a practical non-rigorous shortcut. For Billingsley, on
the other hand, the ﬁgures showing compass marks indicate how only cer-
tain arcs of circles need be drawn in order ‘readily’ to produce triangles in
good Euclidean form – they are not allowed to stand in for the thoroughly
Euclidean constructions in later proofs.
44 Pacioli (1523) shows only two circles crossing at two points for this theorem.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4.12: Illustrations involving compass marks: (a) Recorde (1551, Sig.D2r),
(b) Billingsley (1570, Fol.10r, triangles arranged vertically in original)
The comparison between Recorde and Billingsley takes another dimension
in their diagrams for the Pythagorean theorem, relating the lengths of the
sides of a right triangle. Recorde builds his ﬁgure from a right triangle whose
sides are in the ratio of 3-4-5, dividing each side and its associated square
accordingly. He writes that “by the numbre of the divisions in eche of these
squares, may you perceave not onely what the square of any line is called,
but also that the theoreme is true, and expressed plainly bothe by lines and
numbre.”45 Because his aim is to illustrate the theorem in as comprehensi-
ble and multifarious a way as possible, Recorde depicts a right triangle with
the simplest combination of sides whose lengths are related by ordinary ra-
tios of integers. This allows him to make the demonstration “bothe by lines
and numbre” in a readily graspable format, and his textual explanation is a
step-by-step description identifying the features of the ﬁgure with the general
claims of the proposition – ﬁrst identifying the shapes, then showing how to
read their respective areas from the diagram, and ﬁnally aﬃrming that the
45 Sig.e4r.
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proposition is satisﬁed in the depicted case before describing how to use the
proposition to ﬁnd unknown sides for other right triangles.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4.13: Diagrams for the Pythagorean theorem: (a) Recorde (1551, Sig.e4r),
(b) Billingsley (1570, Fol.58r)
This ﬁgure is a partial exception to Recorde’s rule of adding extra de-
tails to his ﬁgures for those who would learn their conventional proofs. The
standard Euclidean proof, corresponding to Billingsley’s diagram, requires a
number of auxiliary lines to allow the areas of the squares to be compared
by a means other than counting unit squares – something which would not
even be possible with the triangle in Billingsley’s ﬁgure because his sides and
hypotenuse do not appear to correspond to any simple Pythagorean triple of
integers when measured. Recorde’s diagram, however, manages to invoke its
Euclidean counterpart. The orientation of the triangles and squares is an ob-
vious parallel. Easier to miss, Recorde labels a point ‘F’ at the bottom of his
diagram which corresponds not to any of the corners or crossings of his ﬁgure
but to the point labeled as ‘L’ from the vertical auxiliary line in Billingsley’s
ﬁgure.
In the case of the Pythagorean theorem, as, indeed, with most of Euclid’s
propositions, Recorde’s text can hardly be construed to provide even the out-
line of a conventionally rigorous argument. Recorde’s gestures at this distant
rigor – the ‘F’ label, the extra lines in other diagrams – point rather to an ideal
of what geometry is and what it is about. Pathway ’s readers did not learn to
prove, but they saw what proofs looked like and, perhaps more importantly,
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they saw what proofs could show. Recorde’s is thus manifestly a geometry of
showing and, insofar as it was practical for his vernacular readers, of doing as
well.
Billingsley’s geometry, like Recorde’s, aims to explain the meaning and
value of both geometry’s results and practices. Unlike Recorde, however,
Billingsley insists on doing geometry even when it is not a simple matter
of ﬁlling in a dotted line or hanging a ball of lead from an archway. In this
sense, Billingsley’s text appears to us as a work of geometry, while Recorde’s
seems more about geometry. This reﬂects, in large part, the diﬀerent peda-
gogical approaches taken by the two translators. But it also reveals a bias I
would like to suggest is distinctly posterior to these writings.
For both Recorde and Billingsley, proofs are essential to geometric knowl-
edge. Recorde, however, presents a geometry in which man’s senses and ac-
tions are prior even to the proofs. Focusing on the results and applications
of Euclidean geometry as they are available to perception, Pathway need not
be seen as deﬁcient for lacking the sort of rigor later imagined as the heart
of the geometric method. Rather, Recorde’s geometry treats ﬁrst things ﬁrst:
the sensible takes priority over the rational throughout the book, just as it
did in Recorde’s deﬁnitions. Billingsley, then, departs from Recorde only in-
sofar as he gradually allows the rational to assert itself where the senses do
not suﬃce. This is not to argue that this one contrast need overthrow our
present received view of Early Modern Euclidean rigor, but to suggest that
other readings are possible, and indeed may account for some features of texts
that might otherwise pass without notice.
Before outlining the dramatically diﬀerent illustrative strategies in Digges’s
Pantometria, a few words on those of Dee’s preface are in order. Indeed, Dee’s
preface is striking for its lack of geometric illustrations, and contains only
three small diagrams relating to geometry’s applications and his famous taxo-
nomic diagram of the mathematical arts and sciences, despite treating several
concepts related to some which Billingsley ﬁnds necessary to illustrate exten-
sively. Dee’s text thus stands as an important corrective for the comparisons
undertaken in this article, a role which will become more explicit when all
three volumes are directly compared at the end. For Dee, the relationships
between mathematical objects and sciences are to be understood logically and
schematically, not diagrammatically. Even the diagrams he does use, includ-
ing the fold-out diagram at the end of his preface, emphasize that it is the
order of the mathematical sciences which is at the heart of his work, not the
understanding of their constituents.
4.5 Digges’s Geometry in Context
Like Dee’s preface, Thomas Digges’s appended discourse on geometric solids is
only sparsely illustrated. His deﬁnitions include canonical projections of Pla-
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tonic solids along with ornately lettered name labels (ﬁgure 4.14) and some
other geometric projections and line diagrams for complicated constructions
and calculations appear later. But there is little to indicate that he intends
readers to understand his results with the help of in-text diagrams. As a
compendium of new mathematical results, Digges’s discourse is the least ped-
agogical of the texts here considered, and its transmission of Euclid is more
by way of form and style than textual content or imagery. Thus, he begins
with deﬁnitions and presents results in the form of Euclidean propositions,
using Euclidean terminology and rhetoric throughout.
Fig. 4.14: Images of polyhedra from Thomas Digges’s (1571, discourse,
Sig.T2r–T2v)
The Pantometria, on the other hand, is richly illustrated with conventional
geometric ﬁgures and examples, plans for surveying instruments, and, above
all, detailed scenes of geometry in practice. Leonard Digges’s deﬁnitions, like
Recorde’s, are illustrated and labeled in a way that allows them to stand
on their own without textual explanations. Indeed, the language of Digges’s
deﬁnitions is so spare and unelaborated in comparison with the rest of the
text and with Billingsley and Recorde’s renderings that it can easily be seen
as secondary to the diagrams, a perfunctory nod to the norms of Euclidean
exposition. Without much aid from their surrounding text, the diagrams of
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the Pantometria systematically illustrate geometric concepts and their rela-
tionships. They do not, like Recorde’s, aim to show the wide variety of objects
under consideration, but rather depict each concept in a single case in order
to establish a working vocabulary.
Fig. 4.15: Deﬁnitional ﬁgures from Digges (1571, Sig.B1v–B2r)
These single cases, however, are not portrayed in isolation. Even Digges’s
simplest deﬁnitional images are arranged in what might be called ‘conceptual
scenes’ which show how his concepts are related. Thus, a point appears along-
side two types of lines, and terms related to angles, circles, or perpendicular
lines are joined in single composite images (ﬁgure 4.15 and ﬁgure 4.28 below).
The diagrams establish a touchpoint for a new geometric vocabulary, and
help the reader to systematize the large variety of new deﬁnitions by visually
associating related terms and images.
The geometric concepts of the deﬁnitions are then given contextual mean-
ing within elaborate scenes of surveying and warfare. These scenes impose ge-
ometric lines, measures, and instruments on landscapes and in settings where
they might be used. They often contain additional buildings, people, stat-
ues, and decorations, in many cases signiﬁcantly more stylized than the ob-
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jects most closely implicated in the geometry under consideration, in order
to establish the setting.46 In some cases, geometric measurements are made
by surveyors (ﬁgure 4.16 shows a surveyor making three measurements over
time), but in other scenes geometric features are superimosed on the land-
scape without the beneﬁt of an instrument, observer, or either of the two (e.g.
ﬁgure 4.17). Additional people in the scenes help stage the measurement ei-
ther directly, as where a ﬁnely attired woman gestures at the surveyor (ﬁgure
4.18), or indirectly, as where armies stand and wait for the geometer to ﬁnish
his work (ﬁgure 4.19) or hunting parties chase game which is perhaps to be
served in the hall being measured (ﬁgure 4.20). The latter includes hunting
parties in both the foreground and background, corresponding to surveyors
at either end of the hall.
Fig. 4.16: Scene with time-lapse measurements from Digges (1571, Sig.D1r)
The diﬃcult work of bridging representational conventions in landscape art
and geometry often creates striking oddities in the scenes. The ﬁgures from the
text use a standard repertoire of techniques to establish depth and perspective,
but these techniques are not applied to the geometric ﬁgures overlaying the
landscapes. The result is that where the geometric ﬁgure itself has depth (that
is, when it is not in the plane perpendicular to the viewer’s line of sight) there
is a visible incongruity with between the geometry and its scene. Attempting
46 Many of these visual features can be found in, for instance, Pacioli 1523, Fine 1544, or
Frisius 1557.
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Fig. 4.17: Measuring a tower using the sun from Digges (1571, Sig.D1v)
Fig. 4.18: Geometric scene with well-attired onlookers from Digges (1571,
Sig.E1v)
to establish an identity between geometric and landscape drawing, Digges’s
ﬁgures do not quite succeed in either. One can see, for instance, that the
lines in ﬁgure 4.21 describe a right-triangular section of a pasture (not least
because a draftsman’s square is drawn in at one corner), but the pasture’s
nearby square corner appears obtuse from its perspectival rendering. Digges
means to show, as in all of his situated ﬁgures, how geometry can be made
manifest in otherwise familiar scenes, but shows somewhat inadvertently just
how much work this manifestation entails.
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Fig. 4.19: A military scene from Digges (1571, Sig.F2r)
Fig. 4.20: Scene with hunters and a hall from Digges (1571, Sig.D4r)
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Fig. 4.21: Surveying a pasture, from Digges (1571, Sig.G4v)
A similar tension emerges where depth is created by other means than
perspective. Figure 4.22 depicts the determination of the “true water levell
from a fountaine.”47 Digges makes a fountain’s height plausible with a wind-
ing path, but the depth associated with the path vanishes in the fountain’s
geometrization. In scenes such as this, geometry is not necessarily made vi-
sually realistic, but rather is given a situational context where the geometer’s
ﬁgures and the viewer’s scenes can comfortably (if not always naturally) co-
incide. More broadly, distortions of scale and other visual simpliﬁcations or
embellishments in the Pantometria give rise to scenes which do not precisely
depict actual users of geometry in their past or anticipated work. Rather,
they conjure a constellation of images which appeal to geometry as a prac-
tical, worldly, and even glamorous endeavor and reinforce the plausibility of
both the geometric methods themselves and their purported applications.
Nothing better represents the vexed nexus of geometry and familiar experi-
ence than the appearance of instruments in the Pantometria. Geometry, after
all, was wholly alien to the work’s vernacular readers, and was made less so
by association with familiar scenes and contexts. Measuring and surveying in-
struments, on the other hand, are not nearly so otherworldly as the geometric
entities they help to produce. They are real objects and readers may indeed
have seen them without knowing their full role in geometry, but the work and
its illustrations are also premised on the presumption that such instruments
be also unfamiliar and outside of the normal experience, in both form and
use, of Digges’s audience.
Within the Pantometria, geometric instruments play a number of roles.
In the work’s many scenes, the instruments work both to establish geomet-
47 Digges (1571, Sig.K1v).
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Fig. 4.22: Geometric scene with a fountain on a hill from Digges (1571,
Sig.K2r). (Here, ‘fountain’ is synonymous with ‘well’)
ric properties and show their manners of measurement. Thus, a draftsman’s
square produces right angles in two related ways: it shows which angles in a
scene are right angles by virtue of their association with the instrument and
it shows how such angles can be produced by the surveyor who would apply
the lessons of the construction or calculation from the scene. Embedded quad-
rants have a similar function for non-right angles, and lengths are shown with
regularly spaced marks along lines or with labels indicating a certain number
of paces.
In this way, scenes show more than just contexts for the geometry of the
Pantometria. They also use depictions of instruments within those contexts
to bridge the scenes of the work and the sites of the work’s potential applica-
tion. Showing instruments in use, Digges also shows how they are to be used.
This principle holds in the scenes discussed above, which depict instruments
alongside their users, but it also applies where instruments are shown free of
the surveyors or geometers who might use them. In ﬁgure 4.19, for instance,
Digges shows how to produce an angle using “three staves, halberdes, billes,
or any such like things, K L M”48 and depicts several such arrangements,
both on their own and being used by a surveyor. In ﬁgure 4.23, the geometric
tools are given full-name labels within the scene and are shown performing a
simple geometric measurement on their own, independent of the geometer’s
interventions.
48 Sig.F1v .
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Fig. 4.23: Geometric scene with labeled instruments from Digges (1571,
Sig.E2r)
In some places, the line between geometric instrument and geometric object
is blurred in Digges’s diagrams. He refers, for instance, to smaller triangles
which one could construct and measure as a replacement for cumbersome
trigonometric calculations. These triangles are depicted within the larger scene
in order to show all the geometer’s resources in one and the same image,
but appear out of scale so that their construction and dimensions can be
more legibly rendered. Figure 4.24 has one such triangle with whose aid the
geometer in the example measures a much larger similar triangle. Here, the
auxiliary triangle ﬂoats somewhat apart from the scene, away from its users
and in an otherwise unﬁlled part of the landscape. It is a necessary part
of the calculation, but it could, implies Digges, be anywhere, at any scale.
Artistic convenience here coincides with mathematical principles about similar
triangles and their use in calculations across large scales. If the auxiliary ﬁgure
is particularly complex or its associated context particularly diﬃcult to depict,
it might even be shown alone as a stand-in for a more detailed geometric scene,
as is the case for the construction in ﬁgure 4.25 for an example involving the
determination of distances between landmarks.
Measuring instruments themselves also appear in isolation and with con-
siderable detail in the Pantometria. Illustrations such as those of ﬁgure 4.26
would have taught readers how to imagine the details of the coarsely schema-
tized instruments in Digges’s scenes as well as how to build such instruments
for themselves. From the details of the images, one can discern something of
the instrument’s materials, features, and even assembly. The images accom-
pany written instructions which guide the reader through each instrument’s
production, along with some indications regarding its use. Pantometria was,
after all, a text of practical and applied geometry. In order to make Euclidean
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Fig. 4.24: Scene with an auxiliary triangle from Digges (1571, Sig.G3v)
Fig. 4.25: Geometric ﬁgure for an extended computation from Digges (1571,
Sig.K4v)
geometry relevant to the Pantometria’s readers, the work had to ﬁll in the
gaps between Euclidean ideals and geometric experience. Instrument-making
was, for these users of geometry, one of the most essential mechanisms for this
gap-ﬁlling.
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Fig. 4.26: A quadrant and a theodolite from Digges (1571, Sig.C4r, I2r)
4.6 Points and Parallels
Two examples from the geometric deﬁnitions in the works under consideration
help to highlight diﬀerent authors’ contrasting approaches to geometric ﬁg-
ures. Before considering their illustrations of the geometric point, it will help
to examine a slightly more complicated notion: that of parallel lines. Recorde,
Billingsley, and Leonard Digges each include an illustration for the concept of
a parallel line (ﬁgure 4.27). From the rich history of the parallel postulate in
Euclidean geometry it should be clear that what it means for two lines to be
parallel is by no means self-evident. Staging parallel lines with diﬀerent sorts
of diagrams, the authors bring to the fore diﬀerent aspects of the ‘parallel’
concept and diﬀerent roles parallel lines play in Euclidean geometry.
Digges provides the most straightforward image of parallel lines. His ﬁgure
depicts two horizontal line segments of the same length framing the caption
‘Paralleles.’ As with Digges’s other deﬁnitional ﬁgures, this one serves to es-
tablish an operating vocabulary. The two depicted lines are parallels, and act
as a point of reference for future invocations of the parallel concept with-
out being exhaustive of all possibilities for its manifestation. Digges deﬁnes
parallel lines as ones “so equedistantly placed”49 that they never meet, and
underscores this notion by making his example lines not just equidistantly
placed but also of the same length. Parallel lines, according to Digges, are
characterized by their levelness and their equalness, a message reinforced by
the spare details of his image.
49 Sig.B4r. Equidistance seems an unusual criterion to modern readers, but is not hard to
ﬁnd in Early Modern texts. In addition to Digges and Recorde, their contemporary Petrus
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(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 4.27: Figures for parallel lines: (a) Recorde (1551, Sig.A4r–A4v), (b)
Billingsley (1570, Fol.5v), (c) Digges (1571, Sig.B4r)
Parallel lines for Billingsley have a very similar image as for Digges: he too
uses evenly spaced horizontal segments of the same length. But where Digges
labels his with a full word, Billingsley marks his parallel lines with four letters
placed at the endpoints of the two segments. In Billlingsley’s text, the system
of reference established by the letters – that of referring to lines by pairs of
points therein – is more important than Digges’s crude taxonomic nomencla-
ture. That the lines are parallel is something to be proved or stipulated in
the text with the help of labels and not something to be observed from the
ostensible properties of their appearance on the page. Billingsley thus uses the
labeling scheme for his ﬁgure to displace the property of parallelism into the
written text, even as his image reproduces the same conceptual shorthands –
evenness, levelness, equalness – as does Digges’s.
Recorde also has an image of two horizontal segments with the label ‘par-
allelis’, but this is just the second of four labeled examples used to illustrate
the concept. On the page where he introduces the parallel concept, the image
is of two parallel S-shaped curves. In Recorde’s textual deﬁnition, equal spac-
ing is the paramount feature of parallel lines, and the ‘tortuouse paralleles’
of his ﬁrst ﬁgure emphasize this point by showing that no matter where a
line turns its parallel must turn with it in order to stay evenly spaced. As
suggested above, Recorde’s deﬁnitions deal far more in curved lines than do
Ramus (1580, 14) has equidistance as his explicit deﬁnition for parallel lines.
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the subsequent parts of his text, and his deﬁnition for parallel lines is no ex-
ception. Curves allow Recorde economically to embed geometric multiplicity
in relatively few ﬁgures. A single S-curve shows how parallel lines work in
every direction and under any transformation.
Also in keeping with other deﬁnitions, Recorde illustrates the parallel con-
cept contrastively by showing two pairs of non-parallel lines next to his canoni-
cal horizontal parallels. This pairing has two functions. First, it shows just how
parallel lines diﬀer from non-parallels. Even though Recorde’s non-examples
do not cross, one can see very clearly where they will meet by following the
courses of the paired lines from left to right. Recorde thus provides a visual
gloss to aid in recognizing parallelism and non-parallelism in ﬁgures where
these properties might be ambiguous. But second, Recorde establishes the
image of even horizontal lines as the canonical one for the parallel concept.
Both by giving it the simplest label – ‘parallelis’ without any adjectives –
and by setting it opposite his contrastive examples, Recorde makes horizontal
parallels a default reference point for the concept.
Recorde’s parallel concentric circles complete his suite of examples. No
longer equal in length, these continue to show the ‘equality’ aspect of paral-
lelism by covering the same angular scope. Moreover, these have marked end-
points in order to identify the appropriate corresponding points for judging
even spacing, suggesting how such points might be used to gauge parallelism
more generally. They show yet another way to judge parallelness, and empha-
size that equal length is not the only possible clue indicating the parallelness
of two lines. Recorde thus closes his illustration of the parallel concept by
insisting, as he does throughout his deﬁnitions, on the concept’s multiplicity
and wide scope.
Unlike parallel lines, the simple geometric point appears at ﬁrst to be an
unproblematic concept whose properties are largely self-evident from the com-
mon experience of any potential reader. Perhaps because it is the ﬁrst deﬁned
object in the Euclidean corpus, the point receives a level of attention seem-
ingly out of proportion to its obvious simplicity. All but Thomas Digges oﬀer
deﬁnitions. Of those, all but the elder Digges add explanatory notes and all
but Dee oﬀer illustrations (ﬁgure 4.28). The challenge, for our authors, was
to establish a relationship between the points of common knowledge and the
geometric points of the Euclidean texts. For our authors’ readership, points
were recognizable commodities whose manifestation in geometry was nonethe-
less completely alien. Textual and visual cues conspire to transﬁgure common
points into Euclidean points, and thereby to set each work on a suitably rig-
orous Euclidean foundation. There is not much to distinguish the geometric
points’ visual manifestation in the works under consideration, but the subtle
diﬀerences that do exist become quite stark and signiﬁcant upon consideration
of their textual context.
4 Translating Euclid’s diagrams into English 157
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 4.28: Figures for the geometric point: (a) Recorde (1551, Sig.A1r), (b)
Billingsley (1570, Fol.1r), (c) Digges (1571, Sig.B1r)
Billingsley illustrates the geometric point with a small dot in the outside
margin to the right of a label ‘A’, which is printed slightly larger than the
labels in Billingsley’s other geometric diagrams. Digges shows a large dot
labeled ‘A pointe’ arrayed horizontally next to a similarly labeled right line
and collection of crooked lines in a ﬁgure below his third deﬁnition. Recorde’s
three exemplary points, placed at the end of his paragraph, are about the
size of his punctuation marks and are arranged in a small upright equilateral
triangle. Although Dee does not include a drawing of a point, he does connect
Euclidean points to visual experience by explaining that “by visible formes,
we are holpen to imagine, what our Line Mathematicall, is. What our Point,
is.”50
Indeed, for both Dee and Billingsley there is an explicit call for the reader’s
imagination to make the ﬁnal leap from visual to geometric points. Billingsley
calls a point “the least thing that by minde and understanding can be imag-
ined and conceived: then which, there can be nothing lesse, as the point A in
the margent.”51 The printed mark in the margin is small, but it is surely not
the least thing imaginable. Rather, Billingsley’s ﬁgure indicates the relevant
features of points for his exposition, including their smallness and amenity
to labeling by a single letter. Billingsley’s explanation instructs the reader to
regard his textual model as the least thing imaginable, with the letter next
to it understood as the point’s name.
Dee’s and Digges’s use of point-ﬁgures sit at two possible extremes. Dee, on
the one hand, does not illustrate points at all. Not wishing to build his preface
on Euclidean diagrams, he has no need for the visual geometric literacy so
necessary for following the others’ expositions. Points are pointedly not illus-
trated. It is the point’s (textually manifested) philosophical relation to other
50 Sig.a2r. 51 Fol.1r.
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objects and ideas which is important to Dee, not its operational centrality
in geometric proofs and ﬁgures. Dee’s words are rich and elaborate, placing
points in a broader schema for all of mathematics.
Digges, by contrast, bluntly and without elaboration states that “A Point I
call whiche cannot be divided, whose parte is nothing.”52 His deﬁnition would
have been of little use to Pantometria’s readers. Instead, their information
about points came primarily from his diagram, which shows a representative
point and indicates its relation to lines. The deﬁnitions for lines and right lines,
which explicitly describe lines as having points for their extremities, combine
with the point’s deﬁnition and depiction to guide the reader to imagine points
as the indivisible bounds of short segments of lines. This operational under-
standing covers Digges’s uses of points, for which the ‘whose parte is nothing’
aspect plays no formal role.
Recorde, ﬁnally, places his points within a geometric arrangement. Even
when they are the sole subject of the illustration, his points participate in
a larger geometric context. Moreover, Recorde’s triangle of points, like the
text that accompanies them, emphasizes more than any of the other images
how truly common the geometric point should be to his readers. He stages
his points amidst punctuation marks and descriptions of pen pricks so as to
establish their meaning in the familiar contexts of writing and reading. As his
ﬁrst geometric illustration, the points in Recorde’s ﬁgure begin the diﬃcult
work of bridging everyday experience and geometry by showing how geometric
texts produce meaning through arrangements of familiar forms.
4.7 Conclusion
The ﬁrst heralds of English geometry – Recorde, Billingsley, Dee, and Leonard
and Thomas Digges – produced, over a twenty year period, three starkly dif-
ferent geometric texts. Their attempts to translate Euclid’s Elements into
vernacular English brought with them an opportunity to reimagine the whole
of geometry for a new audience. As the comparisons in this essay indicate, vi-
sual images ﬁgured centrally in this reimagining. Our authors used geometric
ﬁgures and diagrams to show geometry vividly to their readers, and their dif-
ferent strategies of illustration place diﬀerent emphases and establish diﬀerent
priorities in the English geometries they aimed to create.
All translations involve the attempt to convey meaning from one idiom and
context to another. It is axiomatic that a translator is faced with a wide range
of textual considerations which can dramatically aﬀect the meaning of the re-
sulting work. Nor is it surprising that similar considerations play out in the
52 Sig.B1r.
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non-textual elements of the translation. More than just decorations or elabo-
rations, diagrams in geometric texts are crucial vehicles for both meaning and
context. The diagrams in the ﬁrst English geometries irrefutably participated
in those geometries’ construction.
For all the ink that has been spilled in the analysis of the Elements and
for all the comparatively few analyses of the neologisms and other non-
diagrammatic features of its ﬁrst English translations, much remains to be
learned from the role diagrams play in Euclid’s re-renderings. Studying di-
agrams under translation, like the corresponding study of the translation of
words and phrases, can say a great deal about the work of interest. It can
show how the work was received, what it meant to its translators and users,
and also what is possible in the work’s interpretation and transmission.
Studies such as this one open the way for a richer discussion of the purpose
and function of Euclidean diagrams in general. They show, for instance, what
features of Euclidean diagrams were considered important, by whom and for
whom. They show how the relationships between diagrams and their textual
context change over time and between audiences. They show, moreover, how
a simple geometry and its associated visual tradition maintained, at least for
the Early Moderns, a remarkable level of interpretive and representational
ﬂexibility.
As Euclid crossed into a new tongue, his translators each refracted diﬀerent
features of his geometry. By contrasting their diagrams, I argue, we may better
glimpse the contrasts between the Euclidean translators, and ultimately gain
a better insight into what it means to translate Euclid.
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Chapter 5
The symbolic treatment of Euclid’s
Elements in He´rigone’s Cursus
mathematicus (1634, 1637, 1642)
Maria Rosa Massa Esteve
Abstract The publication in 1591 of In artem analyticem isagoge by Franc¸ois
Vie`te (1540–1603) constituted an important step forward in the development
of a symbolic language. This work was diﬀused through many other alge-
bra texts, such as the section entitled Algebra in the Cursus mathematicus,
nova, brevi et clara methodo demonstratus, per notas reales & universales,
citra usum cuiuscunque idiomatis, intellectu faciles (Paris, 1634/1637/1642)
by Pierre He´rigone (1580–1643). In fact, He´rigone’s aim in his Cursus was to
introduce a symbolic language as a universal language for dealing with both
pure and mixed mathematics using new symbols, abbreviations and margin
notes. In this article we focus on the symbolic treatment of Euclid’s Elements
in the ﬁrst volume of the Cursus in which He´rigone replaced the rhetori-
cal language of Euclid’s Elements by symbolic language in an original way.
Since He´rigone stated that he had followed Clavius’s Elements (1589) in the
writing of this ﬁrst volume, we compare some demonstrations found in both
authors’ works as regards the style and the use of other propositions from
Euclid’s Elements, with the aim of clarifying the signiﬁcance and the useful-
ness of He´rigone’s new method of demonstration for a better understanding
of mathematics.
Key words: Pierre He´rigone; Symbolic language; Cursus mathematicus; Eu-
clid’s Elements; Seventeenth century; Clavius’s Elements.
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5.1 Introduction
Pierre He´rigone1 (1580–1643) published his Cursus Mathematicus (1634/
1637/1642) in a period when the algebraization of mathematics was taking
place. One of the fundamental characteristics of this process was the intro-
duction of algebraic procedures to solve geometric problems.2 In this process,
the creation of a formal symbolic language to represent algebraic equations
and geometric constructions and curves became one of algebra’s essential fea-
tures.3 For this reason, the publication in 1591 of In Artem Analyticen Isagoge
by Franc¸ois Vie`te (1540–1603) constituted an important step forward in the
development of a symbolic language for mathematics.4
Vie`te’s work was transmitted through various texts on algebra, such as the
Algebra section of He´rigone’s Cursus Mathematicus (hereafter referred to as
the Cursus). We have analyzed this section in a recently published article
(Massa, 2008), in which we show that while He´rigone used Vie`te’s statements
to deal with equations and their solutions, his notation, presentation and
procedures were indeed quite diﬀerent. Furthermore, we analyzed some of
He´rigone’s improvements that derived from a generalization of Vie`te’s exam-
ples.
We now focus our research on the symbolic treatment of Euclid’s Elements
in the ﬁrst volume of He´rigone’s Cursus and its usefulness for rendering Math-
1 Very little is known about He´rigone’s life. Per Stromholm claims that he was from
the Basque Country and that he taught mathematics in Paris. For more information see
Stromholm (1972, p.6) and Knobloch (2001, p.13–14).
2 Therefore, two new developments occurred in mathematics: ﬁrst, the creation of what is
now named analytic geometry, and second, the emergence of inﬁnitesimal calculus. The two
new disciplines achieve their ends through connections between algebraic expressions and
geometric curves, on the one hand, and between algebraic operations and geometric con-
structions on the other. There are many useful studies on this subject, including Mahoney
(1980, p.141–156), Mancosu (1996, p.84–86) and Panza (2005).
3 In fact, the notation is not present in algebraic works in Arabic. Abbreviations are ﬁrst
used to represent the unknown quantities in the arithmetic works of the Renaissance period
and algebraic procedures were expressed in syncopate form. The widespread use of symbolic
notation began in the middle of the sixteenth century. There are many useful studies on the
evolution of symbolic language, including Wallis (1685), Cajori (1928–29), Pycior (1997)
and Stedall (2002).
4 Vie`te used symbols to represent both known and unknown quantities, and was thus able
to investigate polynomial equations in a completely general form. He conceived of equations
in terms of Euclidean ideas of proportion. The equation x2 + bx = d2, for example, can
be written as x(x + b) = d2 and therefore as a proportion x : d = d : (x + b). Solving the
equation is therefore equivalent to ﬁnding three lines in continued proportion. Vie`te showed
the usefulness of algebraic procedures for analysing and solving problems in arithmetic,
geometry and trigonometry. The purpose of Vie`te’s analytical art, in his own words, was to
solve all kinds of problems. For more information see Vie`te (1646), Giusti (1992) and Bos
(2001).
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ematics more comprehensive. The aim of this paper is to show how He´rigone
replaces the rhetorical language of Euclid’s Elements with a symbolic lan-
guage, as well as to analyze some examples of this procedure as a useful
means of obtaining new results.
Since He´rigone stated in the Prolegomena to his Elements that he had
followed the Elements (1589) of Christoph Clavius (1538–1612) for the writing
of this ﬁrst volume, we compare some demonstrations found in the texts by
both authors, examining their style and the order and use of other propositions
from Euclid’s Elements in order to clarify the signiﬁcance and the usefulness
of reformulating rhetorical text into symbolic language.
We divide the article into three sections: the ﬁrst section deals with the
features of He´rigone’s “new method” in the Cursus, the second describes his
procedure of symbolically treating Euclid’s Elements to make demonstrations,
and our ﬁnal section analyzes some examples of geometrical propositions in
He´rigone’s Elements, which facilitated the production of new demonstrations
in the Cursus.
5.2 He´rigone’s new method
In order to understand the reasoning used by He´rigone in his work, we must
analyze the principal features of He´rigone’s new method of demonstration de-
scribed in the Cursus: the original system of notation, the axiomatic-deductive
reasoning and the presentation of the propositions.
He´rigone wrote an encyclopaedic textbook consisting of ﬁve volumes known
as the Cursus Mathematicus.5 The ﬁrst four volumes were published in 1634.
The ﬁrst and second volumes of the Cursus deal with pure mathematics.
The ﬁrst volume deals with geometry and the second volume is devoted to
arithmetic and algebra. The third and fourth volumes deal with mixed math-
ematics, that is to say, with the mathematics required for practical geometry,
military or mechanical uses, geography, and navigation. The ﬁfth and last
volume of the ﬁrst edition, published in 1637, includes spherical trigonometry
and music. Later, in the second edition (1642), He´rigone added the sixth and
ﬁnal volume, which contains two parts dealing with algebra; it also deals with
perspective and astronomy.
Published in parallel Latin and French columns on the same page, the ﬁrst
edition, whose full title is Cursus mathematicus, nova, brevi et clara methodo
5 He´rigone published an edition of the ﬁrst six books of Euclid in 1639 (He´rigone, 1639),
but Stromholm (1972, p.299) claims that these are “little more than the French portion
of Volume 1 of the Cursus.” For more information on the parts of the Cursus see Massa
(2008, p.287).
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demonstratus, per notas reales & universales, citra usum cuiuscunque idioma-
tis, intellectu faciles [“Course of Mathematics demonstrated by a brief and
clear new method through real and universal symbols,6 which are easily un-
derstood without the use of any language”],7 states that He´rigone devised a
new method of demonstration to understand Mathematics in a straightfor-
ward manner.
He´rigone also claimed that he had invented a new method for making
demonstrations briefer and more intelligible that did not require the use of
any language. In the preface to the ﬁrst volume, which bore the dedication
“Au lecteur” [To the reader] he explains,
There is no doubt at all that the best method for teaching the sciences is that in which
brevity is combined with ease. But it is not always easy to attain both, particularly
in mathematics, which, as Cicero pointed out, is highly obscure. Having considered
this myself, and seeing that the greatest diﬃculties arise from an understanding of
the demonstrations, on which the knowledge of all parts of mathematics depend, I
have devised a new method, brief and clear, of making demonstrations, without the
use of any language.8
Indeed, He´rigone’s stated aim in the Cursus was to introduce a symbolic
language as a universal language for dealing with both pure and mixed math-
ematics. Moreover, He´rigone stressed the importance of knowing the symbols
and understanding the demonstrations performed with this notation. His way
of reasoning through the steps of the demonstration is axiomatic-deductive,
as we explain below.
Thus, the ﬁrst feature of He´rigone’s new method is his system of notation;
he uses many new symbols and abbreviations (which he calls “notes”) and
6 We have translated the expression “notes” as “symbols;” however, in He´rigone’s view
“notes” include symbols and abbreviations.
7 The title in French is “Cours Mathematique demonstre´ d’une nouvelle briefve et Claire
methode. Par notes reelles & universelles, qui peuvent estre entendues sans l’usage d’aucune
langue.” In writing this article the author has referred to the copy held in the Bibliothe`que
Nationale de France.
8 Car on ne doute point, que la meilleure methode d’enseigner les sciences est celle, en
laquelle la briefvete´ se trouve conjoincte avec la facilite´ : mais il n’est pas aise´ de pouvoir
obtenir l’une & l’autre, principalement aux Mathematiques, lesquelles comme temoigne Ci-
ceron, sont grandement obscures. Ce que considerant en moy-mesme, & voyant que les plus
grandes diﬃcultez estoient aux demonstrations, de l’intelligence desquelles de´pend la cog-
noissance de toutes les parties des Mathematiques : i’ay invente´ une nouvelle methode de
faire les demonstrations, briefve & intelligible sans l’usage d’aucune langue. /Nam extra
controversiam est, optimam methodum tradendi scientias, esse eam, in qua brevitas per-
spicuitati coniungitur, sed utramque assequi hoc opus hic labor est, praesertim in Mathe-
maticis disciplinis, quae teste Cicerone, in maxima versantur diﬃcultate. Quae cum animo
perpenderem, perspectumque haberem, diﬃcultates quae in erudito Mathematicorum pul-
vere plus negotij facessunt, consistere in demonstrationibus, ex quarum intelligentia Math-
ematicarum disciplinarum omnis omnino pendet cognitio : excogitavi novam methodum
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margin notes (which he calls “citations”). We may claim that his notation is
entirely original; indeed, most of the symbols had not appeared in any previous
book. For example, in Algebra, He´rigone, like Vie`te, uses vowels to represent
unknown quantities and consonants to represent known or given quantities.
To represent powers, He´rigone writes the exponents on the right side of the
letter (so the square is represented by a 2, the cube by a 3 and so on). See
table 5.1 below.
Signs Vie`te Harriot He´rigone Descartes
(1590s) (1631) (1634) (1637)
Equality Aequalis = 2|2 ∝
Greater than Maior est > 3|2 Plus grande
Less than Minus est < 2|3 Plus petite
Product of a and b A and B ab ab ab
Addition plus + + +
Subtraction minus − ∼ −
Ratio ad
∏
a`
Square root V Q.
√
V 2
√
Cubic root V C.
√
c V 3
√
c
Squares Aquadratus, Aquad aa a2 a2, aa
Cubes Acubus, Acub aaa a3 a3
Table 5.1: Table of notations from Massa (2008, p.289).
Furthermore, He´rigone provides alphabetically ordered explanatory tables
of abbreviations and symbols (which he calls “explicatio notarum”). For exam-
ple, there is a mark for the side of the square, a sign meaning ‘perpendicular’,
and a symbol for representing ratios. (See ﬁgure 5.1.)
He´rigone also gives explanatory tables for the citations (which he calls
“explicatio citationum”) at the beginning of each of the volumes of which
the Cursus is composed. The citations always refer either to propositions in
Euclid’s Elements or to the Cursus itself. In the margin of the demonstrations
of propositions, He´rigone cites, line by line, the numbers corresponding to the
theorems he has used.9
demonstrandi brevem & citra ullius idiomatis usum intellectu facilem. (He´rigone, 1634, I,
Ad Lectorem). All translations are the author’s own.
9 In the Ancient copies of Greek editions of Euclid there are no references in the margin to
the theorems he used. However, these references are introduced in Renaissance editions of
Euclid, particularly in Clavius, which was evidently He´rigone’s model, as he himself points
out. We would like to draw attention to He´rigone’s elucidation of Clavius, in which it is
not just Clavius’s works that are mentioned; He´rigone explained that he had used Clavius’s
order and text for Euclid’s Elements, as well as for the three books of Theodosius’s Spherics
and for the fourth book up to the eighteenth proposition. See He´rigone (1642, VI, p. 241).
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Fig. 5.1: He´rigone’s table of abbreviations (He´rigone, 1634, I, f. bvr)
Thus, for example, “c.l.60.10” means “Corollary of the lemma of the propo-
sition X.60” (See ﬁgure 5.2).10
The second feature of He´rigone’s method is the axiomatic-deductive rea-
soning explicitly described by him. In the preface to the reader, He´rigone
emphasizes that the introduction of margin notes is key for following the
steps of the demonstration and this trait is used in this method, unlike in the
“vulgar and common” or ordinary method. He criticizes other authors who
use the “vulgar and common” method. We do not know the exact meaning
of this expression, but since it was He´rigone’s belief that it was diﬃcult to
understand the demonstrations, this expression acquires its signiﬁcance for
On Clavius and his inﬂuence on other seventeenth-century authors, see Knobloch (1988)
and Rommevaux (2006).
10 Corollaire du lemme de la soixantie`me du dixie`me./ Corollarium lemmatis sexagesimae
decimi (He´rigone, 1634, I, unpaginated).
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Fig. 5.2: He´rigone’s explanatory table of citations (He´rigone, 1634, I, f. bviiv)
designing the methods used by other authors in contrast to the new method
he is introducing. In He´rigone’s own words:
I also stress that in the ordinary method many words and axioms are used with-
out prior explanation, but in this method there is nothing that has not already been
explained and conceded in the premises; even in the demonstrations, which are some-
what longer, all that was proved in the sequence of the demonstration are cited with
Greek letters.11
11 Soient aussi qu’en la methode ordinaire on se sert beaucoup de mots & d’axiomes sans les
avoir premierement expliquez, mais en cette methode on ne dit rien qui n’aye este´ explique´
& concede´ aux premises ; mesme aux demonstrations, qui sont quelque peu longues, on cite
par lettres Grecques, ce qui a este´ demonstre´e en la suite de la de´monstration. /Huc etiam
accedit, quo`d in vulgari & communi docendi ratione, plurima proferantur vocabula,& ax-
iomata absque ulla illorum in praemisis explicatione : sed in hac methodo nihil adfertur, nisi
fuerit in praemissis explicatum & concessum. Quum etiam longiores occurrunt demonstra-
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He´rigone goes on to describe his axiomatic-deductive reasoning for the demon-
strations, and adds that he will give an example in the ﬁrst proposition of the
ﬁrst book. In He´rigone’s own words,
And as each consequence depends immediately on the proposition cited, the demon-
stration follows from beginning to end by a continue series of legitimate, necessary
and immediate consequences, each one included in a short line, which can be solved
easily by syllogisms, because in the proposition cited as well as in that which corre-
sponds to the citation one can ﬁnd all parts of the syllogism, as one may see in the
ﬁrst demonstration of ﬁrst book, which has been reduced by syllogisms.12
He´rigone’s originality resides not only in the explicit explanation of axiom-
atic-deductive reasoning, but also because one can ﬁnd in one symbolic line
the major premise and the conclusion, using the former symbolic line as the
minor premise. In the following section we analyse the syllogism and the
identiﬁcation of the premises in the demonstration.
The third feature of He´rigone’s method of demonstration is the presentation
of propositions. He also stresses this point in the preface to the reader,
The distinction of the proposition in its members, that is, the part in which the hy-
pothesis is advanced, the explanation of the requirement, the construction or prepa-
ration and the demonstration, likewise relieves the memory and makes it very helpful
for understanding the demonstration.13
Indeed, He´rigone’s propositions are proved from hypotheses and well-established
properties. Sometimes he states the equalities that he needs for the demon-
stration in a “Praeparatio” paragraph after the hypothesis. He also divides
his demonstrations into separate sections: hypothesis (known and unknown
tiones, quae iam in serie demonstrationis sunt probata, litteris Graecis citantur (He´rigone,
1634, I, Ad Lectorem).
12 Et parce que chaque consequence depend immediatement de la proposition cite´e, la
demonstration s’entretien depuis son commencement jusques a` la conclusion, par une suite
continue de consequences legitimes, necessaires & immediates, contenues chacune en une
petite ligne, lesquelles se peuvent resoudre facilement en syllogismes, a` cause qu’en la propo-
sition cite´e, & en celle qui correspond a` la citation, se trouvent toutes les parties du syllo-
gisme: comme on peut voir en la premiere demonstration du premier livre, qui a este´ reduite
en syllogismes. /Et quoniam singulae consequentiae ex propositionibus allegatis immediate
pendent, demonstratio ab initio ad ﬁnem, serie continua, legitimarum, necessariarumque
consecutionum immediatarum, singulis lineolis comprensarum apte` cohaeret: quarum un-
aquaeque nullo negotio in syllogismum potest converti, quo`d in propositione citata, & in
ea quae citationi respondet, omnes syllogismi partes reperiatur: ut videre est in prima libri
primi demonstratione, quae in syllogismos est conversa (He´rigone, 1634, I, Ad Lectorem).
13 La distinction de la proposition en ses membres, savoir en l’hypothese, l’explication du
requis, la construction, ou preparation, & la demonstration, soulage aussi la memoire, &
sert grandement a` l’intelligence de la demonstration. /Praeterea distinctio propositionis
in sua membra, scilicet in hypothesin, explicationem quaesiti, constructionem, vel praepa-
rationem, & demonstrationem non parum iuvat quoque memoriam, & ad intelligendam
demonstrationem multu`m prodest. (He´rigone, 1634, I, Ad Lectorem).
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quantities); explanation or requirement; demonstration, and conclusion. In
the margin he writes the number of propositions of Euclid’s Elements that
he is using. He occasionally gives the numerical solution (for example in an
equation) in a section headed “Determinatio”. In geometric constructions, he
provides the instructions needed to make the drawing in a paragraph referred
to as “Constructio”.14
Let us see how He´rigone works when proving an algebraic identity in the
Algebra (see Figure 5.3). He proves the algebraic identity, which in modern
Fig. 5.3: Proposition XIX in Algebra’ s chapter 5. (He´rigone, 1634, II, p. 46)
Reproduced from the BNF microﬁlm.
notation would be expressed (a3 + b3)2 = (a3 − b3)2 + 4a3b3, as follows:
The square of the sum of two cubes exceeds the square of the diﬀerence of the same
cubes by the quadruple of the cube determined by the sides.15
14 We would also like to point out that Pietro Mengoli (1626-1686), He´rigone’s follower,
writes all his demonstrations in He´rigonean style by dividing them into a “Hypothesis,”
“Demonstratio,” “Praeparatio” and “Constructio.” Furthermore, in the margin he cites line
by line all the propositions and properties he has used according to an axiomatic-deductive
reasoning. Thus, under the inﬂuence of He´rigone, who considered Euclid’s Elements the
point of reference par excellence, Mengoli brings together, as he says, a “conjuntis perfec-
tionibus” [perfect conjunction] of classical mathematics and modern mathematics to obtain
new theories and new results. See Massa (1997, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2009).
15 Le quarre´ de la somme de deux cubes excede le quarre´ de la diﬀerence des mesmes
cubes, du quadruple du cube contenu sous les costez. /Quadratum aggregati cuborum ex-
cedit quadratum diﬀerentiae eorundem cuborum, quadruplo cubo rectanguli sub lateribus
(He´rigone, 1634, II, p. 46).
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He´rigone’s Notation Modern Notation
Hypoth. Hypothesis
a & b snt quantit ; D. a and b are given quantities.
Req. Π. Demonstr. It is required to prove that:
.a3 + b32|2.a3 ∼ b3 + 4a3b3, Demonstr. (a3 + b3)2 = (a3 − b3) + 4a3b3, Demonstration.
1.d.216..a3 + b3 est a6 + 2a3b3 + b6, α II.def.1 (a3 + b3)2 is a6 + 2a3b3 + b6, (α)
1.d.2..a3 ∼ b3 est a6 ∼ 2a3b3 + b6, β II.def.1 (a3 − b3)2 is a6 − 2a3b3 + b6, (β)
Concl. 18.a.1.17 α ∼ β est 4a3b3. Conclusion. I. axiom.18 α− β is 4a3b3.
Table 5.2: Modern translations of He´rigone’s notations
It is worth pointing out that He´rigone formulates the identity to prove and
even the deﬁnitions and axiom used in symbols, without rhetorical explana-
tions or verbal descriptions. He also divides his demonstration into separate
sections: Hypothesis, requirement to prove, demonstration and conclusion.
We may conclude that He´rigone was convinced that this new method of
demonstration with his new system of notation, his axiomatic-deductive rea-
soning and his new manner of presentation is the clearest, most concise and
most suitable for rendering the mathematics more comprehensively. In the
preface, after analyzing the features of his new method He´rigone aﬃrms:
“These are the principal commodities to be found in our new method of
demonstration”.18
5.3 The reformulation of Euclid’s Elements in symbolic
language
The ﬁrst volume of the Cursus contains Euclid’s Elements and Data, Apol-
lonius’s Conics19 and an exposition of Vie`te’s Doctrine of angular sections
(see Figure 5.4). He´rigone presents the ﬁfteen20 books of Euclid’s Elements,
which is also one of the ﬁrst translations of Euclid’s Elements into a symbolic
language. In fact, Isaac Barrow (1630–1677) in the letter Ad lectorem in his
own edition of the Elements (1659), mentioned He´rigone as an example to
18 Voila les principales commoditez qui se trouvent en notre nouvelle me´thode de demon-
strer. /Atque haec sunt commoda, quae in hac nova methodo demonstrandi reperiuntur
(He´rigone, 1634, I, unpaginated).
19 At the end of Euclid’s Data, He´rigone’s stated aim was to introduce his new method
of demonstration into the ﬁve texts on Apollonius’s Conics restored by Snell (3 texts),
Ghetaldi and Vie`te as well as into the section of angles invented by Vie`te. (He´rigone 1634,
I, p.889–935).
20 He´rigone, like Clavius, mentions that only the ﬁrst thirteen books are attributed to
Euclid and that the other two are attributed to Hypsicles Alexandrinus (He´rigone, 1634, I,
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follow both for reducing Euclid’s Elements to one volume and for turning it
into a symbolic language (Barrow, 1659, unpaginated).21
Fig. 5.4: He´rigone’s frontispiece to Volume I of the Cursus. (He´rigone, 1634,
I, f. aiiv).
Although He´rigone uses the Latin version of Clavius’s 1589 edition of the
Elements only the statements and some ﬁgures for the propositions match
Prolegomena).
21 Barrow for his part explained that He´rigone’s reformulation is for the gratiﬁcation of
those readers who prefer symbolical to verbal reasoning. In his introduction, Heath also
explained this circumstance when he described the principal translations and editions of
the Elements. “The ﬁrst six books ‘demonstrated by symbols, by a method very brief and
intelligible’ by Pierre He´rigone, mentioned by Barrow as the only editor before him who
had used symbols for the exposition of Euclid“ (Heath, 1956, p.108). However, Barrow was
partially mistaken, since Oughtred, in 1631, in the ﬁrst edition of the Clavis Mathematicae
had also rewritten some propositions of Euclid’s Elements in symbolic language. Harriot had
also done this even earlier but his version was never published and remains in manuscript
form. See Stedall (2007, p.386). On the inﬂuence of He´rigone’s Cursus, see Cifoletti (1990)
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in both texts. The style of He´rigone’s propositions, dividing his demonstra-
tions into separate sections, is not found in Clavius’s Elements. Moreover,
Clavius, unlike He´rigone, describes the demonstration and the corresponding
construction for each of his propositions and problems rhetorically.
Like Clavius in his Prolegomena, He´rigone’s Prolegomena to the Elements
discusses the classiﬁcation of Mathematics; however, He´rigone did not fol-
low Clavius’s classiﬁcations. In Clavius’ Prolegomena the order of the parts
(Arithmetic, Music, Geometry and Astronomy) and the division into pure and
mixed mathematics are the same as those by Proclus in his commentary.22
In contrast, He´rigone ordered the four parts as Arithmetic, Geometry, As-
tronomy and Music and while like Clavius he considered mathematics to be
divided into pure and mixed mathematics, He´rigone only mentioned Optic,
Mechanics, Astronomy and Music as mixed.23
He´rigone, in accordance with Clavius, divides the ﬁfteen books of Euclid’s
Elements into four parts24 and this paragraph in both Prolegomena is iden-
tical word for word. There is a further part in He´rigone’s Prolegomena called
“The principles of Mathematics,”25 which is also very similar to the corre-
sponding part in Clavius. Both considered the principles of Mathematics as
being divided into three types: the deﬁnitions, the postulates and the axioms
or common notions.26
However, He´rigone goes further to add new “scholia” to Clavius’s proposi-
tions, which he later uses to justify his demonstrations, and an appendix to
and Massa (2008, p.298–299).
22 He´rigone explained that the Pythagoreans divided mathematics into four categories:
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music. He said others divided mathematics into pure
and mixed mathematics, specifying that in pure mathematics quantity was recognized as
being separate from matter. He considered that pure mathematics should be divided ac-
cording to the kind of quantity (either continuous or discrete) into geometry and arith-
metic, and that mixed mathematics should be divided into optics, mechanics, astronomy
and music. See He´rigone (1634, I, Prolegomena). Clavius also divided mathematics into
pure and mixed Mathematics, pure Mathematics includes Arithmetic and Geometry and
mixed Mathematics includes Astrology, Perspective, Geodesy, Canonical or Music, Calcu-
lation and Mechanics. See Clavius (1589, section II, Prolegomena).
23 On the status of the mathematical disciplines in sixteenth century, see Axworthy (2004,
p.62–80).
24 The ﬁrst part contains the ﬁrst six books, which deal with planes. The second includes
the subsequent three books, which deal with numbers. The third part contains only Book
X, which deals with commensurable and incommensurable lines, while the last part is
composed of the last ﬁve books, which treat the science of solids. See He´rigone (1634, I,
Prolegomena). Like Clavius, He´rigone speciﬁes the part corresponding to each book in the
titles, for example, Book XI reads “The ﬁrst book on the science of solids.”
25 Des principes des Mathematiques. /De principiis Mathematicis (He´rigone, 1634, I, Pro-
legomena).
26 He´rigone claims that he added new axioms to the principles of Mathematics whenever
he considered them necessary for the demonstrations. He speciﬁes that he included a letter
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Book VI, where He´rigone explains sums and products of lines, justifying them
by propositions from his own Elements. In addition, He´rigone introduces this
appendix with the claim that its problems and theorems are necessary for
understanding Algebra and Astronomy.27
In fact, throughout the Cursus, He´rigone insists on the fundamental role of
Euclid’s Elements for understanding mathematics. He´rigone deals with geom-
etry and arithmetic in the ﬁrst and second volumes, respectively, and in the
preface to the second volume he justiﬁes treating geometry before arithmetic
by claiming that geometry enables a better understanding of arithmetic:
On the one hand, it is certain that knowledge of numbers is absolutely necessary
for considering symmetry and incommensurability of a continuous quantity, of which
Geometry constitutes one of the principal objects. On the other hand, there are some
demonstrations in our arithmetic that cannot be understood without the help of the
ﬁrst books of Euclid’s Elements.28
Moreover, when He´rigone discusses the importance of algebra in Volume VI
(1642), he again stresses that the only requirement for solving the equations
is an understanding of Euclid’s Elements.29
We may assume that He´rigone believed that an understanding of Euclid’s
Elements also served a propaedeutic function in his Cursus.30
to distinguish his new axioms from Clavius’s and Euclid’s axioms.
27 A ces six livres des Elements d’Euclide, j’adiousteray un appendix de divers proble`mes
& theoremes, dont les uns sont necessaires a` l’Algebre, les autres a` l’Astronomie ; /His sex
elementorum Euclidis libris, annectam variorum problematum atque theorematum appen-
dicem; quorum alia ad Algebram, alia ad Astronomiam. [To these six books of Euclid’s El-
ements, I add an appendix with some problems and theorems, some of which are necessary
for Algebra and others for Astronomy.] (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.302).
28 Car d’un cote´ il est constant que la connaissance des nombres est absolument requise a`
la conside´ration de la syme´trie et incommensurabilite´ de la quantite´ continue, desquelles la
Ge´ome´trie fait un de ses principaux objets ; et d’autre part, il y a des de´monstrations en
notre Arithme´tique qui ne peuvent eˆtre entendues sans le secours des premiers livres des
Ele´ments d’Euclide. /Quantitatis enim continuae symmetriam & incommensurabilitatem,
quas praecipue inquirit Geometra nusquam intelliget imparatus a` numeris : Neque ex ad-
verso percipi possunt Aritmeticae nostrae quaedam demonstrationes, sine previa cognitione
priorum elementorum Euclidis. (He´rigone, 1634, II, unpaginated)
29 Supple´ment de l’Alge`bre . Les e´quations d’Alge`bre sont d’autant plus diﬃciles a` expliquer
qu’elles sont hautes en l’ordre de l’e´chelle. Et n’est pas besoin d’autres pre´ceptes particuliers,
que de l’intelligence des e´le´ments d’Euclide pour trouver la valeur d’une racine constitue´e
en sa base. /Omnis algebrae aequatio quo altiorem scalae tenet locum, eo diﬃciliorem habet
explicationem. Nec ullo praecepto particulari, praeter Euclidis elementorum notitiam, opus
est, ad exhibendum radicis in sua base existentis valorem. [Supplement on Algebra. The
higher the degree of equations in algebra, the more diﬃcult it is to solve them. There is
no need for particular rules other than an understanding of Euclid’s Elements to ﬁnd the
value of a root that constitutes the base [of the equation]]. (He´rigone, 1642, VI, p.1)
30 On the propaedeutic function in Euclid’s Elements, Tartaglia and Clavius, see Axworthy
(2004, p.13–38).
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Volume I of the Cursus includes a translation into French of Euclid’s Ele-
ments, which He´rigone reformulates in his new symbolic language in an orig-
inal way. So all Euclidean propositions are expressed using symbolic expres-
sions; for example, Pythagoras’s theorem in Proposition I.47 from Euclid’s
Elements is expressed as “.bc 2|2 .ab+.ac.”31
However, it is of the utmost importance to analyze how He´rigone replaces
rhetorical language in the Cursus using his own Elements expressed in sym-
bolic language. He introduces original symbols and abbreviations (“notes”)
and margin notes (“citations”) to represent axioms, postulates and deﬁni-
tions. In fact, He´rigone classiﬁes the citations used in the demonstrations as
follows:
There are seven types of citations in mathematical demonstrations, that is to say, the
postulates, the problems, the deﬁnitions, the axioms, the theorems, the hypotheses
and the constructions: of which the two ﬁrst pertain to the construction or to the
preparation and the other ﬁve to the demonstrations.32
His procedure for the citations is as follows: ﬁrst, he writes the statement of the
axiom, postulate or deﬁnition in rhetorical language similar to Clavius’s Ele-
ments; second, he writes the symbol or abbreviation deduced from this axiom,
postulate or deﬁnition, and ﬁnally, he oﬀers an explanation of this abbrevi-
ation (Explicatio notarum). For example, the note “3.p.1.” refers to Euclid’s
Postulate I. 3: “To describe a circle with any centre and distance” (see ﬁgure
5.5). Then He´rigone replaces Clavius’s rhetorical language by these symbolic
expressions and abbreviations deﬁned previously. For example, where Clavius
has “Centro A, & intervalo rectae AB, describatur circulus CBD,” He´rigone
writes “abcd est O” and notes in the margin “3.p.1.,” referring to the sen-
tence deduced from Euclid’s Postulate I.3. Similarly, throughout Clavius’s
text He´rigone replaces rhetorical explanations by symbolic language. Let us
take one example, the ﬁrst proposition in Book I, where He´rigone uses this
abbreviation and other similar ones in the construction and in the demon-
stration (see Figure 5.6). He´rigone’s statement is expressed as follows: “On a
ﬁnished straight line, to make an equilateral triangle.”33
31 In these demonstrations, He´rigone writes a paragraph headed “praeparatio” in which he
expresses parallel lines using the symbol “==,” angles using the symbol “<” and a right
angle using the symbol “” (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.55–56).
32 Aux demonstrations Mathematiques il y a sept genres de citations, a` savoir, les postulats,
les proble`mes, les deﬁnitions, les axiomes, les theoremes, les hypotheses,& les constructions :
desquels les deux premiers appartiennent a` la construction, ou preparation, & les cinq
autres a` la demonstration. /In demonstrationibus Mathematicis sunt septem citationum
genera, scilicet, postulata, problemata, deﬁnitiones, axiomata, theoremata, hypotheses, &
constructiones: quorum duo priora, ad constructionem, aut praeparationem, reliqua quinque
ad demonstrationem pertinent (He´rigone, 1634, I, Rrr iiij). This clariﬁcation is found at the
end of volume 1 under the title: “Annotations on the ﬁrst volume of Cursus Mathematicus”.
33 Sur une ligne droite donne´e & termine´e, descrire un triangle equilateral. /Super data
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Fig. 5.5: Postulate I.3 of He´rigone’s Elements (He´rigone, 1634, I, f. dviiv).
In this proposition, both describe how to construct an equilateral triangle,
Clavius using rhetorical explanations and He´rigone using his symbolic lan-
guage with repeated references to Euclid’s Elements. The connecting thread is
the geometric construction of the solution. He´rigone replaces Clavius’s rhetor-
ical explanations and instructions with symbolic language. He proceeds by
replacing each of Clavius’s rhetorical sentences by his own corresponding ab-
breviation, and in the margin he makes a note referring to He´rigone-Euclid’s
propositions, postulates or axioms used and deﬁned previously. For instance,
when Clavius has, “Ex quarum utrovis, nempe ex C, ducantur duae rectae lin-
eae CA, CB, ad puncta A & B,” He´rigone writes the abbreviations “ac & bc,
snt —” and makes a note in the margin “1.p.1.,” thus referring to Postulate 1
of Book I of He´rigone’s ﬁrst volume. Similarly, for the demonstration, where
Clavius has: “Quoniam rectae AB, AC, ducuntur ex centro A, ad circumferen-
tiam circuli CBD, erit recta AC, recta AB, aequalis,” He´rigone writes, “ac 2|2
ab” and makes a note in the margin “15.d.1.,” referring to Euclid I. deﬁnition
15.
Like Clavius, He´rigone makes a new demonstration by syllogisms; however,
the procedure is not exactly the same. Clavius makes the demonstration in a
scholium and begins the sequence by the last syllogism of the demonstration.
See for example, the order in Clavius’s demonstration; he begins,
All triangles that have three equal sides35 are equilateral.
The triangle ABC has three equal sides.
Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral.
recta linea terminata, triangulum aequilaterum constituere. (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.1). The
statement and the ﬁgure are identical to those of Clavius.
35 Here Clavius makes a small letter “d” and in the margin he writes “d. 23.def.” (Clavius,
1589, p.28).
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He´rigone’s Notation Modern Notation
Hypoth. Hypothesis.
ab est—D AB is a given straight line.
Req. π. fa. It is required to make:
Δabc æquilat. ABC equilateral triangle.
Constr. Construction.
3.p.1. abcd est , I.postulate.3. ABCD is a circle of
center A and distance AB,
3.p.1. bace est , I.postulate.3. BACE is a circle of
center B and distance BA,
1.p.1. ac & bc, snt—, I.postulate.1 AC and BC are
straight lines,
Symp.34 Δabc est aequilat. Symperasma. I say that the trian-
gle ABC is equilateral
Demonstr. Demonstration.
Constr. abcd & bace snt , Construction. ABCD and BACE
are circles,
15.d.1. ac 2|2 ab, I.deﬁnition.15. AC = AB,
15.d.1. bc 2|2 ba, I.deﬁnition.15. BC = BA,
1.a.1. ac 2|2 bc, I.axiom.1. AC = BC,
Concl. Conclusion.
23.d.1. Δabc est aequilat. I.deﬁnition.23. ABC is an equilat-
eral triangle.
Fig. 5.6: Proposition I.1 (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.1) and modern translations of
He´rigone’s notations.
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The minor will be conﬁrmed by this other syllogism:36
Clavius continues the demonstration by syllogisms until the ﬁrst sentence,
which is the construction of the circumference.
He´rigone also makes the same demonstration in a scholium, but explains
the four syllogisms beginning with the ﬁrst line of demonstration37, and the
major and minor premise as well as the conclusion can easily be identiﬁed in
each syllogism. See He´rigone’s demonstration by syllogisms:
This demonstration is made by four syllogisms, as one can perceive
from the number of citations.
I SYLLOGISM.
The straight lines traced from the centre to the circumference are
equal to each other.
But the straight lines AC & AB are traced from the centre to the
circumference.
Therefore the straight lines AC & AB are equal to each other.38
If we consider the citation: “I. deﬁnition. 15. AC = AB,” we can see that
the major premise is “I. deﬁnition. 15.,” and that the minor premise is the
line immediately preceding it: “ABCD and BACE are circles,” and that the
conclusion is: “AC = AB.” For the second syllogism, He´rigone explains that
it is the same as the ﬁrst. The conclusions of the two ﬁrst syllogisms serve
for the minor premise in the third syllogism. Let us now consider the third
syllogism:
III SYLLOGISM.
Things those are equal to the same are equal to each other.
36 Omne triangulum habent tria latera aequalia, est equilaterum. Triangulum ABC, tria
habet aequalia latera. Triangulum igitur ABC, est aequilaterum. Minorem conﬁrmabit hoc
alio syllogismo. (Clavius, 1589, p.28). The same sequence by syllogisms is found in the ap-
pendix by Alessandro Piccolomini entitled Commentarium de Certitudine Mathematicarum
Disciplinarum (Roma, 1547). (Piccolomini, 1547, p.99 r–99v). According to Rommevaux
(2005, p.52), Clavius makes no reference to Piccolomini, although he probably knew this
work, which forms part of the debate on the certainty of mathematics in the sixteenth cen-
tury. There are many useful works on this quaestio, including Mancosu (1996) and Romano
(2007).
37 This same order of syllogisms is found in the demonstration by syllogisms of Dasypodio’s
work on Euclid’s Elements. (Dasypodio, 1566, A ij).
38 Cette demonstration se fait par quatre syllogismes, comme il appert du nombre des
citations. I. SYLLOGISME. Les lignes droites mene´es du centre a` la circonference, sont
e´gales entre elles. Mais les lignes droites AC & AB sont mene´es du centre a` la circonference.
Donc les lignes droites AC & AB sont e´gales entr’elles. /Haec demonstratio sit quatuor
syllogismis, ut perspicuum est ex numero citationum. I SYLLOGISMUS. Rectae lineae quae
ducuntur a` centro ad circunferentiam, sunt inter se aequales. Sed rectae AC & AB ducuntur
a` centro ad circunferentiam. Igitur rectae AC & AB sunt inter se aequales. (He´rigone, 1634,
p.1–2)
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But the straight lines AC & CB are equal to the same straight line.
Therefore the straight lines AC & CB are equal to each other.39
In this case, “I. axiom. 1.AC = BC,” the major premise is the ﬁrst axiom,
while the minor premise is deduced from the conclusions of the ﬁrst and
second syllogisms: AC = AB and BC = BA, and the conclusion of the third
syllogism is AC = BC. These conclusions enable the minor premise in the
last syllogism to be deduced.
IV SYLLOGISM.
All triangles that have three equal sides are equilateral.
But the triangle ABC has three equal sides.
Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral.40
In this case, “I. deﬁnition. 23. ABC is an equilateral triangle,” the major
premise is I.d.23, while the minor premise is deduced from the former con-
clusions AC = AB, BC = BA and AC = BC, and the conclusion of the
third syllogism is that “the triangle ABC is equilateral,” which concludes the
demonstration.
He´rigone makes no other demonstration by syllogisms and neither does he
make any identiﬁcation between symbolic lines of the demonstration and the
premises of these syllogisms, although this may be deduced from his explana-
tion in the preface: “The demonstration. . . included each one on a short line,
which can be solved easily by syllogisms, because in the proposition cited as
well as in that which corresponds to the citation one can ﬁnd all parts of the
syllogism.”
He´rigone’s originality resides not in demonstrating by syllogisms, but rather
in recognizing that it is possible to identify all parts of the syllogism in sym-
bolic lines, which transforms the demonstration by syllogisms into another one
that is shorter and easier. Indeed, it is important to point out that He´rigone
sought to introduce a new, briefer and more intelligible method for mak-
ing demonstrations. Although the excess of abbreviations and new symbols
may have caused his attempt to fail, there is no doubting the intelligence of
He´rigone’s approach.
39 III. SYLLOGISME. Les choses e´gales a` une mesme, sont e´gales entr’elles. Mais les lignes
droites AC & CB sont e´gales a` une mesme ligne droite. Donc les lignes droites AC &
BC sont e´gales entr’elles. /III. SYLLOGISMUS. Quae eidem aequalia sunt, inter se sunt
aequalia. Sed rectae AC & BC sunt eidem rectae aequales. Igitur rectae AC & BC sunt
inter se aequales. (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.2).
40 IV. SYLLOGISME. Tout triangle qui a trois costez e´gaux, est equilateral. Mais le triangle
ABC a trois costez e´gaux. Donc le triangle ABC est equilateral. /IV. SYLLOGISMUS.
Omne triangulum habens tria latera aequalia, est aequilaterum. Sed triangulum ABC tria
habet aequalia latera. Igitur triangulum ABC est aequilaterum. (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.2).
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5.4 The usefulness of He´rigone’s new method
In this section we analyze two examples in order to show how He´rigone some-
times makes improvements on Vie`te’s examples and Clavius’s Elements, using
his new method.
5.4.1 Equations in the Algebra
The ﬁrst example refers to the treatment of equations in the Algebra. Ac-
cording to He´rigone, an understanding of Euclid’s Elements is the basis for
understanding arithmetic and solving equations. In Algebra, He´rigone used
propositions from Euclid’s Elements to justify algebraic demonstrations. Fur-
thermore, all instructions, procedures and rhetorical explanations for geo-
metrical constructions are replaced by Euclid’s propositions and postulates,
expressed or formulated in He´rigone’s symbolic language. Thus, Euclid’s Ele-
ments are deeply entrenched in the development of He´rigone’s Algebra.
Algebra is a section in Volume 2, which consists of 20 chapters. He´rigone
accepts Vie`te’s view that the symbols of analytic art (or algebra) can be used
to represent not just numbers but also values of any abstract magnitude.41 In-
deed, He´rigone explicitly distinguishes vulgar algebra, which deals with prob-
lems expressed in terms of numbers, from specious algebra, which deals with
problems expressed in more general terms, by means of species or letters. This
idea is very important because it is from Vie`te’s algebra that mathematicians
began to consider objects of algebra, the letters of which represent numbers
and also ﬁgures, angles and lines.
He´rigone’s Notation Modern Notation
ab− a2 2|2 d2 xb− x2 = d2
b− a∏ d∏ a (b−x)
d
= d
x
a 2|2 1
2
b +
√
{b2 1
4
{−d2 x =
1
2
b +
√
b2
4
− d2.
Fig. 5.7: Modern translation of notations from He´rigone’s Algebra.
As regards the treatment of equations, He´rigone, like Vie`te, transforms
equations into a relationship between three proportional quantities. The key is
the identiﬁcation of the terms of an equation, both known and unknown quan-
tities, as terms of a proportion. However, He´rigone always speciﬁes whether
41 On the comparison between Vie`te’s and He´rigone’s algebra, see Massa (2008).
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the required quantity is a number or a line, and in the latter case he justiﬁes
the results by using propositions from Book VI of Euclid’s Elements. Solving
equations consists of three steps: equation, proportion and solution by rule
(see Figure 5.7).
He again justiﬁes the passage between these steps with the propositions of
Euclid’s Elements. In this equation d is the mean proportional and b is the
sum of the extremes, both of which are given. He emphasizes that with these
data that this equation can be solved geometrically by the scholium of Euclid
VI.28. In fact, in the case that b is the diﬀerence of the extremes, he claims
that he uses the scholium of Euclid VI.29, and in the other cases of equations
he mentions propositions in the appendix to the six ﬁrst books.
Moreover, if we analyze this scholium of Euclid VI.28 (see Figure 5.8),
which is used to justify the rules of the quadratic equations and compare it
with those of Clavius, we can say that the statement, the presentation and
the procedure are diﬀerent; in other words, this scholium is not present in
Clavius’s Elements. So this scholium was added by He´rigone, as he states:
Given the mean of three proportional [straight lines] and the addition of the extremes,
ﬁnd the extremes.42
Fig. 5.8: “Scholium” of Euclid VI.28 (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.293)
The usual or classic ﬁgure in Euclid’s Elements, with squares and rectangles
or a semicircle with an inscribed triangle delimiting the diameter, is not found
42 De trois proportionnelles estant donnee la moyenne & la somme des extremes trouver
les extremes./ E serie trium proportionalium, data media & summa extremarum invenire
extremas. (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.293–294).
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in this construction. We can consider this new ﬁgure as He´rigone’s canonical
diagram for geometric constructions for quadratic equations. He´rigone states
two rules for ﬁnding the value of the unknown in an equation with three terms
where the degree of the highest power is double that of the lower power,
and both rules are also illustrated by this same ﬁgure. In fact, one ﬁnds
this ﬁgure and the reference to this scholium throughout the Cursus.43 For
example, when He´rigone deals with irrational numbers in Algebra he again
explicitly cites and uses scholium VI.28 for justifying geometrically his method
for ﬁnding the root of a binomial. Using the same ﬁgure as that used in the
previous scholium, in the demonstration, He´rigone states:
To ﬁnd the square root of a given binomial. Let us assume that the bigger number
of the binomial is the sum of sides and the smaller number (of the binomial) is four
times the rectangle determined by the sides, therefore one will ﬁnd the root by the
scholium 28.6, as follows.44
In contrast, Clavius in his Algebra (1608, p.150) explains three rules for ﬁnding
the square root of a binomial in rhetorical language; then he gives an example
for every rule with an explanation consisting of two pages. He´rigone makes
the demonstration in half a page, does not use the same numerical example
as Clavius, and the mathematical procedure and presentation are also very
diﬀerent.
This new scholium and its ﬁgure allow He´rigone to make some new demon-
strations and to illustrate new rules. We show this scholium as an example of
He´rigone’s new threads achieved with his new method of demonstration.45
5.4.2 Book X Deﬁnitions
Another example focusses on He´rigone’s treatment of the ﬁrst deﬁnitions in
Book X of Euclid’s Elements. Book X introduces the Euclidean theory of
irrationality; it is diﬃcult and full of deﬁnitions in a geometric context, but
He´rigone, unlike Clavius in his Book X, always provides examples referring to
43 In He´rigone’s Elements there are many examples: in propositions II.6 and II.29, in
scholium of proposition II.5, in propositions VI.29, X.16, X.18 and X.19.
44 Extraire la racine quarre´e d’un binoˆme donne´. Soit suppose´ que le plus grande nombre du
binoˆme est l’aggrege´ des costez, & le moindre nombre le quadruple du rectangle contenu sous
les costez, puis on trouvera la racine par le scholie de la 28 du 6, comme s’ensuit. /Ex dato
binomio extrahere radicem quadratam. Finge maius nomen binomij dati esse aggregatum
laterum, minus nomen quadruplum rectanguli sub lateribus comprehensi, deinde invenietur
quaesita radix per scholium 28.6 sic (He´rigone, 1634, II, p.254).
45 For more detailed examples and improvements see Massa (2008).
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numbers and translates the demonstrations in symbolic language.46 Moreover,
he adds some scholia and a new classiﬁcation to clarify these ideas.
Both Clavius and He´rigone present all eleven of Campanus’s deﬁnitions;
however, He´rigone makes an addition with four scholies to clarify these ideas.
Deﬁnitions X.1 and X.2 deﬁne magnitudes to be commensurable when mea-
sured by the same common measure and otherwise incommensurable. Deﬁni-
tions X.3 and X.4 concern commensurable straight lines in square; He´rigone
states that they are commensurable in square when the squares on them are
measured by the same area and otherwise incommensurable in square. Let us
take the ﬁrst deﬁnitions: commensurability and incommensurability.
Commensurable magnitudes are those that are measured by the same common mea-
sure.47 But incommensurable magnitudes are those that do not have any common
measure.48
After the fourth deﬁnition, He´rigone introduces examples in numbers. He
states that the lines a = 7 and b = 5 are commensurable in length (as always,
ﬁrst in symbols and then with his explanation of abbreviations). The lines
b = 5, c =
√
10 and d =
√
8 are commensurable in square because the
squares 25, 10 and 8 are commensurable in length. The lines e =
√√
10
and f =
√√
8 are incommensurable in square because the squares
√
10 and√
8 are incommensurable in length.
In deﬁnitions X.5–X.7 He´rigone describes the rational straight line. Taking
a rational straight line as a reference, the other lines commensurable in length
and in square are called rational. And the lines incommensurable with respect
to this line are termed irrational. In deﬁnitions X.8, X.9, X.10, and X.11,
He´rigone describes rational and irrational ﬁgures.
He´rigone, unlike Clavius, adds four scholia to clarify the concepts. In the
ﬁrst scholium, He´rigone clariﬁes that incommensurable magnitudes cannot
become commensurable, while irrational magnitudes can become rational ones
by changing the rational that one takes as a reference. In fact, for He´rigone
the notions of commensurable and rational are not parallel at all.
In the scholia II and III He´rigone speciﬁes the relation of incommensurabil-
ity in numbers by taking unity as the reference. In fact, the incommensurable
numbers with respect to the unit are called irrationals or ”surds.” However,
46 On the treatment of Book X, there are many interesting works including Fowler (1992)
and Rommevaux (2001).
47 Commensurables grandeurs sont celles-la` lesquelles sont mesurees par une mesme com-
mune mesure. /Commensurabiles magnitudines dicuntur, quas eadem mensura metitur
(He´rigone, 1634, I, p.486). The text of this statement in Latin is identical in Clavius’ s El-
ements.
48 Mais les grandeurs incommensurables sont celles-la`, lesquelles n’ont aucune commune
mesure. /Incommensurabiles autem sunt, quarum nullam communem mensuram contingit
reperiri (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.486).
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and more importantly, he speciﬁes the idea of a rational line expressed by an
irrational number that can be rational if its square is expressed by a rational
number.
In scholium IV He´rigone, unlike Clavius, introduces a “new” classiﬁcation
of the rational lines commensurable in length to each other according to three
types illustrated by a geometric construction (see ﬁgure 5.9).
Fig. 5.9: Classiﬁcation of the rational lines in Book X (He´rigone, 1634, I,
p.491).
Having constructed an example, he takes the semi-diameter of the value 2
as the unit of measure; he then constructs the other lines using as major
premises both corollaries of Euclid IV.15, which states: “In a given circle to
inscribe an equilateral and equiangular hexagon,”49 Euclid IV.6 states: “In a
given circle to inscribe a square.”50, Euclid IV.11 states: “In a given circle to
inscribe an equilateral and equiangular pentagon,”51 and the common notion
Euclid I. axiom. 7 states: “And things which are half of another thing or equal
things are also all equal to each other.”52 He concludes that if cb = 2 is the
rational line of reference; bp = 2 and ab = 4 are rational lines of the ﬁrst type,
because they are commensurable in length and one of them is equal to the
rational reference; ce = 1 and ab = 4 are rational lines of the second type
because they are commensurable in length and none of them is equal to the
49 En un cercle donne´, inscrire un hexagone equilateral & equiangle. /In dato circulo,
hexagonum & equilaterum & equiangulum inscribere (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.169).
50 Dans un cercle donne´, inscrire un carre´. /In dato circulo quadratum describere (He´rigone,
1634, I, p.156).
51 En un cercle donne´, inscrire un pentagone equilateral & equiangle. /In dato circulo,
pentagonum & equilaterum & equiangulum inscribere (He´rigone, 1634, I, p.161).
52 Et les choses qui sont moitie´s d’une mesme, ou des choses egales, sont aussi egales entre
elles. /Et quae eiusdem, vel aequalium sunt dimidia inter se sunt aequalia (He´rigone, 1634,
I, p. c.iiij).
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rational reference. For the third type ak =
√
3 and ap =
√
12 are rational
because they are only commensurable in square with the rational reference
and fd =
√
10−√20 is irrational because it is neither commensurable in
square nor in length.
He´rigone later uses this new classiﬁcation of the rational lines and this
ﬁgure to solve a problem with irrational numbers in the Algebra. The question
consists in ﬁnding the side of a regular pent decagon inscribed in a circle.
He´rigone states: “To ﬁnd the side of a regular pent decagon inscribed in a
given circle.”53
5.5 Some ﬁnal remarks
The ﬁrst remark to be made is that, since He´rigone mentioned that he used
the Latin version of Clavius (1589) to write his Elements, we have veriﬁed the
statements of deﬁnitions in Latin and they turn out to be mostly identical.
However, unlike Clavius, after every statement He´rigone gives no rhetorical
explanations. Moreover, He´rigone adds some scholia and an appendix in order
to explain the mathematics better.
He reformulates Clavius’s Elements by using his symbolic language in an
original way. Thus, He´rigone in the Cursus avoids rhetorical explanations and
seeks to express all phrases symbolically. The steps are justiﬁed by citations
referring to the propositions, axioms, postulates and deﬁnitions from Euclid’s
Elements, which are formulated in symbolic language in Volume 1 as well. We
may surmise that He´rigone’s presentation of this justiﬁcation is once more a
reﬂection of the great signiﬁcance that Euclid’s Elements held for him.
After showing He´rigone’s examples in our Section 3, his procedure of re-
placing the rhetorical language of Euclid’s Elements by symbolic language
to make demonstrations in the Cursus becomes clear. This new method of
demonstration using a universal language and logical sentences through an
axiomatic-deductive reasoning is absolutely original and oﬀers us the logical
and clear structure of his thinking. Moreover, He´rigone emphasizes that his
method is useful for both pure and mixed mathematics and he applies it in
all parts of the Cursus. Perhaps the idea of extending his method to all math-
ematics arose from his reading of Clavius’s Elements. Indeed, Clavius in the
ﬁrst demonstration of the ﬁrst book after the demonstration by syllogisms
claims that in this manner one can solve all Euclid’s propositions as well as
those of all other mathematicians.
53 Quaestion III. Cap. XIX. Trouver le cote´ d’un quindecagonregulier inscrit dans un cercle
donne´. /Invenire latus quintidecagoni ordinati dato circuli inscripti (He´rigone, 1634, II,
p.261).
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However, in order to highlight the highly unusual relationship between
the classical mathematics that Euclid’s work represents and new algebra as
it appears in the work of He´rigone, we would like to discuss whether the
symbolic language introduced in He´rigone’s Elements is useful to obtain new
results or whether it is a diﬀerent way of arriving at the same results. In other
words, did He´rigone actually perform an algebraization of the Elements? I
believe that he did not, at least not completely; He´rigone indeed translates the
diﬀerent notions, interprets the statement and the demonstrations in terms
of symbolic notation, and at the same time gives numerical examples, but
without overlooking the geometric context. He uses ﬁgures, abbreviations and
symbols to establish and reinforce these meanings as well as to make them
meaningful for his readers.
The strategies employed by He´rigone in order to render Euclid’s geome-
try and all his mathematics intelligible to his audience also enable him to
make some improvements. In my previous article on He´rigone’s Algebra and
in the examples from Section 4, it was shown that this diﬀerent writing in
logical statements allows him to obtain some new demonstrations, some new
rules, some new paths and some new classiﬁcations. In fact, in the preface
“to the reader,” in the ﬁrst volume of the Cursus, He´rigone lays claim to his
contributions by stating:
Those who love these divine sciences [Mathematics] may judge what I have con-
tributed on my own behalf in every part of this Cursus, which I trust will prove to
be of use and proﬁt to them.54
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Chapter 6
What more there is in early modern
algebra than its literal Formalism
Marco Panza
Abstract It is often agued that early-modern algebra essentially resulted
from the adoption of a new literal formalism (mainly thanks to the works of
Vie`te, Harriot, Descartes, etc.). I will try to question this claim. I will not
deny that this formalism plays a crucial role and I will even wonder which is
this role. But I am suggesting that its introduction supervenes on a change
in the conception concerning geometrical magnitudes, problems and theorems
that has quite old roots. The paper is devoted to describing this change, by
considering a single example.
Key words: literal formalism, Early Modern Algebra, Euclid, al-Khwa¯rizmı¯,
Tha¯bit ibn Qurra
6.1 Introduction
There are two views about early-modern algebra very often endorsed (either
explicitly or implicitly). The former is that in early-modern age, algebra and
geometry were diﬀerent branches of mathematics and provided alternative so-
lutions for many problems. The latter is that early-modern algebra essentially
resulted from the adoption of a new literal formalism. My present purpose
IHPST (CNRS and University of Paris 1, ENS Paris).
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is to question the latter. In doing that, I shall also implicitly undermine the
former1.
I shall do it by considering a single example. This is the example of a
classical problem. More in particular, I shall consider and compare diﬀerent
ways of understanding and solving this problem. Under the ﬁrst understand-
ing I shall consider, this problem appears as that of cutting a given segment
in extreme and mean ratio. This is what proposition VI.30 of the Elements
requires. In section 6.2, I shall expound and discuss Euclid’s solution of this
proposition2. Then, in section 6.3, I shall consider other propositions of the
same Elements, and argue that they suggest another, quite diﬀerent under-
standing of the same problem. Under this other understanding, this is viewed
as the problem of constructing a segment meeting a certain condition relative
to another given segment. One way to express this condition is by stating the
ﬁrst of the three trinomial equations studied in al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s Algebra, by
supposing that this equation is geometrically understood and a particular case
of it is considered3. In section 6.4, I shall consider this option, by focusing in
particular, on Tha¯bit ibn Qurra’s interpretation and solution of this equation.
1 For a more articulated argumentation against this former view, cf. my [(Panza, 2007)].
The term ‘early-modern algebra’ is quite vague and open to many diﬀerent understandings.
What I mean by it is essentially the practice of dealing both with arithmetical and geomet-
rical problems through a common approach mainly originated by Vie`te’s and Descartes’s
achievements. Hence, early-modern algebra has to be conceived, in my parlance, as being
essentially about geometrical concerns.
2 According to its common use in geometry, the term ‘solution’ is equivocal: it can respec-
tively denote the way a problem is solved, the argument that one relies on to solve a prob-
lem, the action of solving a problem, or even the object (or objects) whose construction is
required by a problem . To avoid unfamiliar phrases, in what follows I shall have no other
option than using this term in these diﬀerent senses, on diﬀerent occasions. I hope the con-
text will be enough to avoid any misunderstanding. In particular, when I shall claim that
the problem I shall consider admits a unique solution, if it is conceived as Euclid does, I
shall not mean that there is only one way to solve it, or only one argument allowing to solve
it, within Euclid’s geometry. I shall rather mean that, supposing that a certain segment be
given, in order to solve this problem so conceived, one has to construct a certain point (on
this segment) which is univocally determined by the conditions of the problem. In other
terms, my point will be that, this segment being given, each way of solving this problem so
conceived, or each argument through which it is solved, have to result in the construction
of the same point (on this segment).
3 In my [(Panza, 2007)], I preferred avoiding to use the term ‘equation’ to refer to condi-
tions like those that al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s and, after it, al-Khayya¯m’s Algebra ([Woepcke, 1851)];
[(Rashed, 1999)]), are about. I used instead the term ‘equations-like problem’ to refer to
the problems associated to these conditions. My reason was that, for al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ and
al-Khayya¯m, stating such a condition was not the same as presenting a mathematical object,
as it is the case when a polynomial equation is presented in the context of the formalism of
early-modern algebra ([(Panza, 2007)], p. 124). I still think that this reason is good. But, for
short and simplicity, I do not follow here my previous convention and I call al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s
conditions ‘equations’, as it is usually done. I hope the previous remark to be enough for
6 What more there is 195
The transition from the former understanding to the latter hinges on the
transition from a way of conceiving geometrical magnitudes and the rela-
tive problems and theorems, to another way of doing the same4. Whereas
the former conception is proper to Euclid’s geometry, the latter is proper to
early-modern algebra. My main point will be that this latter conception is in-
dependent of the appeal to any literal formalism, as is shown by the fact that
it is already at work in Medieval Arabic geometry, in which there is no trace
of such a formalism. Early modern algebra actually resulted from combining
this conception with an appropriate use of a symbolic notation, which gave
raise to the new literal formalism. In my view, this use was made possible by
the adoption of this conception, but it was not merely a natural outcome of
it. Hence, though early-modern algebra could have not development without
the adoption of this conception, the latter cannot be reduced to the former.
The purpose of section 6.5, the last one of my paper, will be that of discussing
this connection.
6.2 Proposition VI.30 of the Elements
Proposition VI.30 of the Elements is a problem. It requires “to cut a given
segment in extreme and mean ratio”5. Let AB be the given segment (Figure
6.1). The problem requires, in other terms, to construct a point E on it, such
that
AB : AE = AE : EB. (6.1)
Euclid’s solution relies on that of proposition VI.29. This is a problem in
turn, and requires “to apply to a given segment a parallelogram equal to
a given rectilineal ﬁgure with excess of [another] parallelogram similar to a
[third] given one”. If the given segment is CA, the given rectilineal ﬁgure is
avoiding any misunderstanding: when this term is used to refer to these conditions, it has not
to be taken to have the same sense as when it is used in the context of early-modern algebra.
4 A quite similar transition (perhaps the same one, even if conceptualized in a partially
diﬀerent way) is described by R. Netz in his [(Netz, 2004)]. About the convergences and
divergences of Netz’s and my views on this matter, cf. [(Panza, 2007)], p. 117 (footnote 46).
Also Netz’s discussion is focused on a single problem. This is signiﬁcantly more complex that
the one I shall consider here. Namely, diﬀerently from this latter one, it is not solvable within
Euclid’s geometry, that is, through a construction by ruler and compass (or elementary
construction, according to the parlance I adopted in [(Panza, 2010)]). Far from undermining
the eﬀectiveness of my example, the relative straightforwardness of the problem I shall
consider is rather intended to make clear that the shift I want to describe does not depend
on the adoption of any mathematical tools exceeding the simple ones proper to Euclid’s
geometry, but was just a shift in conception.
5 For my quotations from the Elements, I base myself on Heath’s translation
([(Heath, 1926)]), though I slightly modify it somewhere.
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A BE
Fig. 6.1: Proposition VI.30 of the Elements
Γ , and the given parallelogram is Δ (Figure 6.2),6 the problem consists in
producing CA up to a point G such that the parallelograms CFDG and AEDG
be respectively equal to Γ and similar to Δ.
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Fig. 6.2: Proposition VI.29 of the Elements
To solve this last problem, Euclid begins by taking the middle point I of
CA, and constructing on IA the parallelogram IALJ similar to Δ. Then, he
constructs a parallelogram OPQK similar to IALJ and Δ, and equal to Γ and
the same IALJ taken together. At this point, it is enough to produce IJ up to
a point N such that NJ = OK, and then to complete the parallelogram NDMJ
in such a way that its diagonal DJ be collineal with the diagonal AJ of IALJ,
and to produce CA up to the point, called G, where it cuts the side DM of
this parallelogram. The point G will be the searched after one7.
6 For the purpose of denoting with the same letters the points with play an analogues role
in the following constructions related to the solution of proposition VI.30, I change some of
the letters in Euclid’s diagrams as they appear in [(Heath, 1926)].
7 The proof is simple. By construction, the equalities OPQK = Γ + IALJ = NDMJ hold.
Hence Γ is equal to the gnomon NDMLAI. But, as I is the middle point of CA, and NDMJ is
similar to IALJ, NEAI is equal both to FNIC and to AGML. Hence FNIC is equal to AGML,
and then FDGC is equal to the gnomon NDMLAI, and consequently to Γ . On the other side,
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To construct the middle point of a given segment is easy. According to the
solution of propositions I.1 and I.9-10, it is enough to describe two circles
having this segment as a common radius and its extremities as the respective
centers, and to join their intersection points (Figure 6.3).
 
C AI
Fig. 6.3: A construction used in propositions I.9-10 of the Elements
It is also easy to construct a parallelogram similar to another given parallelo-
gram on a given segment. Consider the case under examination. The segment
IA being given (Figure 6.4), it is enough: to take on IA a point R such that
RA be equal to the side ra of Δ; to construct on RA (according to the solu-
tion of proposition I.22) a triangle RAS having its sides equal to the sides of
the triangle ras formed by tracing the diagonal rs of Δ (so that R̂AS = r̂as,
according to proposition I.8 and the solution of proposition I.23); to trace the
parallel IT to RS through I; to produce AS up to meet this parallel in L; and
to complete the parallelogram IALJ.
Hence, the only critical step in the solution of proposition I.29 is the con-
struction of the parallelogram OPQK (Figure 6.2). Euclid does not detail this
construction, but it is easy to see that, in order to perform it, one has ﬁrst
to construct a rectilineal ﬁgure equal to Γ and IALJ taken together, and then
apply the solution of proposition IV.25.
IALJ is similar to Δ by construction, with as consequence that also EDGA is so.
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Fig. 6.4: The construction of a parallelogram similar to another given paral-
lelogram on a given segment
This can be done in diﬀerent ways, depending on the nature of such a rectilin-
eal ﬁgure. An obvious possibility is to take this ﬁgure to be the parallelogram
VALU (Figure 6.5) which is got by constructing on IJ and in the angle ĈIJ the
parallelogram VIJU equal to Γ .
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Fig. 6.5: Applying the solution of propositions I.42, I.44-45
This construction goes as follows, according to propositions I.42, and I.44-
45. If Γ is not a triangle, divide it into several (non-overlapping) triangles
by tracing appropriate segments joining two non-consecutive vertexes of it.
Construct the middle point i, of a side fg of one of these triangles fgh. With i
as vertex, construct the angle ﬁ̂j equal to ĈIJ (which can be done as explained
above, according to the solution of propositions I.23) Through h, trace mk
parallel to fg, respectively meeting in m and k the parallel to ij through f
and ij itself). The parallelogram ﬁkm is equal to the triangle fgh, and its
internal angle ﬁ̂k is, by construction, equal to the angle ĈIJ. It is then easy
to construct another parallelogram JWXY equal to ﬁkm, and consequently to
fgh, and having the sides JY and JW collineal to IJ and JL, respectively (it
is enough to produce IJ up to a point Y such that JY = fm and take a point
W on JL such that JW = ﬁ). Produce then XW up to meet CA in Z and
complete the parallelograms ZXnp and IJop in such a way that the diagonal
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of the former be collineal to the diagonal ZJ of the other parallelogram IZWJ.
The parallelogram pIJo is equal to JWXY, and then to fgh. By repeating the
same construction for all the triangles composing Γ , one then gets, step by
step, the sought after parallelogram VIJU.
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Fig. 6.6: Applying the solution of proposition IV.25
Once this last parallelogram has been constructed, the construction of the
parallelogram OPQK (Figure 6.6) goes as follows, according to the solution
of proposition VI.25. Proceeding in the same way as in the construction of
the parallelogram VIJU, construct, on the side rb of Δ and in the angle êrb
equal to r̂as, the parallelogram drbc equal to VALU. According to the solution
of proposition IV.13, construct a segment OP mean proportional between dr
and ra (supposing that tO = dr and Oq = ra, and that u is the middle point
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of tq, OP is the perpendicular through O to tq up the the circle of centre u
and diameter tq). Then construct the two angleŝKOP and̂OPK equal to b̂ra
and r̂ab, respectively, and complete the triangle OPK and the parallelogram
OPQK.
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Fig. 6.7: The solution of proposition VI.30
At this point, the solution of proposition VI.30 is easy. It includes two steps.
The former consists in constructing the square ABHC on the given segment
AB (Figure 6.7). The latter consists in applying to the side AC of this square
a rectangle equal to this same square with excess of a parallelogram similar to
such a square, i. e. with excess of a square. This reduces to the construction,
according to the solution of proposition VI.29, of the rectangle GDFC equal
to the square ABHC and such that AG = GD. The sought after point is the
intersection point E of the side DF of this rectangle and the given segment
AB8.
When applied to the case considered in proposition VI.30, the solution of
proposition VI.29 is simpliﬁed with respect to the general case expounded
above. This is because the role of both the rectilineal ﬁgure Γ and the paral-
lelogram Δ is played by the same ﬁgure, and this ﬁgure is a square, namely
the square ABHC. Let us see how this solution applies in this case.
Let the square ABHC be given (Figure 6.8). Construct the middle point I
of AC, and, on AI, the square LAIJ. According to the general procedure ex-
pounded above, one should then construct the rectangle JIVU equal to ABHC.
8 The proof is easy. As GDFC = ABHC and AEFC is a common part of both, GDEA = EBHF.
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Fig. 6.8: Resuming Euclid’s whole argument for solving proposition VI.30
There would be a quite simple way to do it without following the general
step-by-step procedure expounded above: insofar as ABHC can be divided in
four squares equal to LAIJ, it would be enough to produce LJ up to a point
U such that JU be equal to 4 times LJ, and then complete the rectangle JIVU
(which would be the same as constructing four squares equal to LAIJ on each
other). But this is useless, in fact. Insofar as the role of the parallelogram Δ is
played by the square ABHC, one can take, indeed, the side CH of this square
to coincide with the side rb of Δ (compare Figure 6.8 with Figure 6.6) to the
eﬀect that, after having constructed the rectangle JIVU, one should construct
on CH ≡ rb the rectangle rbcd equal to LAVU. Now, as this last rectangle
Hence, according to proposition I.14: GA : EF = EB : AE, that is: AB : AE = AE : EB, as
required.
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would be, by construction, equal to LAIJ and ABHC taken together, this step
can easily be performed directly, without relying on the construction of the
rectangle JIVU. It is enough to construct on CH ≡ rb the square rbwv equal
to ABHC, then produce Cv up to the point d such that vd be equal to the
half of AI, and ﬁnally complete the rectangle rbcd. The next step consists in
constructing a segment OP mean proportional between rd and the homologous
side of Δ. But, insofar as Δ is nothing but the square ABHC, a coincides with
A and this side is then nothing but AC. Hence, what has to be constructed is
a segment OP mean proportional between rd and AC ≡ ar. The more natural
way to do it, in order to get a geometrical conﬁguration analogous to that
which enters the solution of proposition VI.29, is to perform this construction
on the segment qt collineal to LJ, such that qL = LJ and Jt = rd (to the eﬀect
that qt = Ad), by taking the point O to coincide with the point J. If u is
the middle point of qt, to construct the point P, it is then enough to trace
the semicircle of center u and diameter qt, and the perpendicular OP to qt
through J up to this semicircle. If one proceeds this way, the construction of
the square OPQK equal to CHcd is useless, since the point P directly coin-
cide with the point N (compare now Figure 6.8 with Figure 6.2 and Figure
6.7), the point D is got as the intersection point of the perpendicular to JN
through N and the diagonal AJ of the square LAIJ produced, and the point
G is got by completing the rectangle GDNI. The sough after point E is the
intersection point of the side DN of this rectangle and the given segment AB
(the construction of the point M which completes the rectangle MDNJ is then
useless).
Insofar as ABHC is a square, AI is equal to the half of the given segment AB,
and LAIJ is equal to a square having the half of such a given segment as side.
Hence, the rectangle rbcd is equal both to a square having the given segment
as side taken together with a square having the half of such a given segment
as side, and to a rectangle having as sides the given segment and a segment
equal to this same given segment taken together with another segment equal
to a fourth of it. This is also the case of the square OPKQ. Its side OP is
then the side of a square equal to such a last rectangle. It follows that the
segment AE results from cutting oﬀ the segment LA, equal to a half of the
given segment, from the segment LE equal to a side of a square equal to this
same rectangle.
This description is cumbersome. Still, the adoption of an appropriate nota-
tion allows rephrasing it in a quite simple way. Call the given segment ‘a’. For
any segment α, denote then with ‘αn ’ (where ‘n’ denotes, in turn, a natural
number greater than 1) any segment equal to one n-th of α, and with ‘S (α)’
any square having as side a segment equal to α. For any other segment β,
denote then with ‘R (α, β)’ any rectangle having as sides two segments equal
to α and β, respectively. Use moreover the sign ‘+’ and ‘−’ to indicate the
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requirements of taking two geometric objects together and of cutting oﬀ one
of them from the other, respectively
Using this notation, one can then write the following equalities:
AB = a;
AI =
a
2
;
LAIJ = S
(a
2
)
;
rbcd = S (a) + S
(a
2
)
= R
(
a, a+
a
4
)
= OPQK.
Let now a∗ be a segment such that
R
(
a, a+
a
4
)
= S (a∗) .
Then:
OPQK = S (a∗) ; OP = a∗ ; AE = a∗ − a
2
.
Euclid’s construction as a whole can then be rephrased through three quite
simple equalities:
AB = a ; R
(
a, a+
a
4
)
= S (a∗) ; AE = a∗ − a
2
. (6.2)
Mathematically, the possibility of this rephrasing leaves no doubt. Still,
this is not the same as admitting that this rephrasing is appropriate for the
purpose of describing Euclid’s solution as it is, in fact. If this were so, it
would be natural to wonder why Euclid expounds such a solution in such a
relatively complex way, when he could have described it through such three
simple equalities or, at least, through a vernacular reformulation of them,
for example as follows: construct any segment equal to the given one and a
fourth of it taken together; construct any square equal to the rectangle having
segments equal to this last segment and to the given one as sides (which is the
same as ﬁnding a mean proportional between two sides of this last rectangle);
cut oﬀ a segment equal to a half of the given segment from a segment equal
to a side of this square; this results in a segment meeting the condition of the
problem.
This question is ill-stated, however. Since behind such a rephrasing of Eu-
clid’s solution – and, a fortiori, behind that consisting of equalities (6.2) –
there is an understanding of this solution that is quite far from Euclid’s.
I call ‘purely quantitative’ a geometric problem that asks for the construc-
tion of whatever segments (or whatever geometric objects of a certain sort,
which are determined if appropriate segments are so), which are supposed
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to meet some conditions depending only on the relative size of these seg-
ments and of other given ones, regardless to their respective positions. In
other terms, such a problem asks for the construction of whatever segments
belonging to the equivalence classes of segments which are speciﬁed by stating
these conditions (the relevant equivalence relation being equality). Let a be
any given segment. Hence, one would be stating purely quantitative problems
by requiring, for example, to construct a segment x such that
a : x = x : a− x, (6.3)
or that
R (x, a+ x) = S(a), (6.4)
whatever the given segment a and the positional relations of x and a might be.
But this is not what propositions VI.30 and VI.29 require. They are rather, I
would way, positional problems, each of which have a unique possible solution
(or a ﬁnite number of possible symmetric solutions)9.
Proposition VI.30 is a problem of partition of a given segment. It requires
constructing a certain point on such a given segment, and is then solved if and
only if this very point is constructed. According to a classical terminology,
proposition VI.29 is a problem of application of an area with excess of a
parallelogram similar to a given one. Though classical, this denomination
is potentially misleading, however. Strictly speaking, Euclid is not asking to
construct any parallelogram having a certain area (whatever an area might be
for him). He is rather requiring to construct a certain parallelogram having a
base collineal with a given segment and a vertex coincident with an extremity
of such a segment.
To be more precise, in proposition VI.30, the segment AB being taken
as given (Figure 6.1), Euclid does not require to construct any segment x
smaller then AB and equal to a mean proportional between a segment equal
to AB itself and another segment equal to that which have to be joined to
x itself for getting a segment equal to AB. He rather requires to construct
a certain determinate point on AB, namely the point E (which is a much
more natural requirement to be advanced in his language). Analogously, in
proposition VI.29, the segment CA being taken as given (Figure 6.2), Euclid
does not require to construct any parallelogram equal to Γ suitable for being
divided into two parallelograms, one of which has a base equal to CA and the
other is similar to Δ10. He rather requires to construct a certain determinate
9 Cf. footnote (2), above.
10 Notice that if Euclid’s proposal, in stating proposition VI.29, had been that of advancing
a purely quantitative problem, it would have been pointless to take Γ and Δ to be any
polygon and any parallelogram, respectively. This would have involved no gain of generality
with respect to taking Γ and Δ to be a square and a rectangle, respectively.
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parallelogram, having a vertex in C and a base collineal to CA, namely the
parallelogram FDGC (or at least one of the four symmetric parallelograms
FDGC, CGD′F′, D′′EAG′, and G′AE′D′′′: Figure 6.9).
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D''
Fig. 6.9: The four symmetric parallelograms solving Proposition VI.30
Now, the previous rephrasing of the solution of proposition VI.30 respects its
being concerned with the construction of a certain determinate point on the
given segment, namely with the point E on AB (Figure 6.1). But, within the
context of this rephrasing, the fact that the object to be constructed be a
point on the given segment, rather than any segment equal to a∗− a2 , appears
as an immaterial and extrinsic constraint. Such a rephrasing is based, indeed,
on the understanding of the successive steps of the solution as responses to
purely quantitative sub-problems, which is clearly not Euclid’s understanding.
It is true that the segment OP (Figure 6.6) entering the solution of proposi-
tion VI.29 is supposed to be any mean proportional between any two segments
equal to dr and ra, respectively. Still, this appears to be more a trick for avoid-
ing a too intricate diagram than an intrinsic feature of this solution. Once the
segment OP and the associate parallelogram OPQK are constructed, Euclid
immediately constructs the segment JN, equal to the side OK of this parallel-
ogram in its appropriate position (Figure 6.2). In other terms, he is certainly
concerned with a purely quantitative condition, but he understands it as an
ingredient of the positional problems he is interested to.
The previous rephrasing of Euclid’s own solution of proposition VI.30 is
then unfaithful to such a solution. But is it also, merely, a pointless modern-
ization of Euclid’s argument? In the following part of my paper I shall show
that this is not the case, in fact.
6.3 Comparing Proposition VI.30 with Other
Proposition of the Elements
If proposition VI.30 is compared with proposition I.3 of the same Elements,
it becomes natural to understand the former as requiring to divide the given
segments into two segments, one of which results from cutting oﬀ the other
from the given one. Using, as above, the sign ‘−’ to indicate the requirement
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of cutting oﬀ a segment from another, one could then rephrase the condition
(6.1) as follows
AB : AE = AE : AB− AE. (6.5)
This rephrasing is not innocent as it displaces the focus of the problem
from the construction of the point E into the construction of a segment AE
having a certain relation with the given segment AB. Once this change of
focus is admitted, the requirement that the sought after segment be taken
on AB, that is, that the segment AE, its extremity E being on AB appears
as an extrinsic constraint: as a pointless speciﬁcation of a purely quantitive
condition like
AB : x = x : AB− x, (6.6)
which only diﬀers from condition (6.3) in the way in which the given segment
is denoted. The passage from (6.5) to (6.6) or (6.3) is not anodyne, however,
since it results in transforming the positional problem stated by proposition
VI.30 into a purely quantitative one.
This is a radical change, in my mind. But it does not depend on the ac-
quisition of some new mathematical resources with respect to Euclid’s (the
crucial identiﬁcation of the segment EB with the result of cutting oﬀ AE from
AB is openly licensed and also suggested by proposition I.3, as said). It merely
depends on a change of focus, or, more generally, a shift in conception.
One could object that also the use of a literal notation and of an operational
arithmetical sign like ‘−’, i.e. of terms like ‘a’, ‘x’, and ‘a− x’, is relevant. In
other terms, one could object that condition (6.3) and the problem connected
to it are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from condition (6.1) and proposition VI.30 for
a reason that hinges essentially on the fact that the former are stated by
using a literal notation and an operational arithmetical sign like ‘−’. This is
wrong, however, and depends on a confusion (which is not less misleading for
its being recurrent). This is the confusion between the semantic function of
these terms and their syntactical function11.
The apparent plausibility of the objection depends on the fact that the
terms ‘a’,‘x’ and ‘a − x’ are implicitly supposed to be involved in the whole
formalism of early-modern algebra. If it were so, these terms would be also
used for their syntactical function, to the eﬀect, for example, that the condi-
tion (6.3) should be taken to be ipso facto equivalent to the condition
x2 + ax = a2. (6.7)
11 My use of the two adjectives ‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’ in order to account for the dis-
tinction I want to point out is far from mandatory. I could have used another terminology,
instead. The advantage of my choice is that these adjectives immediately evoke some oppo-
site features of language that this distinction is concerned with. Still, there are many other
aspects of the meaning (or meanings) usually ascribed to these adjectives which are not rel-
evant for my present purpose. By using these adjectives, I do not intend to evoke these. In
section 6.5 below, I shall come back to this distinction, by trying to clarify it further.
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But nothing like this is implied in the passage from (6.1) to (6.3), as I have
described it above. In (6.3), the terms ‘a’,‘x’ and ‘a− x’ are only intended to
denote some segments (either given or sought after), that is, they are merely
used for their semantic function12.
Hence, this last condition (6.3) is not signiﬁcantly distinct from the require-
ment that the segment to be constructed be a mean proportional between a
segment equal to the given one and another segment equal to that resulting
from cutting oﬀ a segment equal to it from a segment equal to the given one.
On the other hand, this condition is not equivalent to the condition (6.7),
since the passage from (6.3) to (6.7) depends on a formalism that goes not
necessarily together with the use of the terms ‘a’,‘x’ and ‘a− x’ according to
their semantic function.
It follows that, according to their intended function (which is here only the
semantic one), the use of terms like ‘a’,‘x’ and ‘a− x’ is nothing more but a
convenient linguistic trick for stating a purely quantitative problem. This use
allows to avoid cumbersome vernacular expressions in favor of shorter, nim-
bler and unambiguous ones, and could thus help for going ahead in complex
reasoning, or for expounding complex arguments in a simpliﬁed and clearer
way. But it is in no way essential for the purpose of stating such a purely
quantitative problem. Hence, the passage from proposition VI.30 to a purely
quantitative problem (which is the passage I focus my attention on) does not
depend on the use of such terms, that is, on the use of a literal notation and
of an operational arithmetical sign like ‘−’.
This being said, consider now proposition II.2 of the same Elements. It is a
theorem: “if a segment is cut at random, the rectangle contained by the whole
12 Notice however that there is an essential diﬀerence between the symbol ‘a’ on one side,
and the symbols ‘x’, and ‘a − x’, as well as the symbols ‘ a
2
’, ‘a
4
’, ‘a + a
2
’, ‘a + a
4
’, ‘a∗’,
‘a∗− a
2
’, ‘S (a)’, ‘S
(
a
2
)
’,‘S
(
a + a
2
)
’,‘R
(
a, a + a
4
)
’,‘S (a∗)’, ‘R (x, a + x)’ used above, on the
other side. The symbol ‘a’ is intended to be a proper name of a certain segment, and is then,
on this respect, analogous to terms like ‘AB’, ‘AE’, ‘EB’, or even ‘ABHC’ or ‘CGDF’ that are
just used by Euclid as proper names of segments and polygons, respectively. The symbols
‘x’, ‘a−x’, ‘a
2
’, ‘a
4
’, etc. are intended to be, instead, non-deﬁnite descriptions denoting any
element of a certain class of equivalence of geometrical objects of the appropriate sort (the
relevant equivalence relation being equality). As a consequence, there is an essential diﬀer-
ence between the meaning to be assigned to the sign ‘=’ in formulas like ‘AB = a’ where
this sign stands between two proper names and in formulas like ‘AI = a
2
’, ‘IJLA = S
(
a
2
)
’ or
‘S (a) + S
(
a + a
2
)
= R
(
a, a + a
4
)
’ where it stands between a proper name and a non-def-
inite description, or between two non-deﬁnite descriptions. In the former case, this sym-
bol indicates identity; in the latter it merely indicates equality. These diﬀerences reﬂect a
distinctive feature of purely quantitative problems: the fact that they involve one or more
principal or independent segments, in terms of which the segments to be constructed are
characterized, and that these segments are taken to be given as such at the beginning of
the construction that is intended to solve the problem, whereas the segments constructed
during this construction are (for the very nature of the problem) whatever elements of cer-
tain classes of equivalence of segments deﬁned in terms of the given ones.
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Fig. 6.10: Proposition II.2
and each of the [two] parts is equal to the square on the whole”. The expression
‘the rectangle contained by the whole and each of the two parts’ refers to the
rectangle contained by the whole and one of the two parts and the rectangle
contained by the whole and the other part taken together. Supposing that the
segment AB is cut at random in C13 (Figure 6.10), Euclid takes his theorem
to state, indeed, that “the rectangle contained by AB, BC together with the
rectangle contained by BA, AC is equal to the square on AB”. To prove that
this is so, he constructs the square DEBA, traces the perpendicular FC to AB
through C, and takes the rectangles DFCA and FEBC to be “the rectangle
contained by BA, AC” and “that contained by AB, BC”, respectively, since
AD = AB = BE. In other terms, supposing that α, β, and γ be three distinct
segments, Euclid takes the rectangle “contained by” α, β to be the same as
(and not just equal to) the rectangle “contained by” α, γ, if β = γ (which is
what allows him giving sense to the notion of rectangle “contained by” two
collineal segments). This suggests that he takes expressions like ‘the rectangle
contained by α, β’ and ‘the square on α’ to refer to any rectangle having
as sides two segments equal to α and β, and to any square having as side a
segment equal to α, respectively. These are purely quantitative notions: they
do not depend on the mutual positions of the relevant segments, but only on
the fact that some of them are equal to others.
Despite this, proposition II.2 appears as a positional theorem: a theorem
whose content depends on the mutual position of the objects it is concerned
with. It asserts something about whatever segment split up into two other
13 I come back now to using the same letters as in Euclid’s diagrams as they appear in
[(Heath, 1926)].
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segments by any point on it, namely that any pair of rectangles one side of
which is equal to the former segment, while the other side is respectively equal
to the two parts of it, are, if taken together, equal to any square having this
former segment as side.
This understanding is reinforced by Euclid’s proof of this theorem, which is
entirely diagrammatic. The segment AB being considered, the crucial step in
in this proof is the claim that the rectangles DFCA and FEBC taken together
are equal to the square DEBA. As this claim is not further justiﬁed, it is
obvious to reconstruct Euclid’s argument as follows: the rectangles DFCA
and FEBC taken together coincide with the square DEBA; but, according to
common notion I.4, “things which coincide with one another are equal to one
another”; hence, the rectangles DFCA and FEBC taken together are equal to
the square DEBA; still, these rectangles are those contained by BA, AC and
by AB, BC, respectively; then these last rectangles taken together are equal to
the square DEBA. This argument crucially depends on the mutual position of
the rectangles DFCA and FEBC and the square DEBA. And this is just what
reinforces the understanding of proposition II.2 as a positional theorem.
Still, there is no doubt that for Euclid, any rectangle is equal to any other
rectangle having equal sides (this is a particular case of proposition I.35), and
any pair of segments respectively equal to the two parts into which a third
segment is split up are, if taken together, equal to this last segment and to any
other segment equal to it. Hence, the same argument also proves the following
implication: if two segments taken together are equal to a third one, then any
pair of rectangles having as sides two segments equal to this third one and to
the two others, respectively, are, if taken together, equal to any square having
as side a segment equal to the third one.
This is no longer a positional theorem, however. Using the same notation
as before, it can be rephrased as follows:
if a = b+ c then R(a, b) +R(a, c) = S(a). (6.8)
Moreover, if three segments a, b and c are such that b + c = a, then if a
segment equal to b is cut oﬀ from a segment equal to a, a segment equal to c
results. Hence, from implication (6.8) it follows that
R(a, b) +R(a, a− b) = S(a). (6.9)
Both implication (6.8) and equality (6.9) are purely quantitative theorems:
they are about some geometric objects which are supposed to meet some
conditions depending only on the relative size of these same objects, regardless
to their respective positions (i. e., they are about the equivalence classes of
these geometric objects that are speciﬁed by stating these conditions, the
relevant equivalence relation being equality).
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One can resist, of course, to understanding proposition II.2 as being equiv-
alent to these theorems, and, then, in ascribing these theorems to Euclid. Still,
without admitting that, for Euclid, the rectangle contained by two segments
α and β is the same as the rectangle contained by α and γ, if β = γ, the very
statement and proof of proposition II.2 are hard to understand. And, once
this is admitted, the understanding of this proposition as being equivalent
to implication (6.8) and equality (6.9) becomes very natural. Nevertheless,
I do not want to argue that this understanding is Euclid’s. For my present
purpose, it is enough to have determined such an understanding and to have
shown that it is at least suggested by the very way Euclid expresses himself
and reasons.
E F
G K H L
A B
C D
Fig. 6.11: Proposition VI.16 of the Elements
Consider now proposition VI.16 of the Elements, in particular its ﬁrst part:
“if four segments are proportional, the rectangle contained by the extremes
is equal to the rectangle contained by the means”. The terms ‘the rectangle
contained by the extremes’ and ‘the rectangle contained by the means’ are
subject to the same considerations relative to the analogous terms occurring in
proposition II.2 and its proof. In proving proposition VI.16, Euclid considers
four given segments, AB, CD, E, and F (Figure 6.11) such that
AB : CD = E : F
and constructs, on AB and CD, respectively, two rectangles ABKG and CDLH,
such that AG = F and CH = E; then he reasons on these last rectangles. It
is then clear, again, that he takes the rectangle contained by two segments
α and β to be the same as the rectangle contained by α and γ, if β = γ.
It is thus natural to understand proposition VI.16 as stating the following
theorem: if four segments are proportional, then any rectangle having as sides
two segments equal to the extremes is equal to any rectangle having as sides
two segments equal to the means. In the same notation as before:
if a : b = c : d then R(a, d) = R(b, c).
Now, by comparing this implication with (6.3), one gets
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R(a, a− x) = S(x).
Hence, from (6.9), it follows:
S(x) +R(a, x) = S(a). (6.10)
If the previous rephrasing of propositions II.2, VI.16 and VI.30 is admitted,
this last proposition can be reduced to the problem of constructing a segment
x such that this last equality holds, supposing that the segment a is given.
Compare now this equality with the construction that provides Euclid’s
solution of this proposition. If AB (Figure 6.7) is the given segment a, then
AE satisﬁes the former: if one takes AE to be a value of x, then the rectangle
AEFC and the square GDEA are values of R(a, x) and S(x), respectively, and,
if they are taken together, they are equal to the square ABHC which is a value
of S(a).
The terminology I use requires an explanation. As I use them, the terms
‘x’, ‘R(a, x)’, ‘S(x)’, and ‘S(a)’ are not singular, that is, they do not respec-
tively refer to a unique object, but rather to whatever element of a certain
equivalence class of objects. By saying that a certain segment is a value of x,
I mean that this segment is an element of the equivalence class to whatever
element of which ‘x’ refers (as the relevant equivalence relation is equality, it
follows that, if α and β are two values of x, then α = β). The same convention
applies to ‘R(a, x)’, ‘S(x)’, and ‘S(a)’ and to any other terms like those: by
saying, for example that a certain square is a value of S(a), I mean that it is
a square having a segment equal to a as side.
This explains the relation between the equality (6.10) and the geometrical
conﬁguration that Euclid’s solution of proposition VI.30 depends on: this
conﬁguration provides a positional model for this equality. Other models are
possible, however. And this is not only because one can construct the point
E – providing the unique solution of this proposition, according to Euclid’s
understanding – in many other ways. But also and overall because, even if
the given segment is always the same – that is, a – there are inﬁnite many
segments other than AE which satisfy this equality as values of x14. All of
them provide a solution of the purely quantitative problem of constructing a
segment x such that equality (6.10) holds.
All these remarks are not enough for solving such a problem. And, it is
neither enough for this purpose to observe that, according to implication
(6.8), from equality (6.10), equality (6.4) follows, and that this last equality
is such that constructing a segment x that satisﬁes it is the same as solving a
problem of application of an area, understood as a purely quantitative problem
(namely the problem of application of an area whose solution is involved in
Euclid’s solution of proposition VI.30). What is still lacking is a construction
14 Cf. footnote (12), above.
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of a segment suitable for providing a value of x. An appropriate formulation of
the problem can help, however, in identifying a positional model suggesting
a simple construction of such a segment. To say the same in another way:
in order to look for a solution of the problem, one can try to reduce it to
some other simpler problem, which can be done, in turn, by appropriately
transforming the condition that this problem is concerned with.
6.4 Tha¯bit ibn Qurra’s interpretation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s
ﬁrst trinomial equation
One such transformation is implied by Tha¯bit ibn Qurra’s solution of al-
Khwa¯rizmı¯’s ﬁrst trinomial equation. Expounding this treatment is a way
of showing that the rephrasing of problems like proposition VI.30 as purely
quantitative problems, and the appeal to appropriate other propositions of the
Elements, understood in turn as purely quantitative theorems, for justifying
such a rephrasing are not merely pleasant possibilities suggested to a modern
reader by certain aspects of Euclid’s text and arguments, but were already
part of mathematical practice several centuries before early-modern algebra
developed. This is the purpose of the present section.
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s Book of Algebra and al-Mua¯bala15 deals with a combina-
torial system including three basic elements, or modes: “Numbers”, “Roots”,
and “Squares”. These elements are combined so as to get six equations: three
are binomial equations, the three other trinomial equations16. For short (using
a notation which is not al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s), one could write them as follows:
S = R ; S = N ; R = N ;
S +R = N ; S +N = R ; R +N = S
(where ‘N ’ refers to a Number, ‘R’ to some Roots, and ‘S’ to some Squares;
the meaning to assign to the sign ‘+’ will be clariﬁed later).
These equations can be ﬁrstly understood as (shortenings of) statements
of general canonical problems about Numbers, Roots, and Squares. As these
equations exhaust the possible combinations admitted by the system (suppos-
15 Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s treatise was probably written in the ﬁrst part of 9th century. I base my
analysis on Rashed’s edition and its French translation ([(Rashed, 2007)]). This is accom-
panied by a rich introduction which, among other things, stresses the connection between
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra, Tha¯bit’s treatment of his trinomial equations, and the tradition
of the Elements. Though my views are not always the same as Rashed’s, much of what I
shall say on these matters has been inspired by what he argues for in this introduction. For
a much earlier edition of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s treatise, together with an English translation, cf.
[(Rosen, 1831)].
16 Cf. footnote (3), above.
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ing that the commutativity of ‘+’ is taken for granted, and repetitions are not
allowed), these are all the problems of this sort that can be stated. Still, these
same equations can also be understood as possible forms of diﬀerent problems
about what Numbers, Roots, and Squares are taken to stand for. In this case,
the fact that these equations exhaust the possible combinations admitted by
the system merely entails that these problems can have six diﬀerent forms,
that is, that al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra is concerned with all the problems that
can take one of these forms, under an appropriate interpretation of Numbers,
Roots, and Squares.
But what is it that Numbers, Roots, and Squares can stand for? In other
terms, which are their possible interpretations? There are two: Numbers,
Roots, and Squares can both stand for numbers, in the usual sense of this
term, or for geometrical magnitudes, namely for rectangles whose sides are
taken to be equal to certain segments which are either given or to be con-
structed.
This being said, let us stop with generalities about al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s algebra.
On one side, I do not want to say too much that I shall not have room to justify
(through a detailed analysis of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s arguments). On the other side,
the consideration of a single example is enough for my present purpose and
will also allow to clarify some of the previous generalities.
This is the example of the general canonical problem corresponding to
the ﬁrst trinomial equation, that is, S + R = N , or, in al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s own
parlance: “The Squares and the Roots equal to a Number” ([(Rashed, 2007)],
pp. 100-101).
Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ describes its solution by expounding his well-known arith-
metical algorithm in a particular case where one Square and ten Roots are
equal to thirty-nine (dirhams). The consideration of this particular case is
enough to make the arithmetic interpretation manifest. In this particular case,
the problem consists in determining a number (which al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ takes to
be a number of dirhams) such that by adding its square to the number result-
ing by multiplying it by ten one gets thirty-nine. In modern terms, one has
then to solve the quadratic equation:
x2 + nx = m
where n = 10, m = 39 and x is taken to be a number17 (which implies that
the Square is nothing but a product of numbers).
17 I cannot enter here into the quite delicate question concerning the suppositions that one
should make about the nature of this number, which is of course a crucial question to be
addressed for clarifying the arithmetical interpretation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s general canonical
problems (but is not relevant for my present purpose). For a discussion of the notion of
number in Arabic algebra, cf., for example, [(Oaks, 2010)], § 2, and [(Oaks, 2011)], § 5.
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Fig. 6.12: The ﬁrst geometrical demonstration by al-Khwa¯rizmı¯
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Fig. 6.13: The second geometrical demonstration by al-Khwa¯rizmı¯
In order to justify this algorithm, he shifts to geometry ([(Rashed, 2007)],
pp. 108–113). Namely, he oﬀers two diﬀerent positional models for the prob-
lem. In both of them, the Square is interpreted as being the square GDEA
(Figures 6.12 and 6.13)18 and its sides are interpreted as being equal to one
Root. In the ﬁrst model, the four small squares Γ , Δ, Θ, Λ (Figure 6.12) are
then taken to have sides equal to a fourth of the number of Roots; the square
GDEA and the four rectangles Π, Σ, Φ, Ψ taken together are taken to be
18 For reasons of uniformity with respect to the letters used to denote points in the diagrams
relative to Euclid’s proposition VI.30, I change the letters in al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s diagrams as
they appear in the French translation included in [(Rashed, 2007)], pp. 110, 112.
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equal to the Number; and the problem is conceived as that of constructing
a side of the square GDEA, supposing that the sides of the squares Γ , Δ, Θ,
Λ are equal to a fourth of a given segment, and the square GDEA and the
four rectangles Π, Σ, Φ, Ψ taken together are equal to a given rectangle or
square. In the second model, instead, the square Γ (Figure 6.13) is taken to
have sides equal to a half of the number of Roots; the square GDEA and the
two rectangles Π, Ψ taken together are taken to be equal to the Number; and
the problem is conceived as that of constructing a side of the square GDEA,
supposing that the sides of the square Γ are equal to half a given segment,
and the square GDEA and the two rectangles Π, Ψ taken together are equal
to a given rectangle or square.
Let a and b be two given segments. Using the previous notation, the con-
dition to be met, as respectively interpreted in the former and in the latter
model, could be written as follows:
S(x) + 4R(
a
4
, x) = S(b) and S(x) + 2R(
a
2
, x) = S(b). (6.11)
Insofar as it is natural to conceive the four rectangles Π, Σ, Φ, Ψ in the
former model (Figure 6.12), and the two rectangles Π, Ψ in the latter (Figure
6.13), as being equal respectively to the four and the two equal parts in which
is divided a rectangle having a side equal to one Root and another side equal to
the number of Roots, these two conditions appear as appropriate rephrasings
of the same condition:
S(x) +R(a, x) = S(b). (6.12)
Under the geometric interpretation, the problem appears then to consist
in constructing a segment x such that this condition obtains, provided that a
and b are given segments: in the particular example considered, a is supposed
to measure 10 (unities of length), and b is supposed to be such that any square
having a side equal to it measures 39 (unities of surface).
I do not want to argue that al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ actually understands his problem
this way I will limit myself to remark that this understanding is compatible
with his geometric arguments. These arguments go as follows.
In both models, the largest square has sides equal to one Root plus the half
of the number of Roots. In the former model, it is also equal to the Number
(which is equal to the square GDEA and the four rectangles Π, Σ, Φ, Ψ taken
together: Figure 6.12) plus four squares whose sides are equal to a fourth of
the number of Roots (the squares Γ , Δ, Θ, Λ ). In the latter model, it is
also equal to the Number (which is equal to the square GDEA and the two
rectangles Π, Ψ taken together: Figure 6.13) plus a square whose sides are
equal to a half of the number of Roots. Since, four squares whose sides are
equal to a fourth of the number of Roots are equal, if taken together, to a
square whose sides are equal to a half of the number of Roots, in both cases,
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the Root is found by subtracting a half of the number of Roots from the side
of a square equal to the Number taken together with a square whose sides are
equal to a half of the number of Roots. In the example considered, it is then
equal to the side of a square equal to 39 + 25 = 64 (unities of surface), i. e. 8
(unities of length), minus the side of a square equal to 25 (unities of surface),
i. e. 5 (unities of length), which is the same as that which is prescribed by the
arithmetic algorithm.
Under the previous understanding, this is the same as observing that con-
dition (6.12) is equivalent to the conditions
S(b) + 4S
(a
4
)
= S(x+
a
2
) and S(b) + S
(a
2
)
= S(x+
a
2
). (6.13)
The problem is thus reduced to two other problems whose solution is quite
simple: a and b being given, construct a square equal to a square whose sides
are equal to b taken together with a square whose sides are equal to a half of
a; then cut oﬀ a segment also equal to a half of a from a side of this square.
Now, it is enough to suppose that a is the same segment as b, to reduce con-
dition (6.12) to condition (6.10). Hence, al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s handling of his ﬁrst
trinomial equation suggests reducing the problem stated in Euclid’s proposi-
tion VI.30, understood as a purely quantitative problem, to the problem of
constructing a segment x such that
S(a) + 4S
(a
4
)
= S(x+
a
2
) or S(a) + S
(a
2
)
= S(x+
a
2
). (6.14)
This reduction is diﬀerent in nature from that through which I passed
above from proportion (6.3) to equality (6.10). Whereas this last reduction is
justiﬁed by a mere inspection of the purely quantitative condition that the
problem requires to meet, the former is justiﬁed by the inspection of two posi-
tional models of the original problem. In al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s argument, condition
(6.10) is ﬁrstly rephrased under the forms of conditions (6.11)19; these two
19 This passage depends in fact on the replacement of R(a, x) with 4R(a
4
, x) and 2R(a
2
, x),
respectively, which is not justiﬁed by an inspection of the two positional models, but
rather suggests them. A justiﬁcation of this replacement could then depend on an ap-
peal to proposition II.1 of the Elements understood as a purely quantitative theorem, in
analogy with the understanding suggested above for proposition II.2. Al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ does
not, however, make any explicit reference to the Elements, and it is far from sure that
this reference is implicit for him. Proposition II.1 is the following: “If there be two seg-
ments and one of them be cut into any number of parts whatever, the rectangle con-
tained by the two [whole] segments is equal to the rectangles contained by the uncut
segment and each of the parts [in which that other segment is cut].” Understood as
a purely quantitative theorem, this proposition can be rephrased through the following
implicationIf b = c+ d+ . . .+ e then R(a, c) +R(a, d) + . . .+R(a, e) = R (a, b), where
a and b are any two given segments. Implication (6.8) can be clearly taken as a particular
case of this last one.
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conditions then suggest two positional models; the inspection of these models
suggests two new purely quantitative conditions, namely conditions (6.13);
ﬁnally conditions (6.14) are got by supposing that segment a be the same as
segment b20.
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Fig. 6.14: The second geometrical demonstration by al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ of his ﬁrst
trinomial equation: a symmetric conﬁguration for a = b
In Tha¯bit’s solution of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation, this diﬀerence disappears.
The occasion for expounding this solution is a short treatise, composed around
the middle of 9th century: Restoration of algebraic problems through geometri-
cal demonstrations21. The aim of this treatise is just that of making manifest
the geometric interpretation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s trinomial equations: this is the
20 Notice that, in the case where segment a is the same as segment b, it is enough to take
a conﬁguration symmetric to that corresponding to the latter model (Figure 6.14) to get
back to the conﬁguration constituted by the square MDNJ (Figure 6.8) entering into Euclid
solution of proposition VI.30. The argument leading to this conﬁguration is however quite
diﬀerent in the two cases.
21 I base my analysis on Rashed’s edition and French translation ([(Rashed, 2009)],
pp. 159-169), which is accompanied by an introduction stressing the connection between
Tha¯bit’s treatise and al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s (ibid. pp. 153-158). The same translation is also inte-
grally quoted (with the exception of the two ﬁrst introductory lines) in [(Rashed, 2007)],
pp. 33-41, where the same connection is also stressed, as I have already said in footnote
(15). For an earlier edition of Tha¯bit’s treatise, together with a German translation, cf.
[(Luckey, 1941)]. A quite similar argument is also advanced in Abu¯ Ka¯mil’s Algebra dating
back to the end of 9th century. An English translation of the relevant passage (together
with the appropriate references to the original text and its critical editions) in included in
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restoration that its title refers to. I consider of course only Tha¯bit’s handling
of the ﬁrst of these equations.
D B
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Fig. 6.15: Tha¯bit ibn Qurra’s solution of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s ﬁrst trinomial equa-
tion
Tha¯bit opens his argument by referring to a quite simple diagram (Figure
6.15). In it, the Square is interpreted as being the square DBAC22. The segment
EB and the rectangle GEBD are then taken to be equal, respectively, to the
number of Roots and to the Roots themselves. Hence, the whole rectangle
GEAC is equal to the Square and the Roots taken together, and then to the
Number.
In order to ﬁx the interpretation of the segment EB and the rectangle GEBD
as being respectively equal to the number of Roots and to the Roots them-
selves, Tha¯bit requires that EB be “how many times the unity by which lines
are measured as the supposed number of Roots”, and remarks that “the prod-
uct of AB and the unity by which lines are measured is the Root”, to the eﬀect
that “the product of AB and BE is equal to the Roots” ([(Rashed, 2009)],
p. 160-161). It seems then that Tha¯bit intends his diagram as a geomet-
ric illustration of the problem arising from the arithmetical interpretation of
al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation. Once having oﬀered this illustration, he remarks,
however, that the problem associated to this equation reduces to “a known
geometric problem”: supposing the segment EB to be “known”, one “joins”
Appendix B of [(Oaks, 2011)].
22 Apart from the addition of ‘G’, the letters are now those of Tha¯bit’s diagram, as it
appears in the French translation included in [(Rashed, 2009)], p. 162.
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the segment BA to it, and one supposes that the “product of EA and BA is
known”; the problem consists then in determining the segment BA.
Supposing that α and β are two collineal segments, like BA and EB, or BA
and EA, Tha¯bit’s expression ‘the product of α and β’ seems to be intended
as to have the same reference as Euclid’s expression ‘the rectangle contained
by α, β’, namely any rectangle having having as sides two segments equal to
α and β, respectively. This suggests two things. The former is that Tha¯bit
conceives the “known geometric problem” (which is, of course, perfectly in-
dependent of the arithmetic interpretation of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation) as a
purely quantitative problem: supposing that a is a given segment (to which
BE is supposed to be equal), construct a segment x such that R(x, a + x) is
equal to a given rectangle or square. The latter thing is that Tha¯bit is will-
ing to solve this problem by appealing to appropriate propositions of book II
of the Elements, understood as purely quantitative theorems, in turn. Both
things are conﬁrmed by the way Tha¯bit continues.
Before coming to that, another remark is appropriate. The geometrical con-
ﬁguration represented by Tha¯bit’s diagram is the same as that which propo-
sition II.3 of the Elements is concerned with. This is a theorem, again: “if a
segment is cut at random, the rectangle contained by the whole and one of
the [two] parts is equal to the rectangle contained by the [two] parts and the
square on the aforesaid part”. The same considerations made above about
proposition II.2, also apply in this case23, and suggest an analogous under-
standing of the former proposition as a purely quantitative theorem:
if a = b+ c then R(a, b) = R (b, c) + S(b),
from which it immediately follows that
S(b) +R (b, c) = R(b, b+ c),
or, by appropriate replacements,
S(x) +R (a, x) = R(x, a+ x). (6.15)
Hence, it is enough to apply proposition II.3 so understood, in order to
rephrase condition (6.12) as:
R(x, a+ x) = S(b), (6.16)
which just corresponds to the “known geometric problem” to which Tha¯bit
reduces al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation, this problem being understood as a purely
quantitative one, and is nothing but a generalization of condition (6.4).
23 Euclid’s proof of proposition II.3 is perfectly analogous to his proof of proposition II.2.
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There is thus room for advancing the claim that Tha¯bit’s diagram is in-
tended as an implicit reference to proposition II.3 used in order to reduce
al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation, interpreted under the form of condition (6.12), to
such a known geometric problem. This is all the more plausible as this dia-
gram does not play any further role in the continuation of Tha¯bit’s argument,
which it is now time to consider.
He explicitly appeals to proposition II.6 of the Elements by claiming that,
according to it, if F is the middle point of EB, then the “the product of EA
and AB” and the “square of BF” taken together are equal to the “square of
AF” ([(Rashed, 2009)], p. 162-163).
Proposition II.6 is also a theorem: “if a segment is cut in half and a segment
is joined to it in a straight line, the rectangle contained by the whole [segment]
with the joined segment and the joined segment, taken together with the
square on the half, is equal to the square on the [segment] composed by the
half and the joined segment”. To prove it, Euclid considers a segment AB
(Figure 6.16) cut in half at C and produced up to a point D. Then he takes:
the “rectangle contained by the whole [segment] with the joined segment and
the joined segment” to be the “rectangle contained by AD, DB”, which he
identiﬁes, in turn, with the rectangle KMDA (supposing that MD = BD);
the “square on the half” to be the “square on CB”, which he identiﬁes, in
turn, with the square EGHL (supposing that EL = CB); the “square on the
[segment] composed by the half and the joined segment” to be the “square on
CD”, which he identiﬁes, in turn, with the square EFDC. What the proposition
asserts is thus that the “rectangle contained by AD, DB”, i. e. the rectangle
KMDA, taken together with the “square on CB”, i. e. the square EGHL, is
equal to “square on CD”, i. e the square EFDC. The proof is then very easy,
since it is enough to notice that the rectangle KLCA is equal to the rectangle
GFMH.
Tha¯bit limits himself to applying Euclid’s proposition to the conﬁguration
constituted by the segment EA (Figure 6.15) and the points B and F on it, and
to re-stating it by replacing Euclid’s expressions ‘the rectangle contained by
−, − ’ and ‘the square on −’ with ‘the product of − and − ’ and ‘the square
of −’. What is important, however, is the use he makes of this proposition.
Since in the “known geometric problem” to which al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation
has been reduced, the product of EA and BA (or the rectangle contained by
EA, BA) is supposed to be known, and this is also the case with the square
of (or on) FB, because this last segment is equal to a half of a given segment,
from proposition II.6, it now follows that also the square of (or on) FA is
known, which entails that FA itself is known. To solve the problem it is then
enough to cut oﬀ FB, from FA, since the result of this is just BA, which thus
comes to be known.
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This argument comes without any explicit construction and its only corre-
late on the diagram is the display of point F. It seems then that proposition
II.6 is used as a sort of rule of inference, independent of any construction or
positional model, and allowing a further reduction of the problem24.
 
A BC D
MK
FE
HL
G
Fig. 6.16: The solution of proposition VI.30 of the Elements suggested by
Tha¯bit’s solution of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s ﬁrst trinomial equation
For Euclid’s proof of this proposition to work, the square EGHL (Figure 6.16)
has to be taken to be the square on CB. This is a further clue for understanding
Euclid’s expressions of the form ‘the square of α’ and ‘the rectangle by α,
β’, and Tha¯bit’s corresponding ones of the form ‘the square on α’ and ‘the
product of α and β’ as referring to any square having as side a segment equal
to α, and to any rectangle having as sides two segments equal to α and β,
respectively. The fact that Tha¯bit feels no need to represent the squares of
(or on) FB and FA, together with his shift from the former expressions to the
latter ones suggests that he understands these expressions just in this way.
In my notation, his understanding of proposition II.6 is thus expressed by
rephrasing it under the form of the following equality
R(a+ b, b) + S
(a
2
)
= S
(a
2
+ b
)
,
or, by appropriate replacements,
R(x, a+ x) + S
(a
2
)
= S
(a
2
+ x
)
. (6.17)
24 The exact sense in which I speak here of rule of inference will be clariﬁed in section 6.5,
below, p. 225.
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His argument then reduces to a comparison of this last equality with the
equality (6.16), so as to get the second of the two equalities (6.13), to which
the problem is ﬁnally reduced.
The conclusion of this argument clearly parallels the one which al-Khwa¯rizmı¯
reaches through the consideration of the second of his geometrical models.
Still, it is justiﬁed by the inspection of no geometrical model, and merely
depends on an application of proposition II.6, understood as a purely quanti-
tative theorem used as a rule of inference.
6.5 Early-Modern Algebra and Purely Quantitative
Theorems and Problems
As observed before, if a is taken to be the same segment as b, condition (6.12),
and thus al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s equation understood as a geometric problem, reduces
to condition (6.10), and the second of the two equalities (6.13) is transformed
in the second of the two equalities (6.14). Hence, when applied to the problem
stated by proposition VI.30, Tha¯bit’s argument suggests a quite easy way to
solve this problem: according to proposition I.47 (the Pythagorean theorem),
it is enough to cut the given segment AB in its middle point C (Figure 6.17),
to construct the right angled rectangle ABD, whose sides BD is equal to CB,
or a half of AB, and to cut oﬀ a segment FD equal to such a side from the
hypotenuse of this triangle. The remaining segment AF satisﬁes condition
(6.10) for a = AB: if IA = AF, the square AFHG and the rectangle IJBA taken
together are equal to the square KLBA. Hence, if the point E is taken on AB
so that AE = AF, AB is cut in extreme and mean ratio, as required.
This provides, in the same time, the (unique) solution of proposition VI.30,
and a quite simple positional model for the purely quantitative problem asso-
ciated to it, whose solutions include, beside AE, also, AF, AG, AI, GH, FH, BJ,
and any other segment equal to them. The relevant point here is that this easy
way of solving proposition VI.30 only appears if this proposition is converted
into such a purely quantitative problem, and this last problem is then reduced
to an easier one by relying on proposition II.6, understood in turn as a purely
quantitative theorem used as a rule of inference. Furthermore, to prove that
the solution that one gets this way is appropriate, one has to rely either on
this last proposition so understood, or on some analogous theorem.
In a nutshell, my point is that the passage from Euclid’s understanding
of proposition VI.30 and his way to solve it, to its conversion into a purely
quantitative problem, which is solved in turn through an appeal to a purely
quantitative theorem used as a rule of inference, manifests a structural feature
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Fig. 6.17: Tha¯bit’s solution to cut a given segment AB in its middle point C
of early-modern algebra, which is both essential to it and independent of any
literal formalism.
Of course, there is much more in early-modern algebra. Still, this much
more is, in my view, dependent on such an understanding of geometrical
problems and theorems and on this way of solving them through appropriate
reductions which are not suggested by the consideration of appropriate posi-
tional models of them, but rather suggest these models. In other terms, this
is a necessary condition that made possible the development of early-modern
algebra and the adoption of its literal formalism.
So, a natural question arises: what more has been needed for the shaping
of early-modern algebra? Or better: what is there more in it than in an ar-
gument like Tha¯bit’s? Suppose one transcribes this argument using a skillful
notation, like the one I have used above. This would be certainly not enough
to reproduce the early-modern algebraic setting. But why not? What would
be still lacking?
Let me conclude my paper by sketching an answer to these questions.
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According to H. Bos, early modern geometry presents a peculiar form of
problematic analysis that is made possible by the introduction of the algebraic
formalism, especially thank to Vie`te, and that he calls ‘analysis by algebra’
([(Bos, 2001)], pp. 97-98). Its crucial diﬀerence from Pappusian analysis is,
for Bos, that it requires rephrasing the problems to be solved through a sys-
tem of equations written in such a formalism. There is no doubt that the
development of early-modern algebra goes together with the adoption of a
non-Pappusian kind of analysis, which is clearly described by Vie`te in the
Isagoge [(Vie`te, 1591)]. Still, it seems to me that Vietian analysis is a particu-
lar form of a more general kind of analysis, crucially diﬀerent from Pappus’s,
which is, as such, perfectly independent of Vie`te’s formalism, and depends,
instead, on the conceptual transformation I have described above.
Elsewhere [(Panza, 2007)], I have coined the term ‘trans-conﬁgurational’
for this kind of analysis, since it consists in transforming the conﬁguration of
data and unknowns that comes with the problem to be solved, into another
conﬁguration. The starting conﬁguration is ﬁxed through a system of purely
quantitative conditions that known and unknown magnitudes are supposed to
meet, then analysis operates on this system of conditions through appropriate
rules of inference, so as to transform it in a new equivalent, but essentially
diﬀerent system of conditions, expressing a new conﬁguration of data and un-
knowns. Typically, this ﬁnal system of conditions suggests a simple positional
model for the given problem (which is not suggested by the original one). The
synthesis (which is nothing but the solution of the given problem) consists
then in the construction of the sought after elements of this model starting
from the given ones.
Tha¯bit’s previous arguments is an example of trans-conﬁgurational analy-
sis. Consider the particular case corresponding to Euclid’s proposition VI.30.
Once this proposition is converted into a purely quantitative problem, it re-
quires constructing a mean proportional x between any segment equal to a
given segment a and any other segment segment a− x resulting from taking
away a segment equal to x from a segment equal to a, that is, a segment x
meeting the following condition
a : x = x : a− x.
Trans-conﬁgurational analysis transforms this problem as follows:
• For proposition VI.16, it reduces it to the problem of constructing a segment
x such that
S(x) = R(a, a− x).
• For proposition II.2 (i. e., according to equality (6.9)), this last condition
reduces to the other one:
S(x) +R(a, x) = S(a)
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• For proposition II.3 (i. e., according to equality (6.15)), this reduces in turn
to:
R(x, a+ x) = S(a)
• Finally, for proposition II.6 (i. e., according to equality (6.17)), this reduces
to:
S(a) + S
(a
2
)
= S
(
x+
a
2
)
,
which immediately suggests a simple positional model, and then a solution.
This piece of analysis is structurally akin to the Vietian one, but it does
not rely on the literal formalism of early-modern geometry. As I have observed
above, the notation used to expound this argument enters only for its semantic
function, that is, it is only employed for the purpose of avoiding too long
and tiresome expressions and phrases: any step in this argument could be
rephrased in a very long and cumbersome, but essentially unmodiﬁed way
without using this notation, but rather a non symbolic language like Euclid’s
or Tha¯bit’s.
The answer I suggest for the previous questions depends on a further clar-
iﬁcation of this point. The symbols that my notation consists of do not only
denote objects that one could also denote in a diﬀerent way, but they over-
all compose complex expressions that transform into each other not because
of some syntactical rules, but rather because of theorems that concern these
objects and are proved by reasoning on them in a way that is independent of
the use of this notation. Consider, as an example, the last step of the previous
argument. It is not licensed by any syntactical rule relative to such a notation,
but it rather depends on the admission of equality (6.17), which is proved by
reasoning on an appropriate conﬁguration of rectangles and squares. By say-
ing that proposition II.6 enters the previous argument as a rule of inference,
I do not mean that this proposition provides any such syntactical rule, but
simply that it allows to pass from a certain equality to another.
The literal formalism of early-modern algebra works in an essentially dif-
ferent way. The signs composing it are also used for their syntactical function.
This means that they are part of a syntactical system providing appropriate
rules for transforming the expressions composed by these symbols into each
other. These rules express the properties of a number of operations, and these
properties are independent of the objects to which these operations are sup-
posed to apply (that is, they are the same whatever these objects might be:
numbers, segments, or any other sort of quantities), to the eﬀect that they
can be expressed without having to care about the semantic function of the
relevant signs, that is, their power to denote some objects. The use of literal
signs for their syntactical function is, I argue, the essential feature of the new
formalism adopted in early-modern algebra.
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Of course, this means neither that the same signs were previously adopted
for their semantic function, nor that they did not also have this last function
within such a formalism. As a matter of fact, the former is only very partially
true. The latter is plainly false, instead. What is relevant is rather that the two
functions of signs, the semantic and the syntactic, are integrated within the
formalism of early modern algebra: these signs both denote objects (according
to some appropriate interpretation of them), and compose expressions that
transform into each other according to some syntactical rules, i. e. rules that
directly apply to these signs independently of their power to denote any object.
But, if this so, one could object, there is no room to argue, as I just did,
that the shift in conception that I accounted for was a necessary condition for
the adoption of the literal formalism of early modern algebra. The emergence
of such a formalism, one could argue, only depended on the ﬁxation of appro-
priate syntactical rules applying to appropriate signs; and just insofar as these
rule are syntactical in the previous sense, this could only be independent on
any way of conceiving geometrical objects and their relation.
This objection is clearly ﬂawed, however, and for a quite trivial reason. Af-
ter all, the features of the syntactical system involved in the literal formalism
of early modern algebra were just motivated (as it happens for any syntactical
system to be used in mathematics) by the purpose of making some interpre-
tations of this formalism possible. This system was just conceived in order to
provide a tool for dealing with arithmetical and/or geometrical objects. The
fact that the rules involved in it are syntactical, that is, directly apply to the
relevant signs independently of their power to denote any object, does not
entail that they were not conceived for the purpose of providing such a tool.
Now, it is easy to understand that it was only insofar as geometrical objects
came to be conceived as pure quantities – that is, as possible relata of a sys-
tem of purely quantitative conditions – that a geometrical interpretations of a
literal formalism as that of early-modern algebra (intrinsically unsuitable for
expressing the positional relations of geometrical objects) could be licensed.
This is just the reason why I argue that the adoption of such a formalism was
made possible by the shift in conception that I have tried to describe25.
25 One could perhaps argue that things should be seen the other way around, that is,
that it was the rephrasing of some geometrical problems (like that stating by proposition
like VI.30) using a literal formalism like that of early modern algebra that forced the
understanding of these problems as a purely quantitative ones. But, for such a line of
argumentation to be plausible, one should also explain what motivated this rephrasing. A
possible response could be that this rephrasing was motivated by the desire of stating (and
solving) geometrical problems by using a language analogous to that of arithmetic. The
choice between my hypothesis and this alternative one should be ultimately justiﬁed by
detailed textual considerations that I can only suggest to undertake here. Still, it seems to
me that the evidence I oﬀered in my paper, relative both to Euclid’s Elements (in section
6.3) and to al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s and Tha¯bit’s treatises (in section 6.4) is at least enough to
show that the understanding of geometrical problems as a purely quantitative ones is not
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At this point, another story should be told: a story accounting for the way in
which such a formalism was conceived, so as to be appropriate for integrating
the semantic and the syntactical functions of the signs involved in it. This is
a quite complex story, that has been told many times in diﬀerent ways. Of
course, I would have my own way to tell it26. But this is not something I can
do here.
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Chapter 7
The geometry of the unknown:
Bombelli’s algebra linearia
Roy Wagner
Abstract This paper studies the ways algebra and geometry are related in
Bombelli’s L’algebra. I show that despite Bombelli’s careful adherence to a
from of homogeneity, he constructs several diﬀerent ways of relating algebra
and geometry, building on Greek, Arabic, abbacist and original approaches. I
further show how Bombelli’s technique of reading diagrams, especially when
representing algebraic unknowns, requires a multiple view that makes lines
stand for much more than the diagrams present to an untrained eye. This
multiplicity reﬂects an exploratory approach that seeks to integrate the al-
gebraic and geometric strata without reducing one to the other and without
suppressing the idiosyncrasies of either stratum.
Key words: Renaissance algebra, geometric algebra, Bombelli, geometric
representation
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Scope, purpose and methodology
In the year 1572 Rafael Bombelli’s L’algebra came out in print. This book,
which is well known for its contribution to solving cubic and quartic equations
Parts of the research for this paper were conducted while visiting Boston University’s Center
for the Philosophy of Science, the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science and the
Edelstein Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, Medicine and Technology in
the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
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by means of roots of negative numbers, contains signiﬁcant work on the rela-
tion between algebra and geometry. The manuscript included two additional
geometry books, of which only a few fragments were incorporated into the
print edition.
This paper will analyse what Bombelli called “algebra linearia”:1 the inter-
representation of geometry and algebra in Bombelli’s L’algebra. I will map
out the various ways that geometry and algebra justify, instantiate, translate
and accompany each other. The purpose of the analysis is to point out the
multiple relations between the two mathematical domains as rigorously set out
in Bombelli’s text, and the multiple vision that’s required for understanding
Bombelli’s geometric diagrams.
This paper runs as follows. After a historical introduction and a review of
Bombelli’s notation, the second section of this paper will conduct a survey
of Bombelli’s geometric representation of algebra and its original regimenta-
tion of homogeneity considerations. I will then show how, despite the rigour
of Bombelli’s geometric representation of algebra, this representation does
not dictate a one-to-one correspondence between algebraic and geometric ele-
ments, but rather allows diﬀerent translations and interpretations to coexist.
The third section will then study the various functional relations between
algebra and geometry. I will show that, building on Greek, Arabic, abbacist2
and original practices, Bombelli’s geometric representations sometimes serve
to justify algebraic manoeuvres, sometimes to instantiate algebra in a diﬀer-
ent medium of representation, sometimes to connect diﬀerent algebraic ex-
pressions through a common geometric translation, and sometimes simply to
provide an independent accompaniment for algebra (this classiﬁcation may
serve as a framework to understand Renaissance juxtapositions of algebra
and geometry).
The fourth section will go on to show how Bombelli’s geometric representa-
tions of algebra confront negative magnitudes, expressions involving roots of
negatives, and algebraic unknowns and their powers. This section will demon-
strate that Bombelli implicitly hypothesized a co-expressivity of algebra and
geometry, and that this hypothesis helped endorse questionable algebraic en-
tities, generated new hybrid geometrico-algebraic entities and practices, and
rendered geometric and algebraic signs polysemic and multi-layered. The over-
all result of this study will be a complex picture of multiple relations between
algebra and geometry, which does not reduce or subject the one to the other,
but assumes that they are deeply related, and builds on this relation to pro-
duce new mathematical practices.
1 This term is best translated as ‘algebra in lines’, to avoid confusion with contemporary
linear algebra.
2 As the abbacists – the arithmetic teachers for Italian traders youth – had very little to
do with the abacus as instrument, I follow other researchers in retaining the ‘bb’ spelling.
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My approach is semiotic and mostly intrinsic. I explore Bombelli’s work as
an inspiring example of practicing mathematics rigorously, but without a con-
ﬁned, pre-charted ontology. Bombelli’s hybridisation of algebra and geometry,
expanding the boundaries of each without reducing one to the role of a servant
to the other, is an instructive example of the open horizons of mathematical
constructions of meaning.
7.1.2 Bombelli and L’algebra
Not much is known about Bombelli’s life. According to [Jayawardene (1965),
Jayawardene (1963)] he was born around 1526 and died no later than 1573. He
was an engineer and architect involved in reclaiming marshland and building
bridges. There is no record that he studied in a university, but he was obviously
a learned man, so much so that a scholar from the university of Rome invited
him to cooperate on a translation of the works of Diophantus.
The writing of the manuscript draft of L’algebra, Bombelli’s only known
publication, took place during a long pause in the Val di Chiana marsh re-
claiming, which Bortolotti [Bombelli (1929)] dates to the early 1550s and
[Jayawardene (1965)] to the late 1550s.
The manuscript [Bombelli (155?)], which was uncovered by Ettore Bor-
tolotti, is divided into ﬁve books. The ﬁrst three books of the manuscript ap-
peared with revisions in the 1572 print edition [Bombelli (1572)]. Bortolotti
published a modern edition of the remaining two books with an introduction
and comments [Bombelli (1929)], which was later combined with the 1572
edition [Bombelli (1966)].3
The ﬁrst book of L’algebra is a treatise on arithmetic, including root ex-
traction and operating on sums of numbers and roots (mostly binomials, but
some longer sums as well). The second book introduces the unknown (Tanto),
presents an elementary algebra of polynomials up to and including division,
and goes on to systematically present techniques for solving quadratic, cubic
and quartic equations, following the discoveries of dal Ferro, Tartaglia, Car-
dano and Ferrari. The third book is a collection of recreational problems in
the abbacist tradition together with problems borrowed directly from Dio-
phantus. The problems are solved using the algebraic techniques taught in
the second book.
3 In referring to Books III, IV and V, I use problem number and section number (the 1929
version is available online, so it makes more sense to use section numbers than the page
numbers of the out-of-print 1966 edition). In references to Books I and II the page numbers
of the 1966 edition are used, as there is no numerical sectioning. The translations from the
vernacular Italian are my own.
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The fourth book, which did not make it to print at the time, concerns
what Bombelli calls algebra linearia, the reconstruction of algebra in geomet-
ric terms. It opens with some elementary Euclidean constructions, and then
builds on them to geometrically reproduce the main techniques of Book II and
some problems of Book III. Book V treats some more traditional geometric
problems in both geometric and algebraic manner, goes on to teach some basic
practical triangulation techniques, and concludes with a treatise on regular
and semi-regular polyhedra. Book IV is not entirely complete. Many of the
spaces left for diagrams remain empty. Book V is even less complete, and its
sections do not appear in the manuscript table of contents.
There are some substantial diﬀerences between the manuscript and the
print edition. Several sections that appear as marginalia in the manuscript
were incorporated as text into the print version of books I and II. Some of
the geometric reconstructions of the unpublished Book IV were incorporated
into the ﬁrst two books. The print edition also has a much more developed
discussion of roots of negative numbers, and introduces some new terminol-
ogy and notation that will be addressed below. Book III went through some
major changes. Problems stated in terms of commerce in the manuscript were
removed, and many Diophantine problems were incorporated (for a full sur-
vey of these changes see [Jayawardene (1973)]). The introduction to the print
edition states an intention to produce a book that appears to be based on the
manuscript Book IV, but this intention was never actualized (Bombelli died
within a year of the print publication).
According to Bortolotti’s introduction, L’algebra seems to have been well
received in early modern mathematical circles. Bortolotti quotes Leibniz as
stating that Bombelli was an “excellent master of the analytical art”, and
brings evidence of Huygens’s high esteem for Bombelli as well [Bombelli (1929),
7–8]. Jean Dieudonne´, however, seems less impressed with Bombelli’s achieve-
ments and renown [Dieudonne´ (1972)]. Note, however, that the geometry
books (IV and V) were not available in print, and are unlikely to have enjoyed
considerable circulation.
The vast majority of technical achievements included in Bombelli’s printed
work had already been expounded by Cardano. The exceptions include some
clever tinkering with root extraction and the ﬁne tuning of techniques for
solving cubics and quartics. Bombelli’s achievements in reconciling algebra
and geometry, which are the subject of this paper, were not published in
print at the time. But Bombelli’s one undeniable major achievement is the
ﬁrst documented use of roots of negative numbers in order to derive a real
solution of a polynomial equation with integer coeﬃcients. He is not the ﬁrst
to work with roots of negative numbers, but he is the ﬁrst to manipulate them
extensively beyond a basic statement of their rules.
However, judging Bombelli’s book through the prism of technical novelty
does not do it justice. Indeed, Bombelli explicitly states in his introduction
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that he is presenting existing knowledge. He explains that “in order to remove
ﬁnally all obstacles for the speculative theoreticians and the practitioners of
this science” (algebra) ... “I was taken by a desire to bring it to perfect order”.4
In fact, the main text that Bombelli sought to clarify was Girolamo Cardano’s
Ars Magna.
Despite this strictly pedagogical aim, Bombelli does occupy a special
place in the history of algebra. While Bombelli’s explicitly mentioned sources
(Leonardo Fibonacci, Oronce Fine´, Heinrich Schreiber, Michael Stifel, Luca
Pacioli, Niccolo´ Tartaglia and Girolamo Cardano) fail to include two centuries
of vernacular Italian algebra developed in the context of abbacus schools,
Bombelli is, in a sense, the last proponent of the abbacist tradition. He is
the last important and innovative author to organize his work around rules
for solving ﬁrst a comprehensive list of kinds of equations, and then around
a much looser collection of recreational problems borrowed from the abbacist
reservoir. Bombelli, like his sixteenth century predecessors, adds much to the
knowledge of past abbacists, but in terms of practices, terminology and prob-
lems he is a direct descendent of their tradition.5
7.1.3 Notation
The name of the unknown in Italian abbacus algebra is usually cosa (thing),
and occasionally quantita` (quantity). Bombelli writes in his manuscript that
he prefers the latter, but uses the former, because that’s the received practice.
In the print version, following Diophantine inspiration, Bombelli changes the
name of the unknown to Tanto (so much, such; I retain these Italian terms in
this paper in order to maintain a distance from modern practice). The second
power is called Censo in the manuscript (Bombelli prefers quadrata, but again
follows received practice) and potenza in the print version. Cubo is the third
power, and Censo di Censo or potenza di potenza is the fourth. Higher powers
are treated and named as well, but are not relevant for this paper.
Bombelli’s manuscript notation for powers of the unknown is a semicircle
with the ordinal number of the power over the coeﬃcient. The print edition
reproduces this notation in diagrams of calculations, but, due to the limita-
tions of print, places the semicircle next to the coeﬃcient in the running text.
So a contemporary 5x2 would be rendered as 5 2 in print and as
2

5 in the
4 “per levare ﬁnalmente ogni impedimento alli speculativi e vaghi di questa scientia e togliere
ogni scusa a’ vili et inetti, mi son posto nell’animo di volere a perfetto ordine ridurla”
[Bombelli (1966), 8].
5 The authoritative survey of abbacus algebra is still that of [Franci & Rigatelli (1985)]. A
comprehensive catalogue of abbacist algebra was compiled by [Van Egmond (1980)].
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manuscript. The manuscript Book II accompanies plain numbers with a 0
above them, but this is almost entirely discarded in the print edition and in
the other manuscript books.
Bombelli uses the shorthand m. for meno (minus) and p. for piu` (plus).
The modern edition replaces those signs with the contemporary − and +, but
otherwise respects the notations of the 1572 edition. I follow this practice here
as well.
7.2 Elements of Algebra Linearia
In this section I will discuss Bombelli’s inter-representation of algebra and
geometry. The ﬁrst subsection will raise the issue of relations between al-
gebra and geometry in the abbacist tradition. The second subsection will
consider the problem of homogeneity6 in Cardano and Bombelli, and describe
Bombelli’s method of preserving homogeneity without committing himself to
a ﬁxed translation of algebraic powers into geometric dimensions. The third
subsection will present Bombelli’s algebraic-geometric translation system, but
will also show that Bombelli’s geometric representations of algebra were not
restricted to this system. Along the way we will encounter a couple of pre-
liminary examples of geometric signs that function on several levels at once.
The point of this section is that Bombelli’s practice is highly rigorous, but
still allows for diﬀerent algebraic-geometric interpretations to coexist.
7.2.1 Letting representation run wild
The second book of L’algebra, which deals with the solution of polynomial
equations up to the fourth degree, concludes with Bombelli’s “reserving it
for later, at my leisure and convenience, to give to the world all these Prob-
lems in geometric demonstrations”.7 The third book, a collection of algebraic
problems solved by the techniques of Book II, concludes with a more elabo-
rate statement: “I had in mind to verify with geometrical demonstrations the
working out of all these Arithmetical problems, knowing that these two sci-
ences (that is Arithmetic and Geometry) have between them such accord that
6 Homogeneity here means never adding or equating geometric entities of diﬀerent dimen-
sions. If a practice is homogeneous, the constructed geometrical object will be invariant
with respect to the choice of units of measurement.
7 “riserbandomi poi con piu` mio agio e commodita` di dare al mondo tutti questi Problemi
in dimostrationi geometriche” [Bombelli (1966), 314].
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the former is the veriﬁcation of the latter and the latter is the demonstration
of the former. Never could the mathematician be perfect, who is not versed in
both, although in these our times many are those who let themselves believe
otherwise; how they deceive themselves they will clearly recognize when they
will have seen my former and latter work; but because it is not yet brought to
such perfection as the excellence of this discipline requires, I decided I want
to consider it better ﬁrst, before I were to present it for the scrutiny of men”.8
Unfortunately, Bombelli died soon after, and never got to perfect this part of
his work, which remained incomplete in manuscript.
Of course, the notion of relating algebra or arithmetic and geometry was
hardly new. The tradition of representing numbers by lines goes back to Eu-
clid’s diagrams in his arithmetic books, if not earlier. But while Euclid made
an eﬀort to set apart the theories of ratios between general homogeneous mag-
nitudes, of ratios between numbers, and of relations between lengths, areas
and volumes (books V, VII and XI of the Elements respectively), a renais-
sance author such as [Cardano (1968), 28] could refer simultaneously to V.19,
VII.17 and XI.31 to explain why, if three cubes equal 24, then one cube equals
8.
But this conﬂation emerged much earlier. Abbacus algebra imported Arabic
geometric diagrams that had already been interpreted as referring to num-
bers.9 Among the abbacists, the most emblematic ‘algebraic geometer’ was
the artist Piero della Francesca. Piero’s geometry dealt with diagrams with
some line lengths given numerically. It used cosa terms to model unknown
lengths of lines, translate information concerning these lengths into polyno-
mial equations, and derive their solutions using abbacist rules. His work was
so inﬂuential, that Luca Pacioli practically imported it as is into his work.10
The algebraic entities — the cosa, censo and cubo (the unknown, its square
and its cube) — were sometimes (but by no means generally!) interpreted
as geometric in introductory presentations and some applications. As 14th
century abbacist Maestro Dardi wrote, “The cosa is a linear length and is
root of the censo, and one says cosa” (literally, thing) “because this name
8 “io fussi di animo di provare con dimostrationi Geometriche l’operatione di tutti questi
problemi Arimetici, sapendo che queste due scientie (cioe` l’Arimetica e Geometria) hanno
intra di loro tanta convenientia che l’una e` la prova dell’altra e l’altra e` la dimostration
dell’una, ne` gia` puote il Matematico esser perfetto il quale in ambedue non sia versato,
benche` a questi nostri tempi molti siano i quali si danno a credere altrimente; del che
quanto si ingannino all’hor chiaramente lo conosceranno quando che l’una e l’altra mia
opera havranno veduta; ma perche` non e` per ancora ridutta a quella perfettione che la
eccellentia di questa disciplina ricerca, mi son risoluto di volerla prima meglio considerare,
avanti che la mandi nel conspetto de gli huomini” [Bombelli (1966), 476].
9 For the earlier roots of the arithmetisation of Greek geometry see Reviel Netz’
highly remarkable The transformation of mathematics in the early Mediterranean world
[Netz (2004)].
10 See Gino Arrighi’s introduction to [della Francesca (1970)].
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can be attributed to all things of the world in general. The censo would
be a surface breadth and is the square of the cosa” ... “The cubo would be
a corporeal magnitude, the body of which includes in itself the length of
the cosa and the surface of the censo, and is called cubo according to the
arithmetic of Boethius” ... “meaning such aggregation of numbers”.11 The
algebraic terms here come from geometry and arithmetic, but have to do
generally with “all things of the world”. Indeed, the one interpretation of
algebraic unknowns common to all abbacists is the economic one: they are
used to represent monetary units and quantities of merchandize.
Since the cosa can be anything, practitioners were not always bound to
respect the above allocation of algebraic terms to geometric dimensions. In
fact, the notion of dimension was probably not terribly rigid in a culture that
used such term as “quadro chubico” for volume [Paolo dell’Abbaco (1964),
128], and sometimes measured volumes in terms of square braccia (braccia is a
unit of length). By the time we reach Cardano we see one and two dimensional
diagrams for algebraic cubic terms, and a square whose one side represents the
second power of an unknown and the other its fourth power [Cardano (1968),
21,52,238].
The correspondence between geometric and algebraic dimensions is not
ﬁxed in the work of Bombelli as well. He is apt to say such things as “the
rectangle .i.l.g. will be a cube and the rectangle .i.l.f. will be 6 1”,12 deny-
ing any consistent relation between the algebraic and geometric hierarchies of
powers and dimensions. He follows this conduct in his Book IV as well, where
algebraic cubes can be drawn as squares with one side an algebraic square and
the other an algebraic cosa (e.g. §28). While Book II does not attempt to geo-
metrically instantiate quartic and biquadratic equations, Book IV represents
fourth powers as squares whose sides are algebraic squares (§§43,46).13
7.2.2 Regimenting representation
But a geometric representation of algebra, which has any regard for classical
practice (as renaissance mathematics obviously had) must confront the issue
of homogeneity. Cardano, for one, included a highbrow warning against the
11 “La cosa e` una lunghessa lineale ed e` radicie del censo, e diciensi cosa perche` questo nome
cosa si puo` atribuire a tutte le cose del mondo gieneralmente. Lo censo sie una anpiessa
superﬁciale ed e` quadrato della cosa, e diciesi censo da cerno cernis che sta per eleggiere,
inpercio` che el censo eleggie lo mec¸c¸o proportionale in tra la cosa e’l cubo. Lo cubo sie una
grossessa chorporale lo cuj chorpo inchiude in se` la lunghessa della cosa e lla superﬁcie del
censo, ed e` ditta cubo sicondo l’arismetrica di Boetio da questo nome cubus cubi che tanto
vuol dire quanto agreghatione di numerj” [Dardi (2001), 37–38].
12 “il paralellogramo .i.l.g. sara` un cubo ed il paralellogramo .i.l.f. sara` 6
1
”
[Bombelli (1966), 229].
13 The diagrams are missing from the manuscript treatment of these sections, but the text
clearly shows that the diagrams inserted by Bortolotti are correct in this respect. Recent
7 The geometry of the unknown 237
misunderstandings that failure to respect homogeneity may bring: “it is clear
that they are mistaken”, explains Cardano, “who say that if BH, for instance,
is the value of” the unknown14 “and GF is 3, the rectangle” formed by BH
and GF “will be 3BH or triple BH. For it is impossible that a surface should
be composed of lines” [Cardano (1968), 34]. But Cardano’s way of actually
dealing with homogeneity in his geometric proofs of algebraic rules was sim-
ply to turn a blind eye to its requirements. After making this very warning,
Cardano ignores the diﬀerence between multiplying a line by a number and
by another line, and very casually adds numbers, lines, areas and volumes as
if they were all homogeneous [Cardano (1968), e.g. 76,65,124].
Bombelli’s practice, however, is much more carefully regimented. When
Bombelli illustrates geometrically the solution of the problems ‘Cose equal
number’ and ‘square(s) equal number’ (§§22–24), he carefully equates prod-
ucts of lines with rectangles, and homogeneously applies rectangles to lines15
or reduces them to squares.16 Nevertheless, when constructing a line repre-
senting one of Euclid’s special binomials (sums of number and square root),
Bombelli has no problem writing “Let the line .a. be 16 square number, and
the line .b. 12 non square number” ... “and let .c. be 144, the square of .b.,
and .d. 192, product of .a. and .b.” (§56).17 Does this mean that Bombelli,
too, violated the requirements of homogeneity?
The answer is negative. Bombelli explicitly developed the means that would
allow him to represent the product of lines as a line, while maintaining homo-
geneity. For instance, in §98 Bombelli poses the following question, a geometric
version of a problem from his manuscript Book III: “Let the line .a.b. be given,
which has to be divided into three parts in continued proportion in such a
way that having found a line that would be equal to the product of the ﬁrst
and the second, the line .o. being the common measure, and the said line
multiplied by the third, it would make a line equal to .g.l.”.18 The product of
the ﬁrst and second lines is a rectangle, and as such can be applied to a line,
work by Marie He´le`ne Labarthe indicate that Pedro Nun˜ez applied similar practices.
14 The English translation has x for Cardano’s res, which I’d rather avoid.
15 To apply a rectangle to a line is to construct another rectangle of the same area with
one side equal to the given line.
16 This accords with the notion of “strict homogeneity” attributed by [Freguglia (1999)] to
Bombelli, but as we shall see below, this attribution has to be qualiﬁed and applied very
cautiously.
17 “Sia la linea .a. 16, numero quadrato, et la linea .b. 12, numero non quadrato, et minore
de la .a., et sia la .c. 144, quadrato della .b., et la .d. 192, moltiplicatione dell’.a. in .b.”.
18 “Sia data la linea .a.b. la quale si habbia a dividere in tre parti continoe, et proportionali
in tal modo, che trovato una linea che sia pari alla potentia della prima nella seconda,
essendo la linea .o. la commune misura, et la detta linea moltiplicata via la terza faccia
una linea pari alla .g.l.”. Note that the common measure could also be understood as unit
measure. Indeed, Bombelli writes a few lines below that “the .o. is 1 always by rule” (“et
la .o. 1, sempre per regola”).
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namely to the common measure .o.. The other side of this applied rectangle
represents the product of the two original lines. The common measure need
not be carried explicitly with the product line, but it is there implicitly as the
other side of a rectangle, for otherwise homogeneity is violated. This practice
makes the product line a hybrid between an independent line and a rectangle
named by its non-common side. The ﬁnal requirement posed by the problem
may be simultaneously viewed as an equation confronting two lines (the prod-
uct of the three parts and .g.l.), or as an equation between two boxes, where
the ﬁrst has one side equal to .o., and the second has two sides equal to .o.
(and one equal to .g.l.). A line no longer simply stands for a line.
In other problems the common measure might not be mentioned under that
name, but is still there. When in §111 Bombelli asks to ﬁnd the line represent-
ing the square of a given line, he uses one of the given lines of the problem as
a common measure. Indeed, when he veriﬁes the solution by assigning lengths
to lines, he assigns this line the length 1, and says that this is the value one
should “always take”.19 But this “always” is immediately qualiﬁed. Geomet-
rically, we may choose our unit as we wish, but arithmetically, our chosen
common measure might already be given a non unit numerical length. And
so Bombelli explains that if the line used as geometrical unit is not of length
1, then a common measure should be derived by rescaling20 this given line
according to its given length so as to produce a line of length 1. If we now per-
form the construction with this newly derived unit as the common measure,
geometric practice will accord with the arithmetic score of line lengths.
We see here that Bombelli takes care to maintain homogeneity on the
geometric level, and at the same time remains faithful to arithmetic con-
siderations, to which homogeneous geometry in itself is blind. This practice
distributes the length of a line between diﬀerent co-extensive registers. Ge-
ometrically, the common measure should “always” be interpreted as 1. But
arithmetically it may be assigned any value. The common measure ties to-
gether two mathematical orders, and is allowed to function on both levels,
accepting and validating their diﬀerence. A single line — that of the common
measure — may represent two values in two contexts at once.21
19 “sempre pongasi la .a.b. essere 1”.
20 I use the term rescaling to refer to reducing or extending a line or an entire geometric
structure by a given ratio.
21 It is interesting to note that Bombelli’s virtuosity concerning homogeneity confused even
as deep and insightful an editor as Ettore Bortolotti (his rampant whiggishness notwith-
standing). In the notes to §110 Bortolotti says that Bombelli’s rectangle .e.b.f. should be a
box, because it equals what Bortolotti reconstructs as X3. But in fact Bortolotti’s X3 is for
Bombelli not a box whose sides are equal to an unknown X, but a square whose one side is
the cosa (Bortolotti’s X), and the other side the square of the cosa reduced to a line, with
.b.f. serving as unit measure (in Bortolotti’s terms: X2/bf). In Bortolotti’s terms, then, the
correct algebraic model for the term equated with .e.b.f. would be X3/bf , and homogene-
ity is indeed maintained if .e.b.f. is a rectangle. This shows how subtle Bombelli’s practice
7 The geometry of the unknown 239
7.2.3 The vicissitudes of regimentation
Bombelli’s geometric representation of algebra is provided with a more or less
systematic setting. After reviewing some elementary Euclidean constructions
(e.g. bisecting a line, reducing a rectilinear surface to a square, applying a
rectangle to a line), Bombelli sets out to instantiate arithmetic and algebraic
operations in geometric terms. Addition and subtraction are represented as
concatenating and cutting oﬀ lines (§§15,16); the product of lines is repre-
sented as the rectangle that they contain (§17); dividing lines is done by
introducing a common measure and using similar triangles (Elements VI.12)
to draw a line whose ratio to the unit is as the ratio of the divided to the
divisor (§18). As Bortolotti observed, this practice of division would later
be reinvented by Descartes. Earlier in the text, in the context of applying a
rectangle to a line, Bombelli uses a construction based on Elements III.35
(chords in a circle cut each other proportionally). This construction, too, is
used further on to implement division with a common measure.
Next Bombelli considers root extraction (§19). This is performed either
by Euclid’s semicircle construction of the geometrical mean between a given
line and a common measure (Elements VI.13, without explicit reference) or
the variation of the same construction, where the unit is taken on the given
line, rather than appended to it (a variation later used by Descartes in his
Regulae). Bombelli then relates this operation to reducing a rectangle or a
sum of squares to a square. Cubic roots (§20) are then extracted through
a trial-and-error method based on constructing similar right angle triangles
that Bombelli, following Barbaro’s commentary on Vitruvius, attributes to
Plato (or his disciples) [Bombelli (1966), 47,228], and that is known from
Pappus’s Mathematicae Collectiones.22 Bombelli promises two methods for
the extraction of cubic roots, but provides only one. A second method appears
in Book I of the print edition, and is based on superposing right-angled rulers
[Bombelli (1966), 48]. Bombelli relates the extraction of a cubic root to ﬁnding
two mean proportionals between a given line and a common measure as well
as to reducing a box to a cube.
These building blocks allow Bombelli to translate arithmetic operations
into geometric ones. However, we should note, as did Giusti [Giusti (1992),
311–312], that the use of these building blocks is not terribly consistent. We
must acknowledge that the strategy of reducing rectangles to lines and em-
ploying explicit common measures is in fact not central to Bombelli’s work.23
of regimenting homogeneity was, and how evolved was Bombelli’s skill of tacitly retaining
the two-dimensionality represented by a single line.
22 See [Giusti (1992), 305–306] for more details.
23 While I am puzzled by Giusti’s claims that modeling division via proportional tri-
angles “is somewhat hidden” and that division by intersecting chords “is abandoned”
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Bombelli usually maintains homogeneity in the classical way, which does not
require such manoeuvres. We should also note that Bombelli’s practice here
is in fact in line with the choices of Descartes, who would later develop the
same technology to deal with homogeneity, but, again like Bombelli, would
rarely use it to work outside the classical practice of homogeneity [Bos (2001),
299]. Van Ceulen, the other pre-Cartesian author who used a unit measure to
reduce a product of lines to a line, had his contemporary editor insert a note
insisting that the product of two lines is an area [Bos (2001), 156]. We see that
bypassing homogeneity by common measures was hard to digest, even when
it was explicitly introduced in a rigorous manner. In fact, the haphazard ap-
proach represented by Cardano enjoyed more popularity, as those who didn’t
mind homogeneity followed its path, while those who did mind homogeneity
were uncomfortable even with the Cartesian approach.24
But Bombelli’s deviations from his expository building blocks for instanti-
ating algebra in geometric terms are not restricted to issues of homogeneity
management. For example, Bombelli frequently uses the Pythagorean theo-
rem, which is not mentioned in the expository part. In the context of ge-
ometrically instantiating algebraic solutions to problems imported from his
manuscript Book III, Bombelli’s approach is sometimes more creative than
a strict combination of his expository building blocks would suggest. For in-
stance in §94 (ﬁgure 7.1), when algebra instructs to divide the square on .b.c.
by twice .a.c., rather than actually double .a.c. and divide using intersecting
chords or proportional triangles as in the introduction, Bombelli draws the
line .c.e. whose square is half the square on .b.c., and then takes advantage of
the fact that .c.e. is a mean proportional between .a.c. and the result of the
division, drawing this result (.g.c.) using one of the diagrams for producing a
mean proportional.
The point of this example is not to nit-pick on Bombelli’s commitment to
the procedures presented in his exposition. I include these details to provide
an example of how Bombelli follows the respective idiosyncratic practicalities
of algebra and geometry, and ends up with diﬀerent procedures even when
geometry is there supposedly to reproduce an algebraic practice.25
[Giusti (1992), 312], it is true that these diagrams rarely depend on an explicit assignment
of the role of a unit to any particular segment.
24 Newton, for instance, wrote: “Multiplication, division and such sorts of computation are
newly received into geometry, and that unwarily and contrary to ﬁrst design”. Quoted in
[Roche (1998), 79].
25 At the same time, in some cases of reconstructing algebraic solutions geometrically the
diagrams follow algebraic orders very strictly. In §99, for example, the algebraic rule re-
quires doubling one of the given quantities, and then dividing it by 2 (when Bombelli con-
structed the quadratic equation that solved the algebraic version of this problem, twice
the given quantity appeared as a coeﬃcient in the equation, and the solution rule then re-
quired this coeﬃcient to be halved — hence the subsequent multiplication and division by
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Fig. 7.1: [Bombelli (1929), §94]: geometric idiosyncracies with respect to al-
gebra
These reservations notwithstanding, Bombelli’s concern with regimenting ho-
mogeneity and representing algebra by geometry demonstrates two major
points of my overall argument. First, a rigorous representation of algebra by
geometry does not necessarily entail establishing univocal links between the
two. Indeed, we saw above how algebraic powers could correspond to various
geometric dimensions, how arithmetic operations received various geometric
interpretations (e.g. root extraction interpreted as reducing a rectangle to a
square and as ﬁnding a mean proportional with a common measure), and
how the algebraic and geometric strata of expression maintained their own
irreducible particularities (as in the description of §94 above, where a geomet-
ric construction, meant to represent an algebraic procedure, depended on the
opportunities provided by the geometric diagram, rather than on the intro-
ductory gemetrico-algebraic ‘dictionary’). Second, the interaction of geometry
and algebra forces each stratum to express more than it had before the en-
2). The geometric reconstruction follows the algebraic rule so faithfully, that it insists on
reproducing the subsequent and mutually-cancelling doubling and halving. A further inter-
esting attempt to express arithmetic information geometrically occurs when extracting the
root of binomials. In §63, when subtracting two roots whose ratio is rational (in Bombelli’s
language, the numbers under the root are to each other as “a square number to a square
number” — “come da numero quadrato a numero quadrato”), the roots are modeled as a
a square removed from a square. But in the next section, where the ratio between the sub-
tracted roots is not rational, they are modeled as a rectangle removed from a square.
242 Roy Wagner
counter. We do not have a simple double expression, where each geometric
sign expresses a geometric entity and an algebraic one. What we have is a
relative sliding of multiple algebraic and geometric interpretations under the
same geometric sign. Indeed, as we saw in the previous subsection, a single
geometric line could represent a line or a rectangle, a geometric unit measure
or an arbitrary arithmetic length.26
We will return to this latter point in the fourth section of this paper. But
ﬁrst let’s expand the former point, and explore the functional (rather than
semantic) relations that Bombelli constructs between geometry and algebra.
7.3 The functional relations between geometry to
algebra
The ﬁrst geometric representation of an algebraic operation in Bombelli’s
Book II is preceded by the following statement: “And while this science is
arithmetic (as it was called by Diophantus the Greek author and the Indians),
nevertheless it does not follow that one can’t provare it all by geometric
ﬁgures (as does Euclid in the second, sixth, tenth)” books of the Elements.27
According to the convincing arguments of Sabetai Unguru and David Rowe
26 It is interesting to recall here Lacan’s reaction in his Instance of the letter to de Saussure’s
representation of the signiﬁer and the signiﬁed strata as two parallel horizontal wave ﬁgures
correlated by vertical lines. Rather than horizontal strata of ‘upper water’ (signiﬁer) and
‘lower water’ (signiﬁed) anchored to each other by the vertical dashes, Lacan suggests
reading the diagram as one horizontal stream ﬂowing under another, while vertical drops
of rain ﬂow between them [Lacan (2006)].
27 “E benche` questa scientia sia Arimetica (come la chiamano Diofante Autore Greco e li
Indiani) pero` non resta che il tutto non si possi provare per ﬁgure Geometriche (come fa Eu-
clide nel secondo, sesto, decimo)” [Bombelli (1966), 184–185]. Bombelli rarely quotes explic-
itly from Euclid — almost all explicit quotations are found in the ﬁrst 18 sections of Book
IV, where Bombelli introduces his basic geometric constructions. From the reference to Eu-
clid’s VI.12 in Bombelli’s §18 we can infer that Bombelli used either a Greek version or an
edition of Zamberti’s Latin translation from the Greek (Campanus’s Latin translation from
an Arabic source has the Greek VI.10 as his VI.12). Nevertheless, Bombelli’s diagram in §18
is not a reproduction of the Greek diagram, but an ad-hoc diagram adapted to his speciﬁc
needs. In fact, Bombelli’s list of algebraic sources (quoted above) suggests a thorough bib-
liographic research, and if this research extended to geometry too, it is likely that Bombelli
consulted several versions of the Elements, and was not committed to any one particular edi-
tion. Medieval translators and commentators had already conﬂated arithmetic and algebra
(e.g. Barlaam’s commentary on Book II), but Bombelli’s reduction of Euclid’s binomials to
sums of roots or of a number and a root is closest to what we observe in Tartaglia’s Italian
translation, which is based on an integration of Campanus’ and Zamberti’s translations, but
which takes a further step toward an arimethization of Euclidean geometry [Malet (2006)].
Bombelli’s step, in turn, towards such arithmetization is bolder still, as he considers Eu-
clid’s entire Book X as covered by the arithmetic of his own Book I [Bombelli (1966), 9].
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[Unguru & Rowe (1981–1982)], Euclid saw things quite diﬀerently. But for
the Renaissance revisionists the provare-bility of arithmetic by geometry was
taken for granted. What must be carefully analysed here, however, is the
precise use that Bombelli makes of the verb provare.
Provare could potentially mean ‘prove’, ‘demonstrate’, ‘test’, ‘verify’ and
a myriad of shades in between. In this section we will follow the diﬀerent
ways that Bombelli relates geometry and algebra. In some cases geometry
provides an independent justiﬁcation of algebraic manoeuvres. In others ge-
ometry serves as instantiation or reconstruction of algebraic operations in
lines rather than characters. In yet other cases a geometric diagram serves as
a common pivotal translation of distinct algebraic expressions, which ties them
together as equivalent. Finally, we must not neglect the cases where geometric
diagrams serve as accompaniment for algebraic problems, either to manifest
two approaches to a single problem without an attempt to relate them, or to
supply a visual accompaniment without any speciﬁc functional purpose. I will
review these themes in detail so as to demonstrate the multiplicity inherent in
Bombelli’s relating of algebra and geometry. I hope that this multiplicity may
serve as a guiding framework for understanding geometry-algebra relations in
wider contexts as well.
7.3.1 Geometric justiﬁcation of algebra
One aspect of the relation between geometry and algebra in Bombelli’s text
goes back to the Arabic sources. This is the justiﬁcation of algebraic rules
for solving quadratic equations by geometric diagrams. In §49, for example,
Bombelli justiﬁes a rule for squaring the sum of roots by drawing a square,
whose sides are the sum of those roots (see ﬁgure 7.2). The square is divided
into the square of the ﬁrst root (.g.e.), the square of the second (.c.e.) and the
two rectangles, each representing the product of the roots (.i.e. and .a.e.). The
mode of the explanation is so geometric that the congruence between the two
rectangles is established not by arithmetic commutativity, but by Theorem
II.4 of the Elements. Nevertheless, this geometric mood is complemented by
assigning numerical values to the lines, without which the diagram could not
speciﬁcally represent a sum of roots.
Similarly, many of the rules of Books I and II concerning operating on
binomials and solving equations receive (at least an attempted) geometric
justiﬁcation in Book IV. These diagrams are not new, and go back to Cardano,
the abbacists, Latin sources and Arabic sources. Quite a few of these diagrams
were included in the print edition of Books I and II. Geometry appears to be
a required footing for algebra to stand on.
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Fig. 7.2: [Bombelli (1929), §49]: geometric justiﬁcation of an arithmetic rule
Bombelli extends this geometric footing to speciﬁc algebraic problems im-
ported from the manuscript Book III as well. §75, for example, translates the
division of 20 scudi in two parts, such that 23 of the ﬁrst part equals
3
4 of the
second [Bombelli (155?), 17r], into the following geometric problem. Given a
line, divide it into two parts, such that if we take a portion of the ﬁrst part
according to the ratio between the given lines .a. and .b., and a portion of
the second according to the ratio between the given lines .c. and .d., then
the resulting portions turn out equal. The geometric solution that Bombelli
provides does not imitate the procedure of the algebraic solution from the
manuscript Book III, and its justiﬁcation depends not on arithmetic, but on
elementary proportion theory (Elements VI.12, which is not referenced ex-
plicitly here, but is referred to earlier in Book IV). The geometric analysis is
followed by supplementing the diagram with numerical data identical to those
in the problem from the manuscript Book III. The end result is of course the
same as well, but the intermediary numbers involved in the Book IV solu-
tion are diﬀerent from those in Book III, as the geometric solution is not a
replication of the algebraic moves. Geometry thus provides an independent
veriﬁcation for algebra.
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7.3.2 Geometric instantiations of algebra
If we go on to §78, however, we get another side of the story. The problem
here is to divide a line .a. in two parts, such that the rectangle made of one
part and the given line .b. equals the rectangle made of the other part and
the given line .c..
First we are presented with a properly geometric solution. On the left hand
part of ﬁgure 7.3 the line .d.f. equals .a., .d.g. equals .c. and .g.h. equals .b..
The lines .g.e. and .f.h. are parallel. Euclidean proportion theory guarantees
that .e. divides .d.f. in the required way. If we were to plug in the numerical
values from the original algebraic question into the diagram, and derive the
same result that we had obtained algebraically, we would obtain, as above, a
geometric veriﬁcation of the algebraic result.
Fig. 7.3: [Bombelli (1929), §78]: geometric justiﬁcation and geometric instan-
tiation
But Bombelli does not do that. Instead, Bombelli writes: “and since the rule
of algebra shows another solution for it, I didn’t want to hold back from
presenting it”.28 Bombelli’s next solution for the same problem depends on
the right hand part of Figure 7.3. Here .i.l. equals .a., .l.m. equals .c., and .l.p.
equals the sum of .b. (equal to .l.o.) and .c. (equal to .o.p.). Euclidean circle
28 “Et perche` la regola de l’algebra ne mostra un’altra dimostratione non ho voluto restare
di metterla”.
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theory (Elements III.35), interpreted by Bombelli as a means of implementing
division, yields that .l.n. equals .a. times .c. divided by the sum of .b. and .c..
Setting .k.l. equal to .l.n., claims Bombelli, obtains the desired partition of
the given line.
What is the justiﬁcation for this claim? Here Bombelli makes no geometric
attempt to show that the rectangle contained by .i.k. and .l.o. equals that
contained by .k.l. and .o.p.. What Bombelli actually did here is take the alge-
braic solution procedure from the corresponding problem in the manuscript
Book III [Bombelli (155?), 119r], and implement it geometrically. Reformu-
lating Bombelli’s solution anachronistically and replacing his numbers by the
letters a, b and c (but remaining faithful to his step by step reasoning), the al-
gebraic solution says that the parts are x and a−x, and since we require that
bx = c(a − x), our equation reduces to (b + c)x = ac, which yields x = acb+c .
The diagram simply applies Bombelli’s geometric mechanism for dividing ac
by b+ c to produce the result .l.n..
Instead of justifying the construction geometrically, Bombelli veriﬁes that
the constructed line represents the correct result by providing numerical values
for the lines. In the example above .a. is given the value 11, .b. is 6 and .c. is
4. Therefore .l.p. is 10, .l.n. is 11·410 (note that this is an arithmetic claim, and
not a claim immediately expressible in Euclidean terms!), and the resulting
parts are 4 25 and 6
3
5 . This result is explicitly veriﬁed to satisfy the terms of
the problem, namely, that multiplying the former part by .b. and the latter
by .c. yields equal results. But, I emphasise, there is no attempt here to argue
geometrically why the rectangle contained by .k.l. and .b. equals the rectangle
contained by .k.i. and .c.. If there is any justiﬁcation for this procedure, it is
to be found in the manuscript Book III algebraic solution (compounded by
the endorsement of intersecting chords as modelling division).
In fact, for the most part, Bombelli’s geometric solutions of problems im-
ported from Book III reproduce his algebraic constructions, rather than justify
them by an independent geometric procedure. In some cases the algebraic rule
is quoted explicitly, while in others only a reference to the relevant problem
of the manuscript Book III is included. If there are explanations added, these
are usually clariﬁcations as to how the geometric manipulations mimic the
algebraic procedure (e.g. end of §§94,95), and not geometric arguments for
the soundness of the solution.
This double gesture — justiﬁcation and instantiation — is not restricted
to problems imported from Book III, but occurs in the context of rules for
solving polynomial equations as well. In [Bombelli (1966), 195] and in the
manuscript §25, the solution of the quadratic is justiﬁed by the standard
diagram borrowed from Arabic sources (ﬁgure 7.4 left). But next to this well
known diagram appears a new diagram, which, as far as I can tell, is new to the
abbacist and the Latin contexts. This diagram geometrically constructs the
solution of the quadratic equation, rather than justify it. Indeed, if we write
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the equation anachronistically as x2 + bx = c, then the area .e.f. represents
the number c, and the side of the area .o. represents b2 . By the Pythagorean
theorem the line .i.e. is the root of the sum of .e.f. and .o. (
√(
b
2
)2
+ c).
Taking .i.p. equal to .i.e., and subtracting the side of .o. (which, recall, is
b
2 ), we obtain .p.g., which we can anachronistically write as the well known
solution formula − b2 +
√(
b
2
)2
+ c. I emphasize again: the left hand diagram
explains geometrically why the standard rule actually solves the equation;
the right hand diagram instantiates the rule by a geometric construction that
follows its arithmetic steps, but makes no attempt to justify the claim that it
is in fact the sought line.
Fig. 7.4: [Bombelli (1966), 195–196]: from geometric justiﬁcation to geometric
instantiation
7.3.3 Common geometric translation of distinct
algebraic entities
But to reduce Bombelli’s geometric representations to the distinct roles of
justiﬁcation and instantiation of algebra would be inattentive to the details.
In the sections dealing with the solution of cubics and quartics (§§32–48) the
geometric representations typically do not quite do either.
In the case of cubics, for example (a treatment adapted from Cardano),
the algebraic cube is represented by a geometric cube, and the various other
algebraic elements (numbers, Cose, squares) are represented by slabs added
to the cube or removed from it. When areas or volumes are said to equal or
cancel each other — unlike in the case of summing roots quoted above, and
in contrast with Cardano’s preferred practice — Bombelli’s argument does
not depend on Euclidean theorems, but on an arithmetic calculation of the
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sizes of the areas or volumes involved. Then, the transformations required to
solve the cubic (change of variable or completion to cube) are presented as
diﬀerent algebraic models for capturing the same geometric diagram. What
we have here is not a geometric construction instantiating the bottom line of
the algebraic solution, nor a justiﬁcation of algebra by a strictly geometric
argument, but a geometric diagram that binds diﬀerent algebraic expressions
by serving as their common translation — a geometric pivot that enables
superposing diﬀerent algebraic expressions on each other. For example, in
§31, the diagram serves to show that the solution of the equation ‘1 3 equals
6 1 +9’ equals the sum of the solution of ‘1
6
+8
1
3

equals 9’ and of 2 divided
by that solution; in §35 the diagram serves to show that the solution of the
equation ‘1 3 +6 2 equals 81’ is related to the solution of the equation ‘1 3
equals 12 1 +65’ by a shift of 2 (the text drags a silly scribal or calculation
error and has 64 for 65).29
An even more explicit expression of the role of geometric diagrams as pivots
binding diﬀerent algebraic expressions is provided in the sections dealing with
transforming quadratic equations. For example, in [Bombelli (1966), 204] the
equation ‘ 2 +6 1 equals 16’ is related to the equation ‘ 2 equals 6 1
+16’ not by algebraically substituting 6
1
1

for 1, but by showing that both
equations translate the same diagram of a rectangle of area 16 whose one side
is longer than the other by 6 — the diﬀerence lying in the side modeled as
1
. But this translation of algebraic language into geometry is useful precisely
because it is not one-to-one. Diﬀerent algebraic texts (the original and reduced
equations) are translated by the same geometric ﬁgure — only the parts of
the ﬁgure are modeled diﬀerently by each algebraic interpretation. The single
reference or translation for the two diﬀerent algebraic texts serves as a pivot
29 [Freguglia (1999)] also studies Bombelli’s geometric representations of solutions of alge-
braic equations. He states that for second and third degree equations Bombelli provides
geometric step-by-step justiﬁcations of the algebraic processes of solution as well as geo-
metric constructions of the solutions that do not justify the algebraic rule. For fourth de-
gree equations, Freguglia claims, Bombelli only provides a partial geometric justiﬁcation of
the algebraic solution process. But as far as I can see, this analysis is imprecise. For sec-
ond degree equations Bombelli provides a geometric justiﬁcation of the solution and then
a distinct geometric instantiation (see ﬁgure 7.4); for third degree equations he provides
a geometric translation of the original equation to a reduced one and a distinct geometric
accompaniment that constructs a solution independently of the algebraic procedure (see
below); and for fourth degree equations Bombelli provides only a geometric translation of
the original equation to a reduced one. Freguglia links Bombelli’s diﬀerent representation
strategies to the problem of homogeneity and of geometric representation of high powers of
the unknown. But my analysis of Bombelli’s treatment of homogeneity undermines this ex-
planation. In fact, Bombelli had the means to provide all kinds of geometric representations
to all relevant equations. His choices had more to do with complexity than with inherent
limitation of representation techniques.
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that identiﬁes the distinct algebraic equations beyond their formal diﬀerences,
and allows for seeing them as solving the same problem.
But there’s another way in which geometry can tie together diﬀerent al-
gebraic objects: it can serve as a common representation that bridges their
conceptual divisions. In §§38–42, for example, a single diagram accompanies
ﬁve diﬀerent reductions of equations of the form ‘cube, squares and Cose
equal number’ to simpler cubic equations. Each reduced form is of a diﬀerent
kind, in parallel to the treatment in Book II. The fact that a single diagram
manages to represent all cases weakens the organising principle structuring
Book II, which considers diﬀerent forms of cubic equations as distinct cases
that require separate treatment.
A similar impact is had by §44 and §45, which share the same diagram,
and where the latter, claims Bombelli, “is no diﬀerent from the former except
in that the square number .u. is added to the square .e.f., and in the other
subtracted”.30 That a common diagram can represent diﬀerent problems that
diﬀer by a sign renders these problems less obviously distinct. The point here
is not simply that a single ‘general’ diagram can represent several ‘speciﬁc’ al-
gebraic cases; the point here is that a single diagram can tie together algebraic
elements that are considered essentially diﬀerent (in the former example dif-
ferent kinds of cubic equations, in the latter addition and subtraction). Such
common geometric representations may have helped Bombelli (on top of the
exhaustion expressed explicitly in the conclusion of his Book II) to eventually
let go of treating separately all diﬀerent reductions of quartic equations and
of distinguishing all subtractive and additive changes of variable required for
these reductions.
Another instance of geometry bridging algebraic diﬀerences occurs in the
context of the principle setting irrational and rational numbers apart as dif-
fering in ‘nature’ [Bombelli (1966), 13]. Indeed, when Bombelli explains how
to geometrically extract a square root, he notes that it “doesn’t suﬀer the
diﬃculties that it suﬀers in numbers; because one will always ﬁnd the root of
any given line” (§19).31 Given that for Bombelli any quantity can be repre-
sented by a line, the division between numbers that have discrete roots and
those that do not becomes much less substantial.32
7.3.4 Geometric accompaniment of algebra
So far we saw that geometry sometime served as a justiﬁcation for algebra,
sometimes as instantiation of an algebraic solution procedure, and sometimes
30 “non e` diﬀerente da la prima se non in questo, che il quadrato numero .u. si aggiungeva
con il quadrato .e.f., et in questo si cava.”.
31 “il quale creatore non patisce le diﬁculta`, che pate nel numero; perche` sempre si trovera`
il creatore d’ogni preposta linea, essendo noto la comune misura”.
32 See [Wagner (2010)] for an overview of Bombelli’s division of numbers according to their
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as a translation or pivot tying together diﬀerent algebraic terms. But these
functions, which are not always easy to set apart, do not exhaust Bombelli’s
ways of relating algebra and geometry.
Problems §123–124, for example, both require to ﬁnd the point .c. equidis-
tant from .e. and .a. (left hand side of ﬁgure 7.5). The solution of §123 models
the line .b.c. as an unknown, and uses the Pythagorean theorem to derive a
quadratic equation for it. The solution in §124 uses the right hand diagram,
and constructs the solution geometrically, having nothing to do with the al-
gebra (the trick is to construct .k.c., an orthogonal bisector of .e.g., and use
the Pythagorean theorem). This independent geometric construction is not
accompanied by numerical values for verifying that it, too, would lead to the
same solution as the algebraic argument. It is simply there as a counterpoint,
accompanying the algebra, without any attempt to project it on the algebra
or tie them together (another example for a geometric accompaniment inde-
pendent from the algebraic solution is the construction of solutions to cubic
equations by means of lines, discussed in section 4.2 below).
Fig. 7.5: [Bombelli (1929), §§123–124]: independently accompanying algebraic
and geometric solutions of a geometric problem
In other cases the relation between geometry and algebra is weaker still. I’m
referring, for example, to the demonstration of rules for adding and subtract-
ing roots. While in ﬁgure 7.2 we saw one of these rules represented by a
partitioned square, the diagrams for the other rules (ﬁgure 7.6) are nothing
but disconnected lettered lines. Book III also has one of those odd diagrams,
where three lines of equal lengths marked .a., .b. and .c. accompany a Dio-
phantine problem (problem 140).
natures and of the undermining of this very division in his algebraic practice.
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Fig. 7.6: [Bombelli (1929), §51]: non-functional geometric diagram accompa-
nying an algebraic rule
These examples perhaps appear more odd than they should. The Euclidean
tradition insisted on drawing diagrams for all problems and theorems, even
arithmetic problems and theorems, and even those where the diagrams were
nothing but a bunch of independent lettered lines. Ian Mueller suggested
that in such cases “the diagram plays no real role” ... “except possibly as a
mnemonic device for ﬁxing the meaning of the letters” [Mueller (1981), 67].
Reviel Netz asserts that arithmetic diagrams “reﬂect a cultural assumption,
that mathematics ought to be accompanied by diagrams” [Netz (1999), 42].
To appreciate the role of diagrams in Bombelli’s text, we must not neglect
this tradition of diagrams, which are there to illustrate, not to argue.33
One more accident allows us to better appreciate the role of diagrams in
Bombelli’s work. In §72 the triangle .d.e.g. is given the numerical side lengths 1
for .d.e., 8 for .d.g. and 4 for .e.g.. These data contradict the triangle inequality,
as 1+ 4 < 8, and therefore cannot describe a genuine Euclidean triangle. But
since the geometric instantiation was not practiced as a faithful illustration of
the data (many other diagrams are disproportional compared to the numerical
data), Bombelli could go on with the example unhindered.
33 For an elaboration of this point see my Deleuzian analysis of classical Greek diagrams
[Wagner (2009b)].
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7.3.5 So what is the relation between algebra and
geometry?
If the multiplicity of relations between geometry and algebra documented
above appears confusing, it is probably because we take too much critical
distance. We must remember: algebra had already had its diagrams when it
came to Italy. The Latin tradition, as well as some abbacus treatises, retained
the geometric diagrams that accompanied the Arabic solution of quadratic
equations and led up to a geometric understanding of the solution of the cubic
equation. On the other hand, many abbacists set algebra and geometry apart,
and developed the former independently. When this maturing algebra came
across geometry again, it brought about an arithmetic understanding of some
of Euclid’s geometric books and algebraic solutions of geometric problems.
It is therefore not surprising that Bombelli, who inherited all these diﬀerent
traditions, came to piece geometry and algebra together in various diﬀerent
ways, and, according to his own quotation above, felt that algebra and ge-
ometry belonged together. This togetherness of algebra and geometry did not
depend on a unique, one-directional relation of justiﬁcation, instantiation,
translation or accompaniment. For people like Bombelli, it seems, algebra was
geometry’s younger — but not for all that entirely dependent — sister, and
these siblings were believed to play best when they were allowed to play to-
gether. Bombelli was intent on exploring and diversifying the playgrounds
available for the common games of geometry and algebra. For an author as
mathematically proﬁcient as Bombelli, this didn’t come at the expense of
rigour.34
7.4 The geometry of what’s not quite there
Bombelli’s algebra linearia becomes much more challenging when we consider
not only its various relations with algebra’s established entities, but also its
34 But that’s a very local interpretation. Seen from a wider epistemological-historic per-
spective, the conjunction of geometry and algebra may have had to do with more wide rang-
ing trends. For one, the regulated projection of one domain of signs on another is, drawing
on Kristeva, a semiotic technique for producing an eﬀect of truth (vraisemblance) since the
birth of the novel in the 15th century (see La productivite´ dite texte in [Kristeva (1969)]; for
how this theory works in a mathematical context see my [Wagner (2009a)]). Moreover, the
emphasis on geometrically observing algebra, rather than just symbolically writing it, can
be seen as related to the role of vision in the epistemology of early modern science. I don’t
pursue either direction here, because Bombelli does not provide enough textual evidence
to substantiate either interpretation. But Bombelli did not write in scientiﬁc isolation, and
the general trends of the period should not be ignored.
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original manner of representing more challenging algebraic objects whose ex-
istence or status was not yet properly settled. Here we can see the genuine
synergy inherent in the core of algebra linearia: its treatment of negative
entities, their roots, algebraic unknowns and their powers. A proper under-
standing of Bombelli’s approach and achievements depends on this hitherto
neglected aspect of his work. A careful study of this aspect will show us how
Bombelli’s bringing together of geometry and algebra generated new mathe-
matical practices, hybrid geometrico-algebraic entities, grounds for endorsing
questionable mathematical entities, and multiple ways of reading a given sign.
The ﬁrst subsection will deal with the geometric representation and en-
dorsement of negative magnitudes. The second subsection will deal with the
endorsement of expressions involving roots of negative numbers and with the
underlying implicit hypothesis of co-expressivity between algebra and geome-
try. The last two subsections will study the hybrid gemetrico-algebraic prac-
tices built around representations of unknown magnitudes, and the multiple
vision of geometric signs that these practices depended on.
7.4.1 The geometry of missing things
I argue in [Wagner (2010)] that the Renaissance meno cannot be properly
reduced to subtraction. But in the context of geometric representations of
algebra the subtraction interpretation seems more defensible, although not
entirely exhaustive. Cardano, for one, uses the term ‘add negatively’ for turn-
ing from addition to something between a subtraction and an addition of
negative geometric elements.35 Bombelli’s practice is similarly ambiguous.
When he says that some areas are meno, they can be, in that context (e.g.
§§26,27,46,47), interpreted as subtracted geometric magnitudes rather than
as added negative geometric magnitudes.
One of the most interesting points of ambiguity occurs around the diagram
reproduced in ﬁgure 7.7. Bombelli explains that “from the square .g.h.o. one
removes the square .r.o.s.” (where the latter is bigger than the former). “And
because we’re missing the gnomon .h.r.p.g. and we have the surface .f., it is
necessary that the said gnomon be equal to that surface”.36 It is clear that
Bombelli allows for the subtraction of a larger area from a smaller one, and
that the result is a “missing” area. But this missing area is positive, in as much
35 “addito per m˜.”, where m˜ is short for minus [Cardano (1968), e.g. 54,97]. Note that the
latter expression was revised in the later editions of the book so as to use unambiguous
subtraction talk.
36 “del quadro .g.h.o. si levi il quadro .r.o.s.” ... “E perche` ci manca il gnomone .h.r.p.g.
et habbiamo la superﬁcie .f., di necessita` bisogna che il detto gnomone sia pari ad essa
superﬁcie” [Bombelli (1966), 202–203].
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as it can be compared to another positive area. Here geometric representation
turns what’s missing into something present. By way of a similar geometric
treatment, the absence or presence of the gnomon becomes a relative position,
rather than an ontological characteristic of a geometric element. Again we
witness the role of diagrams as pivots, translating diﬀerent arithmetic entities
into a common referent.37
Fig. 7.7: [Bombelli (1966), 203]: subtracting a larger area from a smaller one
7.4.2 The geometry of sophistic things
The ﬁrst appearance of roots of negative numbers in Book II occurs in the
context of quadratics. A solution involving a root of a negative number is pre-
sented on a par with another “sophistic method”,38 that of simply replacing
the impossible subtraction in the solution rule by an addition.39 A few pages
37 This representation should be contrasted with Cardano’s diagram illustrating a situation
where 40 were to be subtracted from 25, if one applied the usual solution rule to the
quadratic equation ‘square plus 40 equals 10 things’. There, all that the diagram shows is
a square of area 25 built on half a line of length 10 [Cardano (1968), Ch. 37].
38 “modo soﬁstico” [Bombelli (1966), 201].
39 This approach might be explained by the work of Marco Aurel, who taught and pub-
lished in Valencia. In his Despertador de ingenios, Libro Primero de Arithmetica Algebrat-
ica (1552), he oﬀers as solution to the irreducible case of x2+c = bx the negative counterpart
of Bombelli’s “sophistic” suggestion, namely − b
2
−
√
b2
4
+ c (this is, of course, anachronistic
notation). If one postulates that the product of two isolated negative numbers is negative
(a postulate that Bombelli took up in his manuscript; see my [Wagner (2010)]), one indeed
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later, in the context of the bi-quadratic without real solutions, solutions in-
volving roots of negatives are not mentioned at all, not even under the mark
sophistry. It is simply claimed that “such case could not be solved because it
concerns the impossible”.40
But when we turn to cubic equations, Bombelli’s approach is very diﬀerent.
The context here is equations of the kind ‘Cube equals Tanti and number’.
Applying Dal Ferro’s and Tartaglia’s solution rule for some instances of such
equations — Cardano’s so called irreducible case — yields an expression in-
volving roots of negative numbers. Bombelli’s most renowned achievement is
his endorsement and analysis of such solutions. In the manuscript, Bombelli
justiﬁes his approach on pragmatic grounds: such solutions arise from the
same rule that worked in the reducible cases, and Bombelli can often enough
transform them into correct real solutions [Bombelli (155?), 72v]. Bombelli’s
prime example (in anachronistic notation) is the equation x3 = 15x+4, whose
solution, according to the received solution rule and Bombelli’s method for
extracting cubic roots of binomials, is
(
2 +
√−121)1/3 + (2−√−121)1/3 =(
2 +
√−1)+ (2−√−1) = 4. But the derivation of correct real solutions can-
not alone account for Bombelli’s endorsement of solutions involving roots of
negative numbers, because a few pages further on such a solution is endorsed,
even though Bombelli can’t rewrite it as a real solution [Bombelli (155?),
76v].41
By the time the print edition was ready, Bombelli could provide another
reason for endorsing solutions for cubic equations that involve roots of negative
numbers. He explains: “and although to many this thing will seem eccentric
— for I too was of this opinion some time ago, having the impression that
it should be more sophistic than true — nevertheless I sought until I found
the demonstration, which will be written down below, that indeed this can
be shown in lines, that moreover in these operations it works without any
diﬃculty, and often enough one ﬁnds the value of the Tanto as number”.42
obtains a correct solution (this observation is derived from a talk by Fa`tima Romero Vall-
honesta delivered at the PASR conference in Ghent on August 27, 2009). Bombelli’s refer-
ence to this way of solving quadratic equations, as well as his manuscript reference to the
negative result of the product of isolated negative numbers, might suggest that the “certain
spaniard” (“certo spagnuolo”) mentioned among Bombelli’s sources in his introduction was
not the Portuguese Pedro Nun˜ez, as asserted by Bortolotti, but in fact Marco Aurel.
40 “Ma se non si potra` cavare il numero del quadrato della meta` delle potenze, tal capitolo
non si potra` agguagliare per trattarsi dell’impossibile” [Bombelli (1966), 207].
41 In contemporary terms the solution is
(
3 +
√−720)1/3+(3−√−720)1/3−3. Bombelli’s
techniques do not allow him to simplify the cubic root in this expression.
42 “Et benche` a molti parera` questa cosa stravagante, perche` di questa opinione fui ancho
gia` un tempo, parendomi piu` tosto fosse soﬁstica che vera, nondimeno tanto cercai che
trovai la dimostratione, la quale sara` qui sotto notata, s`ı che questa ancora si puo` mostrare
in linea, che pur nelle operationi serve senza diﬃcultade alcuna, et assai volte si trova la
valuta del Tanto per numero” [Bombelli (1966), 225].
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But what exactly is this demonstration “in lines”? Bombelli’s argument is
as follows. First Bombelli shows that if one has a sum of cubic roots of the
anachronistic form
(
a+
√−b)1/3+(a−√−b)1/3, then a cubic equation can be
constructed, which, given the received solution rule, would produce that sum
as its solution [Bombelli (1966), 226]. Then Bombelli shows geometrically that
such cubic equations must have solutions [Bombelli (1966), 227–228]. Since he
can show that the questionable algebraic expression solves an equation, and
since, moreover, he can draw a solution for that same equation geometrically,
Bombelli concludes that the geometrically found “length of the Tanto will
also be the length of” the sum of “the two cubic roots above”.43 Bombelli
concludes that the algebraic solution of the equation must coincide with the
geometric construction, and that the latter therefore validates the former.
This argument, however, is not without its diﬃculties. The ﬁrst diﬃculty
is one that is explicitly addressed by Bombelli. Indeed, Bombelli’s geometric
solution is a planar construction, which, given a segment and an area repre-
senting the coeﬃcients of the equation, a unit measure, and two right angled
rulers, yields a segment representing the solution. Bombelli rejects possible
objections to the use of right angled rulers by noting that a planar solution
to a solid problem must use advanced tools44 and by relying on the authority
of no less than Plato and Archytas.
A second diﬃculty, which Bombelli fails to address, concerns the conditions
of viability of the geometric construction. The solid diagram for solving cubic
equations [Bombelli (1966), 226], derived from the one introduced by Car-
dano, fails to solve the irreducible case, as Bombelli and Cardano explicitly
note. The novelty in Bombelli’s planar diagram is precisely that it circumvents
this diﬃculty. However, Bombelli makes no eﬀort to show that his diagram is
indeed constructible for all possible coeﬃcients of the relevant kind of cubic
equation. This is all the more unsettling, as the next kind of cubic equa-
tion that Bombelli treats does not always have a positive solution, but while
Bombelli is well aware of this fact, and provides a precise arithmetic solvabil-
ity condition [Bombelli (1966), 231], he makes no attempt to point out the
geometric obstruction restricting his construction. Bombelli does not raise the
question of whether his former geometric construction is or is not restricted
by obstructions, and leaves his claim of general solvability without critical
examination.
There’s a further diﬃculty that Bombelli fails to address, which concerns
the correspondence between the arithmetic and geometric representations of
the solution. Bombelli is well aware of negative solutions of cubic equations.
He uses such solutions to derive positive solutions of other equations, and
43 “e trovata che si havera` la longhezza del Tanto sara` ancora la longhezza delle due R.c.
legate proposte” [Bombelli (1966), 226].
44 See [Bos (2001), Ch.3–4] for the context of such an argument.
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sometimes even considers them independently.45 But Bombelli never explicitly
raises the possibility that his questionable sum of cubic roots might capture
a negative solution, rather than the positive solution that he constructed
geometrically.
Bombelli is obviously eager to make his solution for the cubic acceptable.
To that end he is willing to use questionable construction methods, avoid
dealing with the viability conditions of his diagrams, and suppress negative
solutions. But most important here is that on top of all that Bombelli takes
another crucial step on this already shaky ledge. Bombelli uses his argument
above to endorse an algebraic entity, which his geometric construction does
not actually draw. Nowhere does the diagram pick up roots of negative num-
bers, either directly or inside the cubic root of a binomial. In the language
we introduced above, the geometric construction accompanies the algebraic
solution, rather than justify, instantiate or even translate it. The diagram
does indeed construct a line satisfying the terms of the equation, but its con-
struction has nothing to do with the algebraic rule of solution and its roots of
negative numbers. The speculation that the algebraic solution is identical to
the line constructed in the diagram is snuck in through the back door without
an explicit account.
The relation between geometry and algebra here can be qualiﬁed in a ﬁner
manner, if we observe Bombelli’s remark that a certain cubic equation allowed
him to trisect an angle, and that this fact led him to keep attempting (in
vain) to transform that equation into one that he could solve without roots
of negative numbers. His conclusion was that “it is impossible to ﬁnd such
general rule” for solving cubics without roots of negatives.46 The point here
is the tension that Bombelli expresses between being able to draw a solution
and not being able to write it down in traditional arithmetic terms. This
tension is something that Bombelli ﬁnds so hard to sustain, that he concludes
by allowing an expression involving roots of negative numbers as an algebraic
representation of the geometric solution. Recall, in contrast, that in the case of
quadratic equations, where solutions involving roots of negative numbers could
not be drawn geometrically or reduced to veriﬁable real solutions, Bombelli
rejected them as sophistry. Bombelli’s underlying conviction thus reveals itself:
45 See [Wagner (2010)] for details.
46 “S`ı che (quanto al mio giuditio) tengo impossibile ritrovarsi tal regola generale”
[Bombelli (1966), 245]. The discussion probably refers to §135 of Book V, where the trisec-
tion of an angle for the construction of a regular nine-gon is reduced to a cubic equation.
This is not the same cubic equation as cited in Book II, and there’s no attempt in Book
V to solve this cubic equation with or without roots of negative numbers, but we must re-
call that Book V is the least complete among the books of L’algebra. Note also that this
algebraic-geometric reﬂection, unlike the one concerning the general plane geometric so-
lution of ‘Cube equals Tanti and number’, was already present in Bombelli’s manuscript
[Bombelli (155?), 88r], and may have therefore factored into his original endorsement of so-
lutions involving roots of negative numbers.
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if you can draw it, you should be able to express it algebraically, even if the
expression looks like gibberish. To put it into a catch phrase: ‘What you see
is what you say’.
If we are to understand Bombelli’s articulation of the algebra-geometry
nexus, we should acknowledge the intimacy granted here to algebra and ge-
ometry. It’s not just about justiﬁcation, instantiation, translation or accom-
paniment. It’s not just about two strata of expression interacting with each
other in order to bring the best out of both. It’s about a deeply underlying
assumption of co-expressivity: what’s expressible in the one domain, should be
expressible in the other. Geometric visibility does not only guarantee reality,
it should also guarantee algebraic expressibility. Without such underlying as-
sumption, Bombelli’s argument above would not have forced him to integrate
roots of negative numbers into his mathematics.
The logic that short-circuits visibility and expressibility is, of course, an
issue that deserves an independent tracking across the history of science. But
here we’ll restrict ourselves only to validating that it works in both directions.
The other direction of the principle that ‘what you see is what you say’ is
the principle that what you say should be visible as well. According to this
principle algebraic unknowns should be expressible geometrically. And this is
where we’re turning next.
7.4.3 The geometry of the unknown: the rule of three
Geometric modelling of unknown magnitudes is not new. The very diagrams
that since Al-Khwarizmi accompanied the solution of the quadratic equation
did just that. The unknown line was represented by an arbitrary line, and so
were lines representing known magnitudes, without necessarily respecting the
proportions between the eventual value of the unknown and the given known
values. But Bombelli is interested in doing better than that.
Let’s go back to ﬁgure 7.4. The left hand side is the typical diagram trace-
able to Arabic sources, where .a.b. is the unknown line and .b.g. is a known
line. The right hand side of the diagram, as explained above, is not another
justiﬁcation of the algebraic solution, but a geometric instantiation of the
solution rule. The unknown square .a.b.d. (standing for the square of the un-
known) and rectangle .d.b.c. (standing for the known coeﬃcient .b.c. times
the unknown) are to be equated to the known .f.g.e. (a number). The con-
struction derives .p.g. as the value of the unknown. Since this is obviously
disproportional with respect to .a.b., the previous representation of the un-
known, Bombelli redraws the right hand side of the right hand diagram as the
rectangle .r.s.t.
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This strategy is not typical of the tradition, nor is it typical of Bombelli.
It stands out more as an expression of a problem than as a way of dealing
with it. When including known and unknown lines in the same diagram, and
then using the known lines to derive a representation of the unknown, the
unknown can no longer be drawn arbitrarily. Bombelli is concerned with this
problem and attempts to derive a more satisfactory form of representation.
Bombelli’s alternative representation is as ingenious as it is simple, and the
fact that it was not systematically replicated (as far as I know) was, I feel, a
genuine loss to techniques of mathematical representation. One of the most
interesting examples occurs in ﬁgure 7.8. This geometric problem is presented
by Bombelli as an analogue of Problem 41 from the manuscript Book III,
which reads: “Two people have money, and ﬁnd a purse in which there was as
much money as the ﬁrst person had, and this ﬁrst person says to the other:
if I had the purse, and 13 of yours, and 2 more, I would have twice as much
as your remainder. The second says: if I had the purse, by giving you 4 of
mine, I would have two times and a half as much as you. One asks how much
money was in the purse and how much each of them had”.47 In the geometric
version of Book IV §86, the money of each person is replaced by an unknown
line, 13 is replaced by the ratio between the lines .a. and .b., and 2 and 4 are
replaced by the lines .c. and .e. respectively.
Fig. 7.8: [Bombelli (1929), §86]: adding known and unknown lines
47 “Due hanno denari, et trovano una borsa ne la quale era tanti denari quanti haveva il
primo, et dice esso primo a` l’altro: se io havessi la borsa con 1
3
de tuoi, et 2 pu`ı,” [sic] “io
haveria duo tanti del tuo rimanente. Dice il secondo: se io havessi la borsa, con il dare a
te 4 de miei, io haverei due volte et mezzo quanto te. Si domanda quanti denari era ne la
borsa et haveva ciascuno da se” [Bombelli (155?), 122r].
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The solution begins by selecting a line .f.g. “as one wishes, which would play
the role that the cosa plays for numbers”,48 and which stands for the second
person’s original money (note that Bombelli mentions the algebraic version
only after the geometric statement and solution are concluded; I conﬂate the
two problems to bring out the analogy and make things easier to follow). But
Bombelli warns that “the unknown lines can never be added or subtracted
from the known”.49 And so in ﬁgure 7.8, when .f.g. is rescaled according to the
given ratio .a. : .b. to form .f.k., and then the known .c. is subtracted from the
remainder .k.g. (this represents taking 13 of the second person’s money and 2
more), .f.k. (the result of the rescaling) is drawn on .f.g., but the subtracted
.l. (which equals the known .c.) is drawn separately. If one continues the
geometric modelling of the protagonists’ manipulations and wades through
their geometric representations,50 one eventually obtains that the unknown
.d. minus .y. is to equal the known .z. plus .ψ.
Only at this point does Bombelli bring known and unknown lines into
contact via the bottom part of the diagram. On the ‘unknown axis’ (this
is not Bombelli’s term) we draw .B.D. equal to the diﬀerence between the
unknown .d. and .y., and .B.E. equal to our original unknown .f.g.. On the
‘known axis’ we draw .B.C. equal to the sum of .z. and .ψ.. Now, as .B.C.
is supposed to equal .B.D., drawing the parallel lines .D.C. and .E.F. yields
.B.F., which, according to Euclidean proportion theory, is the sought value of
the unknown .f.g..
Bombelli does not justify his procedure here, because he has already done
so earlier, in §73, where this rescaling technique was explicitly related to the
rule “of three”.51 In the context of this example, the rule of three applies as
follows. After the geometric construction is concluded, Bombelli assigns to the
known lines the original numerical values from Book III, and to the unknown
48 “Pigliasi una linea a beneplacito la quale fara` l’eﬀetto che fa la cosa nel numero”.
49 “Et notasi, che mai le linee incerte, non si possano aggiungere ne` cavare con le certe”.
50 This goes as follows. The diﬀerence between .k.g. and .l. corresponds to the second
person’s remainder in the ﬁrst person’s narrative. To retrieve what the ﬁrst person originally
had according to his narrative, double the latter to produce the diﬀerence between the
unknown .m. an the known .n., subtract from the latter the unknown .f.k. and the known .c.
to get the diﬀerence between the unknown .o. and known .p., and then divide in half to get
the diﬀerence between the unknown .q. and known .r.. Now that we have a representation
of the ﬁrst person’s original money, we follow the second person’s narrative. We add to the
latter the known .e. to get the sum of the unknown .u. and the known .x., which corresponds
to the ﬁrst person’s money at the end of the second person’s narrative. Rescaling by the
ratio of 5 : 2 we get the sum of the unknown .y. and the known .z., which corresponds to the
second person’s money at the end of his own narrative. According to that narrative, this
sum must also correspond to the result of adding .f.g. to .q. minus .r. (represented as the
unknown .t. minus the known .s.) and then removing the known .e.. This ﬁnal magnitude is
represented by the unknown .d. minus the known .ψ.. The bottom line is that the unknown
.y. and known .z. equal the unknown .d. minus the known .ψ..
51 “la regola della proportione chiamata del tre”.
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line .B.E.=.f.g. he assigns the tentative numerical value 3. Then, following
the steps of the geometric construction, .B.D. ends up being 34 and .B.C. ends
up as 912 . Now, since
3
4 (.B.D.) is actually supposed to stand for 9
1
2 (.B.C.),
then, according to the rule of three, .B.E. is actually supposed to stand for
3·9 12
3
4
= 38, which is the length of .B.F..
Just as the arbitrary numerical choice 3 was a place holder for the correct
solution 38, so is the line .B.E.=.f.g. a place holder for to correct solution .B.F..
The number 3 didn’t simply stand for itself, and neither did the line .f.g.. This
form of representation enables a line to stand for its possible rescaling with
respect to other given lines. As long as we keep the known magnitudes and
unknown magnitudes along diﬀerent ‘axes’ or ‘dimensions’, there’s no risk of
error. The point is that just as the rule of three (as I argue in [Wagner (2010)])
evolved into an abbacist practice of seeing numbers as other numbers, here
we learn to see lines as other lines.
The double vision required to understand the diagram extends to the side-
by-side setting of known and unknown lines in the upper part of the diagram.
The two scales are confronted, but not confused. And this separation occurs
in the numerical instantiation that follows the geometric construction as well.
Given the numerical values he assigns, Bombelli obtains that .t. minus .s. is
“4 12 meno 3”, but this is never interpreted as 1
1
2 , because 4
1
2 is our place
holder for an unknown magnitude, while 3 is a known magnitude. Indeed, the
equivalent term in the algebraic solution of Book III is 112
1
 − 3 (recall that
.f.g., which stands for the unknown, was assigned the value 3 in the arithmeti-
cal veriﬁcation of the geometric version of this problem, and so 112
1
 = 4 12 ).
Moreover, in §85, solved by a similar technique, a certain diﬀerence is recon-
structed as “2 meno 3”, but this diﬀerence is not marked as negative, as the
2 is a place holder for an unknown magnitude. Indeed, in the diagram, the
lines representing this diﬀerence have a positive diﬀerence, as is the case if we
substitute the ﬁnal result for these lines.
The bottom line of this geometric representation technique is that one is
trained in seeing lines as tentative place holders and as representing more
than their visible lengths, not only with respect to a rescaling of the entire
diagram (as is already the case in Euclidean diagrams), but also relative to
other lines in the same diagram. What you get is more than what you see.
Lines belong to various systems of relations with respect to other lines, and
these relations are invisible for an eye not trained in this hybrid practice of
algebra in lines.
The confrontation of known and unknown lines described above starts as
reproducing cossist algebra, but then ends up as a geometric representation
of the rule of three. Similarly, §§119–120 juxtapose in the context of the same
problem cossist algebra, geometric rescaling and a quadratic version of the rule
of three (where rescaling a given magnitude by a certain factor rescales another
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magnitude by that factor squared; here this applies to the relation between the
side of a triangle and its area). While in terms of arithmetic/algebraic practice
the rule of three and linear cossist algebra are distinguishable, Bombelli’s
geometric representation makes it diﬃcult to set them apart. This technique
of representation serves as a common reference that helps bind the rule of
three with algebra, and may have contributed to the eventual absorption of
the older practice into the newer one.
7.4.4 The geometry of the unknown: cosa
But another step is required if one is to render cossist algebra geometrically
visible. According to one interpretation, geometric representations of powers
of the cosa were restricted to the line-square-cube scale. Beyond that, algebra
was not geometrcially instantiated.52 However, as we saw above, not only
is Bombelli willing to represent higher algebraic powers by lower geometric
dimensions, he also has the technique to rigorously reduce higher geometric
dimensions to lines. This is combined explicitly in §21, where an elegant spiral-
like diagram starts from a unit segment and reconstructs each power of the
cosa as the geometric mean between the previous power and the next.
The geometric representation of higher powers in Books IV and V of
L’algebra is treated in several ways. The ﬁrst treatment occurs in the con-
text of geometric translations of algebraic solutions of polynomial equations,
following the Arabic sources and Cardano’s diagrams discussed above (see
Subsection 7.3.3). In this treatment higher powers of the cosa correspond
to higher geometric dimensions. The second treatment concerns ‘arithmetic
geometry’, where geometric problems are presented in terms of numerical
line lengths. There the unknown line is modeled as cosa, and the geometric
situation is expressed by an algebraic problem, which is then solved using
algebraic rules. This was an abbacist practice whose state of the art exposi-
tion belongs to Piero della Francesca (Bombelli’s innovation here is restricted
to the often included geometric instantiation of the algebraic solution, see
Subsection 7.3.2).
But Bombelli’s third geometric treatment of cosa powers, however rare, is
the most interesting. The four problems §§102,104,122 and 131 go beyond the
two forms of geometric treatment mentioned in the previous paragraph. These
geometric problems are analysed without recourse to speciﬁc numerical values,
they model higher powers of cosa as lines, and they manage to provide not
52 See, for example, [della Francesca (1970), 91], where Piero makes this comparison explicit
for the ﬁrst three powers of the cosa, reconstructs the fourth power as “two squares” (“doi
quadrati”), but then neglects a further geometrisation of the higher powers that he names
and deﬁnes.
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only a geometric instantiation of the algebraic solution, but also a geometric
representation of the equations themselves and of their algebraic reduction to
a canonical form. This modeling technique requires a delicate and specialized
way of seeing.
Let’s have a close look at §102.53 The problem asks for three lines, which
are represented in ﬁgure 7.9 as follows. The unknown .d. is the ﬁrst line sought
by the problem. .e. is twice .d., and together with .f., which equals the given
.a., constitutes the second line sought by the problem. The third line sought
by the problem is such that Rect(third line, .b.)54 (where .b. is given) equals
the rectangle formed by the previous two lines, namely Rect(.d., .e. plus .f.).
Finally, the ratio between .d. and the sum of all three sought lines should
equal the ratio between the given .c. and .G.C..
Fig. 7.9: [Bombelli (1929), §102]: multiplying known and unknown lines
To make things easier to handle, Bombelli represents the unknown .d. as
equal in length to the known .b. This choice is possible because .d. and .b.
53 §104 starts with the same approach, but then skips directly to a geometric instantiation
of the algebraic solution. §§122 and 131 have blank spaces for diagrams in the manuscript,
and the missing diagrams are diﬃcult to reconstruct from the text.
54 By ‘Rect(line1, line2)’ I refer to the rectangle built from the two lines. This is not
Bombelli’s notation, and I use it here to make things easier to follow. The same goes for
the ‘Sum(line1, line2, ...)’ and ‘line1:line2’ notations.
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belong to diﬀerent scales — unknown and known lines. That they appear to be
equal doesn’t commit us to assume that they actually are. As long as they’re
kept apart, any choice is as good as any other. Now that .b. equals .d. “in
length”,55 the third line required above (such that Rect(third line, .b.) equals
Rect(.e. plus .f., .d.)) is equal “in length” to .e. plus .f., and is represented
by .g. plus .h.. But Rect(.g. plus .h., .b.) must equal Rect(.e. plus .f., .d.)
not only in area but also in scale. Since .e. and .d. are of the scale of the
unknown (corresponding to the algebraic cosa), and .f. and .b. are known
(corresponding to numbers), .g. must be scaled like the second power of the
unknown (algebraic censo), and .h. must be of the scale of the unknown (cosa).
This way both rectangles are sums of censi and cose. In the corresponding
algebraic problem 92 of the manuscript Book III [Bombelli (155?), 134v], the
line .d. is modeled as 1, .e. plus .f. as 2 1 +4 and .g. plus .h. as 2 2 +4 1 (.b.
has no explicit algebraic equivalent, and serves as the geometric unit measure).
We can already see the multiple vision, a geometrico-algebraic hybrid,
required to understand the relations between lines in this diagram. Now
let’s see how things are put together. Recall that the problem requires
that the ratio .d.:Sum(.d., .e. plus .f., .g. plus .h.) equal the known ra-
tio .c.:.G.C.. In problem 92 of Book III The ratio .c.:.G.C. is modeled as
20 : 300, and the ratio .d.:Sum(.d., .e. plus .f., .g. plus .h.) as 1 : 2 2
+7 1 +4. This translates to an equality between Rect(.d., .C.G.) and
Rect(.c., Sum(.d., .e. plus .f., .g. plus .h.)). The former rectangle is the bot-
tom rectangle of the diagram, where .G.y. equals the unknown .d.. The lat-
ter rectangle is the middle one in the diagram, where .o.i. equals the given
.c., .o.q. equals the censi .g., .q.s. equals the cose .d., .e. and .h., and .s.t.
equals the known .f.. In the algebraic version of Book III the equation of
the rectangles is mirrored by the cross multiplication yielding the equation
40 2 +140 1 +80 = 300 1.
Now the task is to compare the two rectangles, balancing at the same time
their areas and scales. Bombelli’s trick here is elementary as it is ingeniously
elegant. Both rectangles are rescaled according to the known ratio between
.b. and .c.. But the middle rectangle is rescaled along the known vertical
dimension, reducing its height from .o.i. to .o.n., whereas the lower rectangle
is rescaled along the known horizontal dimension, reducing its length from
.G.C. to .G.D.. Now both rectangles have the same height in terms of length
(but not in terms of scale). The middle rectangle is divided into censi, cose
and known areas, whereas the bottom rectangle is strictly cose. Note that this
normalisation move does not have an algebraic equivalent in the solution of
the algebraic version in Book III. As with the choice of .d. equal in length to
.b., it is a geometric artefact of the geometrico-algebraic hybrid.
55 “in lunghezza”
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Since the middle rectangle includes the cose rectangle .q.s.l., which is of the
same scale as the lower rectangle, this can be subtracted from both rectangles,
leaving the rectangles .o.q.n. and .s.t.x. in the middle and .E.G.y. below.
This manoeuvre reﬂects the subtraction of cose terms from both sides of the
algebraic equation to obtain an equation of the form censi and numbers equal
cose. The resulting equation in problem 92 of Book III is 40 2 +80 = 160 1.
The last normalization step is to reduce the censi to a single square. Alge-
braically this is the division of the quadratic equation by its leading coeﬃcient,
40. Geometrically this is the rescaling of all rectangles so that .o.q.n. becomes
a square, that is, rescaling by the ratio .b.:.o.q., which, due to the represen-
tation of .b. as equal to .d. and the equality between .o.q. and twice .d., is
exactly 12 . Note that the extra geometric rescaling and the choice of .b. for the
role of geometric unit measure led to a diﬀerence between the geometric and
algebraic rescaling: in the algebraic model we rescale once by a factor of 140 ,
whereas in the geometric model we ﬁrst rescaled along one dimension by the
ratio of .b.:.c. ( 120 ) and then along the other dimension by the ratio of .b.:.d.
( 12 ). The resulting equation is 1
2
 +2 = 4 1
We are ﬁnally in a situation where the single censo .n.p.o. plus the known
.s.l.u. equal the cose .F.G.y.. This is a normalized equation, and can be treated
geometrically as in the left hand side of ﬁgure 7.4 above. But Bombelli skips
directly to the geometric instantiation of the solution rule as in the right
hand side of ﬁgure 7.4. He draws the known .ψ.y., half the coeﬃcient of the
cose (2 in the algebraic equation), ﬁnds u.x., the root of the known rectangle
.s.l.u. (
√
2 in the algebraic equation), and then copies it as .ψ.z. to form the
right angle triangle .y.ψ.z.. Now .y.z. is the root of the diﬀerence between the
squares of .ψ.z. and .ψ.y. (
√
22 − 2), which is copied as .y.m.. Finally this root
is added to the known .ψ.y.. The end result is .ψ.m. (2+
√
22 − 2), the sought
value of the original unknown .d..
It is, however, crucial to note that despite the analogies with the algebraic
model, the geometric treatment includes no assignment of arithmetic values to
line lengths. The solution is algebraico-geometric, but strictly non-arithmetic.
The point of pursuing this last example in such detail is of course to bring
out the multiple vision of lines according to their lengths and scales that’s
required to pursue Bombelli’s diagrams correctly on the arithmetic, algebraic
and geometric levels. I made a point of highlighting the shifts that algebraic
practice undergoes when Bombelli translates it into a geometrico-algebraic
hybrid. It is this multiple, co-expressive, but not entirely congruent vision
of several mathematical strata, which renders Bombelli such an insightful
mathematician.
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7.5 Conclusion
Together with a recognition of the hybridisation of algebraic and geometric
points of view in the above diagrams, it is important to appreciate the mul-
tiplicity and deferral inherent in each of the two perspectives of this double
vision. In subsection 7.4.3 we saw that a segment/number may not stand for
its length/value, but as a place holder for another; in subsection 7.4.4 we saw
that a line may carry a scale or dimension that turns its apparent relation
to other lines problematic, but not for all that meaningless (recall that scale-
independent equality of lengths and areas did play an important role in the
last solution above); in subsection 7.2.2 we saw that a line can be seen a an
implicit rectangle whose other side is a unit measure, and that the geometric
unit role can be played by any line, but this is no longer the case where arith-
metic values are imposed on lines. All this is compounded by the sine qua non
of algebra: that the unknown stand by deﬁnition for a deferred value.
Interesting as they are, Bombelli’s inventive geometric representations are
a minor and isolated strategy. I do not mean to say that they have never been
repeated by later mathematicians; I mean that they have been used locally,
sketchily, heuristically and without a rigorous articulation. The canonical co-
representation of algebra and geometry is the one emanating from Descartes:
instead of Bombelli’s single unknown line that can take the place of various
diﬀerent values and be interpreted as belonging to various diﬀerent scales,
Descartes’ successors draw all possible lines together, so to speak side by side.
To put this last claim more clearly, note that in Bombelli’s representation
each side of the equation 40 2 +140 1 +80 = 300 1 is represented by two
rectangles, whose scales are yet to be determined, and therefore stand for a
range of possible values. In the post-Cartesian representation, however, each of
the vertical lines that cover the space between the curve y = 40x2+140x+80
and the x-axis captures one possible value of the term 40x2 +140x+80, each
of the vertical lines that cover the space between the curve y = 300x and
the x-axis captures one possible value of the term 300x, and the intersection
of the curves captures the one value of x for which the former is equal to
the latter. Instead of representing arbitrarily the desired length and deferring
the determination of its scale, we post-Cartesians put the inﬁnity of possible
representations side by side, and extract the one that’s required. With the
post-Cartesian representation, multiple vision is disambiguated. Instead of
seeing one thing as many, we review all possibilities at a glance.
The transition from Bombelli’s representation technique to the post-Cartesian
one, which dominated early modern mathematics, can perhaps be situated in
a more general context: the production of modern techniques for exhaustive
representation and observation rather than a representation through a token
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instance.56 But the view of many underdetermined things under one sign is
not for all that abandoned. When one extends one’s scope, one can recognise
that the pair of post-Cartesian curves above may contract the representation
of many diﬀerent empirical phenomena; that it may serve as a token for a gen-
eral technique rather than a speciﬁc example; that it may be read as hiding
several compressed dimensions (the x can always be reinterpreted, for exam-
ple, as a projection of two independent variables onto their sum). The story
of mathematical representation is a story played with hybrids, contractions
and disambiguations. The range of hybridizations and contractions is never
conﬁned or charted in advance, and the disambiguation is never entirely ex-
haustive.
The transition from Bombelli’s algebra linearia to post-Cartesian analytic
geometry is also a process of normalising the relations between geometry and
algebra. Whereas Bombelli simultaneously built on several traditions of rep-
resentations (Greek, Arabic, Latin and abbacist), and observed relations of
justiﬁcation, instantiation, translation and accompaniment (which were mixed
far more casually than this crude division suggests), the following centuries
tended toward a more foundational approach. Rigorous practices were devel-
oped that tried to impose a single, well regimented set of relations between
algebra and geometry. Not that foundational attempts ever suppressed the
practice of plural relations between algebras and geometries, but they often
suppressed an explicit account of these multiple relations, as well as the id-
iosyncratic residues that the isomorphisms constructed to reduce one to the
other kept leaving behind.
Why is this important for historians of mathematics? When 19th and most
20th century historians considered Greek mathematics, all they could see was
geometric algebra — geometry was conceived of as a technique for representing
(perhaps even concealing) algebraic knowledge. This view was so thoroughly
entrenched that historians who reacted against it had to dislodge not only the
claim that classical Greek geometry was a coded algebra, but also the weaker
claim that Greek geometry contained traces of algebraic thinking. Some of the
arguments used to establish such claims show that if one allows some traces of
algebra into our interpretation of Greek geometry, one will end up algebraising
one’s interpretation to an extent that eﬀectively recreates geometric algebra.57
But historians should be careful of extending such arguments beyond their in-
tended scope. Outside the classical Greek framework (and occasionally at its
boundaries) geometry can be algebraic to various diﬀerent extents without
56 I’m referring here to recent work by Lorraine Daston presented in her talk at the History
of Science Society meeting in Pittsburgh in 2008, but the connection I’m making is yet to
be historically validated.
57 I’m referring, of course, to the ground breaking work of Sabetai Unguru and his col-
leagues, e.g. [Unguru & Rowe (1981–1982)], which went as far as asserting the death of ge-
ometric algebra in Hebrew, Greek and Latin at the end of the paper.
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necessarily recreating geometric algebra. One does not simply have two pos-
sibilities: pure geometry and geometric algebra. As Bombelli shows, there’s
very much between these options and beyond.
Bombelli’s case is a ﬁne demonstration of the fact that one can rigorously
handle various diﬀerent ways of relating algebra and geometry without giv-
ing up on the speciﬁcities of either. Geometry and algebra are conceived as
co-expressive; what the one can show the other should be able to say and
vice-versa. But this co-expressivity does not turn into a hierarchy, a reduc-
tion or a complete isomorphism. Each algebraic sign and each geometric line
stands for more than a single value chosen from among a conﬁned space of
interchangeable choices. The techniques of translation are many, and leave
idiosyncracies behind. They require specialised multiple vision and lead to
hybrid and expanded algebraic and geometric practices. But, most impor-
tantly, these multiplicities are not a problem — they are, precisely, (what
enables ﬁnding) solutions.
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Part III
Mathesis universalis and
charateristica universalis

Chapter 8
The “merely mechanical” vs. the “scab
of symbols”: seventeenth century
disputes over the criteria of
mathematical rigor
Douglas M. Jesseph
Abstract This paper deals with seventeenth-century understandings of rig-
orous demonstration. Although there was a widely-shared concept of rigor
that has its origins in classical Greek sources, philosophers in the early mod-
ern period were divided over how to characterize the ultimate foundation for
mathematics. One group (whom I term the “geometric foundationalists”) held
that seeming physical concepts such as space, body and motion, were prop-
erly foundational. The other group (whom I call “algebraic foundationalists”)
claimed that the true foundations of mathematics must be abstract notions
of quantity which were the subject of algebra, or even a more general math-
esis universalis that encompassed all reasoning about number and measure.
The geometric foundationalists faced the objection that they had introduced
“merely mechanical” or insuﬃciently abstract principles into the foundations
of mathematics. In contrast, the algebraic foundationalists needed to rebut the
accusation that they based mathematics on a “scab of symbols”, or empty no-
tation divorced from anything real or substantial. I argue that this episode
oﬀers some useful insights into general questions about foundations, and can
help us understand what is at stake in disputes over foundational issues, as
well as how such disputes rise to prominence and then fade away.
8.1 Introduction
One of the things that philosophers ﬁnd most intriguing about mathematics
is the rigor of its demonstrations. A properly developed mathematical theory
is one which starts with clearly conceived and well-understood ﬁrst princi-
ples, then unfolds via deductively valid inferences to reach conclusions that,
however outre´ or surprising they may seem to untutored common sense, are
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every bit as secure as the ﬁrst principles on which they depend. This picture
of mathematics has convinced many philosophers that it is the pinnacle of hu-
man intellectual achievement, something that can serve as a bulwark against
the challenges of skepticism, and whose deductive structure might serve as a
model for philosophical theorizing.
We can see this dynamic at work in the famous anecdote concerning
Thomas Hobbes’s discovery of mathematics as related by his friend John
Aubrey:
He was forty years old before he looked on geometry; which happened accidentally.
Being in a gentleman’s library Euclid’s Elements lay open, and ’twas the forty-seventh
proposition in the ﬁrst book. He read the proposition. “By God,” said he, “this is
impossible!” So he reads the demonstration of it, which referred him back to such a
proof; which referred him back to another, which he also read. Et sic deinceps, that
at last he was demonstratively convinced of that truth. This made him in love with
geometry. (Aubrey 1898, p. 322)
As my concern here is with the interaction between philosophy and math-
ematics in the seventeenth-century, it is ﬁtting to begin with an anecdote
involving Hobbes, even if his mathematical misadventures featured numerous
outrageously poor attempts to solve such problems as the squaring of the
circle or the duplication of the cube.1
The issue I wish to discuss concerns seventeenth-century understandings
of what it is that makes mathematical (and perhaps more speciﬁcally geo-
metric) demonstrations rigorous. Although there was a widely-shared general
characterization of rigor that has its origins in classical Greek approaches to
the philosophy of mathematics, philosophers and mathematicians in the early
modern period were divided over whether the ultimate foundation for math-
ematics should be sought in seemingly physical concepts such as space, body
and motion, or in more abstract notions of quantity which were the subject
of algebra, or perhaps a more general mathesis universalis that encompassed
all reasoning about number and measure. Those who sought to ground the
whole of mathematics in concepts such as space and motion had to confront
the objection that they had introduced “merely mechanical” or insuﬃciently
abstract principles into the foundations of mathematics. On the other hand,
proponents of a mathesis universalis needed to rebut the accusation that, in
doing so, they based the whole science on a “scab of symbols,” or a jumble of
empty notation divorced from anything real or substantial.
I begin with a brief overview of the classical Greek point of view on the
subject, as exempliﬁed in the works of Euclid and his neo-Platonist commenta-
tor Proclus Diadochus. I then consider the “geometric foundationalism” pro-
pounded by Isaac Newton and Isaac Barrow (among others), which seeks to
ground all of mathematic in fundamental geometric notions. I will then inves-
1 For an account of Hobbes’s failed campaign for mathematical glory, see Jesseph (1999)
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tigate the “algebraic foundationalism” put forward by John Wallis, Descartes,
and others. In the end, I think this episode oﬀers some useful insights into
general questions about foundations, and it can help us understand what is
at stake in disputes over foundational issues, as well as how such disputes rise
to prominence and then fade away.
8.2 Euclid, Proclus, and the Classical Point of View
Classical Greek authors took pure mathematics to consist of two essentially
diﬀerent subjects: arithmetic on the one hand and geometry on the other.2
The applied mathematical sciences, which include such things as astronomy,
music, optics, mechanics, were taken to diﬀer from the pure sciences because
the pure part is – to quote Proclus – “concerned with intelligibles only,” while
the applied part of mathematics “work[s] with perceptibles and [is] in contact
with them” (Proclus 1970, p. 31). Classically conceived, then, the pure sciences
of geometry and arithmetic are distinguished from one another by having
diﬀerent objects. The object of arithmetic is discrete quantity (“number” or
ἀριθμός in the Greek), while the object of geometry is continuous quantity
(“magnitude” or μέγεθος in Greek). Thus understood, the two branches of
pure mathematics can be developed in separate ways and there is no question
of attempting to “reduce” one to the other or to show that one is in some
sense the genuine foundation of all mathematics. This pluralistic approach to
the philosophy of mathematics does not presume or require that the diﬀerent
mathematical sciences be reduced to some underlying foundational science.
This does not, however, imply that classical authors always conceived of the
two branches of mathematics as of equal importance. Proclus took the view
that, although pure geometry was entirely independent of arithmetic, geome-
try nevertheless “occupies a place second to arithmetic,” because (in keeping
with his neo-Platonist epistemology) everything knowable must ultimately be
expressed in terms of commensurable ratios (Proclus 1970, p. 39). The princi-
pal point here is that classical authors saw no relation of dependence between
the truths of arithmetic and the truths of geometry.
This becomes clearer in the presentation of the theory of ratios in Euclid’s
Elements. Book V develops the theory of proportions in the context of con-
tinuous magnitudes, and Book VII oﬀers an account of ratio and proportion
as applied to discrete quantities or “numbers” (ἀριθμόι). It was, of course,
well understood in the ancient world that the theory of proportions in Book
2 On the Greek classiﬁcation of the geometrical sciences, see Heath (1931), Klein (1968,
Part I) and Knorr (1981)
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VII could be taken as just a special case of the theory developed in Book V.
Aristotle remarked that
it might seem that the proportion alternates for things as numbers and as lines and
as solids and as times – as once it used to be proved separately, though it is possible
for it to be proved of all cases by a single demonstration. But because all these things
– numbers, lengths, times, solids – do not constitute a single named item and diﬀer
in sort from one another, it used to be taken separately (Posterior Analytics 74a
18-22)
Thus, rather than assuming that there is one underlying notion of proportion
that applies equally to continuous magnitudes and discrete multitudes, the
tradition in Greek geometry was to develop the two theories separately. This
simply reﬂects, and indeed reinforces, the notion that geometry and arithmetic
are autonomous sciences.
Given that they are separate sciences, arithmetic and geometry will have to
have separate ﬁrst principles. The ﬁrst principles of a demonstrative science
were traditionally distinguished into three classes: axioms, deﬁnitions, and
postulates. Axioms or “common notions” apply to any science whatever and
include such general principles as “things which are equal to the same thing are
equal to one another” or “if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders
are equal” (Elements 1, Ax. 1, 3). These apply universally to any subject
matter, but they are insuﬃciently speciﬁc to develop a particular science.
Deﬁnitions are principles speciﬁc to a given science and set out the essential
properties of the objects of that science. So, in the case of arithmetic we have
the deﬁnition of a unit as “that by virtue of which each of the things that exist
is called one,” and a number as “a collection of units” (Elements 7, Def. 1,
2). In the case of geometry, we require deﬁnitions such as those of point, line,
surface, and angle, which are the proper object of geometric investigation.
Finally, postulates are demands that a certain construction be admitted or
eﬀected, such as the geometric postulate “to describe a circle with any centre
and distance” (Elements 1, Pos. 3).
Aristotle famously declared that the ﬁrst principles upon which demonstra-
tive sciences depend must themselves be indemostrable and known by a kind
of immediate, non-inferential understanding (Posterior Analytics 72b19-21).3
Of course, not just any ﬁrst principles are permissible in mathematics, for the
obvious reason that the security of the derived theorems can be no greater
than that of the principles from which the theorems are derived. The result is
Aristotle’s famous requirement that the ﬁrst principles of demonstration must
be “true, and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to
and explanatory of the conclusion” (Posterior Analytics, 70b 21-23).
3 On Aristotle and demonstrative science see Smith (1995, pp. 47-53) and Heath (1931, pp.
194 - 201.
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We can therefore summarize the classical notion of mathematical rigor
as follows: there are two mathematical sciences, geometry and arithmetic,
distinguished from one another by the fact that they investigate the properties
of very diﬀerent kinds of objects: continuous, inﬁnitely divisible magnitudes
on the one hand, and discrete collections of units on the other. Both sciences
must be developed demonstratively from ﬁrst principles, which include very
general axioms applicable to any science whatever, along with deﬁnitions and
postulates that are speciﬁc to either geometry or arithmetic. Any claim that
can be added as a theorem to either science must be shown to follow from
these ﬁrst principles by a truth-preserving deductive process.
Two features of this criterion of rigor are worth noting. The ﬁrst of them
is what I term the “purity constraint” which requires that the objects of pure
mathematics must be abstracted from any messy features of the material
world. As Proclus put the matter in his discussion of the Euclidean deﬁnitions
of such terms as ‘point’, ‘line’, ’boundary’, and ’surface’:
in the forms separable from matter the ideas of the boundaries exist in themselves
and not in the things bounded, and it is because they remain precisely what they
are that they become agents for bringing to existence the entities dependent upon
them... Matter muddies ... the precision [of the forms]; the idea of the plane gives
the plane depth, that of the line blurs its one-dimensional nature and becomes gen-
erally divisible, and the idea of the point ends by becoming bodily in character and
extensible together with the thing it bounds. For all ideas when they ﬂow into mat-
ter ... are ﬁlled with their substrates: they forsake their natural simplicity for alien
combinations and extensions. (Proclus 1970, 87)
The notion of “purity” at work here is likely to be diﬃcult to articulate in
any detail, but the fundamental idea is this: the objects of pure mathematics
cannot be confused with the messy objects of ordinary sense-experience. In
part, this demand arises from the notion that nothing in the material world
answers exactly to the dimensionless points or breadthless lines of geometry or
the number seventeen in arithmetic. Another source of the purity constraint
is presumably the intuition that the truths of pure mathematics must hold
regardless of the structure or contents of the actual world, and so we should
demand that the objects of pure mathematics be strictly segregated from the
spatio-temporal realm.
A second feature of the classical notion of rigor, however, is the thought that
rigorous demonstrations must proceed from principles that express causes.
This “causality constraint” as I term it, is well expressed in the demand that
a genuine demonstration must identify causes. When Aristotle required that
the ﬁrst principles of demonstration must be “true, and primitive and imme-
diate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion”
(Posterior Analytics 70b 21-23), the requirement that the principles explain
the conclusion was typically understood to mean that they in some sense
cause the conclusion. Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition characterized a
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demonstration satisfying the causality constraint as ἀπόδειξις το῀υ διότι, as op-
posed to ἀπόδειξις το῀υ ὁτι, a distinction which is typically rendered in English
as the distinction between “a demonstration of the fact” and “a demonstra-
tion of the reasoned fact.” The point of the distinction is that an ἀπόδειξις
το῀υ ὁτι shows merely that something is the case, while an ἀπόδειξις το῀υ ὁτι
shows why the fact must obtain by constructing a syllogism whose premises
exhibit the causes of the conclusion.
It should be clear that this characterization of rigorous demonstration in-
volves something of a tension between the purity constraint on the one hand
and the causality constraint on the other. To be “pure” a mathematical the-
orem must lack any physical content, but to be truly “causal” the theorem
must be demonstrated from principles that articulate causes. Since the best
understood model of causation involves objects in the physical world interact-
ing with one another, it seems natural to suppose that satisfying the causality
constraint must tell against the purity constraint and vice versa. Aristotelian-
ism could navigate this tension by employing a wider array of causal princi-
ples than those we acknowledge today. Because the Aristotelian philosophy
takes individual substances as composites of form and matter, its methodol-
ogy can distinguish between formal, material, eﬃcient, and ﬁnal causes. Thus,
a causal explanation in the Aristotelian tradition can include a reference to a
substance’s form (the formal cause), its matter (the material cause), the pro-
cess that produced it (the eﬃcient cause), and the end or purpose for which
it was produced (the ﬁnal cause) (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1013a).
Given this broad conception of causation, it is no great leap to see mathe-
matical demonstrations as concerned with formal causes: the form or essence
of the circle (as expressed in its deﬁnition) is causally responsible for the the-
orem that every triangle inscribed in a semicircle is a right triangle. Now,
it is no secret that Aristotelian philosophy came under serious pressure in
the early modern period, and one consequence of the rise of the mechanistic
“new philosophy” was the gradual demise of this concept of formal causality.
The rise of an alternative to Aristotelianism led, I claim, to the conﬂict I
now wish to consider: one that pitted those who were accused of employing
“merely mechanical” principles against those whose abstract demonstrations
were denounced as nothing but a “scab of symbols.”
8.3 The Mechanical Style of Thought in Seventeenth
Century Mathematics
In an essay entitled “Der mechanistische Denkstil in der Mathematik des 17.
Jahrhunderts” (Breger, 1991) Herbert Breger has drawn attention to the role
of the mechanistic “new philosophy” in setting the agenda for mathematicians
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of the seventeenth century. Breger cites a variety of instances in which the
mathematical research of the seventeenth century was profoundly inﬂuenced
by the rise of the mechanistic paradigm, and I think that one salient instance
of this is the conﬂict that mechanism engenders between the purity constraint
and the causality constraint. Mechanism, roughly speaking, is the thesis that
the phenomena of the natural world are to be explained in terms of the mo-
tions and impacts of material bodies. The rise of mechanism as an explanatory
model therefore involves an abandonment of the Aristotelian notions of for-
mal or ﬁnal causality in favor of a philosophy that emphasizes matter and
motion. Nature, as understood by the mechanists, has no intrinsic teleology,
and the appeal to substantial forms is viewed with something between sus-
picion and derision. The question of interest, then, is what becomes of the
traditional demand that genuine demonstrations must articulate causes? Or,
to put the matter another way, what does a demonstration το῀υ διότι look like
if we abandon the Aristotelian doctrine of four causes and content ourselves
with material and eﬃcient causality?
The answer, not surprisingly, is that the demise of formal causality demands
that the basic deﬁnitions of mathematical concepts (and speciﬁcally those in
geometry) be understood as brought about by the motions. This kinematic
account of magnitudes takes a line or curve, for example, to be the path traced
by a point in motion through space. A circle, then, is conceived as something
traced by the revolution of a line about one of its endpoints, and surfaces are
understood to be produced by the motion of lines. The kinematic approach
to geometric magnitudes is well-summarized by Newton in the introduction
to his treatise On the Quadature of Curves:
I don’t here consider Mathematical Quantities as composed of Parts extreamly small ,
but as generated by a continual motion. Lines are described, and by describing are
generated, not by any apposition of Parts, but by a continual motion of Points.
Surfaces are generated by the motion of Lines, Solids by the Motion of Surfaces,
Angles by the Rotation of their Legs, Time by a continual ﬂux, and so in the rest.
These Geneses are founded upon Nature, and are every Day seen in the motion of
Bodies. (Newton 1964 - 67, 1: 141)
The emphasis here on the “geneses” and “generation” of magnitudes is impor-
tant, as it provides the basis for the claim that demonstrations which employ
the kinematic conception of magnitudes satisfy the causality constraint.
Newton was hardly the originator of this doctrine. Isaac Barrow, New-
ton’s predecessor in the Lucasian chair of mathematics at Cambridge, held
essentially the same view, and his Geometrical Lectures are dominated by it.
As Barrow explained, “Among the ways of generating magnitudes, the pri-
mary and chief is that performed by local motion, which all [others] must
in some sort suppose, because without motion nothing can be generated or
produced” (Barrow 1860 1: 159). I term this approach to mathematics and
its demonstrations “geometrical foundationalism” because it takes geometry
280 Douglas M. Jesseph
as a more fundamental science than arithmetic, and it seeks to ground all of
mathematics in geometric concepts. As Barrow stated the view
number (at least that which the mathematician contemplates) does not diﬀer in the
least from that quantity which is called continuous, but is formed wholly to express
and declare it. And neither are arithmetic and geometry conversant about diverse
matters, but equally demonstrate properties common to one and the same subject,
and from this it will follow that many and great advantages derive to the republic of
mathematics. (Barrow 1860, 1: 47)
As a matter of fact, the deﬁnition of geometric objects by motion has a clas-
sical pedigree. A salient instance is Euclid’s deﬁnition of a cone, which reads
“When a right triangle with one side of those about the right angle remains
ﬁxed is carried round and restored again to the same position from which it
began to be moved, the ﬁgure so comprehended is a cone” (Elements 11, Def.
18). Likewise, there were many “special” curves such as the spiral, conchoid,
and quadratrix which were deﬁned in terms of the compound motions of lines
or points.4
Nevertheless, the appeal to motion was regarded with some suspicion in the
classical period, as it was thought to introduce an unnecessarily “mechanical”
aspect into geometry that is inconsistent with the desired purity of the sub-
ject. Plutarch gives a memorable account of the status of such “mechanical”
deﬁnitions:
For the art of mechanics, now so celebrated and admired, was ﬁrst originated by
Eudoxus and Archytas, who embellished geometry with its subtleties, and gave to
problems incapable of proof by word and diagram, a support derived from mechanical
illustrations that were patent to the senses. For instance, in solving the problem
of ﬁnding two mean proportional lines, a necessary requisite for many geometrical
ﬁgures, both mathematicians had recourse to mechanical arrangements, adapting to
their purposes certain intermediate portions of curved lines and sections. But Plato
was incensed at this, and inveighed against them as corrupters and destroyers of the
pure excellence of geometry, which thus turned her back upon the incorporeal things
of abstract thought and descended to the things of sense, making use, moreover, of
objects which required much mean and manual labour. For this reason mechanics
was made entirely distinct from geometry, and being for a long time ignored by
philosophers, came to be regarded as one of the military arts. (Plutarch 1949–59, 5:
472–3).
The concern here is that a “merely mechanical” approach to mathematics
violates the purity constraint by introducing an unacceptable dependence of
mathematics on the merely physical. Obviously, not all seventeenth-century
mathematicians were worried by this sort of apparent dependence, but there
was no shortage of thinkers who objected to the unwarranted intrusion of
4 On such curves and the problems they were introduced to solve, see Heath (1931, Chapter
VII) and Knorr (1986).
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“plainly physical” concepts such as motion into the foundations of mathe-
matics.
A case in point can be drawn from the controversy between Hobbes and
John Wallis. Hobbes was second to none in his insistence that the fundamental
principles of mathematics must express causes, and his enthusiastic embrace
of materialist mechanism led him to conclude that the whole of geometry
should be re-written to put mechanical principles at its foundation. As he put
the issue in discussing his own program for demonstrating geometric results
by considering compound motions of points, and lines:
“But,” you will ask, “what need is there for demonstrations of purely geometric theo-
rems to appeal to motion?” I respond: ﬁrst, all demonstrations are ﬂawed, unless they
are scientiﬁc, and unless they proceed from causes, they are not scientiﬁc. Second,
demonstrations are ﬂawed unless their conclusions are demonstrated by construction,
that is, by the description of ﬁgures, that is, by the drawing of lines. For every draw-
ing of a line is motion: and so every demonstration is ﬂawed, whose ﬁrst principles
do not contain the deﬁnitions of motions by which ﬁgures are described. (Hobbes
1839-45, 4: 421)
Wallis objected that such an approach introduces physical principles into the
foundations of mathematics, thereby contaminating it. He asked, for instance,
“what need is there for the concepts of body or motion [in these foundations],
since the concept of a line or curve can be understood without them?” (Wallis
1655, p. 6). As Wallis explained, such physical notions are “plainly accidental,
nor do they pertain to the essences [of the things deﬁned], so it is strange to
ﬁnd motion in the deﬁnitions of geometry” (Wallis 1655, p. 7).
Wallis was not alone in disparaging the attempt to introduce alien physical
concepts into mathematics. Descartes distinguished between “truly geometri-
cal” curves that could be expressed as polynomial equations in two unknowns
and what he termed the “merely mechanical” curves such as the cycloid. These
mechanical curves did not admit of a “precise and exact” measure (according
to Descartes) and could only be deﬁned by a composition of curvilinear and
rectilinear motions which could not be the object of a properly geometric the-
ory.5 The concern here is that something merely mechanical must inevitably
be imprecise or inexact because mechanical considerations fail to respect the
purity constraint.
Newton emphatically rejected this attitude by arguing that mechanics,
properly understood, is as precise and pure a science as any. In Newton’s
view, the failure to appreciate the abstract and perfectly precise nature of
mechanics has given rise to the erroneous opinion that geometry must not
introduce anything mechanical into its foundations:
Both the genesis of the subject-matter of geometry, therefore, and the fabrication
of its postulates pertain to mechanics. Any plane ﬁgures executed by God, nature
5 On Descartes and mathematics see Bos (2001, especially chapters 24-26) and Sasaki
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or any technician you will are measured by geometry on the hypothesis that they
are exactly constructed.... Geometry makes the unique demand that [its objects] be
described exactly. It has now, however, come to be usual to regard as geometrical
everything which is exact, and as mechanical all that proves not to be of the kind,
as though nothing could possibly be mechanical and at the same time exact. But
this common belief is a stupid one, and has its origin in nothing else than that
geometry postulates an exact mechanical practice in the description of a straight
line and circle, and moreover is exact in all its operations, while mechanics as it is
commonly exercised is imperfect and without exact laws. It is from the ignorance and
imperfection of mechanicians that the common opinion deﬁnes mechanics. On this
reasoning a thing would be the more mechanical the more imperfect it was. Posit a
mechanical thing to be perfect and you will correct the error. (Newton 1967-86, 7:
289)
The program of “geometric foundationalism” thus ﬁnds itself ultimately com-
mitted to the principle that mechanical concepts properly belong to the “pure”
science of mathematics and are the basis for its capacity to provide true
demonstrations. We may now turn to a consideration of a very diﬀerent pro-
gram for the foundations of mathematics, namely“algebraic foundationalism.”
8.4 The Idea of a Mathesis Universalis
I have been arguing that the “mechanical style” of thought in seventeenth-
century mathematics results from an emphasis on the causality constraint at
the expense of the purity constraint; another trend in seventeenth-century
mathematics works from the other direction and stresses the purity of the
ﬁrst principles while downplaying any notion of mathematical causality. The
trend I have in mind here can be usefully associated with the term mathesis
universalis, or “universal mathematics.” Rather than arising from concerns
about the adequacy of the Aristotelian model of causation and demonstration,
the notion of mathesis universalis was a consequence of the development of
algebra in the sixteenth century.6 As more complex problems were posed and
solved, the power of algebra became more evident, and some were encour-
aged to see in it a tool that could be applied to the solution of all manner of
mathematical problems. Indeed, some went so far as to claim that algebra was
the genuine foundation of all mathematics. It was, however, far from obvious
whether algebra had an appropriate object, and it was unclear where it might
be placed in the traditional classiﬁcation of the sciences. The theory of equa-
tions can be applied to all quantities – discrete or continuous – and the success
of algebraic methods undermined the traditional division of mathematics into
(2003).
6 See Rabouin (2009) on the concept of mathesis universalis and its origins.
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geometry and arithmetic. And yet, since the fundamental operations of addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, and division seem to derive from arithmetic,
some thinkers conceived of algebra as a generalized “arithmetic with letters”
in which symbols or “species” representing arbitrary quantities were employed
in developing the “arithmetic of species.”
Joseph Raphson’s Mathematical Dictionary contains an instructive account
of the understanding of algebra and its development into a general mathesis
universalis:
Algebra, from Al in Arabic, which signiﬁes Excellent, and Gerber the Name of the
supposed Inventor of it, is a Science of Quantity in general, whence it has also got
the name among some of Mathesis Universalis, & is chieﬂy conversant in ﬁnding
Equations, by comparing of unknown and known Quantities together whence also by
some it is called the Art of Equation, and is distinguished into
[Algebra]Numeral , which is the more ancient and serves for the Resolution of Arith-
metical Problems: For these see Diophantus
[Algebra]Specious, or the new Algebra, which is also called Logistica Speciosa, and
is conversant about Quantity denoted by General or Universal Symbols, which are
commonly the letters of the Alphabet; and serves indiﬀerently for the Solution of all
Mathematical Problems, whether Arithmetical or Geometrical. (Raphson 1702, 2-3)
Raphson was somewhat late to the party, writing in the very early eighteenth
century, and his fanciful etymology for the term ‘algebra’ suggests that his
understanding of the history of the subject could use some improvement.
Nevertheless, he summarizes the seventeenth-century understanding of the de-
velopment of algebra as a kind of mathematical “superscience” more abstract
and universal than arithmetic or geometry. Indeed, in Henry Billingsley’s 1570
translation of Euclid we can ﬁnd a reference to “that more secret and subtill
part of Arithmetike commonly called Algebra” (Billingsley 1570, 229) which
contains a very abstract treatment of quantity in general.
Among the authors who embraced the notion of a mathesis universalis,
Descartes and John Wallis ﬁgure quite prominently, although one cannot over-
look the contributions of Franc¸ois Vie`te and Leibniz. A strong commitment
to what I have termed the “purity constraint” is fundamental to the notion of
mathesis universalis. Wallis, in his work entitled Mathesis Universalis stresses
that the true principles of mathematics concern only quantity in general, and
argues that “when time, place, ... and even motion or weight” are said to be
quantities, the term ‘quantity’ must be taken in a “broad sense” that is not
really suited to pure mathematics (Wallis 1693-99, 1: 17). In Wallis’s under-
standing, “we call those parts of mathematics ‘pure’ which treat of quantity
considered absolutely, so far as it is abstracted from matter” (Wallis 1693-99,
1: 18). The result is that
we say there are two pure mathematical disciplines, namely arithmetic and geometry
the one of which is concerned with discrete quantity, or number, and the other of
continuous quantity, or magnitude. But of these one is indeed more and the other
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less pure: for the subject of arithmetic is purer and more universal that the subject
of geometry; and it also has more universal speculations which are applicable to the
matter of geometry equally and to all others. (Wallis 1693-99, 1: 18).
It might seem that Wallis takes arithmetic to be the true mathesis uni-
versalis, but in fact he sees arithmetic as a kind of special case of a more
fundamental science of quantity. Geometry, in Wallis’s view, is less pure and
abstract than arithmetic, but arithmetic itself falls under the scope of algebra
or mathesis universalis.
The diﬃculty for proponents of this grand fundamental algebraic science
is that the emphasis upon the abstract and pure nature of their supposed
mathesis universalis raises the suspicion that it amounts to nothing more
than an empty formalism devoid of any speciﬁcally mathematical content.
Barrow is a case in point. He objected that algebra “is really no science
at all” (Barrow 1860, 1: 59). The reason for this harsh judgment is that
algebra “has no object distinct to itself, ... but only delivers a kind of artiﬁce
for designating magnitudes and numbers by certain notes or symbols, and
collecting and comparing their sums and diﬀerences, founded on Geometry
or arithmetic; and so it constitutes no part of mathematics distinct from
geometry or arithmetic, but is entirely contained in them” (Barrow 1860, 1:
46). On Barrow’s view, algebra amounts to little more than a collection of rules
for manipulating symbols, but it lacks any genuine mathematical content.
Such considerations lead quite naturally to the objection that employing
algebraic reasoning in a geometric context oﬀers no real advantage over tradi-
tional methods. If algebraic techniques have governing principles and do not
simply proceed by guesswork, then these principles must be vindicated by
appeal to geometric considerations. Put another way, this sort of objection
reasons that if an algebraic manipulation in an equation is legitimate, it must
correspond to a proper geometric construction; but in that case, the most
that algebra can oﬀer is a collection of symbols that might abbreviate the
writing of a proof, but cannot really show the genuine reasons why the proof
is correct.
Barrow was adamant on this point and devoted many pages to arguing
that geometry was the real foundation of all mathematics, which could be
developed without recourse to arithmetical or algebraic techniques.7 Newton,
too, held that geometric (or, indeed mechanical) concepts have a kind of
explanatory primacy. Although he was well aware of the power of algebraic
techniques, Newton came to view Cartesian analytic geometry with some
suspicion, and praised the power of ancient methods which, he declared,
Men of recent times, eager to add to the discoveries of the ancient, have united the
arithmetic of variables with geometry. Beneﬁtting from that, progress has been broad
and far-reaching if your eye is on the profuseness of output, but the advance is less
7 On Barrow’s mathematics, see Mahoney (1990).
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of a blessing if you look at the complexity of the conclusions. For these computations
... often express in an intolerably roundabout way quantities which in geometry are
designated by the drawing of a single line. (Newton 1967-86, 4: 421)
Hobbes framed essentially the same objection as follows:
What else do the great masters of the current symbolics, Oughtred and Descartes,
teach, but that for a sought quantity we should take some letter of the alphabet,
and then by right reasoning we should proceed to the consequence? But if this be an
art, it would need to have been shown what this right reasoning is. Because they do
not do this, the algebraists are known to begin sometimes with one supposition and
sometimes with another, and to follow sometimes one path, and sometimes another...
Moreover, what proposition discovered by algebra does not depend upon [theorems
in Euclid]? Certainly, algebra needs geometry, but geometry has no need of algebra
(Hobbes 1839-45, 4: 9-10)
This sort of objection lies behind Hobbes’s dismissal of Wallis’s Treatise of
Conic Sections as a work “covered over with the scab of Symboles,” and
oﬀering “no knowledge neither of Quantity, nor of measure, nor of Proportion,
nor of Time, nor of Motion, nor of any thing, but only of certain Characters,
as if a Hen had been scraping there” (Hobbes 1839-45, 1: 316, 330).
Proponents of “algebraic foundationalism” could, of course, point to the
success of their new theories in solving outstanding problems as evidence
that they had identiﬁed not only the true foundation of mathematics but
also the means of solution for a vast range of problems. Leibniz, for instance,
famously dreamed of a universal characteristic that could reduce any problem
whatever to a calculation, with the result that disputes could be resolved and
the sciences advanced.
8.5 Conclusion: What Became of the Dispute?
If the story I have been telling is anywhere near the truth, there was a genuine
dispute among seventeenth-century philosophers and philosophically-minded
mathematicians about the criteria of rigorous demonstration. One group,
which I have called the “geometric foundationalists,” stressed the notion that
demonstrations must proceed from true causes and demanded that a truly rig-
orous demonstration be grounded in geometric or even physical notions such
as space, time, motion, and body. The opposing group – the “algebraic foun-
dationalists” – deemed the proposed geometric foundation as insuﬃciently
pure because it was contaminated by extraneous “merely mechanical” con-
cepts. The algebraic foundationalists sought to base all of mathematics on a
very abstract (and we might note, completely “pure”) science of quantity in
general that had no admixture of any speciﬁc physical content. The objection
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to this program was that its very abstractness or “purity” rendered it inca-
pable of being the foundation of anything more than a set of rules for the
manipulation of symbols.
One striking fact about this dispute is that it is no longer a topic of interest
in the philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, for as much as it was a live issue
in the seventeenth century, the quarrel between geometrical foundationalists
and algebraic foundationalists seems to have disappeared without a trace.
This raises the obvious question of why and how the dispute was eventually
resolved, and what its demise can tell us about how issues in the philosophy
of mathematics come to prominence and then fade away. The dispute did not
die as a result of some kind of “killer argument” that one side could launch
against the other. That is to say, the question was not decided on the basis of
some purely technical or strictly mathematical grounds. Instead, the conﬂict
seems to have been reformulated in a rather diﬀerent struggle over how best
to explicate the foundational concepts in the calculus.
In other words, I propose that the opposition between the geometric foun-
dationalists and their algebraic counterparts was subsumed in a later opposi-
tion over what course to take in providing a solid foundation for the mathe-
matical study of continuous variation that we now know as the calculus. By
the end of the seventeenth century there were two very diﬀerent approaches
to the subject – on the one hand the Newtonian “method of ﬂuxions” and on
the other the Leibnizian calculus diﬀerentialis. The Newtonians held that the
best way to understand the mathematics of continuous variation was to appeal
to the experience of bodies in motion. The method of ﬂuxions was conceived
as a tool for modeling all instances of continuous change in a theory whose
basic concepts (in Newton’s words) “are founded upon Nature, and are every
Day seen in the motion of Bodies” (Newton 1964-67, 1: 141). The Leibnizians,
in constrast, conceived their calculus diﬀerentialis as ultimately justiﬁed by
appeal to very abstract and general principles of magnitude that could extend
reasoning about ﬁnite increments and ratios to the case of inﬁnitesimal incre-
ments and their ratios. Such a science went beyond anything available in mere
geometry and had no dependence on anything involving sense or imagination.
The conﬂict between these two ways of considering the calculus was sharp-
ened by the nasty priority dispute between Newton and Leibniz.8 The New-
tonians denounced the scandalously lax standards of the decadent Continen-
tals, whose leader, they claimed, had stolen the perfectly rigorous Newtonian
calculus and transformed it into a bundle of self-contradictions concealed be-
hind empty symbolic notation. The Leibnizians retorted that their British
opponents were incapable of abstract thought, and were “mere empirics” who
required that mathematical theories be closely tied to physical notions. By
1710, then, the earlier conﬂict between geometric and algebraic foundational-
8 See Bertoloni-Meli (1993) on the Newton-Leibniz dispute.
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ism had been re-cast as a battle between the British method of ﬂuxions and
the Continental calculus of inﬁnitesimal sums and diﬀerences.
This suggests that one salient means whereby foundational disputes can dis-
appear. They need not necessarily be resolved through argument and counter-
argument, but can be “relocated” when the relevant mathematical context
changes. As worries about the proper formulation of the calculus and the
rigor of its procedures came to the fore, they displaced earlier concerns about
how best to understand the model of rigorous demonstration.
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Chapter 9
Leibniz between ars characteristica
and ars inveniendi : Unknown news
about Cajori’s ‘master-builder of
mathematical notations’
Eberhard Knobloch
Abstract Leibniz’s paramount interest in these three disciplines caused him
to spend his entire life trying to perfect and organize the ars characteristica
that is the art of inventing suitable characters, signs; the ars combinatoria that
is the art of combination; the ars inveniendi that is the art of inventing new
theorems, new results, new methods. These arts are strongly correlated with
each other. There are two famous examples for the usefulness and success of
Leibniz’s invention of suitable signs in order to foster the mathematical devel-
opment: 1. The diﬀerential and integral calculus, 2. determinant theory. The
article focusses on less well-known examples of Leibnizian inventions of math-
ematical symbolism related to diﬀerential equations, products of power sums,
number-theoretical partitions, and elimination theory. To that end, Leibniz
especially reintroduced numbers instead of letters, consciously deviating from
Vie`te’s practice.
Key words: character, diﬀerential equations, power sums, partitions, elimi-
nation theory.
9.1 Introduction
Leibniz spent his entire life trying to perfect and organize the ars inveniendi,
the ars characteristica, and the ars combinatoria. These three arts were, in his
view, inseparably connected. The methodically pursued expansion of knowl-
edge, the ars inveniendi, was decisively based on the suitable choice of charac-
ters, of signs, such as those invented by the ars characteristica. Meanwhile, the
ars combinatoria provided the rules according to which the characters created
were to be manipulated to create new knowledge: in his eyes it was a gen-
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eral science that teaches a merely syntactical manipulation of signs (Kra¨mer,
1992, p. 229). His ability of creating suitable notations made Florian Cajori
call him the ‘master-builder of mathematical notation’ (Cajori, 1925).
This paper is meant to conﬁrm Cajori’s statement by illustrating less well
known examples of Leibniz’s mathematical studies. First we will clarify his
concept of the ars characteristica. Secondly we will discuss some of the ways
considered by Leibniz for writing the coeﬃcients of diﬀerential equations, his
ideas regarding the products of power sums, and ﬁnally his so-called explica-
tion theory.
9.2 Ars characteristica – The characteristic art
Leibniz clearly deﬁned what he meant by the notions of character, ars char-
acteristica, expressio. These deﬁnitions are worth considering. Let us have a
closer look at them (Leibniz, 1688; Poser, 1979, 321):
Characterem voco, notam visibilem cogitationes repræsentantem.
Ars characteristica est ars ita formandi atque ordinandi characteres, ut referant cog-
itationes, seu ut eam inter se habeant relationem, quam cogitationes inter se habent.
I call ‘character’ a visible sign representing thoughts.
The ‘characteristic art’ is the art of creating and arranging characters in such a way
that they reﬂect thoughts or that they have that relation among one another which
the thoughts have among one another.
Thus characters bring about visualizations of intellectual entities. Mathemati-
cally speaking a character is a homomorphism ch that maps the set of thoughts
T into the set of their representations R:
ch : T → R so that for t1, t2 ∈ T
ch(t1 × t2) = ch(t1)× ch(t2)
Leibniz continued:
Expressio est aggregatum characterum rem quæ exprimitur repræsentantium.
Lex expressionum hæc est: ut ex quarum rerum ideis componitur rei exprimendæ
idea, ex illarum rerum characteribus componatur rei expressio.
An expression is an aggregate of characters representing the thing that is expressed.
The law of expressions reads as follows: the idea of a thing that has to be expressed is
composed of ideas of (certain) things. The expression of the thing must be composed
of the characters of those things.
In other words there are things, ideas (or thoughts) of things and represen-
tations or characters. Things are expressed, ideas are represented. Things are
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expressed by means of the representations of the ideas we have of these things.
If an idea (of a certain thing) is composed (of ideas of certain things), the ex-
pression of this thing will be composed (of the representations of the ideas of
those things).
How to create the characteristic art? Leibniz gave the answer in his “Spec-
imen analyseos novæ”, “Example of a new analysis,” dating from June 1678
(Knobloch, 1980, 5):
Artis ergo characteristicæ hæc summa regula est, ut characteres omnia exprimant,
quæ in re designata latent, quod numeris, ob eorum copiam et calculandi facilitatem
optime ﬁet. Item et in Geometria magni usus erit, ad situs exprimendos.
Thus this is the highest rule of the characteristic art that the characters express
everything which is hidden in the designated thing. This is best done by numbers
because of their variety and suitability for calculation. In geometry, too, it will be
very useful in order to express positions.
In the same period when Leibniz wrote these clariﬁcations he elaborated also
his “Discours de me´taphysique” wherein he explained the relations between
ideas and notions saying (Leibniz, 1686, 1572):
Ainsi ces expressions qui sont dans nostre ame, soit qu’on les concoive ou non, peuvent
etre appelle´es ide´es, mais celles qu’on concoit ou forme, se peuvent dire notions,
conceptus.
Therefore these expressions which are in our soul whether one conceives them or not
can be called ideas. But those which one conceives or forms might be called notions,
concepts.
Notions are – according to Leibniz – well understood ideas.
At this point we might resume the main results of the hitherto discussed
issue: the characteristic art is an essential part of Leibniz’s epistemology: it
must serve the ars inveniendi, the art of discovering. It should make evi-
dent hidden structures, properties, relations etc. Let us consider a Leibnizian,
number-theoretical example in order to illustrate the relation between hidden
intellectual structures and their representations. Leibniz looked for the dis-
tribution law of prime numbers. Among others he worked out the following
ﬁgure in order to discover it (Leibniz, 1676a, 597):
Fig. 9.1: Figure illustrating the distribution of prime numbers (LSB VII, 1,
597)
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Leibniz considers the sequence of natural numbers including zero. Line by line
the multiples of one, two, three, four etc. are marked by a dot. Perpendicular
lines connect dots being one over the other in successive lines. Horizontal lines
connect the perpendiculars. He is overwhelmed by the result saying (Leibniz,
1676a, 598):
Patet hic illustri exemplo artem circa intelligibilia inveniendi præclara theoremata in
eo consistere, ut quoniam ipsa pingi aut audiri non possunt pingamus aut audiamus
earum repræsentationes, etiamsi non similes, et in iis sensibiles quasdam pulchri-
tudines observemus, quæ in nobis facient intelligi theorema seu proprietatem ipsius
rei intelligibilis.
Here it becomes evident by an illustrious example that the art of discovering famous
theorems with regard to intellectual things consists in the following: Because they
themselves cannot be painted or heard, we paint or hear their representations even
if they are not similar and observe some perceptible beauties in them that will pro-
duce the eﬀect in us that a theorem or a property of the intellectual thing itself is
understood.
Presumably still in April 1676 Leibniz wrote another study “De characteribus
et compendiis” where he referred to this earlier paper (Leibniz, 1676b, 434):
His recte observatis tam illos confutabimus qui credidere veritates esse sine relatione
ad characteres, quam illos, qui credidere non in rebus, sed in characteribus esse
veritatem: cum veritas sit in rebus quatenus ad characteres referuntur.
If this is rightly observed we will refute those who believed that there are truths
without relation to characters, and those as well who believed that truth is not in
the things but in the characters while truth is in the things in so far as they are
referred to characters.
Numbers are especially suitable to make evident hidden structures, properties,
relations etc. Leibniz says. Why numbers? For three reasons:
1. They enable us to control calculations.
2. They can express arrangements, orders, relationships between quantities
and characters.
3. They facilitate the discovery of laws of progress, continuation, harmonies,
in other words they support the mathematical progress.
The following three sections are meant to illustrate this statement.
9.3 Diﬀerential equations
Leibniz invented dozens of denotations in order to characterize the relationship
between coeﬃcients and the corresponding terms of diﬀerential equations: The
terms consist of powers of variables and various diﬀerentials. These studies
remained unknown up to now because nearly all of them are still unpublished
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and only available in manuscript form. Time and again he changed his solu-
tions and tried to improve them (Knobloch, 1982). We would like to discuss
some examples that seem to be especially interesting.
In the manuscript LH 35 XIII,1 sheets 145f. Leibniz uses the following
notation:
0 = 80dx +91xdy +81xdx +811xydx +92x2dy +82x2dx +921x2ydy +...
dy ydx ydy dy y2dx y2dy xy2dx
Leibniz’s manner of writing is equivalent to:
0 = 80(dx+ dy) + 91(xdy + ydx) + 81(xdx+ ydy) + 811(xydx+ xydy)+
92(x2dy + y2dx) + 82(x2dx+ y2dy) + 921(x2ydy + xy2dx) + ...
He explains:
Ubi 9 præﬁgo, cum diﬀerentialis (dx vel dy) sequitur potentiam inferiorem, alias
8. Nempe 9 præﬁgo pro x2y, quia x2 est superior potentia, et y inferior, habetur
autem non dx, sed dy. Ita ex solo aspectu coeﬃcientis iudicari potest cui formæ
fuerit præﬁxus.
There I preﬁx 9 when the diﬀerential (dx or dy) follows the lower power (i. e. of the
variables), otherwise 8. I preﬁx namely 9 to x2y because x2 is the higher power and
y the lower. Yet, we don’t have dx but dy. Thus on the strength of a mere look at
the coeﬃcient we can judge the form it was preﬁxed to.
Obviously the numerical coeﬃcients consist of two parts:
1. The ﬁrst part consists of the preﬁxed number that characterizes the relation
between the power of variables and the occurring diﬀerentials.
2. The second part consists of the exponents of the powers of variables occur-
ring. They occur strictly symmetrically.
Leibniz says “otherwise 8”: This is the negation of “the diﬀerential follows the
lower power”, in other words: If it is not true that the diﬀerential follows the
lower power Leibniz preﬁxes 8. There are two possible cases in this respect:
either the exponents are equal or the diﬀerential follows the higher power. For
that reason Leibniz speciﬁed the notation in two diﬀerent ways.
• First, improvement regarding the checking of the calculation: still in the
same manuscript Leibniz introduces ‘antepræﬁxæ’ saying:
Sed ut calculus sit tutior, adhibeamus antepræﬁxas, exprimentes novenarium
residuum valoris et pro 80 91 81 811 92 82 921 821
stabit 880 191 481 2811 792 082 6921 1821
But in order that the calculation be more secure we would like to use ‘numbers
that precede the preﬁxed numbers’. They express the excess of nine of the value
and
instead of 80 91 82 811 92 82 921 821
we will have 880 191 481 2811 792 082 6921 1821
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The excesses of nine belong to the coeﬃcients of another diﬀerential equa-
tion which is compared with that given above.
• Second, improvement regarding the negation of “the diﬀerential follows the
lower power”: in the manuscript LH 35 XIII, 2b sheet 162 preﬁxes three
diﬀerent numbers 2, 3, 4 in order to distinguish between the three diﬀerent
possible cases:
0 = +400dx +210xdx +310ydx +411xydx +220x2dx +...
dy ydy xdy dy y2dy
This equation is equivalent to:
0 = 400(dy + dx) + 210(xdx+ ydy) + 310(ydx+ xdy)+
411(xydx+ xydy) + 220(x2dx+ y2dy) + ...
Leibniz explains:
Ubi notandum in coeﬃcientibus seu numeris ﬁctitiis præﬁxas esse 2, 3, 4...prout
diﬀerentialis sequitur literam in combinatione prævalentem vel debiliorem, vel
utramque cum scil. neutra prævalet.
There it has to be remarked that, in the coeﬃcients, ﬁctitious numbers 2, 3, 4 are
preﬁxed depending on whether the diﬀerential follows the stronger or the weaker
variable in the combination or whether it follows both of them when none of them
is stronger.
There are plenty of other notations. I would like to restrict myself to discuss
the following three:
• In 1691 Leibniz writes: 001dx+002dy+101xdx+011ydx+102xdy+012ydy+
201x2dx+021yydx+111xydx+202x2dy... = 0 (LH 35 VI,2 sheets 1 + 7).
This time the coeﬃcients of symmetric terms are diﬀerent. The ﬁrst two
ﬁgures represent the exponents of the powers of the variables x or y. The
third, last, ﬁgure indicates by 1 or 2 respectively whether the ﬁrst diﬀer-
ential dx or the second diﬀerential dy occurs.
• In the manuscript LH 35 XIII,1 sheet 308 Leibniz considers the two equa-
tions:
100v + 200z + 101dv + 201dz + 120a = 0
300v + 400z + 301dv + 401dz + 340a = 0
The ﬁrst ﬁgure indicates the occurring variable v or z. To that end Leibniz
uses diﬀerent ﬁgures 1, 2 or 3, 4 in diﬀerent equations for the same variables
v, z. The third ﬁgure indicates by 0 or 1 whether a diﬀerential occurs or not,
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the ﬁrst ﬁgure indicates which of the two variables is meant. The meaning
of the second ﬁgure remains unclear: the constant term a is characterized
by 1 and 2 or 3 and 4, respectively that occupy the ﬁrst two places.
• In the manuscript LH 35 XIII,2b sheets 75f. Leibniz needs a system of two
equations with three variables x, y, v:
110y + 111dy + 120v + 121dv + 100dx = 0
210y + 211dy + 220v + 221dv + 200dx = 0
The ﬁrst ﬁgures 1 or 2 indicate the equation, the second ﬁgures 0, 1, 2 indi-
cate the variables, the third ﬁgures 0, 1 indicate whether the corresponding
diﬀerential occurs or not. Yet, this interpretation only applies to dy and
dv; dx is characterized by two 0 occupying the third place.
The last two notations do not seem to be satisfactory. No wonder that
Leibniz did not stop experimenting in looking for suitable notations.
9.4 Products of power sums
Leibniz was deeply interested in the theory of symmetric functions, especially
in power sums.
Since about 1677 to 1679 he was able to represent them by means of the
elementary symmetric functions. After writing down these representations of
the ﬁrst nine power sums he remarked (Knobloch, 1976, 195):
Nullam unquam Tabulam numerorum vidi ex qua plura Mysteria pulcherrima dux-
erim.
I never saw a table of numbers from which I drew more mysteries of the highest
beauty.
During the last decade of his life he corresponded with Theobald Overbeck,
school-master in Wolfenbu¨ttel, about this subject. In 1714 they mainly dealt
with two questions: with the product of power sums and with the reduction
of multiform symmetric functions to power sums. Only thanks to suitable no-
tations the close connection of these questions with number-theoretical par-
titions and their hidden combinatorial structure became evident (Knobloch,
1976, 236-253). Obviously Overbeck elaborated a copy of Leibniz’s results.
Let a, b, c etc. be pairwise diﬀerent variables. Leibniz indicated a power sum
am + bm + cm + . . . or in general a symmetric function by the ﬁrst term
a.m. , putting dots under the term. For technical reasons I replace the dots by∑
:
∑
am := am + bm + cm + . . .
296 Eberhard Knobloch
Step by step he calculated the product of two, three, four, etc. power sums.
Then he used an abridged and eventually another abridged notation in order
to represent the results. Let us consider the product of three power sums:
(
∑
am) (
∑
an) (
∑
ap) =
∑
am+n+p +
∑
am+nbp
+
∑
am+pbn
+
∑
an+pbm +
∑
ambncp
The ﬁrst abridged representation leaves aside the bases a, b, c etc. because
they can be added again in their alphabetical order. Only the combinations
of exponents are kept:
(
∑
am) (
∑
an) (
∑
ap) = mnp +mn | p
+mp | n
+np | m+m | n | p
The second abridged representation counts the exponents and describes the
combinations as number-theoretical partitions:
= 3 + 2 | 1 + 1 | 1 | 1
The encircled 3 counts the frequency of the occurrence of the same partition.
This special result can be generalized. In order to calculate the coeﬃcients
within parentheses the notation makes evident that Leibniz had to solve the
following problem:
Let be X a set of k objects. There are N possibilities to distribute them into
d = r1 + r2 + ... + rk boxes so that r1 boxes contain exactly one object, r2
boxes contain exactly two objects,..., rk boxes contain exactly k objects.
Let k = 1r1 + 2r2 + ...+ krk
N =
k!
(1!)r1 . . . (k!)rkr1! . . . rk!
The ﬁrst k powers of the denominator correspond to the fact that we have
to suppress all ν! permutations of exponents that are represented by ν (ν =
1, 2, ..., k). For am+n = an+m so that nm | p | q or 2.1.1 is the same as
mn | p | q.
The second k factors of the denominator take into account the fact that we
have to suppress all rν ! permutations which are produced by the rν sections
of the exponent of the same length: mn | q | p cannot be distinguished from
mn | p | q because of the symmetry of the function.
The second main problem was the reduction of multiform symmetric functions∑
ambncp etc. to power sums. In order to solve this problem Leibniz had only
to transform the equations of the products of power sums.
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Leibniz knew that(∑
am
)(∑
an
)
=
∑
am+n +
∑
ambn
Hence ∑
ambn =
(∑
am
)(∑
an
)
−
∑
am+n (9.1)
This equation is multiplied by
∑
ap, the emerging symmetric functions con-
sisting of two variables are eliminated by means of 9.1 etc. Step by step Leibniz
reduced the representations of multiform symmetric functions to power sums
again using the two forms of abridgements. For example:∑
ambncpdq = m | n | p | q −mn | p | q + 2mnp | q +mn | pq − 6mnpq
= 1.1.1.1.− 2.1.1.+ 3.1.+ 2.2.− 4.
It becomes evident that in the general case of k variables all possible par-
titions of k have to be enumerated. If k = 4, there are ﬁve partitions of k
namely 1.1.1.1, 2.1.1, 3.1, 2.2, 4. How to ﬁnd the coeﬃcients and their signs?
Let k = 1r1 + 2r2 + ...+ krk be an arbitrary partition of k. The coeﬃcient of
k reads:
c = (1!)r2(2!)r3(3!)r4 . . . ((k − 1)!)rk
The sign rule reads: If there is an even number of even numbers, we have to
take +, if there is an odd number of even numbers, we have to take –.
Let us consider the example discussed above. The last (ﬁfth) partition of
4 is 4. Therefore k = 4 = 4.1 = krk or the coeﬃcient is (3!)1 = 6. There is
an odd number (that is, one) of even numbers. Therefore we have to take the
sign − or the coeﬃcient −6.
Leibniz’s notation revealed the relation between the algebraic problem of re-
ducing certain symmetric functions to power sums and the number-theoretical
problem of ﬁnding the partitions of natural numbers. The formulae he had
derived are called after Edward Waring because Waring published them in
1762 and a second time in 1770 (Waring, 1762, pp. 6-8; Waring, 1770, pp.
7-10).
9.5 Leibniz’s explication theory dating from 1693/94
A third example for the utility of numbers in order to discover hidden math-
ematical relationships is Leibniz’s elimination theory. A special case of this
theory is his explication theory that he elaborated in the years 1693 and 1694
(Knobloch, 1974). About ﬁfty to seventy years later Euler occupied himself
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with the same problem without using ﬁctitious numbers as coeﬃcients (Euler,
1748 vol. 2, pp. 259-271; Euler, 1750; Euler, 1766).
The aim is the elimination of a common unknown of two polynomials:
10x3 + 11x2 + 12x+ 13 = 0
20x3 + 21x2 + 22x+ 23 = 0
Leibniz used double subscripts as ﬁctitious numbers: The ﬁrst ﬁgure denotes
the equation, the second the power the coeﬃcient belongs to. In order to
reduce these two cubic equations to two quadratic equations he needed two
steps:
1. The ﬁrst equation is multiplied by 20, the second by 10, the multiplied ﬁrst
equation is subtracted from the multiplied second equation.
2. The ﬁrst equation is multiplied by 23, the second by 13, the multiplied
second equation is subtracted from the multiplied ﬁrst equation.
Thus we get:
10.21 x2 +10.22 x +10.23 or (20)x2 + (21)x+ (22) = 0
−11.20 −12.20 −13.20 = 0
10.23 x2 +11.23 x +12.23 or (10)x2 + (11)x+ (12) = 0
−13.20 −13.21 −13.20 = 0
The original coeﬃcients – now put between parentheses – are ‘explicated’ as
Leibniz called this procedure: (20) = 10.21−11.20, (21) = 10.22−12.20, (22) =
10.23 − 13.20, (10) = 10.23 − 13.20 etc. It has to be repeated until one gets
the resultant sought.
Leibniz elaborated a ‘tabula dichotomica’, a dichotomic table for these re-
peated explications of the double subscripts with 2 as ﬁrst ﬁgure:
20︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.21︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.22︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.23− 13.20
-12.20︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.21− 11.20
-11.20︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.21︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.22− 12.20
-11.20︷ ︸︸ ︷
10.21− 11.20
etc.
If one continuously substitutes the explications for the foregoing double sub-
scripts 22, 21, 20, one gets Leibniz’s dichotomic table (Knobloch, 1974, pp.
162f.):
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Fig. 9.2: Leibniz’s dichotomic table regarding elimination theory (Knobloch,
1974, 162f.)
Eventually the series of terms of a certain line of this table directly provides
the resultant looked for. It might be instructive to compare Euler’s calculation
and Leibniz’s notation in this respect. To that end let us take a linear equation
and an equation of fourth degree. Euler wrote (Euler, 1748 vol. II, p. 261):
P +Qy = 0
P + qy + ryy + sy3 + ty4 = 0
Q4p− PQ3q + PPQQr − P 3Qs+ P 4t = 0
Leibniz wrote:
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10x+ 11 = 0
20x4 + 21x3 + 22x2 + 23x+ 24 = 0
The fourth line of explication provides the resultant (12 = 13 = 14 = 0):
104.24− 103.11.23 + 102.112.22− 10.113.21 + 114.20 = 0
What is the hidden structure of this table? Leibniz described it by means of
a special notation:
• In every line the capitals A, B, C, D, etc. denote domains that are the
second half, the second fourth, the second eighth, the second sixteenth of
the whole set of terms. The capitals within parentheses (A), (B), (C), (D),
etc. denote series based on a further bisection (‘subbisectio’) of the domains
A, B, C, D, etc.:
• The series (A) is contained in the second half of a line. There we take the
ﬁrst term of the second half, of the second fourth, of the second eighth, etc.
The series (B) is contained in the second fourth. There we take the ﬁrst
term of the second half, of the second fourth, of the second eighth, etc.
• Combinations of capitals have to be interpreted from the right to the left.
The series (A)A is contained in the second half of the second half of a line.
There we take the ﬁrst term of the second half, of the second fourth, of
the second eighth, etc. The series (B)AB is contained in the second fourth
of the second half of the second fourth of a line. There we take the ﬁrst
term of the second half, of the second fourth, of the second eighth, etc.
Let us take examples from the seventh line that begins with +106.26. The
following ‘series’ consist of only one term:
(D)A = −103.11.11.14.20
(C)AA = +102.11.11.11.13.20
(B)AAA = −10.11.11.11.11.12.20
34 corollaries describe peculiarities of this table. Yet, Leibniz neither men-
tioned nor proved the following most interesting theorem:
Any permutation of the capitals (with or without parentheses) of such a com-
bination of capitals represents the same series.
Without Leibniz’s notation this theorem cannot be even formulated.
9.6 Epilogue
In October 1674 Leibniz wrote his life maxim:
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Malo enim bis idem facere, quam semel nihil (LSB VII, 3, p. 539)
For I prefer to do the same twice instead of doing nothing once.
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